John Lord
Ancient States and Empires
Acquisition of Sicily.
The Romans were gainers by this war. They acquired the richest island in the world, fertile in all the fruits of the earth, with splendid harbors, cities, and a great accumulation of wealth. The long war of twenty-four years, nearly a whole generation, was not conducted on such a scale as essentially to impoverish the contending parties. There were no debts contracted for future generations to pay. It was the most absorbing object of public interest, indeed; but many other events and subjects must also have occupied the Roman mind. It was a foreign war, the first that Rome had waged. It was a war of ambition, the commencement of those unscrupulous and aggressive measures that finally resulted in the political annihilation of all the other great powers of the world.
But this war, compared with those foreign wars which Rome subsequently conducted, was carried on without science and skill. It was carried on in the transition period of Roman warfare, when tactics were more highly prized than strategy. It was by a militia, and agricultural generals, and tactics, and personal bravery, that the various Italian nations were subdued, when war had not ripened into a science, such as was conducted even by the Greeks. There was no skill or experience in the conduct of sieges. The navy was managed by Greek mercenaries.
Creation of a Roman naval power.
The great improvement in the science of war which this first contest with a foreign power led to, was the creation of a navy, and the necessity of employing veteran troops, led by experienced generals. A deliberative assembly, like the Senate, it was found could not conduct a foreign war. It was left to generals, who were to learn marches and countermarches, sieges, and a strategical system. The withdrawal of half the army of Regulus by the Senate proved nearly fatal. Carthage could not be subdued by that rustic warfare which had sufficed for the conquest of Etruria or Samnium. The new system of war demanded generals who had military training and a military eye, and not citizen admirals. The final success was owing to the errors of the Carthaginians rather than military science.
CHAPTER XXX.
THE SECOND PUNIC OR HANNIBALIC WAR
The peace between the Carthaginians and Romans was a mere truce. Though it lasted twenty-one years, new sources of quarrel were accumulating, and forces were being prepared for a more decisive encounter.
Before we trace the progress of this still more memorable war, let us glance at the events which transpired in the interval between it and the first contest.
Condition of Carthage after the war.
That interval is memorable for the military career of Hamilcar, and his great ascendency at Carthage. That city paid dearly for the peace it had secured, for the tribute of Sicily flowed into the treasury of the Romans. Its commercial policy was broken up, and the commerce of Italy flowed in new channels. This change was bitterly felt by the Phœnician city, and a party was soon organized for the further prosecution of hostilities. There was also a strong peace party, made up of the indolent and cowardly money-worshipers of that mercantile State. The war party was headed by Hamilcar, the peace party by Hanno, which at first had the ascendency. It drove the army into mutiny by haggling about pay. The Libyan mercenaries joined the revolt, and Carthage found herself alone in the midst of anarchies. In this emergency the government solicited Hamilcar to save it from the effect of its blunders and selfishness.
Hamilcar.
This government, as at Rome, was oligarchic, but the nobles were merely mercantile grandees, without ability—jealous, exclusive, and selfish. The great body of the people whom they ruled were poor and dependent. In intrusting power to Hamilcar, the government of wealthy citizens only gave him military control. The army which he commanded was not a citizen militia, it was made up of mercenaries. Hamilcar was obliged to construct a force from these, to whom the State looked for its salvation.
He was a young man, a little over thirty, and foreboding that he would not live to complete his plans, enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age, when he was about to leave Carthage, to swear at the altar of the Eternal God hatred of the Roman name.
Hasdrubal.
He left Carthage for Spain, taking with him his sons, to be reared in the camp. He marched along the coast, accompanied by the fleet, which was commanded by Hasdrubal. He crossed the sea at the Pillars of Hercules, with the view of organizing a Spanish kingdom to assist the Carthaginians in their future warfare. But he died prematurely, B.C. 229, leaving his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, to carry out his designs, and the southern and eastern provinces of Spain became Carthaginian provinces. Carthagena arose as the capital of this new Spanish kingdom, in the territory of the Contestana. Here agriculture flourished, and still more, mining, from the silver mines, which produced, a century afterward, thirty-six millions of sesterces—nearly two million dollars—yearly. Carthage thus acquired in Spain a market for its commerce and manufactures, and the New Carthage ruled as far as the Ebro. But the greatest advantage of this new acquisition to Carthage was the new class of mercenary soldiers which were incorporated with the army. At first, the Romans were not alarmed by the rise of this new Spanish power, and saw only a compensation for the tribute and traffic which Carthage had lost in Sicily. And while the Carthaginians were creating armies in Spain, the Romans were engaged in conquering Cisalpine Gaul, and consolidating the Italian conquests.
Hannibal.
Hasdrubal was assassinated after eight years of successful administration, and Hannibal was hailed as his successor by the army, and the choice was confirmed by the Carthaginians, B.C. 221. He was now twenty-nine, trained to all the fatigue and dangers of the camp, and with a native genius for war, which made him, according to the estimation of modern critics, the greatest general of antiquity. He combined courage with discretion, and prudence with energy. He had an inventive craftiness, which led him to take unexpected routes. He profoundly studied the character of antagonists, and kept himself informed of the projects of his enemies. He had his spies at Rome, and was frequently seen in disguises in order to get important information.
Fall of Saguntum.
This crafty and able general resolved, on his nomination, to make war at once upon the Romans, whom he regarded as the deadly foe of his country. His first great exploit was the reduction of Saguntum, an Iberian city on the coast, in alliance with the Romans. It defended itself with desperate energy for eight months, and its siege is memorable. The inhabitants were treated with savage cruelty, and the spoil was sent to Carthage.
Hannibal retires to Carthagena.
This act of Hannibal was the occasion, though not the cause, of the second Punic war. The Romans, indignant, demanded of Carthage the surrender of the general who had broken the peace. On the fall of Saguntum, Hannibal retired to Carthagena for winter quarters, and to make preparations for the invasion of Italy. He collected an army of one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, sixteen thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight elephants, assisted by a naval force. But the whole of this great army was not designed for the Italian expedition. A part of it was sent for the protection of Carthage, and a part was reserved for the protection of Spain, the government of which he intrusted to his brother Hasdrubal.
He prepares for vigorous war.
The nations of the earth, two thousand years ago, would scarcely appreciate the magnitude of the events which were to follow from the invasion of Italy, and the war which followed—perhaps “the most memorable of all the wars ever waged,” certainly one of the most memorable in human annals. The question at issue was, whether the world was to be governed by a commercial oligarchy, with all the superstitions of the East, or by the laws of a free and patriotic State. It was a war waged between the genius of a mighty general and the resources of the Roman people, for Hannibal did not look for aid so much to his own State, as to those hardy Spaniards who followed his standard.
Crosses the Ebro.
In the spring, B.C. 218, Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army of ninety thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. He encountered at the Ebro the first serious resistance, but this was from the natives, and not the Romans. It took four months to surmount their resistance, during which he lost one-fourth of his army. As it was his great object to gain time before the Romans could occupy the passes of the Alps, he made this sacrifice of his men. When he readied the Pyrenees, he sent home a part of his army, and crossed those mountains with only fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry; but these were veteran troops. He took the coast route by Narbonne and Nimes, through the Celtic territory, and encountered no serious resistance till he reached the Rhone, opposite to Avignon, about the end of July. The passage was disputed by Scipio, assisted by friendly Gauls, but Hannibal outflanked his enemies by sending a detachment across the river, on rafts, two days' march higher up, and thus easily forced the passage, and was three days' march beyond the river before Scipio was aware that he had crossed. Scipio then sailed back to Pisa, and aided his colleague to meet the invader in Cisalpine Gaul.
Hannibal crosses the Alps.
Hannibal, now on Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone, could not be prevented from reaching the Alps. Two passes then led from the lower Rhone across the Alps—the one by the Cottian Alps (Mount Geneva); and the other, the higher pass of the Grain Alps (Mount St. Bernard), and this was selected by Hannibal. The task of transporting a large army over even this easier pass was a work of great difficulty, with baggage, cavalry, and elephants, when the autumn snows were falling, resisted by the mountaineers, against whom they had to fight to the very summit of the pass. The descent, though free from enemies, was still more dangerous, and it required, at one place, three days' labor to make the road practicable for the elephants. The army arrived, the middle of September, in the plain of Ivrea, where his exhausted troops were quartered in friendly villages. Had the Romans met him near Turin with only thirty thousand men, and at once forced a battle, the prospects of Hannibal would have been doubtful. But no army appeared; the object was attained, but with the loss of half his troops, and the rest so demoralized by fatigue, that a long rest was required.
Scipio.
The great talents by which Scipio atoned for his previous errors now extricated his army from destruction. He retreated across the Ticinio and the Po, refusing a pitched battle on the plains, and fell back upon a strong position on the hills. The united consular armies, forty thousand men, were so posted as to compel Hannibal to attack in front with inferior force, or go into winter quarters, trusting to the doubtful fidelity of the Gauls.
Battle of the Trasimene Lake.
It has been well said, “that it was the misfortune of Rome's double magistracy when both consuls were present on the field.” Owing to a wound which Scipio had received, the command devolved upon Sempronius, who, eager for distinction, could not resist the provocations of Hannibal to bring on a battle. In one of the skirmishes the Roman cavalry and light infantry were enticed by the flying Numidians across a swollen stream, and suddenly found themselves before the entire Punic army. The whole Roman force hurried across the stream to support the vanguard. A battle took place on the Trasimene Lake, in which the Romans were sorely beaten, but ten thousand infantry cut their way through the masses of the enemy, and reached the fortress of Placentia, where they were joined by other bands. After this success, which gave Hannibal all of Northern Italy, his army, suffering from fatigue and disease, retired into winter quarters. He now had lost all his elephants but one. The remains of the Roman army passed the winter in the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona.
Hannibal in Italy.
The next spring, the Romans, under Flaminius, took the field, with four legions, to command the great northern and eastern roads, and the passes of the Appenines. But Hannibal, knowing that Rome was only vulnerable at the heart, rapidly changed his base, crossed the Appenines at an undefended pass, and advanced, by the lower Arno, into Etruria, while Flaminius was watching by the upper course of that stream. Flaminius was a mere party leader and demagogue, and was not the man for such a crisis, for Hannibal was allowed to pass by him, and reach Fæsulæ unobstructed. The Romans prepared themselves for the worst, broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator.
Hannibal marches to the Adriatic.
Pyrrhus would have marched direct upon Rome, but Hannibal was more far-sighted. His army needed a new organization, and rest, and recruits, so he marched unexpectedly through Umbria, devastated the country, and halted on the shores of the Adriatic. Here he rested, reorganized his Libyan cavalry, and resumed his communication with Carthage. He then broke up his camp, and marched into Southern Italy, hoping to break up the confederacy. But not a single Italian town entered into alliance with the Carthaginians.
Fabius. Efforts of the Romans.
Fabius, the dictator, a man of great prudence, advanced in years, and a tactitian of the old Roman school, determined to avoid a pitched battle, and starve or weary out his enemy. Hannibal adjusted his plans in accordance with the character of the man he opposed. So he passed the Roman army, crossed the Appenines, took Telesia, and turned against Capua, the most important of all the Italian dependent cities, hoping for a revolt among the Campanian towns. Here again he was disappointed. So, retracing his steps, he took the road to Apulia, the dictator following him along the heights. So the summer was consumed by marchings and counter-marchings, the lands of the Hispanians, Campamans, Samnites, Pælignians, and other provinces, being successively devastated. But no important battle was fought. He selected then the rich lands of Apulia for winter quarters, and intrenched his camp at Gerenium. The Romans formed a camp in the territory of the Larinates, and harassed the enemy's foragers. This defensive policy of Fabius wounded the Roman pride, and the dictator became unpopular. The Senate resolved to depart from a policy which was slowly but surely ruining the State, and an army was equipped larger than Rome ever before sent into the field, composed of eight legions, under the command of the two consuls, L. Æmilius Paulus, and M. Terentius Varro. The former, a patrician, had conducted successfully the Illyrian war; the latter, the popular candidate, incapable, conceited, and presumptuous.
Battle of Cannæ. Its great consequences. Varro.
As soon as the season allowed him to leave his winter-quarters, Hannibal, assuming the offensive, marched out of Gerenium, passed Luceria, crossed the Aufidus, and took the citadel of Cannæ, which commanded the plain of Canusium. The Roman consuls arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer, with eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. Hannibal's force was forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, inured to regular warfare. The Romans made up their minds to fight, and confronted the Carthaginians on the right bank of the Aufidus. According to a foolish custom, the command devolved on one of the consuls every other day, and Varro determined to avail himself of the first opportunity for a battle. The forces met on the plain west of Cannæ, more favorable to the Carthaginians than the Romans, on account of the superiority of the cavalry. It is difficult, without a long description, to give clear conceptions of this famous battle. Hannibal, it would seem, like Epaminondas and Alexander, brought to bear his heavy cavalry, under Hasdrubal, upon the weakest point of the enemy, after the conflict had continued awhile without decisive results. The weaker right of the Roman army, led by Paulus, after bravely fighting, were cut down and driven across the river. Paulus, wounded, then rode to the centre, composed of infantry in close lines, which had gained an advantage over the Spanish and Gaulish troops that encountered them. In order to follow up this advantage, the legions pressed forward in the form of a wedge. In this position the Libyan infantry, wheeling upon them right and left, warmly assailed both sides of the Roman infantry, which checked its advance. By this double flank attack the Roman infantry became crowded, and were not free. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal, after defeating the right wing, which had been led by Paulus, led his cavalry behind the Roman centre and attacked the left wing, led by Varro. The cavalry of Varro, opposed by the Numidian cavalry, was in no condition to meet this double attack, and was scattered. Hasdrubal again rallied his cavalry, and led it to the rear of the Roman centre, already in close fight with the Spanish and Gaulish infantry. This last charge decided the battle. Flight was impossible, for the river was in the rear, and in front was a victorious enemy. No quarter was given. Seventy thousand Romans were slain, including the consul Paulus and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was saved by the speed of his horse. The Carthaginians lost not quite six thousand.
Revolt of allies.
This immense disaster was the signal for the revolt of the allies, which Hannibal before in vain had sought to procure. Capua opened her gates to the conqueror. Nearly all the people of Southern Italy rose against Rome. But the Greek cities of the coast were held by Roman garrisons, as well as the fortresses in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium. The news of the battle of Cannæ, B.C. 216, induced the Macedonian king to promise aid to Hannibal. The death of Hiero at Syracuse made Sicily an enemy to Rome, while Carthage, now elated, sent considerable re-enforcements.
Wisdom of Hannibal.
Many critics have expressed surprise that Hannibal, after this great victory, did not at once march upon Rome. Had he conquered, as Alexander did, a Persian, Oriental, effeminate people, this might have been his true policy. But Rome was still capable of a strong defense, and would not have succumbed under any pressure of adverse circumstances, and she also was still strong in allies. And more, Hannibal had not perfected his political combinations. He was not ready to strike the final blow. He had to keep his eye on Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and Spain. Alexander did not march to Babylon, until he had subdued Phœnicia and Egypt. Even the capture of Rome would not prevent a long war with the States of Italy.
Fortitude of the Romans.
Nor did the Romans lose courage when they learned the greatest calamity which had ever befallen them. They made new and immense preparations. All the reserve forces were called out—all men capable of bearing arms—young or old. Even the slaves were armed, after being purchased by the State, and made soldiers. Spoils were taken down from the temples. The Latin cities sent in contingents, and the Senate refused to receive even the envoy of the conqueror.
The crisis.
Such courage and fortitude and energy were not without effect, while the enervating influence of Capua, the following winter, demoralized the Carthaginians. The turning point of the war was the winter which followed the defeat at Cannæ. The great aim of Hannibal, in his expedition to Italy, had been to break up the Italian confederacy. After three campaigns, that object was only imperfectly accomplished, in spite of his victories, and he had a great frontier to protect. With only forty thousand men, he could not leave it uncovered, and advance to Rome. The Romans, too, learning wisdom, now appointed only generals of experience, and continued them in command.
Marcellus.
The animating soul of the new warfare was Marcus Claudius Marcellus, a man fifty years of age, who had received a severe military training, and performed acts of signal heroism. He was not a general to be a mere spectator of the movements of the enemy from the hills, but to take his position in fortified camps under the walls of fortresses. With the two legions saved from Cannæ, and the troops raised from Rome and Ostia, he followed Hannibal to Campania, while other Roman armies were posted in other quarters.
Hannibal now saw that without great re-enforcements from Carthage, Spain, Macedonia, and Syracuse, he would be obliged to fight on the defensive. But the Carthaginians sent only congratulations; the king of Macedonia failed in courage; while the Romans intercepted supplies from Syracuse and Spain. Hannibal was left to his own resources.
Scipio.
Scipio, meanwhile, in Spain, attacked the real base of Hannibal, overran the country of the Ebro, secured the passes of the Pyrenees, and defeated Hasdrubal while attempting to lead succor to his brother. The capture of Saguntum gave the Romans a strong fortress between the Ebro and Carthagena. Scipio even meditated an attack on Africa, and induced Syphax, king of one of the Numidian nations, to desert Carthage, which caused the recall of Hasdrubal from Spain. His departure left Scipio master of the peninsula; but Hasdrubal, after punishing the disaffected Numidians, returned to Spain, and with overwhelming numbers regained their ascendency, and Scipio was slain, as well as his brother, and their army routed.
Revolt of Syracuse. Archimedes.
It has been mentioned that on the death of Hiero, who had been the long-tried friend of Rome, Syracuse threw her influence in favor of Carthage, being ruled by factions. Against this revolted city the consul Marcellus now advanced, and invested the city by land and sea. He was foiled by the celebrated mathematician Archimedes, who constructed engines which destroyed the Roman ships. This very great man advanced the science of geometry, and made discoveries which rank him among the lights of the ancient world. His theory of the lever was the foundation of statics till the time of Newton. His discovery of the method of determining specific gravities by immersion in a fluid was equally memorable. He was not only the greatest mathematician of the old world, but he applied science to practical affairs, and compelled Marcellus to convert the siege of Syracuse into a blockade. He is said to have launched a ship by the pressure of the screw, which, reversed in its operation, has revolutionized naval and commercial marines.
Siege of Syracuse. Death of Archimedes.
The time gained by this eminent engineer, as well as geometer, enabled the Carthaginians to send an army to relieve Syracuse. The situation of Marcellus was critical, when, by a fortunate escalade of the walls, left unguarded at a festival, the Romans were enabled to take possession of a strong position within the walls. A pestilence carried off most of the African army encamped in the valley of Anapus, with the general Himilco. Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral, retreated, rather than fight the Roman fleet. Marcellus obtained, by the treachery of a Sicilian captain, possession of the island of Ortygia, where Dionysius had once intrenched himself, the key to the port and the city, and Syracuse fell. The city was given up to plunder and massacre, and Archimedes was one of the victims. Marcellus honored the illustrious defender with a stately funeral, and he was buried outside the gate of Aeradina. One hundred and fifty years later, the Syracusans had forgotten even where he was buried, and his tomb was discovered by Cicero.
Fall of Capua.
While these events took place in Spain and Sicily, Hannibal bent his efforts to capture Tarentum, and the Romans were equally resolved to recover Capua. The fall of Tarentum enabled Hannibal to break up the siege of Capua, and foiled in his attempts to bring on a decisive battle before that city, he advanced to Rome, and encamped within five miles of the city, after having led his troops with consummate skill between the armies and fortresses of the enemy. But Rome was well defended by two legions, under Fabius, who refused to fight a pitched battle. Hannibal was, therefore, compelled to retreat in order to save Capua, which, however, in his absence, had surrendered to the Romans, after a two years' siege, and was savagely punished for its defection from the Roman cause. The fall of Capua gave a renewed confidence to the Roman government, which sent re-enforcements to Spain. But it imprudently reduced its other forces, so that Marcellus was left to face Hannibal with an inadequate army. The war was now carried on with alternate successes, in the course of which Tarentum again fell into Roman hands. Thirty thousand Tarentines were sold as slaves, B.C. 209.
Battle of Metaurus. Reverses of Hannibal.
This great war had now lasted ten years, and both parties were sinking from exhaustion. In this posture of affairs the Romans were startled with the intelligence that Hasdrubal had crossed the Pyrenees, and was advancing to join his brother in Italy. The Romans, in this exigency, made prodigious exertions. Twenty-three legions were enrolled; but before preparations were completed, Hasdrubal crossed the Alps, re-enforced by eight thousand Ligurian mercenaries. It was the aim of the two Carthaginian generals to form a juncture of their forces, and of the Romans to prevent it. Gaining intelligence of the intended movements of Hannibal and Hasdrubal by an intercepted dispatch, the Roman consul, Nero, advanced to meet Hasdrubal, and encountered him on the banks of the Metaurus. Here a battle ensued, in which the Carthaginians were defeated and Hasdrubal slain. Hannibal was waiting in suspense for the dispatch of his brother in his Apulian camp, when the victor returned from his march of five hundred miles, and threw the head of Hasdrubal within his outposts, On the sight of his brothers head, he exclaimed; “I recognize the doom of Carthage.” Abandoning Apulia and Lucania, he retired to the Bruttian peninsula, and the victor of Cannæ retained only a few posts to re-embark for Africa.
And yet this great general was able to keep the field four years longer, nor could the superiority of his opponents compel him to shut himself up in a fortress or re-embark, a proof of his strategic talents.
Scipio.
In the mean time a brilliant career was opened in Spain to the young Publius Scipio, known as the elder Africanus. He was only twenty-four when selected to lead the armies of Rome in Spain; for it was necessary to subdue that country in order to foil the Carthaginians in Italy. Publius Scipio was an enthusiast, who won the hearts of soldiers and women. He was kingly in his bearing, confident of his greatness, graceful in his manners, and eloquent in his speech—popular with all classes, and inspiring the enthusiasm which he felt.
His successes in Spain.
He landed in Spain with an army of thirty thousand, and at once marched to New Carthage, before the distant armies of the Carthaginians could come to its relief. In a single day the schemes of Hamilcar and his sons were dissolved, and this great capital fell into the hands of the youthful general, not yet eligible for a single curule magistracy. Ten thousand captives were taken and six hundred talents, with great stores of corn and munitions of war. Spain seemed to be an easy conquest; but the following year the Carthaginians made a desperate effort, and sent to Spain a new army of seventy thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and thirty-two elephants. Yet this great force, united with that which remained under Hasdrubal and Mago, was signally defeated by Scipio. This grand victory, which made Scipio master of Spain, left him free to carry the war into Africa itself, assisted by his ally Masinassa. Gades alone remained to the Carthaginians, the original colony of the Phœnicians, and even this last tie was severed when Mago was recalled to assist Hannibal.
Scipio consul. He invades Africa.
Scipio, ambitious to finish the war, and seeking to employ the whole resources of the empire, returned to Italy and offered himself for the consulship, B.C. 205, and was unanimously chosen by the centuries, though not of legal age. His colleague was the chief pontiff P. Licinius Crassus, whose office prevented him from leaving Italy, and he was thus left unobstructed in the sole conduct of the war. Sicily was assigned to him as his province, where he was to build a fleet and make preparations for passing over to Africa, although a party, headed by old Fabius Maximus, wished him to remain in Italy to drive away Hannibal. The Senate withheld the usual power of the consul to make a new levy, but permitted Scipio to enroll volunteers throughout Italy. In the state of disorganization and demoralization which ever attend a long war, this enrollment was easily effected, and money was raised by contributions on disaffected States.
Hannibal evacuates Italy.
Hannibal was still pent up among the Bruttii, unwilling to let go his last hold on Italy. Mago, in cisalpine Gaul, was too far off to render aid. The defense of Africa depended on him alone, and he was recalled. He would probably have anticipated the order. Rome breathed more freely when the “Libyan Lion” had departed. For fifteen years he had been an incubus or a terror, and the Romans, in various conflicts, had lost three hundred thousand men. Two of the Scipios, Paulus Gracchus and Marcellus, had yielded up their lives in battle. Only Fabius, among the experienced generals at the beginning of the war, was alive, and he, at the age of ninety, was now crowned with a chaplet of the grass of Italy, as the most honorable reward which could be given him.
