John Lord
Ancient States and Empires
The important results.
Thus Greece was saved by the battle of Salamis, and the distinguished services of Themistocles, which can not be too highly estimated. The terrific cloud was dispersed, the Greeks abandoned themselves to joy. Unparalleled honors were bestowed upon the victor, especially in Sparta, and his influence, like that of Alcibiades, after the battle of Marathon, was unbounded. No man ever merited greater reward.
Mardonius left in command of the Persians. He ravishes Attica and Bœotia.
Though the Persians now abandoned all hopes of any farther maritime attack, yet still great success was anticipated from the immense army which Mardonius commanded. The Greeks in the northern parts still adhered to him, and Thessaly was prostrate at his feet. He sent Alexander, of Macedon, to Athens to offer honorable terms of peace, which were nobly rejected, and he was sent back with this message: “Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path we will never contract alliance with a foe who has shown no reverence to our gods and heroes, and who has burned their statues and houses.” The league was renewed with Sparta for mutual defense and offense, in spite of seductive offers from Mardonius; but the Spartans displayed both indifference and selfishness to any interests outside the Peloponnesus. They fortified the Isthmus of Corinth, but left Attica undefended. Mardonius accordingly marched to Athens, and again the city was the spoil of the Persians. The Athenians again retreated to Salamis, with bitter feelings against Sparta for her selfishness and ingratitude. Again Mardonius sought to conciliate the Athenians, and again his overtures were rejected with wrath and defiance. The Athenians, distressed, sent envoys to Sparta to remonstrate against her slackness and selfishness, not without effect, for, at last, a large Spartan force was collected under Pausanias. Meanwhile Mardonius ravaged Attica and Bœotia, and then fortified his camp near Platæa, ten furlongs square. Platæa was a plain favorable to the action of the cavalry, not far from Thebes; but his army was discouraged after so many disasters—in modern military language, demoralized—while Artabazus, the second in command, was filled with jealousy. Nor could much be hoped from the Grecian allies, who secretly were hostile to the invaders. The Thebans and Bœotians appeared to be zealous, but were governed by fear merely of a superior power, and hence were unreliable. It can not be supposed that the Thebans, who sided with the Persians, by compulsion, preferred their cause to that of their countrymen, great as may have been national jealousy and rivalries.
The Greeks assemble against the Persians at Platæa. Preparations for battle.
The total number of Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Athenians, and other Greeks, assembled to meet the Persian army, B.C. 479, was thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men, heavily armed, and seventy-one thousand three hundred light armed, without defensive armor; but most of these were simply in attendance on the hoplites. The Persians, about three hundred thousand in number, occupied the line of the river Asopus, on a plain; the Greeks stationed themselves on the mountain declivity near Erythæ. The Persian cavalry charged, to dislodge the Greeks, unwilling to contend on the plain; but the ground was unfavorable for cavalry operations, and after a brief success, was driven back, while the general, Masistias, who commanded it, was slain. His death, and the repulse of the cavalry, so much encouraged Pausanias, the Spartan general, that he quitted his ground on the mountain declivity, and took position on the plain beneath. The Lacedæmonians composed the right wing; the Athenians, the left; and various other allies, the centre. Mardonius then slightly changed his position, crossing the Asopus, nearer his own camp, and took post on the left wing, opposite the right wing of the Greeks, commanded by Pausanias. Both armies then offered sacrifices to the gods, but Mardonius was able to give constant annoyance to the Greeks by his cavalry, and the Thebans gave great assistance. Ten days were thus spent by the two armies, without coming into general action, until Mardonius, on becoming impatient, against the advice of Artabazus, second in command, resolved to commence the attack. The Greeks were forewarned of his intention, by Alexander of Macedon, who came secretly to the Greek camp at night—a proof that he, as well as others, were impatient of the Persian yoke. The Lacedæmonians, posted in the right wing, against the Persians, changed places with the Athenians, who were more accustomed to Persian warfare; but this manœuvre being detected, Mardonius made a corresponding change in his own army—upon which Pausanias led back again his troops to the right wing, and a second movement of Mardonius placed the armies in the original position.
Battle of Platæa.
A vigorous attack of the Persian cavalry now followed, which so annoyed the Greeks, that Pausanias in the night resolved to change once again his position, and retreated to the hilly ground, north of Platæa, about twenty furlongs distant, not without confusion and mistrust on the part of the Athenians. Mardonias, astonished at this movement, pursued, and a general engagement followed. Both armies fought with desperate courage, but discipline was on the side of the Greeks, and Mardonius was slain, fighting gallantly with his guard. Artabazus, with the forty thousand Persians under his immediate command, had not taken part, and now gave orders to retreat, and retired from Greece. The main body, however, of the defeated Persians retired to their fortified camp. This was attacked by the Lacedæmonians, and carried with immense slaughter, so that only three thousand men survived out of the army of Mardonius, save the forty thousand which Artabazus—a more able captain—had led away. The defeat of the Persians was complete, and the spoils which fell to the victors was immense—gold and silver, arms, carpets, clothing, horses, camels, and even the rich tent of Xerxes himself, left with Mardonius. The booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army. The real victors were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans; the Corinthians did not reach the field till the battle was ended, and thus missed their share of the spoil.
Chastisement of Thebes.
There was one ally of the Persians which Pausanias resolved to punish—the city of Thebes when a merited chastisement was inflicted, and the customary solemnities were observed, and honors decreed for the greatest and most decisive victory which the Greeks had ever gained. A confederacy was held at Platæa, in which a permanent league was made between the leading Grecian States, not to separate until the common foe was driven back to Asia.
Battle of Mycale.
While these great events were transpiring in Bœotia, the fleet of the Greeks, after the battle of Salamis, undertook to rescue Samos from the Persians, and secure the independence of the Ionian cities in Asia. The Persian fleet, now disheartened, abandoned Samos and retired to Mycale, in Ionia. The Greek fleet followed, but the Persians abandoned or dismissed their fleet, and joined their forces with those of Tigranes, who, with an army of sixty thousand men, guarded Ionia. The Greeks disembarked, and prepared to attack the enemy just as the news reached them of the battle of Platæa. This attack was successful, partly in consequence of the revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp, although the Persians fought with great bravery. The battle of Mycale was as complete as that of Platæa and Marathon, and the remnants of the Persian army retired to Sardis. The Ionian cities were thus, for the time, delivered of the Persians, as well as Greece itself chiefly by means of the Athenians and Corinthians. The Spartans, with inconceivable narrowness, were reluctant to receive the continental Ionians as allies, and proposed to transport them across the Ægean into Western Greece, which proposal was most honorably rejected by the Athenians. In every thing, except the defense of Greece Proper, and especially the Peloponnesus, the Spartans showed themselves inferior to the Athenians in magnanimity and enlarged views. After the capture of Sestos, B.C. 478, which relieved the Thracian Chersonese from the Persians, the fleet of Athens returned home. The capture of this city concludes the narration of Herodotus, which ended virtually the Persian war, although hostilities were continued in Asia. The battle of Marathon had given the first effective resistance to Persian conquests, and created confidence among the Greeks. The battle of Salamis had destroyed the power of Persia on the sea, and prevented any co-operation of land and naval forces. The battle of Platæa freed Greece altogether of the invaders. The battle of Mycale rescued the Ionian cities.
Rivalry between Athens and Sparta.
Athens had, on the whole, most distinguished herself in this great and glorious contest, and now stood forth as the guardian of Hellenic interests on the sea and the leader of the Ionian race. Sparta continued to take the lead of the military States, to which Athens had generously submitted. But a serious rivalry now was seen between these leading States, chiefly through the jealousy of Sparta, which ultimately proved fatal to that supremacy which the Greeks might have maintained overall the powers of the world. Sparta wished that Athens might remain unfortified, in common with all the cities of Northern Greece, while the isthmus should be the centre of all the works of defense. But Athens, under the sagacious and crafty management of Themistocles, amused the Spartans by delays, while the whole population were employed upon restoring its fortifications.
Disgrace and death of Pausanias.
Although the war against the Persians was virtually concluded by the capture of Sestos, an expedition was fitted out by Sparta, under Pausanias, the hero of Platæa, to prosecute hostilities on the shores of Asia. After liberating most of the cities of Cyprus, and wresting Byzantium from the Persians, which thus left the Euxine free to Athenian ships, from which the Greeks derived their chief supplies of foreign corn, Pausanias, giddy with his victories, unaccountably began a treasonably correspondence with Xerxes, whose daughter he wished to marry, promising to bring all Greece again under his sway. He was recalled to Sparta, before this correspondence was known, having given offense by adopting the Persian dress, and surrounding himself with Persian and Median guards. When his treason was at last detected, he attempted to raise a rebellion among the Helots, but failed, and died miserably by hunger in the temple in which he had taken sanctuary.
Fall of Themistocles. Cimon Death of Themistocles..
A fall scarcely less melancholy came to the illustrious Themistocles. In spite of his great services, his popularity began to decline. He was hated by the Spartans for the part he took in the fortification of the city, who brought all their influence against him. He gave umbrage to the citizens by his personal vanity, continually boasting of his services. He erected a private chapel in honor of Artemis. He prostituted his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. He accepted bribes without scruple, to the detriment of the State, and in violation of justice and right. And as the Persians could offer the highest bribes, he was suspected of secretly favoring their interests. The old rivalries between him and Aristides were renewed; and as Aristides was no longer opposed to the policy which Athens adopted, of giving its supreme attention to naval defenses, and, moreover, constantly had gained the respect of the city by his integrity and patriotism, especially by his admirable management at Delos, where he cemented the confederacy of the maritime States, his influence was perhaps greater than that of Themistocles, stained with the imputation of Medism. Cimon, the son of Miltiades, also became a strong opponent. Though acquitted of accepting bribes from Persia, Themistocles was banished by a vote of ostracism, as Aristides had been before—a kind of exile which was not dishonorable, but resorted to from regard to public interests, and to which men who became unpopular were often subjected, whatever may have been their services or merits. He retired to Argos, and while there the treason of Pausanias was discovered. Themistocles was involved in it, since the designs of Pausanias were known by him. Joint envoys from Sparta and Athens were sent to arrest him, which, when known, he fled to Corcyra, and thence to Admetus, king of the Molossians. The Epirotic prince shielded him in spite of his former hostility, and furnished him with guides to Pydna, across the mountains, from which he succeeded in reaching Ephesus, and then repaired to the Persian court. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property, amounting to one hundred talents, accumulated by the war, was confiscated. In Persia, he represented himself as a deserter, and subsequently acquired influence with Artaxerxes, and devoted his talents to laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece. He received the large sum of fifty talents yearly, and died at sixty-five years of age, with a blighted reputation, such as no previous services could redeem from infamy.
Death of Aristides.
Aristides died four years after the ostracism of Themistocles, universally respected, and he died so poor as not to have enough for his funeral expenses. Nor did any of his descendants ever become rich.
Death of Xerxes.
Xerxes himself, the Ahasuerus of the Scriptures, who commanded the largest expedition ever recorded in human annals, reached Sardis, eight months after he had left it, disgusted with active enterprise, and buried himself amid the intrigues of his court and seraglio, in Susa, as recorded in the book of Esther. He was not deficient in generous impulses, but deficient in all those qualities which make men victorious in war. He died fifteen years after, the victim of a conspiracy, in his palace, B.C. 465—six years after Themistocles had sought his protection.
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE AGE OF PERICLES
Rivalry between the Grecian States.
With the defeat of the Persian armies, Athens and Sparta became, respectively, the leaders of two great parties in Greece. Athens advocated maritime interests and democratic institutions; Sparta, was the champion of the continental and oligarchal powers. The one was Ionian, and organized the league of Delos, under the management of Aristides; the other was Dorian, and chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. The rivalries between these leading States involved a strife between those ideas and interests of which each was the recognized representative. Those States which previously had been severed from each other by geographical position and diversity of interests, now rallied under the guidance either of Athens or Sparta. The intrigues of Themistocles and Pausanias had prevented that Panhellenic union, so necessary for the full development of political power, and which was for a time promoted by the Persian war. Athens, in particular, gradually came to regard herself as a pre-eminent power, to which the other States were to be tributary. Her empire, based on maritime supremacy, became a tyranny to which it was hard for the old allies to submit.
Pre-eminently between Athens and Sparta.
But the rivalry between Sparta and Athens was still more marked. Sparta had thus far taken the lead among the Grecian States, and Athens had submitted to it in the Persian invasion. But the consciousness of new powers, which naval warfare developed, the éclat of the battles of Marathon and Salamis, and the confederacy of Delos, changed the relative position of the two States. Moreover, to Athens the highest glory of resisting the Persians was due, while her patriotic and enlarged spirit favorably contrasted with the narrow and selfish policy of Sparta.
Opposition by Sparta to the fortifications of Athens.
And this policy was seen in nothing more signally than in the oppositions he made to the new fortifications of Athens, so that Themistocles was obliged to go to Sparta, and cover up by deceit and falsehood the fact that the Athenians were really repairing their walls, which they had an undoubted right to do, but which Ægina beheld with fear and Sparta with jealousy. And this unreasonable meanness and injustice on the part of Sparta, again reacted on the Athenians, and created great bitterness and acrimony.
The city nevertheless fortified. The Peireus. Increase of the navy. Confederacy of Delos.
But in spite of the opposition of Sparta, the new fortifications arose, to which all citizens, rich and poor, lent their aid, and on a scale which was not unworthy of the grandeur of a future capital. The circuit of the walls was fifty stadia or seven miles, and they were of sufficient strength and height to protect the city against external enemies. And when they were completed Themistocles—a man of great foresight and genius, persuaded the citizens to fortify also their harbor, as a means of securing the ascendency of the city in future maritime conflicts. He foresaw that the political ascendency of Athens was based on those “wooden walls” which the Delphic oracle had declared to be her hope in the Persian invasion. The victory at Salamis had confirmed the wisdom of the prediction, and given to Athens an imperishable glory. Themistocles persuaded his countrymen that the open roadstead of Phalerum was insecure, and induced them to inclose the more spacious harbors of Peireus and Munychia, by a wall as long as that which encircled Athens itself,—so thick and high that all assault should be hopeless, while within its fortifications the combined fleets of Greece could safely he anchored, and to which the citizens of Athens could also retire in extreme danger. Peireus accordingly was inclosed at vast expense and labor by a wall fourteen feet in thickness, which served not merely for a harbor, but a dock-yard and arsenal. Thither resorted metics or resident foreigners, and much of the trade of Athens was in their hands, since they were less frequently employed in foreign service. They became a thrifty population of traders and handy craftsmen identified with the prosperity of Athens. These various works, absorbed much of the Athenian force and capital, yet enough remained to build annually twenty new triremes—equivalent to our modern ships of the line. Athens now became the acknowledged head and leader of the allied States, instead of Sparta, whose authority as a presiding State was now openly renunciated by the Athenians. The Panhellenic union under Sparta was now broken forever, and two rival States disputed the supremacy,—the maritime States adhering to Athens, and the land States, which furnished the larger part of the army at Platæa, adhering to Sparta. It was then that the confederacy of Delos was formed, under the presidency of Athens, which Aristides directed. His assessment was so just and equitable that no jealousies were excited, and the four hundred and sixty talents which were collected from the maritime States were kept at Delos for the common benefit of the league, managed by a board of Athenian officers. It was a common fear which led to this great contribution, for the Phœnician fleet might at any time reappear, and, co-operating with a Persian land force, destroy the liberties of Greece. Although Athens reaped the chief benefit of this league, it was essentially national. It was afterward indeed turned to aggrandize Athens, but, when it was originally made, was a means of common defense against a power as yet unconquered though repulsed.
Confederacy of Delos.
During all the time that the fortifications of Athens and the Peireus were being made, Themistocles was the ruling spirit at Athens, while Aristides commanded the fleet and organized the confederacy of Delos. It was thus several years before he became false to his Countrymen, and the change was only gradually wrought in his character, owing chiefly to his extravagant habits and the arrogance which so often attends success.
Change in the Athenian constitution.
During this period, a change was also made in the civil constitution of Athens. All citizens were rendered admissible to office. The State became still more democratic. The archons were withdrawn from military duties, and confined to civil functions. The stategi or generals gained greater power with the extending political relations, and upon them was placed the duty of superintending foreign affairs. Athens became more democratical and more military at the same time.
The political growth of Athens.
From this time, 479 B.C., we date the commencement of the Athenian empire. It gradually was cemented by circumstances rather than a long-sighted and calculating ambition. At the head of the confederacy of Delos, opportunities were constantly presented of centralizing power, while its rapid increase of population and wealth favored the schemes which political leaders advanced for its aggrandizement. The first ten years of the Athenian hegemony or headship were years of active warfare against the Persians. The capture of Eion, on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison, by Cimonon, led to the settlement of Amphipolis by the Athenians; and the fall of the cities which the Persians had occupied in Thrace and in the various islands of the Ægean increased the power of Athens.
The Confederate States.
The confederate States at last grew weary of personal military service, and prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, for which they imposed upon themselves a suitable money-payment. They thus gradually sunk to the condition of tributary allies, unwarlike and averse to privation, while the Athenians, stimulated by new and expanding ambition, became more and more enterprising and powerful.
Unpopularity of Athens.
But with the growth of Athens was also the increase of jealousies. Athens became unpopular, not only because she made the different maritime States her tributaries, but because she embarked in war against them to secure a still greater aggrandizement. Naxos revolted, but was conquered, B.C. 467. The confederate State was stripped of its navy, and its fortifications were razed to the ground. Next year the island of Thasos likewise seceded from the alliance, and was subdued with difficulty, and came near involving Athens in a war with Sparta. The Thasians invoked the aid of Sparta, which was promised though not fulfilled, which imbittered the relations between the two leading Grecian States.
Expeditions against Persia.
During this period, from the formation of the league at Delos, and the fall of Thasos, about thirteen years, Athens was occupied in maintaining expeditions against Persia, being left free from embarrassments in Attica. The towns of Platæa and Thespiæ were restored and repeopled under Athenian influence.
Sparta. Rebellion of the Helots. Cimon opposed to Pericles. Alliance of different states with Athens.
The jealousy of Sparta, in view of the growing power of Athens, at last gave vent in giving aid to Thebes, against the old policy of the State, to enable that city to maintain supremacy over the lesser Bœotian towns. The Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications, which aid made Thebes a vehement partisan of Sparta. Soon after, a terrible earthquake happened in Sparta, 464 B.C., which calamity was seized upon by the Helots as a fitting occasion for revolt. Defeated, but not subdued, the insurgents retreated to Ithome, the ancient citadel of their Messenian ancestors, and there intrenched themselves. The Spartans spent two years in an unsuccessful siege, and were forced to appeal to their allies for assistance. But even the increased force made no impression on the fortified hill, so ignorant were the Greeks, at this period, of the art of attacking walls. And when the Athenians, under Cimon, still numbered among the allies of Sparta, were not more successful, their impatience degenerated to mistrust and suspicion, and summarily dismissed the Athenian contingent. This ungracious and jealous treatment exasperated the Athenians, whose feelings were worked upon by Pericles who had opposed the policy of sending troops at all to Laconia. Cimon here was antagonistic to Pericles, and wished to cement the more complete union of Greece against Persia, and maintain the union with Sparta. Cimon, moreover, disliked the democratic policy of Pericles. But the Athenians rallied under Pericles, and Cimon lost his influence, which had been paramount since the disgrace of Themistocles. A formal resolution was passed at Athens to renounce the alliance with Sparta against the Persians, and to seek alliance with Argos, which had been neutral during the Persian invasion, but which had regained something of its ancient prestige and power by the conquest of Mycenæ and other small towns. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance which was intended to be antagonistic to Sparta. Megara, shortly after, renounced the protection of the Peloponnesian capital, and was enrolled among the allies of Athens,—a great acquisition to Athenian power, since this city secured the passes of Mount Gerania, so that Attica was protected from invasion by the Isthmus of Corinth. But the alliance of Megara and Athens gave deep umbrage to Corinth as well as Sparta, and a war with Corinth was the result, in which Ægina was involved as the ally of Sparta and Corinth.
Defeat of Athens on the land and victory on the sea.
The Athenians were at first defeated on the land; but this defeat was more than overbalanced by a naval victory over the Dorian seamen, off the island of Ægina, by which the naval force of Ægina hitherto great, was forever prostrated. The Athenians captured seventy ships and commenced the siege of the city itself. Sparta would have come to the rescue, but was preoccupied in suppressing the insurrection of the Helots. Corinth sent three hundred hoplites to Ægina and attacked Megara. But the Athenians prevailed both at Ægina and Megara, which was a great blow to Corinth.
Pericles begins his career. Cimon banished.
Fearing, however, a renewed attack from Corinth and the Peloponnesian States, now full of rivalry and enmity, the Athenians, under the leadership of Pericles, resolved to connect their city with the harbor of Peireus by a long wall—a stupendous undertaking at that time. It excited the greatest alarm among the enemies of Athens, and was a subject of contention among different parties in the city. The party which Cimon, now ostracised, had headed, wished to cement the various Grecian States in a grand alliance against the Persians, and dreaded to see this long wall arise as a standing menace against the united power of the Peloponnesus. Moreover, the aristocrats of Athens disliked a closer amalgamation with the maritime people of the Peireus, as well as the burdens and taxes which this undertaking involved. These fortifications doubtless increased the power of Athens, but weakened the unity of Hellenic patriotism; and increased those jealousies which ultimately proved the political ruin of Greece.
Hostilities between Sparta and Athens.
Under the influence of these rivalries and jealousies the Lacedæmonians, although the Helots wore not subdued, undertook a hostile expedition out of the Peloponnesus, with eleven thousand five hundred men, ostensibly to protect Doris against the Phœcians, but really to prevent the further aggrandizement of Athens, and this was supposed to be most easily effected by strengthening Thebes and securing the obedience of the Bœotian cities. But there was yet another design, to prevent the building of the long walls, to which the aristocratical party of Athens was opposed, but which Pericles, with long-sighted views, defended.
Ascendency of Pericles. His character and accomplishments.
This extraordinary man, with whom the glory and greatness of Athens are so intimately associated, now had the ascendency over all his rivals. He is considered the ablest of all the statesmen which Greece produced. He was of illustrious descent, and spent the early part of his life in retirement and study, and when he emerged from obscurity his rise was rapid, until he gained the control of his countrymen, which he retained until his death. He took the side of the democracy, and, in one sense, was a demagogue, as well as a statesman, since he appealed to popular passions and interests. He was very eloquent, and was the idol of the party which was dominant in the State. His rank and fortune enabled him to avail himself of every mode of culture and self-improvement known in his day. He loved music, philosophy, poetry, and art. The great Anaxagoras gave a noble direction to his studies, so that he became imbued with the sublimest ideas of Grecian wisdom. And his eloquence is said to have been of the most lofty kind. His manners partook of the same exalted and dignified bearing as his philosophy. He never lost his temper, and maintained the severest self-control. His voice was sweet, and his figure was graceful and commanding. He early distinguished himself as a soldier, and so gained upon his countrymen that, when Themistocles and Aristides were dead, and Cimon engaged in military expeditions, he supplanted all who had gone before him in popular favor. All his sympathies were with the democratic party, while his manners and habits and tastes and associations were those of the aristocracy. His political career lasted forty years from the year 469 B.C. He was unremitting in his public duties, and was never seen in the streets unless on his way to the assembly or senate. He was not fond of convivial pleasures, and was, though affable, reserved and dignified. He won the favor of the people by a series of measures which provided the poor with amusement and means of subsistence. He caused those who served in the courts to be paid for their attendance and services. He weakened the power of the court of the Areopagus, which was opposed to popular measures. Assured of his own popularity, he even contrived to secure the pardon of Cimon, his great rival, when publicly impeached.
