John Lord
Ancient States and Empires
Orchomenus revolts from Thebes. Unfortunate fate of the city.
It was while Pelopidas was engaged in his Thessalian campaign, that a conspiracy against the power of Thebes took place in the second city of Bœotia—Orchomenus, on Lake Copais. This city was always disaffected, and in the absence of Pelopidas in Thessaly, and Epaminondas with a fleet on the Hellespont, some three hundred of the richest citizens undertook to overthrow the existing government. The plot was discovered before it was ripe for execution, the conspirators were executed, the town itself was destroyed, the male adults were killed, and the women and children were sold into slavery. This barbarous act was but the result of long pent up Theban hatred, but it kindled a great excitement against Thebes throughout Greece. The city, indeed, sympathized with the Spartan cause, and would have been destroyed before but for the intercession of Epaminondas, whose policy was ever lenient and magnanimous. It was a matter of profound grief to this general, now re-elected as one of the bœotarchs, that Thebes had stained her name by this cruel vengeance, since he knew it would intensify the increasing animosity against the power which had arrived so suddenly to greatness.
Renewed hostilities. Epaminondas attempts to surprise Sparta. His great victory over the Lacedæmonians at Mantinea. His death.
Hostilities, as he feared, soon broke out with increased bitterness between Sparta and Thebes. And these were precipitated by difficulties in Arcadia, then at war with Elis, and the appropriation of the treasures of Olympia by the Arcadians. Sparta, Elis, and Achaia formed an alliance, and Arcadia invoked the aid of Thebes. The result was that Epaminondas marched with a large army into the Peloponnesus, and mustered his forces at Tegea, which was under the protection of Thebes. His army comprised, besides Thebans and Bœotians, Eubœans, Thessalians, Locrians, and other allies from Northern Greece. The Spartans, allied with Elians, Achæans, and Athenians, united at Mantinea, under the command of Agesilaus, now an old man of eighty, but still vigorous and strong. Tegea lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, and while Agesilaus was moving by a more circuitous route to the westward, Epaminondas resolved to attempt a surprise on Sparta. This movement was unexpected, and nothing saved Sparta except the accidental information which Agesilaus received of the movement from a runner, in time to turn back to Sparta and put it in a condition of defense before Epaminondas arrived, for Tegea was only about thirty miles from Sparta. The Theban general was in no condition to assault the city, and his enterprise failed, from no fault of his. Seeing that Sparta was defended, he marched back immediately to Tegea, and dispatched his cavalry to surprise Mantinea, about fifteen miles distant. The surprise was baffled by the unexpected arrival of Athenian cavalry. An encounter took place between these two bodies of cavalry, in which the Athenians gained an advantage. Epaminondas saw then no chance left for striking a blow but by a pitched battle, with all his forces. He therefore marched from Tegea toward the enemy, who did not expect to be attacked, and was unprepared. He adopted the same tactics that gave him success at Leuctra, and posted himself, with his Theban phalanx on the left, against the opposing right, and bore down with irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry, while he kept back the centre and right, composed of his trustworthy troops, until the battle should be decided. His column, not far from fifty shields in depth, pressed upon the opposing column of only eight shields in depth, like the prow of a trireme impelled against the midships of an antagonist in a sea-fight. This mode of attack was completely successful. Epaminondas broke through the Lacedæmonian line, which turned and fled, but he himself, pressing on to the attack, at the head of his column, was mortally wounded. He was pierced with a spear—the handle broke, leaving the head sticking in his breast. He at once fell, and his own troops gathered around his bleeding body, giving full expression to their grief and lamentations.
His great military genius. His character.
Thebes gained, by the battle of Mantinea, the preservation of her Arcadian allies and of her anti-Spartan frontier; while Sparta lost, beyond hope, her ancient prestige and power. But the victory was dearly purchased by the death of Epaminondas, who has received, and probably deserves, more unmingled admiration than any hero whom Greece ever produced. He was a great military genius, and introduced new tactics into the art of war. He was a true patriot, thinking more of the glory of his country than his own exaltation. He was a man of great political insight, and merits the praise of being a great statesman. He was, above all, unsullied by vices, generous, devoted, merciful in war, magnanimous in victory, and laborious in peace. He was also learned, eloquent, and wise, ruling by moral wisdom as well as by genius. His death was an irreparable loss—one of those great men whom his country could not spare, and whose services no other man could render. Of modern heroes he most resembles Gustavus Adolphus. And as the Thirty Years in Germany loses all its interest after the battle of Leutzen, when the Swedish hero laid down his life in defense of his Protestant brethren, so the Theban contest with Sparta has no great significance after the battle of Mantinea. The only great blunder which Epaminondas made was to encourage his countrymen to compete with Athens for the sovereignty of the seas. That sovereignty was the natural empire of Athens, even as the empire of the land was the glory of Sparta. If these two powers had been contented with their own peculiar sphere, and joined in a true alliance with each other, the empire of Greece might have resisted the encroachments of Philip and Alexander, and defied the growing ascendency of Rome.
Death of Agesilaus. Death of Artaxerxes.
Shortly after the death of Epaminondas, B.C. 362, the greatest man of Spartan annals disappeared from the stage of history. Agesilaus died in Egypt, having gone there to assist the king in his revolt from Persia. He also possessed all the great qualities of a prince, a soldier, a statesman and a man. He, too, was ambitious, but only to perpetuate the power of Sparta. It was his misfortune to contend with a greater man, but he did all that was in the power of a king of Sparta to retrieve her fortunes, and died deeply lamented and honored. Artaxerxes died B.C. 358, after having subdued the revolt of his satraps and of Egypt, having reigned forty-five years, and Ochus succeeded to his throne, taking his father's name.
Philip of Macedon.
Athens recovered, during the wars between Sparta and Thebes, much of her former maritime power, and succeeded in retaking the Chersonese. But another great character now arises to our view—Philip of Macedon, who succeeded in overturning the liberties of Greece. But before we present his career, that of Dionysius of Syracuse, demands a brief notice, and the great power of Sicily, as a Grecian State, during his life.
CHAPTER XXIII.
DIONYSIUS AND SICILY
We have already seen how the Athenian fleet was destroyed at the siege of Syracuse, where Nicias and Demosthenes were so lamentably defeated, which defeat resulted in the humiliation of Athens and the loss of her power as the leading State of Greece.
The destruction of this great Athenian armament in September, B.C. 413, created an intoxication of triumph in the Sicilian cities. Nearly all of them had joined Syracuse, except Naxos and Catana, which sided with Athens. Agrigentum was neutral.
Syracuse after the failure of Nicias.
The Syracusans were too much exhausted by the contest to push their victory to the loss of the independence of these cities, but they assisted their allies, the Lacedæmonians, with twenty triremes against Athens, under Hermocrates, while Rhodes furnished a still further re-enforcement, under Dorieus. But the Peloponnesian war was not finished as soon as the Syracusans anticipated. Even the combined Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained two defeats in the Hellespont. The battle of Cyxicus was even still more calamitous, since the Spartan admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet was captured and destroyed. The Syracusans suffered much by this latter defeat, and all their triremes were burned to prevent them falling into the hands of their enemies, and the seamen were left destitute on the Propontis, in the satrapy of Pharnabazus. These adverse events led to the disgrace of Hermocrates, who stimulated the movement and promised what he could not perform. But his conduct had been good, and his treatment was unjust and harsh. War recognizes only success, whatever may be the virtues and talents of the commanders; and this is one of the worst phases of war, when accident and circumstances contribute more to military rewards than genius itself.
Internal condition of the city.
The banishment of Hermocrates was followed by the triumph of the democratical party, and Diocles, an influential citizen, was named, with a commission of ten, to revise the constitution and the laws. The laws of Diocles did not remain in force long, and were exceeding severe in their penalties. But they were afterward revived, and copied by other Sicilian cities, and remained in force to the Grecian conquest of the island.
The wars of the Syracusans with Carthage.
The Syracusans then prosecuted war with vigor against Naxos, which sided with Athens, until it was brought to a sudden close by an invasion of the Carthaginians, the ancient foes of Greece. As far back as the year 480 B.C.—that year which witnessed the invasion of Greece by Xerxes—the Carthaginians had invaded Sicily, with a mercenary army under Hamilcar, for the purpose of reinstating the tyrant of Himera, expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. The Carthaginian army was routed, and Hamilcar was slain by Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse. This defeat was so signal, that it was seventy years before the Carthaginians again invaded Sicily, shortly after the destruction of Athenian power at Syracuse. No sooner was the protecting naval power of Athens withdrawn from Greece, than the Persians and the Carthaginians pressed upon the Hellenic world.
Carthage. Its maritime power.
It is singular that so little is known of the early history of Carthage, which became the great rival of Rome. It was founded by the Phœnicians, and became a considerable commercial city before Athens had reached the naval supremacy of Greece. Her possessions were extensive on the coast of Africa, both east and west, comprehending Sardinia and the Balearic isles. At the maximum of her power, before the first Punic war, the population was nearly a million of people. It was built on a fortified peninsula of about twenty miles in circumference, with the isthmus. Upon this isthmus was the citadel Byrsa, surrounded with a triple wall, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. It possessed three hundred tributary cities in Libya, which was but a small part of the great empire which belonged to it in the fourth century before Christ. All the towns on the coast, even those founded by the Phœnicians, like Hippo and Utica, were tributary, with the exception of Utica. Although the Carthaginians were averse to land service, yet no less than forty thousand hoplites, with one thousand cavalry and two thousand war chariots, marched out from the gates to resist an enemy. But the Carthaginian armies were mostly composed of mercenaries—Gauls, Iberians, and Libyans, and forming a discordant host in language and custom.
Its political constitution.
The political constitution of Carthage was oligarchal. Two kings were elected annually, and presided over the Senate, of three hundred persons, made up from the principal families. The great families divided between them, as in Rome, the offices and influence of the State, and maintained an insolent distinction from the people. It was an aristocracy, based on wealth, and created by commerce, as in Venice, in the Middle Ages. There was a demos, or people, at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions; but, whether numerous or not, they were kept in dependence to the rich families by banquets and lucrative employments. The government was stable and well conducted, both for internal tranquillity and commercial aggrandizement.
Its eminent men.
The first eminent historical personage was Mago, B.C. 500, who greatly extended the dominions of Carthage. Of his two sons, Hamilcar was defeated and slain by Gelon of Syracuse. The other son, Hasdrubal, perished in Sardinia. His sons remained the most powerful citizens of the State, carrying on war against the Moors and other African tribes. Hannibal, grandson of Hamilcar, distinguished himself in an invasion of Sicily, B.C. 410, and with a large army, of one hundred thousand men, stormed and took Selinus, and killed one hundred and sixty thousand of the inhabitants, and carried away captive five thousand more. He then laid siege to Himera, which he also took, and slaughtered three thousand of the inhabitants, in expiation of the memory of his grandfather. These were Grecian cities, and the alarm throughout Greece was profound for this new enemy. These events look place about the time that Hermocrates was banished for an unsuccessful maritime war. Hermocrates afterward attempted to enter Syracuse, but was defeated and slain.
Dionysius at Syracuse.
At this period Dionysius appears upon the stage—for the next generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world. He had none of the advantages of family or wealth—but was well educated, and espoused the cause of Hermocrates, and rose to distinction during the intestine commotions which resulted from the death of Hermocrates and the banishment of Diocles, the lawgiver.
Carthaginians invade Sicily.
In 406 B.C., Sicily was again invaded by a large force from Carthage, estimated by some writers as high as three hundred thousand men, who were chiefly mercenaries. Hannibal was the leader of these forces. All the Greek cities now prepared for vigorous war. The Syracusans sent to Sparta and the Italian Greek cities for aid. Agrigentum was most in danger, and most alarmed of the Greek Sicilian cities. It was second only to Syracuse in numbers and wealth, having a population of eight hundred thousand people, though this is probably an exaggeration. It was rich in temples and villas and palaces; its citizens were wealthy, luxurious, and hospitable.
Rise of Dionysius.
The army of Hannibal advanced against this city, which was strongly fortified, and re-enforced by a strong body of troops from Syracuse, under Daphneus. He defeated the Iberian mercenaries, but did not preserve his victory, so that the Carthaginians were enabled to take and plunder Agrigentum. There was, of course, bitter complaint against the Syracusan generals, who might have prevented this calamity. In the discontent which succeeded, Dionysius was elevated to the command. He procured a vote to restore the Hermocratean exiles, and procured, also, a body of paid guards, and established himself as despot of Syracuse; and he arrived at this power by demagogic arts, allying himself with the ultra democratic party.
Defeated by the Carthaginians.
Soon after his elevation, the Carthaginians advanced, under Imoleo, to attack Gela, which was relieved by Dionysius with a force of fifty thousand men. Intrenching himself between Gela and the sea, opposite the Carthaginians, he resolved to attack the invaders, but was defeated and obliged to retreat, so that Gela fell into the hands of the Carthaginians, who perpetrated their usual cruelties. This defeat occasioned a mutiny at Syracuse, and his house was plundered of the silver and gold and valuables which he had already collected. But he rapidly returned to Syracuse, and punished the mutineers, and became master of the city, driving away the rich citizens who had vainly obstructed his elevation. He abolished every remnant of freedom, and ruled despotically with the aid of his mercenaries, and the common people who rallied to his standard.
Carthaginians make peace.
It was fortunate for him that the Carthaginians, although victors at Gela, made proposals of peace, which were accepted. Dionysius accepted a peace, the terms of which were favorable to Carthage, in order to secure his own power. He betrayed the interests of Sicily to an enemy from selfish and unworthy motives. The whole south of Sicily was consigned to the Carthaginians, and Syracuse to Dionysius.
Dionysius centralizes his power.
Dionysius now concentrated all his efforts to centralize and maintain his power. He greatly strengthened the fortifications of Syracuse. He constructed a new wall, with lofty towers and elaborate defenses, outside the mole which connected the islet Ortygia with Sicily. He also erected a citadel. He then had an impregnable stronghold, powerful for attack and defense. The fortress he erected in the islet of Ortygia he filled with his devoted adherents, consisting mostly of foreigners, to whom he assigned a permanent support and residence. He distributed anew the Syracusan territory, reserving the best lands for his friends, who thus became citizens. By this wholesale confiscation he was enabled to support ten thousand mercenary troops, devoted to him and his tyranny. The contributions he extorted were enormous, so that in five years twenty per cent of the whole property of Syracuse was paid into his hands.
Marches against the Sikels. His critical condition. Strengthens the fortifications of Syracuse. His vast military preparations.
Having thus strengthened his power in Syracuse, he marched against the Sikels, in the interior of the island. But his absence was taken advantage of by the discontented citizens, who attempted to regain their freedom. He returned at once to Syracuse, and intrenched himself in his fortress, where he was besieged by the insurgents. The tyrant was now driven to desperation, and nothing saved him but the impregnable fortifications which he had erected. But his situation was so desperate that his adherents melted away, and he began to abandon all hope of retaining his position. As a last resource, he purchased the aid of a body of Campanian cavalry, in the Carthaginian service, which was stationed at Gela, while he amused the Syracusans, to gain time, by a pretended submission. They agreed to allow him to depart with five triremes, and relaxed the siege, supposing him already subdued. Meanwhile the Carthaginian mercenaries arrived and defeated the Syracusans, already dispersed and divided. Dionysius, finding himself rescued and re-established in his dominions, strengthened the fortifications of Ortygia, and employed his forces, now that Syracuse was subdued, in conquering the Grecian cities of Naxos, Catana, and Leontini. Strengthened at home and in the interior, Dionysius then prepared to attack the Carthaginians, but previously took measures to insure the defensibility of Syracuse. Six thousand persons were employed on a wall three and a half miles in length, from the fort of Trogilus to Euryalus, the summit of the slope of Epipolæ, a high cliff, which commanded the roads to the city. Six thousand teams of oxen were employed in drawing the stones from the quarries. This wall was not like Ortygia, a guard-house against the people of Syracuse, but a defense against external enemies. As it was a great public work of defense, the citizens worked with cheerfulness and vigor, and so enthusiastically did they labor, that the work was completed in twenty days. The city being now impregnable, he commenced preparations for offensive war, and changed his course toward the citizens, pursuing a mild, and conciliatory policy. He made peace with Messene and Rhegium, and married a lady from Locri. He collected all the best engineers, mechanics, and artisans from Sicily and Italy, constructed immense machines, provided arms from every nation around the Mediterranean, so that he collected or fabricated one hundred and forty thousand shields and fourteen thousand breastplates, destined for his body-guard and officers, together with a vast number of helmets, spears, and daggers. All these were accumulated in his impregnable fortress of Ortygia. His naval preparations were equally stupendous. The docks of Syracuse were filled with workmen, and two hundred triremes were added to the one hundred and ten which already were housed in the docks. The trireme was the largest ship of war which for three hundred years had sailed in the Grecian or Mediterranean waters. But Dionysius constructed triremes with five banks of oars, and had a navy vastly superior to what Athens ever possessed. He now hired soldiers from every quarter, enlisting Syracusans and the inhabitants of the cities depending upon her. He sent envoys to Italy and the Peloponnesus for recruits, offering the most liberal pay.
His marriage. Marches against the Carthaginians.
When all his preparations were completed, he married, on the same day, two wives—the Locrian (Doris), and the Syracusan (Aristomache), and both of these women lived with him at the same table in equal dignity. He had three children by Doris, the oldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger, and four by Aristomache. When his nuptials had been celebrated with extraordinary magnificence, and banquets, and fetes, in which the whole population shared, he convoked a public assembly, and exhorted the citizens to war against Carthage, as the common enemy of Greece, B.C. 397. He then granted permission to plunder the Carthaginian ships in the harbor, and shortly after marched out from Syracuse with an army against the Carthaginians in Sicily, consisting of eighty thousand men, while a fleet of two hundred triremes and five hundred transports accompanied his march along the coast—the largest military force hitherto assembled under Grecian command.
His success.
The first place he attacked was Motya, north of Cape Lilybæum, in the western extremity of the island, all the Grecian cities under Carthaginian leadership having revolted. This city was both populous and wealthy, built on an islet, which was separated from Sicily by a narrow strait two-thirds of a mile in width, bridged over by a narrow mole. The Motyans, seeing the approach of so formidable an army, broke up their mole, and insulated themselves from Sicily. The Carthaginians sent a large fleet to assist Motya, under Imilco, but being inferior to that of Dionysius, it could not venture on a pitched battle. Motya made a desperate defense, but a road across the strait being built by the besiegers, the new engines of war carried over it were irresistible, the town was at length carried and plundered, and the inhabitants slaughtered or sold as slaves.
He returns to Syracuse. His naval defeat at Catana.
The siege occupied the summer, and Dionysius, triumphant, returned to Syracuse. But Imilco being elevated to the chief magistracy of Carthage, brought over to Sicily an overwhelming force, collected from all Africa and Iberia, amounting to one hundred thousand men, afterward re-enforced by thirty thousand more, at the lowest estimate, with four hundred ships and six hundred transports. This army disembarked at Panormus, on the northwestern side of the island (Palermo) retook Motya, regained Eryx, then marched east and captured Messene, at the extreme eastern part of the island near Italy, which prevented Dionysius from getting aid from Italy. The Sikels also rebelled, and Dionysius, greatly disquieted by the loss of all his conquests, and by approaching dangers, strengthened the fortifications of Syracuse, to which he had retired, and made preparations to resist the enemy. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and one hundred and eighty ships of war. He sent also to Sparta for aid. He then advanced to Catana. A naval battle took place off this city, gained by the Carthaginians, from superior numbers. One hundred of the Syracusan ships were destroyed, with twenty thousand men, B.C. 395.
Imilco lays siege to Syracuse.
After this defeat, Dionysius retreated to Syracuse with his land forces, amid great discontent, and invoked the aid of Sparta and Corinth. Imilco advanced also to Syracuse, while his victorious fleet occupied the great harbor—a much more imposing armament than that the Athenians had at the close of the Persian war. The total number of vessels was two thousand. Imilco established his head-quarters at the temple of Zeus Olympius, one mile and a half from the city, and allowed his troops thirty days for plunder over the Syracusan territory; then he established fortified posts, and encircled his camp with a wall, and set down in earnest to reduce the city to famine. But as he was not master of Epipolæ, as Nicias was, Syracuse was able to communicate with the country around, both west and north, and also found means to secure supplies by sea.
Disasters of the Carthaginians. They retire from Syracuse.
Meanwhile the Syracusans defeated a portion of the Carthaginian fleet, and a terrific pestilence overtook the army before the city. The military strength of the Carthaginians was prostrated by the terrible malady, which swept away one hundred and fifty thousand persons in the camp. When thus weakened and demoralized, the Carthaginians were attacked by the Syracusans, and were completely routed. The fleet was also defeated and set on fire, and the conflagration reached the camp, which was thus attacked by pestilence, fire, and sword. The disaster was fatal to the Carthaginians, and retreat was necessary. Imilco dispatched a secret envoy to Dionysius, offering three hundred talents if the fleet was allowed to sail away unmolested to Africa. This could not be permitted, but Imilco and the native Carthaginians were allowed to retire. The remaining part of the army, deprived of their head, was destroyed, with the exception of the Sikels, who knew the roads, and made good their escape.
Death of Imilco.
This immense disaster, greater than that the Athenians had suffered under Nicias, produced universal mourning and distress at Carthage, while the miserable Imilco vainly endeavoring to disarm the wrath of his countrymen, shut himself up in his house, and starved himself to death. This misfortune led also to a revolt of the African allies, which was subdued with difficulty, while the power of Carthage in Sicily was reduced to the lowest ebb. Dionysius was now left to push his conquests in other directions, and Syracuse was rescued from impending ruin.
Financial embarrassments of Dionysius.
Dionysius had now reigned eleven years, with absolute power. The pestilence, and the treachery of Imilco, had freed him of the Carthaginians. But a difficulty arose as to the payment of his mercenaries, which he compromised by giving them the rich territory of Leontini, so that ten thousand quitted Syracuse, and took up their residence in the town. The cost of maintaining a large standing army was exceeding burdensome, and we only wonder how the tyrant found means to pay it, and prosecute at the same time such great improvements.
Makes himself master of Messene.
He now directed his attention to the Sikels, in the interior of the island, and took several of their towns, but from one of them he met with desperate resistance, find came near losing his life from a wound by a spear which penetrated his cuirass. This repulse caused the Carthaginians to rally in the west of the island, under Magon, with an army of eighty thousand. But he was repulsed by Dionysius, and concluded a truce with him, which gave the latter leisure to make himself master of Messene and Taurominium—the two most important maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, and thus prepare for the invasion of the Greek cities in the south of Italy, B.C. 391.
Invades Italy.
Dionysius departed from Syracuse, B.C. 389, with a powerful force, to subdue the Italiot Greeks, and laid siege to Caulonia. He defeated their army, and slew their general. The victor treated the defeated Greeks with lenity, and then laid siege to Rhegium, to which he granted peace on severe terms. Caulonia and Hipponeum, two cities whose territory occupied the breadth of the Calabrian peninsula, fell into his hands. Rhegium surrendered after a desperate defense, and Phyton, who commanded the town, was treated with brutal inhumanity. The town was dismantled, and all the territory of Southern Calabria was united to Locri. It was at this time that the peace of Antalcidas took place, which put an end to the Spartan wars in Asia Minor. The ascendant powers of Greece were now Sparta and Syracuse, each fortified by alliance with the other.
Conquers Croton.
Croton, the largest city in Magna Grecia, was now conquered by Dionysius, who plundered the temple of Ilere, near Cape Lacinium, and among its treasure was a splendid robe, decorated in the most costly manner, which the conqueror sold to the Carthaginians, which long remained one of the ornaments of their city. The value and beauty of the robe may be estimated at the price paid for it—one hundred and twenty talents, more than one hundred thousand dollars.
Becomes master of Southern Italy. Hissed at the Grecian games.
He now undertook a maritime expedition along the coast of Latium and Etruria, and pillaged the rich temple at Agylla, stripping it of gold and ornaments to the value of one thousand talents. So great was the celebrity he acquired, that the Gauls of Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, proffered their alliance and aid. Master of Sicily and Southern Italy, he inspired, by his unscrupulous plundering of temples, the greatest terror and dislike throughout Central Greece. He then entered as competitor at the festivals of Greece for the prize of tragic poetry. But so contemptible were his poems, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed. Especially those poems which were recited at Olympeia—where he sent legations decked in the richest garments, furnished with gold and silver, and provided with splendid tents—were received with a storm of hisses, which plunged him in an agony of shame and grief, and drove him nearly mad, and made him conscious of the deep hatred which everywhere existed toward him. All his rich displays, which surpassed every thing that had ever before been seen in that holy plain, were worse than a failure—because they came from him. Not all his grandeur in Syracuse could save him from the disgrace and insults which he had received in Olympeia.
