Томас Джефферсон
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 1 (of 9)
TO COLONEL MONROE
Paris, July 9, 1786.
Dear Sir,—I wrote you last on the 10th of May; since which your favor of May the 11th has come to hand. The political world enjoys great quiet here. The King of Prussia is still living, but like the snuff of a candle, which sometimes seems out, and then blazes up again. Some think that his death will not produce any immediate effect in Europe. His kingdom, like a machine, will go on for some time with the winding up he has given it. The King's visit to Cherbourg has made a great sensation in England and here. It proves to the world, that it is a serious object to this country, and that the King commits himself for the accomplishment of it. Indeed, so many cones have been sunk, that no doubt remains of the practicability of it. It will contain, as is said, eighty ships of the line, be one of the best harbors in the world, and by means of two entrances, on different sides, will admit vessels to come in and go out with every wind. The effect of this, in another war with England, defies calculation. Having no news to communicate, I will recur to the subjects of your letter of May the 11th.
With respect to the new States, were the question to stand simply in this form, How may the ultramontane territory be disposed of, so as to produce the greatest and most immediate benefit to the inhabitants of the maritime States of the Union? the plan would be more plausible, of laying it off into two or three States only. Even on this view, however, there would still be something to be said against it, which might render it at least doubtful. But that is a question which good faith forbids us to receive into discussion. This requires us to state the question in its just form, How may the territories of the Union be disposed of, so as to produce the greatest degree of happiness to their inhabitants? With respect to the maritime States, little or nothing remains to be done. With respect, then, to the ultramontane States, will their inhabitants be happiest, divided into States of thirty-thousand square miles, not quite as large as Pennsylvania, or into States of one hundred and sixty thousand square miles, each, that is to say, three times as large as Virginia within the Alleghany? They will not only be happier in States of moderate size, but it is the only way in which they can exist as a regular society. Considering the American character in general, that of those people particularly, and the energetic nature of our governments, a State of such extent as one hundred and sixty thousand square miles, would soon crumble into little ones. These are the circumstances which reduce the Indians to such small societies. They would produce an effect on our people, similar to this. They would not be broken into such small pieces, because they are more habituated to subordination, and value more a government of regular law. But you would surely reverse the nature of things, in making small States on the ocean, and large ones beyond the mountains. If we could, in our consciences, say, that great States beyond the mountains will make the people happiest, we must still ask, whether they will be contented to be laid off into large States? They certainly will not; and, if they decide to divide themselves, we are not able to restrain them. They will end by separating from our confederacy, and becoming its enemies. We had better, then, look forward, and see what will be the probable course of things. This will surely be a division of that country into States of a small, or, at most, of a moderate size. If we lay them off into such, they will acquiesce; and we shall have the advantage of arranging them, so as to produce the best combinations of interest. What Congress have already done in this matter is an argument the more in favor of the revolt of those States against a different arrangement, and of their acquiescence under a continuance of that. Upon this plan, we treat them as fellow citizens; they will have a just share in their own government; they will love us, and pride themselves in an union with us. Upon the other, we treat them as subjects; we govern them, and not they themselves; they will abhor us as masters, and break off from us in defiance. I confess to you, that I can see no other turn that these two plans would take. But I respect your opinion, and your knowledge of the country too much, to be ever confident in my own.
I thank you sincerely for your communication, that my not having sooner given notice of the Arrets relative to fish gave discontent to some persons. These are the most friendly offices you can do me, because they enable me to justify myself, if I am right, or correct myself, if wrong. If those, who thought I might have been remiss, would have written to me on the subject, I should have admired them for their candor, and thanked them for it: for I have no jealousies nor resentments at things of this kind, where I have no reason to believe they have been excited by a hostile spirit; and I suspect no such spirit in a single member of Congress. You know there were two Arrets; the first of August the 30th, 1784, the second of the 18th and 25th of September, 1785. As to the first, it would be a sufficient justification of myself to say, that it was in the time of my predecessor, nine months before I came into office, and that there was no more reason for my giving information of it, when I did come into office, than of all the other transactions which preceded that period. But this would seem to lay a blame on Dr. Franklin, for not communicating it, which I am confident he did not deserve. This government affects a secrecy in all its transactions whatsoever, though they be of a nature not to admit a perfect secrecy. Their Arrets, respecting the islands, go to those islands, and are unpublished and unknown in France, except in the bureau where they are formed. That of August, 1784, would probably be communicated to the merchants of the seaport towns also. But Paris having no commercial connections with them, if anything makes its way from a seaport town to Paris, it must be by accident. We have, indeed, agents in these seaports; but they value their offices so little, that they do not trouble themselves to inform us of what is passing there. As a proof that these things do not transpire here, nor are easily got at, recollect that Mr. Adams, Dr. Franklin, and myself were all here, on the spot together, from August, 1784, to June, 1785, that is to say, ten months, and yet not one of us knew of the Arret of August, 1784. September the 18th and 25th, 1785, the second was passed. And here alone I became responsible. I think it was about six weeks before I got notice of it, that is, in November. On the 20th of that month, writing to Count de Vergennes on another subject, I took occasion to remonstrate to him on that. But from early in November, when the Fitzhughs went to America, I had never a confidential opportunity of writing to Mr. Jay from hence, directly, for several months. In a letter of December the 14th to Mr. Jay, I mentioned to him the want of an opportunity to write to him confidentially, which obliged me, at that moment, to write by post, via London, and on such things only as both post offices were welcome to see. On the 2d of January, Mr. Bingham setting out for London, I wrote to Mr. Jay, sending him a copy of my letter to Count de Vergennes, and stating something which had passed in conversation on the same subject. I prayed Mr. Bingham to take charge of the letter, and either to send it by a safe hand, or carry it himself, as circumstances should render most advisable. I believe he kept it, to carry himself. He did not sail from London till about the 12th of March, nor arrived in America till about the middle of May. Thus you see, that causes had prevented a letter which I had written on the 20th of November from getting to America till the month of May. No wonder, then, if notice of this Arret came first to you by way of the West Indies; and, in general, I am confident that you will receive notice of the regulations of this country, respecting their islands, by the way of those islands before you will from hence. Nor can this be remedied, but by a system of bribery which would end in the corruption of your own ministers, and produce no good adequate to the expense. Be so good as to communicate these circumstances to the persons who you think may have supposed me guilty of remissness on this occasion.
I will turn to a subject more pleasing to both, and give you my sincere congratulations on your marriage. Your own dispositions and the inherent comforts of that state, will insure you a great addition of happiness. Long may you live to enjoy it, and enjoy it in full measure. The interest I feel in every one connected with you, will justify my presenting my earliest respects to the lady, and of tendering her the homage of my friendship. I shall be happy, at all times, to be useful to either of you, and to receive your commands. I enclose you the bill of lading of your Encyclopedie. With respect to the remittance of it, of which you make mention, I beg you not to think of it. I know, by experience, that on proceeding to make a settlement in life, a man has need of all his resources; and I should be unhappy were you to lessen them, by an attention to this trifle. Let it be till you have nothing else to do with your money. Adieu, my dear Sir, and be assured of the esteem with which I am, your friend and servant.
TO JOHN ADAMS
Paris, July 11, 1786.
Dear Sir,—Our instructions relative to the Barbary States having required us to proceed by way of negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our duty to do this to the best of our power. Whatever might be our private opinions, they were to be suppressed, and the line, marked out to us, was to be followed. It has been so, honestly and zealously. It was, therefore, never material for us to consult together, on the best plan of conduct towards these States. I acknowledge, I very early thought it would be best to effect a peace through the medium of war. Though it is a question with which we have nothing to do, yet as you propose some discussion of it, I shall trouble you with my reasons. Of the four positions laid down in your letter of the 3d instant, I agree to the three first, which are, in substance, that the good offices of our friends cannot procure us a peace, without paying its price; that they cannot materially lessen that price; and that paying it, we can have the peace in spite of the intrigues of our enemies. As to the fourth, that the longer the negotiation is delayed, the larger will be the demand; this will depend on the intermediate captures: if they are many and rich, the price may be raised; if few and poor, it will be lessened. However, if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be hastened; but I should prefer the obtaining it by war.
1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe; and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over its delinquent members, and prevent it from using what would be less safe. I think that so far, you go with me. But in the next steps, we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. Equally effectual. I ask a fleet of one hundred and fifty guns, the one-half of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet, built, manned and victualled for six months will cost four hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. Its annual expense will be three hundred pounds sterling a gun, including everything; this will be forty-five thousand pounds sterling a year. I take British experience for the basis of my calculation: though we know, from our own experience, that we can do in this way, for pounds lawful, what costs them pounds sterling. Were we to charge all this to the Algerine war, it would amount to little more than we must pay, if we buy peace. But as is it proper and necessary that we should establish a small marine force, (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines,) and as that force, laid up in our dock-yards, would cost us half as much annually, as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say that only twenty-two thousand and five hundred pounds sterling, per annum, should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. It will be as effectual. To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal, urged to show that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary, where there is any management. About forty years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent Monsieur de Massiac, with one large, and two small frigates; he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed to the terms he proposed. If it be admitted, however, that war, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against this, the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea, to enforce an observance of it.
So far, I have gone on the supposition that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. But, 1. Naples will join us. The character of their naval minister (Acton), his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officiously trying to make for them, and his dispositions against the Algerines, give the best grounds to believe it. 2. Every principle of reason assures us that Portugal will join us. I state this as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not be at peace with Algiers. I suppose, then, that a convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples and the United States, by which the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them, according to their respective wealth; and the term of it should be, when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three, on equal terms. This might be left open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers of Europe, (except France, England, Holland, and Spain, if her peace be made) would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of having their peace with the piratical States guaranteed by the whole. I suppose, that, in this case, our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on.
These are the reasons which have influenced my judgment on this question. I give them to you, to show you that I am imposed on by a semblance of reason, at least; and not with an expectation of their changing your opinion. You have viewed the subject, I am sure, in all its bearings. You have weighed both questions, with all their circumstances. You make the result different from what I do. The same facts impress us differently. This is enough to make me suspect an error in my process of reasoning, though I am not able to detect it. It is of no consequence; as I have nothing to say in the decision, and am ready to proceed heartily on any other plan which may be adopted, if my agency should be thought useful. With respect to the dispositions of the State, I am utterly uninformed. I cannot help thinking, however, that on a view of all the circumstances, they might be united in either of the plans.
Having written this on the receipt of your letter, without knowing of any opportunity of sending it, I know not when it will go; I add nothing, therefore, on any other subject, but assurances of the sincere esteem and respect with which I am, dear Sir, your friend and servant.
TO COMMODORE JONES
Paris, July 11, 1786.
Dear Sir,—I am perfectly ready to transmit to America any accounts or proofs you may think proper. Nobody can wish more that justice be done you, nor is more ready to be instrumental in doing whatever may insure it. It is only necessary for me to avoid the presumption of appearing to decide where I have no authority to do it. I will this evening lodge in the hands of Mr. Grand the original order of the board of treasury, with instructions to receive from you the balance you propose to pay, for which he will give you a receipt on the back of the order. I will confer with you when you please on the affair of Denmark, and am, with very great esteem, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.
TO M. DE CREVECOEUR
Paris, July 11, 1786.
Sir,—I have been honored with a letter from M. Delisle, Lieutenant General au bailleage de lain, to which is annexed a postscript from yourself. Being unable to write in French so as to be sure of conveying my true meaning, or perhaps any meaning at all, I will beg of you to interpret what I have now the honor to write.
It is time that the United States, generally, and most of the separate States in particular, are endeavoring to establish means to pay the interest of their public debt regularly, and to sink its principal by degrees. But as yet, their efforts have been confined to that part of their debts which is evidenced by certificate. I do not think that any State has yet taken measures for paying their paper money debt. The principle on which it shall be paid I take to be settled, though not directly, yet virtually, by the resolution of Congress of June 3d, 1784; that is, that they will pay the holder, or his representative, what the money was worth at the time he received it, with an interest from that time of six per cent, per annum. It is not said in the letter whether the money received by Barboutin was Continental money; nor is it said at what time it was received. But, that M. Delisle may be enabled to judge what the five thousand three hundred and ninety-eight dollars were worth in hard money when Barboutin received them, I will state to you what was the worth of one hard dollar, both in Continental and Virginia money, through the whole of the years 1779 and 1780, within some part of which it was probably received:
Thus you see that, in January 1779, seven dollars and seventy-two hundredths of a dollar of Continental money were worth one dollar of silver, and at the same time, eight dollars of Virginia paper were worth one dollar of silver, &c. After March 18th, 1780, Continental paper, received in Virginia, will be estimated by the table of Virginia paper. I advise all the foreign holders of paper money to lodge it in the office of their consul for the State where it was received, that he may dispose of it for their benefit the first moment that payment shall be provided by the State or Continent. I had lately the pleasure of seeing the Countess d'Houditot well at Sanois, and have that now of assuring you of the perfect esteem and respect with which I have the honor to be, dear Sir, your most obedient humble servant.
TO THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE
Paris, July 17, 1786.
Dear Sir,—I have now the honor of enclosing to you an estimate of the exports and imports of the United States. Calculations of this kind cannot pretend to accuracy, where inattention and fraud combine to suppress their objects. Approximation is all they can aim at. Neither care nor candor have been wanting on my part to bring them as near the truth as my skill and materials would enable me to do. I have availed myself of the best documents from the custom-houses, which have been given to the public, and have been able to rectify these in many instances by information collected by myself on the spot in many of the States. Still remember, however, that I call them but approximations, and that they must present some errors as considerable as they were unavoidable.
Our commerce divides itself into European and West Indian. I have conformed my statement to this division.
On running over the catalogue of American imports, France will naturally mark out those articles with which she could supply us to advantage; and she may safely calculate, that, after a little time shall have enabled us to get rid of our present incumbrances, and of some remains of attachment to the particular forms of manufacture to which we have been habituated, we shall take those articles which she can furnish, on as good terms as other nations, to whatever extent she will enable us to pay for them. It is her interest, therefore, as well as ours, to multiply the means of payment. These must be found in the catalogue of our exports, and among these will be seen neither gold nor silver. We have no mines of either of these metals. Produce, therefore, is all we can offer. Some articles of our produce will be found very convenient to this country for her own consumption. Others will be convenient, as being more commerciable in her hands than those she will give in exchange for them. If there be any which she can neither consume, nor dispose of by exchange, she will not buy them of us, and of course we shall not bring them to her. If American produce can be brought into the ports of France, the articles of exchange for it will be taken in those ports; and the only means of drawing it hither, is to let the merchant see that he can dispose of it on better terms here than anywhere else. If the market price of this country does not in itself offer this superiority, it may be worthy of consideration, whether it should be obtained by such abatements of duties, and even by such other encouragements as the importance of the article may justify. Should some loss attend this in the beginning, it can be discontinued when the trade shall be well established in this channel.
With respect to the West India commerce, I must apprise you that this estimate does not present its present face. No materials have enabled us to say how it stands since the war. We can only show what it was before that period. This is most sensibly felt in the exports of fish and flour. The surplus of the former, which these regulations threw back on us, is forced to Europe, where, by increasing the quantity, it lessens the price; the surplus of the latter is sunk, and to what other objects this portion of industry is turned or turning, I am not able to discover. The imports, too, of sugar and coffee are thrown under great difficulties. These increase the price; and being articles of food for the poorer class (as you may be sensible in observing the quantities consumed), a small increase of price places them above the reach of this class, which being very numerous, must occasion a great diminution of consumption. It remains to see whether the American will endeavor to baffle these new restrictions in order to indulge his habits, or will adopt his habits to other objects which may furnish employment to the surplus of industry formerly occupied in raising that bread which no longer finds a vent in the West Indian market. If, instead of either of these measures, he should resolve to come to Europe for coffee and sugar, he must lessen equivalently his consumption of some other European articles in order to pay for his coffee and sugar, the bread with which he formerly paid for them in the West Indies not being demanded in the European market. In fact, the catalogue of imports offer several articles more dispensable than coffee and sugar. Of all these subjects, the committee and yourself are the more competent judges. To you, therefore, I trust them, with every wish for their improvement; and, with sentiments of that perfect esteem and respect with which I have the honor to be, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.
