Anson George
A Voyage Round the World
CHAPTER IX
OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FACILITATING THE
PASSAGE OF OUR FUTURE CRUISERS ROUND CAPE HORN
The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the disappointment (recited in the foregoing chapter) of falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above a hundred leagues to the westward of that whole coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacifick Ocean; this unseasonable navigation, I say, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards encountered. For from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of our people, the ruin of our project on Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish places, and the reduction of our squadron from the formidable condition in which it passed Streights Le Maire to a couple of shattered half-manned cruisers and a sloop, so far disabled that in many climates they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, all ships hereafter bound to the South Seas from suffering the same calamities, I think it my duty to insert in this place such directions and observations as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, in relation to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the east and west side of South America.
And first, with regard to the proper place for refreshment on the east side of South America. For this purpose the island of St. Catherine's has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their faith we put in there, as has been formerly mentioned. But the treatment we met with, and the small store of refreshments we could procure there, are sufficient reasons to render all ships for the future cautious how they trust themselves in the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz, for they may certainly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars will give him leave. And as this treacherous conduct is inspired by the views of private gain in the illicit commerce carried on to the river of Plate, rather than by any national affection which the Portuguese bear the Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors of the Brazil coast, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very extensive and general. And though the governors should themselves detest so faithless a procedure, yet as ships are perpetually passing from some or other of the Brazil ports to the river of Plate, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving, by this means, casual intelligence of any British ships upon the coast, which, however imperfect such intelligence might be, would prove of dangerous import to the views and interests of those cruisers who were thus discovered.
For the Spanish trade in the South Seas running all in one track from north to south, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power of two or three cruisers, properly stationed in different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea; but this is only so long as they can continue concealed from the neighbouring coast, for the instant an enemy is known to be in those seas, all navigation is prohibited, and consequently all captures are at an end, since the Spaniards, well apprized of these advantages of the enemy, send expresses along the coast and lay a general embargo on all their trade; a measure which they prudentially foresee will not only prevent their vessels being taken, but will soon lay any cruisers who have not strength sufficient to attempt their places under necessity of returning home. Hence then appears the great importance of concealing all expeditions of this kind, and hence, too, it follows how extremely prejudicial that intelligence may prove which is given by the Portuguese governors to the Spaniards in relation to the designs of ships touching at the ports of Brazil.
However, notwithstanding the inconveniences we have mentioned of touching on the coast of Brazil, it will often-times happen that ships bound round Cape Horn will be obliged to call there for a supply of wood and water, and other refreshments. In this case, St. Catherine's is the last place I would recommend, both as the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, cannot be procured there (for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, by being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions), and also because, from its being nearer the river of Plate than many of their other settlements, the inducements and conveniences of betraying us are much stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio Janeiro, where two of our squadron put in after they were separated from us in passing Cape Horn, for here, as I have been informed by one of the gentlemen on board those ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry may be procured; and this place being more distant from the river of Plate, the difficulty of intelligence is somewhat inhanced, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered in some degree augmented. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, shall be considered more at large hereafter.
I next proceed to the consideration of the proper course to be steered for doubling Cape Horn. And here, I think, I am sufficiently authorised by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and examination of the journals of former navigators, to give this piece of advice, which in prudence I think ought never to be departed from: that is, that all ships bound to the South Seas, instead of passing through Streights Le Maire, should constantly pass to the eastward of Staten-land, and should be invariably bent on running to the southward, as far as the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before they endeavour to stand to the westward; and that when they are got into that latitude they should then make sure of sufficient westing before they once think of steering to the northward.
But as directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons for each part of this maxim. And first, as to the passing to the eastward of Staten-land. Those who have attended to the risque we ran in passing Streights Le Maire, the danger we were in of being driven upon Staten-land by the current, when, though we happily escaped being put on shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that island; those who reflect on this, and the like accidents which have happened to other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to pass through Streights Le Maire, and run the risque of shipwreck, and after all find themselves no farther to the westward (the only reason hitherto given for this practice) than they might have been in the same time by a secure navigation in an open sea.
And next as to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61 or 62 south, before any endeavour is made to stand to the westward. The reasons for this precept are, that in all probability the violence of the currents will be hereby avoided, and the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This last circumstance we ourselves experienced most remarkably, for after we had unexpectedly fallen in with the land, as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, we stood away to the southward to run clear of it, and were no sooner advanced into sixty degrees or upwards but we met with much better weather and smoother water than in any other part of the whole passage. The air indeed was very cold and sharp, and we had strong gales, but they were steady and uniform, and we had at the same time sunshine and a clear sky; whereas in the lower latitudes the winds every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength, and then returned suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at each blast the loss of our masts, which must have ended in our certain destruction. And that the currents in this high latitude would be of much less efficacy than nearer the land seems to be evinced from these considerations, that all currents run with greater violence near the shore than at sea, and that at great distances from shore they are scarcely perceptible. Indeed the reason of this seems sufficiently obvious, if we consider that constant currents are, in all probability, produced by constant winds, the wind driving before it, though with a slow and imperceptible motion, a large body of water, which being accumulated upon any coast that it meets with, must escape along the shore by the endeavours of its surface to reduce itself to the same level with the rest of the ocean. And it is reasonable to suppose that those violent gusts of wind which we experienced near the shore, so very different from what we found in the latitude of sixty degrees and upwards, may be owing to a similar cause, for a westerly wind almost perpetually prevails in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. And this current of air being interrupted by those immense hills called the Andes, and by the mountains on Terra del Fuego, which together bar up the whole country to the southward as far as Cape Horn, a part of it only can force its way over the tops of those prodigious precipices, whilst the rest must naturally follow the direction of the coast, and must range down the land to the southward, and sweep with an impetuous and irregular blast round Cape Horn and the southermost part of Terra del Fuego. However, not to rely on these speculations, we may, I believe, establish as incontestible these matters of fact, that both the rapidity of the currents and the violence of the western gales are less sensible in the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees than nearer the shore of Terra del Fuego.
But though I am satisfied from both our own experience, and the relations of other navigators, of the importance of the precept I here insist on, that of running into the latitude of 61 or 62 degrees, before any endeavours are made to stand to the westward, yet I would advise no ships hereafter to trust so far to this management as to neglect another most essential maxim, which is the making this passage in the height of summer – that is, in the months of December and January; and the more distant the time of passing is taken from this season, the more disastrous it may be reasonably expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere violence of the western winds be considered, the time of our passage, which was about the equinox, was perhaps the most unfavourable of the whole year; but then it must be remembered that independent of the winds there are in the depth of winter many other inconveniences to be apprehended which are almost insuperable, for the severity of the cold and the shortness of the days would render it impracticable at that season to run so far to the southward as is here recommended; and the same reasons would greatly augment the alarms of sailing in the neighbourhood of an unknown shore, dreadful in its appearance in the midst of summer, and would make a winter navigation on this coast to be, of all others, the most dismaying and terrible. As I would therefore advise all ships to make their passage in December and January, if possible, so I would warn them never to attempt the doubling Cape Horn, from the eastward, after the month of March.
And now, as to the remaining consideration, that is, the properest port for cruisers to refresh at on their first arrival in the South Seas. On this head there is scarcely any choice, the island of Juan Fernandes being the only place that can be prudently recommended for this purpose. For though there are many ports on the western side of Patagonia, between the Streights of Magellan and the Spanish settlements, where ships might ride in great safety, might recruit their wood and water, and might procure some few refreshments, yet that coast is in itself so dangerous from its numerous rocks and breakers, and from the violence of the western winds which blow constantly full upon it, that it is by no means adviseable to fall in with that land, at least till the roads, channels, and anchorage, in each part of it are accurately surveyed, and both the perils and shelter it abounds with are more distinctly known.
Thus having given the best directions in my power for the success of our cruisers who may be hereafter bound to the South Seas, it might be expected that I should again resume the thread of my narration. Yet as both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work I have thought it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate such maxims as had the least appearance of proving beneficial to future navigators, but also occasionally to recommend such measures to the public as I conceive are adapted to promote the same laudable purpose, I cannot desist from the present subject without beseeching those to whom the conduct of our naval affairs is committed to endeavour to remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the navigation to the South Seas is at present necessarily encumbered. An effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themselves, and extremely beneficial to their country. For it seems to be sufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall receive, either by the invention of methods that shall render its practice less hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coasts, roads, and ports already known, or by the discovery of new nations, or new species of commerce; it seems, I say, sufficiently evident, that by whatever means navigation is promoted, the conveniences hence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of Great Britain. Since as our fleets are at present superior to those of the whole world united, it must be a matchless degree of supineness or mean-spiritedness if we permitted any of the advantages which new discoveries, or a more extended navigation, may produce to mankind to be ravished from us.
As, therefore, it appears that all our future expeditions to the South Seas must run a considerable risque of proving abortive whilst in our passage thither, we are under the necessity of touching at Brazil, the discovery of some place more to the southward, where ships might refresh and supply themselves with the necessary sea-stock for their voyage round Cape Horn, would be an expedient which would relieve us from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter worthy of the attention of the public. Nor does this seem difficult to be effected. For we have already the imperfect knowledge of two places which might perhaps, on examination, prove extremely convenient for this purpose. One of them is Pepys's Island, in the latitude of 47° south, and laid down by Dr. Halley about eighty leagues to the eastward of Cape Blanco, on the coast of Patagonia; the other is Falkland's Isles, in the latitude of 51-½°, lying nearly south of Pepys's Island. The first of these was discovered by Captain Cowley in his voyage round the world in the year 1686, who represents it as a commodious place for ships to wood and water at, and says it is provided with a very good and capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride at anchor in great safety; that it abounds with fowls, and that as the shore is either rocks or sands, it seems to promise great plenty of fish. The second place, or Falkland's Isles, has been seen by many ships, both French and English, being the land laid down by Frezier, in his chart of the extremity of South America, under the title of the New Islands. Woodes Rogers, who run along the N.E. coast of these isles in the year 1708, tells us that they extended about two degrees in length, and appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, and seemed to be good ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours. Either of these places, as they are islands at a considerable distance from the continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to lie in a climate sufficiently temperate. It is true, they are too little known to be at present recommended as the most eligible places of refreshment for ships bound to the southward, but if the Admiralty should think it adviseable to order them to be surveyed, which may be done at a very small expence by a vessel fitted out on purpose, and if, on this examination, one or both of these places should appear proper for the purpose intended, it is scarcely to be conceived of what prodigious import a convenient station might prove, situated so far to the southward, and so near Cape Horn. The Duke and Duchess of Bristol were but thirty-five days from their losing sight of Falkland's Isles to their arrival at Juan Fernandes in the South Seas: and as the returning back is much facilitated by the western winds, I doubt not but a voyage might be made from Falkland's Isles to Juan Fernandes and back again in little more than two months. This, even in time of peace, might be of great consequence to this nation; and, in time of war, would make us masters of those seas.
And as all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the properest to be employed in this service: it were to be wished that the whole coast of Patagonia, Terra del Fuego, and Staten-land were carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads, and harbours with which they abound were accurately examined. This might open to us facilities of passing into the Pacifick Ocean, which as yet we may be unacquainted with, and would render all that southern navigation infinitely securer than at present; particularly an exact draught of the west coast of Patagonia, from the Streights of Magellan to the Spanish settlements, might perhaps furnish us with better and more convenient ports for refreshment, and better situated for the purposes either of war or commerce, and above a fortnight's sail nearer to Falkland's Island than the island of Juan Fernandes. The discovery of this coast hath formerly been thought of such consequence by reason of its neighbourhood to the Araucos and other Chilian Indians, who are generally at war, or at least on ill terms, with their Spanish neighbours, that Sir John Narborough was purposely fitted out in the reign of King Charles II. to survey the Streights of Magellan, the neighbouring coast of Patagonia, and the Spanish ports on that frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse with the Chilian Indians, and to establish a commerce and a lasting correspondence with them. His Majesty's views in employing Sir John Narborough in this expedition were not solely the advantage he might hope to receive from the alliance of those savages, in restraining and intimidating the crown of Spain; but he conceived that, independent of those motives, the immediate traffick with these Indians might prove extremely advantageous to the English nation. For it is well known that at the first discovery of Chili by the Spaniards, it abounded with vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has at any time produced since it has been in their possession. And hence it has been generally believed that the richest mines are carefully concealed by the Indians, as well knowing that the discovery of them would only excite in the Spaniards a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more precarious. But with respect to their commerce with the English, these reasons would no longer influence them; since it would be in our power to furnish them with arms and ammunition of all kinds, of which they are extremely desirous, together with many other conveniencies which their intercourse with the Spaniards has taught them to relish. They would then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffick of such mutual convenience to both nations; for then their gold, instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would procure them weapons to assert their liberty, to chastise their tyrants, and to secure themselves for ever from the Spanish yoke; whilst with our assistance, and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that wealth which formerly by the House of Austria, and lately by the House of Bourbon, has been most mischievously lavished in the pursuit of universal monarchy.
It is true, Sir John Narborough did not succeed in opening this commerce, which, in appearance, promised so many advantages to this nation. However, his disappointment was merely accidental, and his transactions upon that coast (besides the many valuable improvements he furnished to geography and navigation) are rather an encouragement for future trials of this kind than any objection against them; his principal misfortune being the losing company of a small bark which attended him, and having some of his people trepanned at Baldivia. However, it appeared, by the precautions and fears of the Spaniards, that they were fully convinced of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, and extremely alarmed with the apprehension of its consequences. It is said that his Majesty King Charles the Second was so far prepossessed with the belief of the emoluments which might redound to the publick from this expedition, and was so eager to be informed of the event of it, that having intelligence of Sir John Narborough's passing through the Downs on his return, he had not patience to attend his arrival at court, but went himself in his barge to Gravesend to meet him.
To facilitate as much as possible any attempts of this kind which may be hereafter undertaken, I prepared a chart of that part of the world, as far as it is hitherto known, which I flatter myself is, in some respects, much correcter than any which has been yet published. To evince which, it may be necessary to mention what materials I have principally made use of, and what changes I have introduced different from other authors.
The two most celebrated charts hitherto published of the southermost part of South America, are those of Dr. Halley, in his general chart of the magnetic variation, and of Frezier in his voyage to the South Seas. But besides these, there is a chart of the Streights of Magellan, and of some part of the adjacent coast, by Sir John Narborough above-mentioned, which is doubtless infinitely exacter in that part than Frezier's, and in some respects superior to Halley's, particularly in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of those streights. The coast from Cape Blanco to Terra del Fuego, and thence to Streights Le Maire, we were in some measure capable of correcting by our own observations, as we ranged that shore generally in sight of land. The position of the land to the northward of the Streights of Magellan, on the west side, is doubtless laid down but very imperfectly; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than what has hitherto been done, as it is drawn from the information of some of the Wager's crew who were shipwrecked on that shore and afterwards coasted it down, and as it agrees pretty nearly with the description of some Spanish manuscripts I have seen. The channel dividing Terra del Fuego is drawn from Frezier; but Sir Francis Drake, who first discovered Cape Horn, and the S.W. part of Terra del Fuego, observed that whole coast to be divided by a great number of inlets, all which he conceived did communicate with the Streights of Magellan. And I doubt not that whenever this country is thoroughly examined this circumstance will be verified, and Terra del Fuego will be found to consist of several islands.
And having mentioned Frezier so often, I must not omit warning all future navigators against relying on the longitude of Streights Le Maire, or of any part of that coast, laid down in his chart, the whole being from 8 to 10 degrees too far to the eastward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals, verified in some particulars by astronomical observation. For instance, Sir John Narborough places Cape Virgin Mary in 65° 42' of west longitude from the Lizard, that is in about 71-½° from London. And the ships of our squadron, who took their departure from St. Catherine's (where the longitude was rectified by an observation of the eclipse of the moon), found Cape Virgin Mary to be from 70-½° to 72-½° from London, according to their different reckonings; and since there were no circumstances in our run that could render it considerably erroneous, it cannot be esteemed in less than 71 degrees of west longitude; whereas Frezier lays it down in less than 66 degrees from Paris, that is, little more than 63 degrees from London, which is doubtless 8 degrees short of its true quantity. Again, our squadron found Cape Virgin Mary and Streights Le Maire to be not more than 2-½° different in longitude, which in Frezier are distant near 4 degrees, so that not only the longitude of Cape St. Bartholomew is laid down in him near 10 degrees too little, but the coast from the Streights of Magellan to Streights Le Maire is enlarged to near double its real extent.
But to have done with Frezier, whose errors, the importance of the subject, and not a fondness for cavilling, has obliged me to remark (though his treatment of Dr. Halley might, on the present occasion, authorise much severer usage), I must, in the next place, relate wherein I differ from that of our learned countryman last mentioned.
It is well known that this gentleman was sent abroad by the public to make such geographical and astronomical observations as might facilitate the future practice of navigation, and particularly to determine the variation of the compass in such places as he should touch at, and, if possible, to ascertain its general laws and affections. These things Dr. Halley, to his immortal reputation and the honour of our nation, in good measure accomplished, especially with regard to the variation of the compass, a subject, of all others, the most interesting to those employed in the art of navigation. He likewise corrected the position of the coast of Brazil, which had been very erroneously laid down by all former hydrographers; and from a judicious comparison of the observations of others, he happily succeeded in settling the geography of many considerable places where he had not himself been. So that the chart he composed, with the variation of the needle marked thereon, being the result of his labours on this subject, was allowed by all Europe to be far compleater in its geography than any that had till then been published, whilst it was at the same time most surprisingly exact in the quantity of variation assigned to the different parts of the globe; a subject so very intricate and perplexing, that all general determinations about it had been usually deemed impossible.
But as the only means he had of correcting the situation of those coasts, where he did not touch himself, were the observations of others, when those observations were wanting, or were inaccurate, it was no imputation on his skill that his decisions were defective. And this, upon the best comparison I have been able to make, is the case with regard to that part of his chart, which contains the south coast of South America. For though the coast of Brazil, and the opposite coast of Peru on the South Seas, are laid down, I presume, with the greatest accuracy, yet from about the river of Plate on the east side, and its opposite point on the west, the coast gradually declines too much to the westward, so as at the Streights of Magellan to be, as I conceive, about fifty leagues removed from its true position; at least, this is the result of the observations of our squadron, which agree extremely well with those of Sir John Narborough. I must add that Dr. Halley has, in the philosophical transactions, given the foundation on which he has proceeded in fixing Port St. Julian in 76-½° of west longitude, which the concurrent journals of our squadron place from 70-¾° to 71-½°. This, he tells us, was an observation of an eclipse of the moon made at that place by Mr. Wood, then Sir John Narborough's lieutenant, and which is said to have happened there at eight in the evening, on the 18th of September 1670. But Captain Wood's journal of this whole voyage under Sir John Narborough is since published together with this observation, in which he determines the longitude of Port St. Julian to be 73 degrees from London, and the time of the eclipse to have been different from Dr. Halley's account. But the numbers he has given are so faultily printed that nothing can be determined from them.