Томас Джефферсон
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 5 (of 9)
TO J. B. COLVIN
Monticello, September 20, 1810.
Sir,—Your favor of the 14th has been duly received, and I have to thank you for the many obliging things respecting myself which are said in it. If I have left in the breasts of my fellow citizens a sentiment of satisfaction with my conduct in the transaction of their business, it will soften the pillow of my repose through the residue of life.
The question you propose, whether circumstances do not sometimes occur, which make it a duty in officers of high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of solution in principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. When, in the battle of Germantown, General Washington's army was annoyed from Chew's house, he did not hesitate to plant his cannon against it, although the property of a citizen. When he besieged Yorktown, he leveled the suburbs, feeling that the laws of property must be postponed to the safety of the nation. While the army was before York, the Governor of Virginia took horses, carriages, provisions and even men by force, to enable that army to stay together till it could master the public enemy; and he was justified. A ship at sea in distress for provisions, meets another having abundance, yet refusing a supply; the law of self-preservation authorizes the distressed to take a supply by force. In all these cases, the unwritten laws of necessity, of self-preservation, and of the public safety, control the written laws of meum and tuum. Further to exemplify the principle, I will state an hypothetical case. Suppose it had been made known to the Executive of the Union in the autumn of 1805, that we might have the Floridas for a reasonable sum, that that sum had not indeed been so appropriated by law, but that Congress were to meet within three weeks, and might appropriate it on the first or second day of their session. Ought he, for so great an advantage to his country, to have risked himself by transcending the law and making the purchase? The public advantage offered, in this supposed case, was indeed immense; but a reverence for law, and the probability that the advantage might still be legally accomplished by a delay of only three weeks, were powerful reasons against hazarding the act. But suppose it foreseen that a John Randolph would find means to protract the proceeding on it by Congress, until the ensuing spring, by which time new circumstances would change the mind of the other party. Ought the Executive, in that case, and with that foreknowledge, to have secured the good to his country, and to have trusted to their justice for the transgression of the law? I think he ought, and that the act would have been approved. After the affair of the Chesapeake, we thought war a very possible result. Our magazines were illy provided with some necessary articles, nor had any appropriations been made for their purchase. We ventured, however, to provide them, and to place our country in safety; and stating the case to Congress, they sanctioned the act.
To proceed to the conspiracy of Burr, and particularly to General Wilkinson's situation in New Orleans. In judging this case, we are bound to consider the state of the information, correct and incorrect, which he then possessed. He expected Burr and his band from above, a British fleet from below, and he knew there was a formidable conspiracy within the city. Under these circumstances, was he justifiable, 1st, in seizing notorious conspirators? On this there can be but two opinions; one, of the guilty and their accomplices; the other, that of all honest men. 2d. In sending them to the seat of government, when the written law gave them a right to trial in the territory? The danger of their rescue, of their continuing their machinations, the tardiness and weakness of the law, apathy of the judges, active patronage of the whole tribe of lawyers, unknown disposition of the juries, an hourly expectation of the enemy, salvation of the city, and of the Union itself, which would have been convulsed to its centre, had that conspiracy succeeded; all these constituted a law of necessity and self-preservation, and rendered the salus populi supreme over the written law. The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. But those controlling powers, and his fellow citizens generally, are bound to judge according to the circumstances under which he acted. They are not to transfer the information of this place or moment to the time and place of his action; but to put themselves into his situation. We knew here that there never was danger of a British fleet from below, and that Burr's band was crushed before it reached the Mississippi. But General Wilkinson's information was very different, and he could act on no other.
From these examples and principles you may see what I think on the question proposed. They do not go to the case of persons charged with petty duties, where consequences are trifling, and time allowed for a legal course, nor to authorize them to take such cases out of the written law. In these, the example of overleaping the law is of greater evil than a strict adherence to its imperfect provisions. It is incumbent on those only who accept of great charges, to risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety of the nation, or some of its very high interests are at stake. An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which they were not intended, and which involved the most important consequences. The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.
I have indulged freer views on this question, on your assurances that they are for your own eye only, and that they will not get into the hands of newswriters. I met their scurrilities without concern, while in pursuit of the great interests with which I was charged. But in my present retirement, no duty forbids my wish for quiet.
Accept the assurances of my esteem and respect.
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Monticello, September 22, 1810.
Dear Sir,—I have wanted the occasion of the present enclosure to perform the duty of my thanks for the kind communication of papers from your office in the question between Livingston and myself. These have mainly enabled me to give a correct statement of facts. I deferred proceeding to a particular consideration of the case in hopes of the aid of Moreau's Memoire, which I have understood to be the ablest which has been written. But I was at length forced to proceed without it, my counsel informing me they were ruled to plead, and must therefore know the grounds of defence. You will see what I have made of it by the enclosed, which I forward in the hope you will consider and correct it. I have done this the rather because I presume all my fellow laborers feel an interest in what all approved, and because I think I should urge nothing which they disapprove. Will you then do me the favor to put on paper such corrections as you would advise, and forward them to me, handing on the enclosed paper at the same time to Mr. Rodney? I wrote him by this post that he may expect it from you, and I ask the same favor of correction from him, and above all to delay as little as possible, because time presses to give to this paper its ultimate form. My counsel press me earnestly not to let the topics of defence get out, so as to be known to the adversary. Although I know Congress will be strongly urged, yet I hope they will take no measure which may impress a jury unfavorably, by inferences not intended. And were the case to be thought to belong to the public, still I believe it better they should let it come on, on the footing of a private action. I pray you to be assured of my constant affection and respect.
September 26th. Sent a P. S. verbatim, the same as that to Mr. Rodney.
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Monticello, September 25, 1810.
Dear Sir,—I have to thank you for your kind letter of June 8th, and the suggestions it furnished on the question whether Livingston could maintain an action in Richmond for a trespass committed in Orleans. This being a question of common law, I leave it to my counsel so much more recent than I am in that branch of law. I have undertaken to furnish them with the grounds of my defence under the lex loci. I wished for the aid of Moreau's Memoire because it is understood to be the ablest of any. However, my counsel being ruled to plead, and pressing me for the grounds of defence, I proceeded to consider the case, meaning at first only an outline, but I got insensibly into the full discussion, which became very voluminous, and the more so as it was necessary not only to enter all the authorities at large in the text, because few possess them, but also translations of them, because all do not understand all the languages in which they are. Believing my late associates in the executive would feel an interest in the justification of a conduct in which all concurred, and also in the issue of it, I have thought it a duty to consult them as to the grounds to be taken, and to take none against their advice. My statement has therefore been submitted to the President, Mr. Smith and Mr. Gallatin, and will be forwarded to you by Mr. Smith as soon as he shall have read it. I have to request your consideration and corrections of it, and that you will be so good as to furnish them on a separate paper. I am obliged also to ask an immediate attention to them, because time presses to give to this paper its ultimate shape, to plead, and collect the evidence. Its early return to me therefore is urging. I do not know whether my counsel (Hay, Wist and Tazewell) have pleaded to the jurisdiction. * * * * * The death of Cushing is opportune, as it gives an opening for at length getting a republican majority on the supreme bench. Ten years has the anti-civism of that body been bidding defiance to the spirit of the whole nation, after they had manifested their will by reforming every other branch of the government. I trust the occasion will not be lost; Bidwell's disgrace withdraws the ablest man of the section in which Cushing's successor must be named. The pure integrity, unimpeachable conduct, talents and republican firmness of Lincoln, leave him now, I think, without a rival. He is thought not an able common lawyer. But there is not and never was an able one in the New England States. Their system is sui generis, in which the common law is little attended to. Lincoln is one of the ablest in their system, and it is among them he is to execute the great portion of his duties. Nothing is more material than to complete the reformation of the government by this appointment, which may truly be said to be putting the keystone into the arch. In my statement of the law of Livingston's case, I do not pretend to consider every argument as perfectly sound. I have, as is usual, availed myself of some views, which may have a weight with others which they have not with me. I have no right to assume infallibility, and I present them, therefore, ut valcant ubi possint. Accept the assurances of my constant and affectionate esteem.
P. S., September 26. In my letter of yesterday, I have omitted to observe, with respect to the arrangement of materials in the paper it speaks of, that it is not such as counsel would employ in pleading a cause. It was determined by other considerations. I thought it very possible the case might be dismissed out of court by a plea to the jurisdiction. I determined, on this event, to lay it before the public, either directly or through Congress. Respect for my associates, for myself, for our nation, would not permit me to come forward, as a criminal under accusation, to plead and argue a cause. This was not my situation. This would naturally be by way of narrative or statement of the facts in their order of time, establishing these facts as they occur, and bringing forward the law arising on them, and pointing to the Executive the course he was to pursue. I supposed it more dignified to present it as a history and explanation of what had taken place. It does not, indeed, in that form, display the subject in one great whole, but it brings forward successively a number of questions, solving themselves as they arise, and leaving no one unexamined. And the mind, after travelling over the whole case, and finding as it goes along that all has been considered and all is right, rests in that state of satisfaction which it is our object to produce. In truth, I have never known a case which presented so many distinct questions, having no dependence on one another, nor belonging even to the same branches of jurisprudence.
TO MR. GALLATIN
Monticello, September 27, 1810.
Dear Sir,—Yours of the 10th came safely to hand, and laid me under new obligations for the valuable observations it contained. The error of twelve feet instead of seven, for the rise of the batture, really sautoit aux yeux, and how I could have committed it at first, or passed it over afterwards without discovery, and having copied Pelletier's plan myself, is unaccountable. I have adopted also most of your other corrections. You observe that the arguments proving the batture public, yet prove it of such a character that it could not be within the scope of the law of March 4th, against squatters. I should so adjudge myself; yet I observe many opinions otherwise, and in defence against a spadassin, it is lawful to use all weapons. Besides, I have no pretensions to be exclusively the judge of what arguments are sound and what not. I give them, therefore, that they may weigh with those who think they have weight and have a right to decide for themselves. That act of Congress, moreover, was evidently respected, particularly in the order under which the removal was made.
With respect to the arrangement of materials in my statement, I know it is not such as counsel would employ in pleading such a cause; it is not such as I would have made myself in that character; it was determined by other considerations. I thought it possible the case might be dismissed out of court by a plea to the jurisdiction. I determined, on this event, to lay it before the public, either directly or through Congress. Respect for my associates, for myself, for our nation, would not permit me to come forward, as a criminal under accusation, to plead and argue a cause. This was not my situation. I had only to state to my constituents a common transaction. This would naturally be by way of narrative or statement of the facts, in their order of time, establishing these facts as they occur, and bringing forward the law arising on them and pointing to the Executive the course he was to pursue. I suppose it more self-respectful to present it as a history and explanation of what had taken place. It does not, indeed, in that form, display the subject in one great whole, but it brings forward successively a number of questions, solving themselves as they arise, and leaving no one unexamined. And the mind, after travelling over the whole case, and finding as it goes along that all has been considered, and all is right, rests in that state of satisfaction which it is our object to produce. In truth, I have never known a case which presented so many distinct questions, having no dependence on one another, nor belonging even to the same branches of jurisprudence. After all, I offer this as explanation, not justification of the order adopted.
* * * * * * * *
At length, then, we have a chance of getting a republican majority in the Supreme Judiciary. For ten years has that branch braved the spirit and will of the nation, after the nation had manifested its will by a complete reform in every branch depending on them. The event is a fortunate one, and so timed as to be a God-send to me. I am sure its importance to the nation will be felt, and the occasion employed to complete the great operation they have so long been executing, by the appointment of a decided republican, with nothing equivocal about him. But who will it be? The misfortune of Bidwell removes an able man from the competition. Can any other bring equal qualifications to those of Lincoln? I know he was not deemed a profound common lawyer; but was there ever a profound common lawyer known in any of the Eastern States? There never was, nor never can be one from those States. The basis of their law is neither common nor civil; it is an original, if any compound can so be called. Its foundation seems to have been laid in the spirit and principles of Jewish law, incorporated with some words and phrases of common law, and an abundance of notions of their own. This makes an amalgam sui generis, and it is well known that a man, first and thoroughly initiated into the principles of one system of law, can never become pure and sound in any other. Lord Mansfield was a splendid proof of this. Therefore, I say, there never was, nor can be a profound common lawyer from those States. Sullivan had the reputation of preëminence there as a common lawyer. But we have his history of land titles, which gives us his measure. Mr. Lincoln is, I believe, considered as learned in their laws as any one they have. Federalists say that Parsons is better. But the criticalness of the present nomination puts him out of question. As the great mass of the functions of the new judge are to be performed in his own district, Lincoln will be most unexceptionable and acceptable there; and on the supreme bench equal to any one who can be brought from thence; add to this his integrity, political firmness and unimpeachable character, and I believe no one can be found to whom there will not be more serious objections.
You seem to think it would be best to ascertain the probable result before making a proposition to Congress to defend Livingston's suit. On mature consideration I think it better that no such proposition should be made. The debates there would fix the case as a party one, and we are the minority in the judiciary department, and especially in the federal branch of it here. Till Congress can be thoroughly put in possession of all the points in the case, it is best they should let it lie. Livingston, by removing it into the Judiciary, has fairly relinquished all claims on their interference. I am confident that Congress will act soundly, whenever we can give them a knowledge of the whole case. But I tire you with this business, and end therefore with repeating assurances of my constant attachment and respect.
TO CAPTAIN ISAAC HILLARD
Monticello, October 9, 1810.
Sir,—I duly received your letter of September 10th, and return you thanks for that and the pamphlet you were so kind as to enclose me. The health you enjoy at so good an old age, and the strength of mind evidenced in your pamphlet, are subjects of congratulation to yourself and of thankfulness to him who gives them. I am sorry that a professor of religion should have given occasion for such a censure. It proves he has much to conquer in his own uncharitableness, and that it is not from him his flock are to learn not to bear false witness against their neighbor. But as to so much of his pulpit philippic as concerns myself I freely forgive him; for I feel no falsehood and fear no truth. That you may long continue to enjoy health, happiness and a sound mind, is my sincere prayer.
