Томас Джефферсон
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 3 (of 9)
The Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United States, by order of Congress, immediately wrote circular letters to the Governors of the several States, dated May 3, 1786, No. 31, to obtain information how far they had complied with the proclamation of January 14th, 1784, and the recommendation accompanying it; and April 13, 1787, Congress, desirous of removing every pretext which might continue to cloak the inexecution of the treaty, wrote a circular letter to the several States, in which, in order to produce more surely the effect desired, they demonstrate that Congress alone possess the right of interpreting, restraining, impeding, or counteracting the operation and execution of treaties, which, on being constitutionally made, become, by the confederation, a part of the law of the land, and, as such, independent of the will and power of the Legislatures; that, in this point of view, the State acts, establishing provisions relative to the same objects, and incompatible with it, must be improper; resolving that all such acts now existing ought to be forthwith repealed, as well to prevent their continuing to be regarded as violations of the treaty, as to avoid the disagreeable necessity of discussing their validity; recommending, in order to obviate all future disputes and questions, that every State, as well those which had passed no such acts as those which had, should pass an act, repealing, in general terms, all acts and parts of acts repugnant to the treaty; and encouraging them to do this, by informing them that they had the strongest assurances that an exact compliance with the treaty on our part, would be followed by a punctual performance of it on the part of Great Britain.
Sec. 39. In consequence of these letters, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed the acts Nos. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40. New Jersey and Pennsylvania declared that no law existed with them repugnant to the treaty—see documents Nos. 41, 42, 43. Georgia had no law existing against the treaty. South Carolina, indeed, had a law existing, which subjected all persons, foreign or native, No. 44, to certain modifications of recovery and payment. But the liberality of her conduct on the other points is a proof she would have conformed in this also, had it appeared that the fullest conformity would have moved Great Britain to compliance, and had an express repeal been really necessary.
Sec. 40. For indeed all this was supererogation. It resulted from the instrument of confederation among the States, that treaties made by Congress, according to the confederation, were superior to the laws of the States. The circular letter of Congress had declared and demonstrated it, and the several States, by their acts and explanations before mentioned, had shown it to be their own sense, as we may safely affirm it to have been the general sense of those, at least, who were of the profession of the law. Besides the proof of this, drawn from the act of confederation itself, the declaration of Congress, and the acts of the States before mentioned, the same principle will be found acknowledged in several of the documents hereto annexed for other purposes. Thus, in Rhode Island, Governor Collins, in his letter, No. 20, says, "The treaty, in all its absolute parts, has been fully complied with, and to those parts that are merely recommendatory and depend upon the legislative discretion, the most candid attention hath been paid." Plainly implying that the absolute parts did not depend upon the legislative discretion. Mr. Channing, the attorney for the United States in that State, No. 19, speaking of an act passed before the treaty, says, "This act was considered by our courts as annulled by the treaty of peace, and subsequent to the ratification thereof no proceedings have been had thereon." The Governor of Connecticut, in his letter, No 18, says, "The sixth article of the treaty was immediately observed on receiving the same with the proclamation of Congress; the courts of justice adopted it as a principle of law. No further prosecutions were instituted against any person who came within that article, and all such prosecutions as were then pending were discontinued." Thus, prosecutions going on, under the law of the State, were discontinued, by the treaty operating as a repeal of the law. In Pennsylvania, Mr. Lewis, attorney for the United States, says, in his letter, No. 60, "The judges have, uniformly and without hesitation, declared in favor of the treaty, on the ground of its being the supreme law of the land. On this ground, they have not only discharged attainted traitors from arrest, but have frequently declared that they were entitled by the treaty to protection." The case of the Commonwealth vs. Gordon, January, 1788, Dallas' Reports, 233, is a proof of this. In Maryland, in the case of Mildred vs. Dorsey, cited in your letter [E. 4.] a law of the State, made during the war, had compelled those who owed debts to British subjects to pay them into the treasury of that State. This had been done by Dorsey, before the date of the treaty; yet the judges of the State general court decided that the treaty not only repealed the law for the future, but for the past also, and decreed that the defendant should pay the money over again to the British creditor. In Virginia, Mr. Monroe, one of the Senators of that State in Congress, and a lawyer of eminence, tells us, No. 52, that both court and counsel there avowed the opinion, that the treaty would control any law of the State opposed to it. And the Legislature itself, in an act of October, 1787, c. 36, concerning moneys carried into the public loan office, in payment of British debts, use these expressions: "And whereas it belongs not to the Legislature to decide particular questions, of which the judiciary have cognizance, and it is, therefore, unfit for them to determine whether the payments so made into the loan office be good or void between the creditor and debtor." In New York, Mr. Harrison, attorney for the United States in that district, assures us, No. 45, that the act of 1782, of that State, relative to the debts due to persons within the enemy's line, was, immediately after the treaty, restrained by the superior courts of the State from operating on British creditors, and that he did not know a single instance to the contrary—a full proof that they considered the treaty as a law of the land, paramount to the law of their State.
Sec. 41. The very case of Rutgers, vs. Waddington, [E. 8.] which is a subject of complaint in your letter, is a proof that the courts consider the treaty as paramount to the laws of the States. Some parts of your information, as to that case, have been inexact. The State of New York had, during the war, passed an act [C. 16.] declaring that, in any action by the proprietor of a house or tenement against the occupant, for rent or damage, no military order should be a justification; and, May 4, 1784, after the refusal of the British to deliver up the posts in the State of New York, that Legislature revived the same act. [C. 19.] Waddington, a British subject, had occupied a brew-house in New York, belonging to Rutgers, an American, while the British were in possession of New York. During a part of the time he had only permission from the quartermaster general; for another part he had an order of the commanding officer to authorize his possession. After the evacuation of the city, Rutgers, under the authority of this law of the State, brought an action against Waddington for rent and damages, in the Mayor's court of New York. Waddington pleaded the treaty, and the court declared the treaty a justification, in opposition to the law of the State, for that portion of the time authorized by the commanding officer, his authority being competent, and gave judgment for that part in favor of the defendant; but, for the time he held the house under permission of the quartermaster general only, they gave judgment against the defendant, considering the permission of that officer incompetent, according to the regulations of the existing powers. From this part of the judgment the defendant appealed. The first part, however, was an unequivocal decision of the superior authority of the treaty over the law. The latter part could only have been founded in an opinion of the sense of the treaty in that part of the 6th article which declares, "There shall be no future prosecutions against any persons for the part he may have taken in the war, and that no person should, on that account, suffer any future loss or damage in their property," &c. They must have understood this as only protecting actions which were conformable with the laws and authority existing at the time and place. The tenure of the defendant under the quartermaster general was not so conformable. That under the commanding officer was. Some may think that murders, and other crimes and offences, characterized as such by the authority of the time and place where committed, were meant to be protected by this paragraph of the treaty; and, perhaps, for peace sake, this construction may be the most convenient. The Mayor's court, however, seems to have revolted at it. The defendant appealed, and the question would have been authoritatively decided by the superior court, had not an amicable compromise taken place between the parties. See Mr. Hamilton's statement of this case, No. 46.
Sec. 42. The same kind of doubt brought on the arrest of John Smith Hatfield in New Jersey, whose case [E. 9.] is another ground of complaint in your letter. A refugee, sent out by the British as a spy, was taken within the American lines, regularly tried by a court martial, found guilty, and executed. There was one Ball, an inhabitant of the American part of Jersey, who, contrary to the laws of his country, was in the habit of secretly supplying the British camp in Staten Island with provisions. The first time Ball went over, after the execution of the spy, of which it does not appear he had any knowledge, and certainly no agency in his prosecution, John Smith Hatfield, a refugee also from Jersey, and some others of the same description, seized him, against the express orders of the British commanding officer, brought him out of the British lines, and Hatfield hung him with his own hands. The British officer sent a message to the Americans, disavowing this act, declaring that the British had nothing to do with it, and that those who had perpetrated the crime ought alone to suffer for it. The right to punish the guilty individual seems to have been yielded by the one party, and accepted by the other, in exchange for that of retaliation on an innocent person; an exchange which humanity would wish to see habitual. The criminal came afterwards into the very neighborhood, a member of which he had murdered. Peace, indeed, had now been made; but the magistrate, thinking probably, that it was for the honest soldier and citizen only, and not for the murderer, and supposing, with the mayor's court of New York, that the paragraph of the treaty against future persecutions meant to cover authorized acts only, and not murders and other atrocities, disavowed by the existing authority, arrested Hatfield. At the court which met for his trial, the witnesses failed to attend. The court released the criminal from confinement, on his giving the security required by law for his appearance at another court. He fled; and you say that, "as his friends doubted the disposition of the court to determine according to the terms of the treaty, they thought it more prudent to suffer the forfeiture of the recognizances, than to put his life again into jeopardy." But your information in this, Sir, has not been exact. The recognizances are not forfeited. His friends, confident in the opinion of their counsel, and the integrity of the judges, have determined to plead the treaty, and not even give themselves the trouble of asking a release from the Legislature; and the case is now depending. See the letter of Mr. Boudinot, member of Congress for Jersey, No. 47.
Sec. 43. In Georgia, Judge Walton, in a charge to a grand jury, says, "The State of Rhode Island having acceded to the Federal Constitution, the Union and Government have become complete. To comprehend the extent of the General Government, and to discern the relation between that and those of the States, will be equally our interest and duty. The Constitution, laws, and treaties of the Union are paramount." And in the same State, in their last federal circuit court, we learn from the public papers, that, in a case wherein the plaintiffs were Brailsford and others, British subjects, whose debts had been sequestered (not confiscated) by an act of the State during the war, the judges declared the treaty of peace a repeal of the act of the State, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
Sec. 44. The integrity of those opinions and proceedings of the several courts should have shielded them from the insinuations hazarded against them. In pages 9 and 10, it is said, "That during the war, the Legislatures passed laws to confiscate the estates of the loyalists, to enable debtors to pay into the State treasuries paper money, then exceedingly depreciated, in discharge of their debts." And page 24, "The dispensations of law by the State courts have been as unpropitious to the subjects of the crown, as the legislative acts of the different assemblies." Let us compare, if you please, Sir, these unpropitious opinions of our State courts with those of foreign lawyers' writing on the same subject. 15"Quod dixi de actionibus recto publicandis ita demum obtinet; si quod subditi nostri hostibus nostris debent, princeps a subditis suis revera exegerit. Si exegerit, recte solutum est, si non exegerit, pace facta, reviviscit jus pristinum creditoris; secundum, hæc inter gentes fere convenit, ut nominibus bello publicatis, pace deinde factâ, exacta censeantur periisse, et maneant extincta; non autem exacta reviviscant et restiuantur veris creditoribus." Bynk. Q. J. P. l. 1, c. 7. But what said the judges of the State court of Maryland in the case of Mildred and Dorsey? That a debt forced from an American debtor into the treasury of his sovereign, is not extinct, but shall be paid over again to his British creditor. Which is most propitious, the unbiassed foreign jurist, or the American judge, charged with dispensing justice with favor and partiality? But from this, you say, there is an appeal. Is that the fault of the judge, or the fault of anybody? Is there a country on earth, or ought there to be one, allowing no appeal from the first errors of their courts? and if allowed from errors, how will those from just judgments be prevented? In England, as in other countries, an appeal is admitted to the party thinking himself injured; and here, had the judgment been against the British creditor, and an appeal denied, there would have been better cause of complaint than for not having denied it to his adversary. If an illegal judgment be ultimately rendered on the appeal, then will arise the right to question its propriety.
Sec. 45. Again it is said, page 34, "In one State the supreme federal court has thought proper to suspend for many months the final judgment on an action of debt, brought by a British creditor." If by the supreme federal court be meant the supreme court of the United States, I have had their records examined, in order to know what may be the case here alluded to; and I am authorized to say, there neither does, nor ever did exist any cause before that court, between a British subject and a citizen of the United States. See the certificate of the clerk of the court, No. 48. If by the supreme federal court be meant one of the circuit courts of the United States, then which circuit, in which State, and what case is meant? In the course of inquiries I have been obliged to make, to find whether there exists any case, in any district of any circuit court of the United States, which might have given rise to this complaint, I have learnt, that an action was brought to issue, and argued in the circuit court of the United States, in Virginia, at their last term, between Jones, a British subject, plaintiff, and Walker, an American, defendant; wherein the question was the same as in the case of Mildred and Dorsey, to wit; Whether a payment into the treasury, during the war, under a law of the State, discharged the debtor? One of the judges retiring from court, in the midst of the argument, on the accident of the death of an only son, and the case being primæ impressionis in that court, it was adjourned, for consideration, till the ensuing term. Had the two remaining judges felt no motive but of predilection to one of the parties; had they considered only to which party their wishes were propitious or unpropitious; they possibly might have decided that question on the spot. But, learned enough in their science to see difficulties which escape others, and having characters and consciences to satisfy, they followed the example so habitually and so laudably set by the courts of your country, and of every country, where law, and not favor, is the rule of decision, of taking time to consider. Time and consideration are favorable to the right cause, precipitation to the wrong one.
Sec. 46. You say again, p. 29, "The few attempts to recover British debts, in the courts of Virginia, have universally failed, and these are the courts wherein, from the smallness of the sum, a considerable number of debts can only be recovered." Again, p. 34, "In the same State, county courts (which alone can take cognizance of debts of limited amount) have uniformly rejected all suits instituted for the recovery of sums due to the subjects of the crown of Great Britain." In the first place, the county courts, till of late, have had exclusive jurisdiction only of sums below 10l., and it is known, that a very inconsiderable proportion of the British debt consists in demands below that sum. A late law, we are told, requires, that actions below 30l. shall be commenced in those courts; but allows, at the same time, an appeal to correct any errors into which they may fall. In the second place, the evidence of gentlemen who are in the way of knowing the fact, No. 52, 53, is, that though there have been accidental checks in some of the subordinate courts, arising from the chicanery of the debtors, and sometimes, perhaps, a moment of error in the court itself, yet these particular instances have been immediately rectified, either in the same or the superior court, while the great mass of suits for the recovery of sums due to the subjects of the crown of Great Britain, have been uniformly sustained to judgment and execution.
Sec. 47. A much broader assertion is hazarded, page 29. "In some of the Southern States, there does not exist a single instance of the recovery of British debt in their courts, though many years have expired since the establishment of peace between the two countries." The particular States are not specified. I have therefore thought it my duty to extend my inquiries to all the States which could be designated under the description of Southern, to wit: Maryland, and those to the south of that.
As to Maryland, the joint certificate of the senators and delegates of the State in Congress, the letter of Mr. Tilghman, a gentleman of the law in the same State, and that of Mr. Gwinn, clerk of their general court, prove that British suits have been maintained in the superior and inferior courts throughout the State without any obstruction; that British claimants have, in every instance, enjoyed every facility in the tribunals of justice equally with their own citizens; and have recovered in due course of law, and remitted large debts, as well under contracts previous, as subsequent to the war.
In Virginia, the letters of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Giles, members of Congress from that State, and lawyers of eminence in it, prove that the courts of law in that State have been open and freely resorted to by the British creditors, who have recovered and levied their moneys without obstruction; for we have no right to consider as obstructions the dilatory pleas of here and there a debtor, distressed perhaps for time, or even an accidental error of opinion in a subordinate court, when such pleas have been overruled, and such errors corrected in a due course of proceeding marked out by the laws in such cases. The general fact suffices to show that the assertion under examination cannot be applied to this State.
In North Carolina, Mr. Johnston, one of the senators of that State, tells us he has heard indeed but of few suits brought by British creditors in that State; but that he never heard that any one had failed of a recovery because he was a British subject; and he names a particular case, of Elmesly v. Lee's executors, "of the recovery of a British debt in the superior court at Edenton." See Mr. Johnston's letter, No. 54.
In South Carolina, we learn, from No. 55, of particular judgments rendered, and prosecutions carried on, without obstacle, by British creditors, and that the courts are open to them there as elsewhere. As to the modifications of the execution heretofore made by the State law having been the same for foreigner and citizen, a court would decide whether the treaty is satisfied by this equal measure; and if the British creditor is privileged by that against even the same modifications to which citizens and foreigners of all other nations were equally subjected, then the law imposing them was a mere nullity.
In Georgia, the letter of the senators and representatives in Congress, No. 56, assures us that, though they do not know of any recovery of a British debt, in their State, neither do they know of a denial to recover since the ratification of the treaty, the creditors having mostly preferred amicable settlement; and that the federal court is as open and unobstructed to British creditors there, as in any other of the United States; and this is further proved by the late recovery of Brailsford and others, before cited.
Sec. 48. You say more particularly of that State, page 25, "It is to be lamented, that, in a more distant State, (Georgia) it was a received principle, inculcated by an opinion of the highest judicial authority there, that as no Legislative act of the State ever existed, confirming the treaty of peace with Great Britain, war still continued between the two countries—a principle which may perhaps still continue in that State." No judge, no case, no time, is named. Imputations on the judiciary of a country are too serious to be neglected. I have thought it my duty, therefore, to spare no endeavors to find on what fact this censure was meant to be affixed. I have found that Judge Walton of Georgia, in the summer of 1783, the definitive treaty not yet signed in Europe, much less known and ratified here, set aside a writ in the case of Thompson, (a British subject) v. Thompson, assigning for reasons, 1st. "That there was no law authorizing a subject of England to sue a citizen of that State; 2d. That the war had not been definitively concluded; or 3d. If concluded, the treaty not known to, or ratified by, the Legislature; nor 4th. Was it in any manner ascertained how those debts were to be liquidated." With respect to the last reason, it was generally expected that some more specific arrangements, as to the manner of liquidating and times of paying British debts would have been settled in the definitive treaty. No. 58 shows, that such arrangements were under contemplation. And the judge seems to have been of opinion that it was necessary the treaty should be definitively concluded, before it could become a law of the land, so as to change the legal character of an alien enemy, who cannot maintain an action, into that of an alien friend, who may. Without entering into the question, whether, between the provisional and definitive treaties, a subject of either party could maintain an action in the courts of the other (a question of no consequence, considering how short the interval was, and this, probably the only action essayed), we must admit that, if the judge was right in his opinion, that a definitive conclusion was necessary, he was right in his consequence that it should be made known to the Legislature of the State, or, in other words, to the State; and that, till that notification, it was not a law authorizing a subject of England to sue a citizen of that State. The subsequent doctrine of the same judge, Walton, with respect to the treaties, when duly completed, that they are paramount to the laws of the several States, as has been seen in this charge to a grand jury, before spoken of, (Sec. 43,) will relieve your doubts whether the "principle still continues in that State, of the continuance of war between the two countries."
Sec. 49. The latter part of the quotation before made, merits notice also, to wit, where, after saying not a single instance exists of the recovery of a British debt, it is added, "though many years have expired since the establishment of peace between the two countries." It is evident from the preceding testimony, that many suits have been brought, and with effect; yet it has often been matter of surprise that more were not brought, and earlier, since it is most certain that the courts would have sustained their actions and given them judgments. This abstinence on the part of the creditors has excited a suspicion that they wished rather to recur to the treasury of their own country; and to have color for this, they would have it believed that there were obstructions here to bringing their suits. Their testimony is in fact the sole, to which your court till now, has given access. Had the opportunity now presented been given us sooner, they should sooner have known that the courts of the United States, whenever the creditors would choose that recourse, and would press, if necessary, to the highest tribunals, would be found as open to their suits, and as impartial to their subjects, as theirs to ours.
Sec. 50. There is an expression in your letter, page 7, that "British creditors have not been countenanced or supported, either by the respective Legislatures, or by the State courts, in their endeavors to recover the full value of debts contracted antecedently to the treaty of peace." And again, in p. 8, "In many of the States, the subjects of the crown in endeavoring to obtain the restitution of their forfeited estates and property, have been treated with indignity." From which an inference might be drawn, which I am sure you did not intend, to wit: that the creditors have been deterred from resorting to the courts by popular tumults, and not protected by the laws of the country. I recollect to have heard of one or two attempts, by popular collections, to deter the prosecution of British claims. One of these is mentioned in No. 49. But these were immediately on the close of the war, while its passions had not yet had time to subside, and while the ashes of our houses were still smoking. Since that, say for many years past, nothing like popular interposition, on this subject, has been heard of in any part of our land. There is no country, which is not sometimes subject to irregular interpositions of the People. There is no country able, at all times, to punish them. There is no country which has less of this to reproach itself with, than the United States, nor any, where the laws have more regular course, or are more habitually and cheerfully acquiesced in. Confident that your own observation and information will have satisfied you of this truth, I rely that the inference was not intended, which seems to result from these expressions.
Sec. 51. Some notice is to be taken, as to the great deficiencies in collection urged on behalf of the British merchants. The course of our commerce with Great Britain was ever for the merchant there to give his correspondent here a year's credit; so that we were regularly indebted from a year to a year and a half's amount of our exports. It is the opinion of judicious merchants, that it never exceeded the latter term, and that it did not exceed the former at the commencement of the war. Let the holders then of this debt be classed into, 1st. Those who were insolvent at that time. 2d. Those solvent then, who became insolvent during the operations of the war—a numerous class. 3d. Those solvent at the close of the war, but insolvent now. 4th. Those solvent at the close of the war, who have since paid or settled satisfactorily with their creditors—a numerous class also. 5th. Those solvent then and now, who have neither paid, nor made satisfactory arrangements with their creditors. This last class, the only one now in question, is little numerous, and the amount of their debts but a moderate proportion of the aggregate which was due at the commencement of the war; insomuch, that it is the opinion, that we do not owe to Great Britain, at this moment, of separate debts, old and new, more than a year, or a year and a quarter's exports, the ordinary amount of the debt resulting from the common course of dealings.
Sec. 52. In drawing a comparison between the proceedings of Great Britain and the United States, you say, page 35, "The conduct of Great Britain, in all these respects, has been widely different from that which has been observed by the United States. In the courts of law of the former country, the citizens of the United States have experienced, without exception, the same protection and impartial distribution of justice, as the subjects of the crown." No nation can answer for perfect exactitude of proceedings in all their inferior courts. It suffices to provide a supreme judicature, where all error and partiality will be ultimately corrected. With this qualification, we have heretofore been in the habit of considering the administration of justice in Great Britain as extremely pure. With the same qualification, we have no fear to risk everything which a nation holds dear, on the assertion, that the administration of justice here will be found equally pure. When the citizens of either party complain of the judiciary proceedings of the other, they naturally present but one side of the case to view, and are, therefore, to be listened to with caution. Numerous condemnations have taken place in your courts of vessels taken from us after the expirations of the terms of one and two months stipulated in the armistice. The State of Maryland has been making ineffectual efforts, for nine years, to recover a sum of £55,000 sterling, lodged in the bank of England previous to the war. A judge of the King's bench lately declared, in the case of Greene, an American citizen, v. Buchanan and Charnock, British subjects, that a citizen of the United States, who had delivered £43,000 sterling worth of East India goods to a British subject at Ostend, receiving only £18,000 in part payment, is not entitled to maintain an action for the balance in a court of Great Britain, though his debtor is found there, is in custody of the court, and acknowledges the fact. These cases appear strong to us. If your judges have done wrong in them, we expect redress. If right, we expect explanations. Some of them have already been laid before your court. The others will be so in due time. These, and such as these, are the smaller matters between the two nations, which, in my letter of December 15th, I had the honor to intimate, that it would be better to refer for settlement through the ordinary channel of our ministers, than embarrass the present important discussions with them. Such cases will be constantly produced by a collision of interests in the dealings of individuals, and will be easily adjusted by a readiness to do right on both sides, regardless of party.
