Anson George
A Voyage Round the World
CHAPTER XIV
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED FROM OUR SQUADRON HAD IT ARRIVED IN THE SOUTH SEAS IN GOOD TIME
After the recital of the transactions of the commodore, and the ships under his command, on the coasts of Peru and Mexico, contained in the preceding narration, it will be no useless digression to examine what the whole squadron might have been capable of atchieving had it arrived on its destined scene of action in so good a plight as it would probably have done had the passage round Cape Horn been attempted at a more seasonable time of the year. This disquisition may be serviceable to those who shall hereafter form projects of the like nature for that part of the world, or who may be entrusted with their execution. And therefore I propose, in this chapter, to consider, as succinctly as I can, the numerous advantages which the public might have received from the operations of the squadron had it set sail from England a few months sooner than it did.
To begin then: I presume it will be granted me that in the summer time we might have got round Cape Horn with an inconsiderable loss, and without any material damage to our ships or rigging. For the Duke and Duchess of Bristol, who between them had above three hundred men, buried no more than two from the coast of Brazil to Juan Fernandez; and out of a hundred and eighty-three hands which were on board the Duke alone, there were only twenty-one sick of the scurvy when they arrived at that island. Whence as men-of-war are much better provided with all conveniences than privateers, we might doubtless have appeared before Baldivia in full strength, and in a condition of entering immediately on action; and therefore, as that place was in a very defenceless state, its cannon incapable of service, and its garrison in great measure unarmed, it was impossible that it could have opposed our force, or that its half-starved inhabitants, most of whom are convicts banished thither from other parts, could have had any other thoughts than that of submitting. This would have been a very important acquisition; since when Baldivia, which is an excellent port, had been once in our possession, we should immediately have been terrible to the whole kingdom of Chili, and should doubtless have awed the most distant parts of the Spanish Empire in America. Indeed it is far from improbable that, by a prudent use of this place, aided by our other advantages, we might have given a violent shock to the authority of Spain on that whole continent, and might have rendered some at least of her provinces independent. This would certainly have turned the whole attention of the Spanish ministry to that part of the world where the danger would have been so pressing, and thence Great Britain and her allies might have been rid of the numerous difficulties which the wealth of the Spanish Indies, operating in conjunction with the Gallick intrigues, have constantly thrown in their way.
But that I may not be thought to over-rate the force of this squadron by ascribing to it a power of overturning the Spanish Government in America, it is necessary to enter into a more particular discussion, and to premise a few observations on the condition of the provinces bordering near the South Seas, and on the disposition of the inhabitants, both Spaniards and Indians, at that time. For hence it will appear that the conjuncture was the most favourable we could have desired, since we shall find that the Creolian subjects were disaffected and their governors at variance, that the country was wretchedly provided with arms and stores, and they had fallen into a total neglect of all military regulations in their garrisons; and that the Indians on their frontier were universally discontented, and seemed to be watching with impatience the favourable moment when they might take a severe revenge for the barbarities they had groaned under during more than two ages: so that every circumstance concurred to facilitate the enterprizes of our squadron. Of all these articles we were amply informed by the letters we took on board our prizes; none of these vessels, as I remember, having had the precaution to throw their papers overboard.
The ill blood amongst the governors was greatly augmented by their apprehensions of our squadron; for every one being willing to have it believed that the bad condition of his government was not the effect of negligence, there were continual demands and remonstrances among them in order to throw the blame upon each other. Thus, for instance, the President of St. Jago in Chili, the President of Panama, and many other governors and military officers were perpetually soliciting the Viceroy of Peru to furnish them with the necessary sums of money for putting their provinces and places in a proper state of defence to oppose our designs: but the customary answer of the viceroy to these representations was that he was unable to comply with their requests, urging the emptiness of the royal chest at Lima, and the difficulties he was under to support the expences of his own government: he in one of his letters (which we intercepted) mentioning his apprehensions that he might soon be necessitated to stop the pay of the troops and even of the garrison of Callao, the key of the whole kingdom of Peru. Indeed he did at times remit to these governors some part of their demands; but as what he sent them was greatly short of their wants, these partial supplies rather tended to the raising jealousies and heart-burnings among them than contributed to the purposes for which they had at first been desired.
Besides these mutual janglings amongst the governors, the whole body of the people were extremely dissatisfied, they being fully persuaded that the affairs of Spain for many years before had been managed by the influence of a particular foreign interest, which was altogether detached from the advantages of the Spanish nation: so that the inhabitants of these distant provinces believed themselves to be sacrificed to an ambition which never considered their convenience or emoluments nor paid any regard to the reputation of their name or the honour of their country. That this was the temper of the Creolian Spaniards at that time might be proved from a hundred instances; but I shall content myself with one which is indeed conclusive: this is the testimony of the French mathematicians sent into America to measure the magnitude of an equatorial degree of latitude. For in the relation of the murther of a surgeon belonging to their company in one of the cities of Peru, and of the popular tumult thence occasioned, written by one of those astronomers, the author confesses that the multitude during the uproar universally joined in imprecations on their bad government, and bestowed the most abusive language upon the French, detesting them, in all probability, more particularly as being of a nation to whose influence in the Spanish counsels the Spaniards imputed all their misfortunes.
And whilst the Creolian Spaniards were thus dissatisfied, it appears by the letters we intercepted that the Indians on almost every frontier were ripe for a revolt, and would have taken up arms upon the slightest encouragement; particularly the Indians in the southern parts of Peru, as likewise the Arraucos, and the rest of the Chilian Indians, the most powerful and terrible to the Spanish name of any on that continent. For it seems in some disputes between the Spaniards and the Indians, which happened a short time before our arrival, the Spaniards had insulted the Indians with an account of the force which they expected from Old Spain under the command of Admiral Pizarro, and had vaunted that he was coming thither to compleat the great work which had been left unfinished by his ancestors. These threats alarmed the Indians, and made them believe that their extirpation was resolved on. For the Pizarros being the first conquerors of that coast, the Peruvian Indians held the name, and all that bore it, in execration; not having forgot the destruction of their monarchy, the massacre of their beloved Inca, Atapalipa, the extinction of their religion, and the slaughter of their ancestors, all perpetrated by the family of the Pizarros. The Chilian Indians too abhorred a chief who was descended of a race which, by its lieutenants, had first attempted to inslave them, and had necessitated the stoutest of their tribes for more than a century to be continually wasting their blood in defence of their independency.
Nor let it be supposed that among barbarous nations the traditions of these distant transactions could not be preserved for so long an interval; since those who have been acquainted with that part of the world agree that the Indians, in their publick feasts and annual solemnities, constantly revive the memory of these tragick incidents; and such as have been present at these spectacles have constantly observed that all the recital and representations of this kind were received with emotions so vehement, and with so enthusiastick a rage, as plainly demonstrated how strongly the memory of their former wrongs was implanted in them, and how acceptable the means of revenge would at all times prove. To this I must add too, that the Spanish governors themselves were so fully informed of the disposition of the Indians at this conjuncture, and were so apprehensive of a general defection among them, that they employed all their industry to reconcile the most dangerous tribes, and to prevent them from immediately taking up arms. Among the rest, the President of Chili in particular made large concessions to the Arraucos and the other Chilian Indians, by which, and by distributing considerable presents to their leading men, he at last got them to consent to a prolongation of the truce between the two nations. But these negociations were not concluded at the time when we might have been in the South Seas; and had they been compleated, yet the hatred of these Indians to the Spaniards was so great that it would have been impossible for their chiefs, how deeply soever corrupted, to have kept them from joining us against their old detested enemy.
Thus then it appears that on our arrival in the South Seas we might have found the whole coast unprovided with troops and destitute even of arms: for we well know, from very particular intelligence, that there were not three hundred fire-arms, of which too the greatest part were matchlocks, in all the province of Chili. Whilst at the same time, the Indians were ripe for a revolt, the Spaniards disposed to mutiny, and the governors enraged with one another, and each prepared to rejoice in the disgrace of his antagonist. At this fortunate crisis we, on the other hand, might have consisted of near two thousand men, the greatest part in health and vigour, all well armed, and united under a chief whose enterprising genius (as we have seen) could not be depressed by a continued series of the most sinister events, and whose equable and prudent turn of temper would have remained unvaried in the midst of the greatest degree of good success; and who besides possessed, in a distinguished manner, the two qualities the most necessary for these uncommon undertakings – I mean that of maintaining his authority and preserving, at the same time, the affections of his people. Our other officers too, of every rank, appear, by the experience the public hath since had of them, to have been equal to any attempt they might have been charged with by their commander: and our men (at all times brave if well conducted) in such a cause, where treasure was the object, and under such leaders, would doubtless have been prepared to rival the most celebrated achievements hitherto performed by British mariners.
It cannot then be contested but that Baldivia must have surrendered on the appearance of our squadron: after which, it may be presumed, that the Arraucos, the Pulches, and Penguinches, inhabiting the banks of the river Imperial, about twenty-five leagues to the northward of this place, would have immediately taken up arms, being disposed thereto, as hath been already related, and encouraged by the arrival of so considerable a force in their neighbourhood. As these Indians can bring into the field near thirty thousand men, the greatest part of them horse, their first step would have been the invading the province of Chili, which they would have found totally unprovided both of ammunition and weapons; and as its inhabitants are a luxurious and effeminate race, they would have been incapable, on such an emergency, of giving any opposition to this rugged enemy: so that it is no strained conjecture to imagine that the Indians would have been soon masters of the whole country. Moreover, the other Indians, on the frontiers of Peru, being equally disposed with the Arraucos to shake off the Spanish yoke, it is highly probable that they likewise would have embraced this favourable occasion, and that a general insurrection would have taken place through all the Spanish territories of South America; in which case, the only resource left to the Creolians (dissatisfied as they were with the Spanish government) would have been to have made the best terms they could with their Indian neighbours, and to have withdrawn themselves from the obedience of a master who had shown so little regard to their security. This last supposition may perhaps appear chimerical to those who measure the possibility of all events by the scanty standard of their own experience; but the temper of the times, and the strong dislike of the natives to the measures then pursued by the Spanish court, sufficiently evince at least its possibility. However, not to insist on the presumption of a general revolt, it is sufficient for our purpose to conclude that the Arraucos would scarcely have failed of taking arms on our appearance: since this alone would so far have terrified the enemy that they would no longer have employed their thoughts on the means of opposing us, but would have turned all their care to the Indian affairs; as they still remember, with the utmost horror, the sacking of their cities, the rifling of their convents, the captivity of their wives and daughters, and the desolation of their country by these resolute savages in the last war between the two nations. For it must be observed that the Chilian Indians have been frequently successful against the Spaniards, and possess at this time a large tract of country which was formerly full of Spanish towns and villages, whose inhabitants were all either destroyed or carried into captivity by the Arraucos and the other neighbouring Indians, who in a war against the Spaniards never fail to join their forces.
But even, independent of an Indian revolt, there were two places only, on all the coast of the South Sea, which could be supposed capable of resisting our squadron; these were the cities of Panama and Callao: as to the first of these, its fortifications were so decayed, and it was so much in want of powder, that the president himself, in an intercepted letter, acknowledged it was incapable of being defended; whence I take it for granted it would have given us but little trouble, especially if we had opened a communication across the isthmus with our fleet on the other side. And with regard to the city and port of Callao, its condition was not much better than that of Panama; since its walls are built upon the plain ground, without either out-work or ditch before them, and consist only of very slender feeble masonry, without any earth behind them; so that a battery of five or six pieces of cannon, raised anywhere within four or five hundred paces of the place, would have had a full view of the whole rampart, and would have opened it in a short time; and the breach hereby formed, as the walls are so extremely thin, could not have been difficult of ascent; for the ruins would have been but little higher than the surface of the ground; and it would have yielded this particular advantage to the assailants, that the bullets, which grazed upon it, would have driven before them such shivers of brick and stone as would have prevented the garrison from forming behind it, supposing that the troops employed in defence of the place should have so far surpassed the usual limits of Creolian bravery as to resolve to stand a general assault. Indeed, such a resolution cannot be imputed to them; for the garrison and people were in general dissatisfied with the viceroy's behaviour, and were never expected to act a vigorous part. On the contrary, the viceroy himself greatly apprehended that the commodore would make him a visit at Lima, the capital of the kingdom of Peru; to prevent which, if possible, he had ordered twelve gallies to be built at Guaiaquil and other places, which were intended to oppose the landing of our boats, and to hinder us from pushing our men on shore. But this was an impracticable project of defence, and proceeded on the supposition that our ships, when we should land our men, would keep at such a distance that these gallies, by drawing little water, would have been out of the reach of our guns; whereas the commodore, before he had made such an attempt, would doubtless have been possessed of several prize ships, which he would not have hesitated to have run on shore for the protection of his boats; and besides, there were many places on that coast, and one particularly in the neighbourhood of Callao, where there was good anchoring, though a great depth of water, within a cable's length of the shore; consequently the cannon of the man-of-war would have swept all the coast to above a mile's distance from the water's edge, and would have effectually prevented any force from assembling to oppose the landing and forming of our men. And this landing-place had the additional advantage that it was but two leagues distant from Lima; so that we might have been at that city within four hours after we should have been first discovered from the shore. The place I have in view is about two leagues south of Callao, and just to the northward of the headland called, in Frezier's draught of that coast, Morro Solar. Here there is seventy or eighty fathom of water within two cables' length of the shore; and here the Spaniards themselves were so apprehensive of our attempting to land, that they had projected to build a fort close to the water; but as there was no money in the royal chests, they could not compleat so considerable a work, and therefore they contented themselves with keeping a guard of a hundred horse there, that they might be sure to receive early notice of our appearance on that coast. Indeed some of them (as we were told), conceiving our management at sea to be as pusillanimous as their own, pretended that this was a road where the commodore would never dare to hazard his ships, for fear that in so great a depth of water their anchors could not hold them.
And let it not be imagined that I am proceeding upon groundless and extravagant presumptions, when I conclude that fifteen hundred or a thousand of our people, well conducted, should have been an over-match for any numbers the Spaniards could muster in South America. Since, not to mention the experience we had of them at Paita and Petaplan, it must be remembered that our commodore was extremely solicitous to have all his men trained to the dexterous use of their fire-arms; whereas the Spaniards, in this part of the world, were wretched provided with arms, and were very awkward in the management of the few they had: and though on their repeated representations the court of Spain had ordered several thousand firelocks to be put on board Pizarro's squadron, yet those, it is evident, could not have been in America time enough to have been employed against us. Hence then by our arms, and our readiness in the use of them (not to insist on the timidity and softness of our enemy), we should in some degree have had the same advantages which the Spaniards themselves had on the first discovery of this country against its naked and unarmed inhabitants.
Now let it in the next place be considered what were the events which we had to fear, or what were the circumstances which could have prevented us from giving law to all the coast of South America, and thereby cutting off from Spain the resources which she drew from those immense provinces. By sea there was no force capable of opposing us; for how soon soever we had sailed, Pizarro's squadron could not have sailed sooner than it did, and therefore could not have avoided the fate it met with. As we should have been masters of the ports of Chili, we could thereby have supplied ourselves with the provisions we wanted in the greatest plenty; and from Baldivia to the equinoctial we ran no risque of losing our men by sickness (that being of all climates the most temperate and healthy), nor of having our ships disabled by bad weather. And had we wanted sailors to assist in the navigating of our squadron whilst a considerable proportion of our men were employed on shore, we could not have failed of getting whatever numbers we pleased in the ports we should have taken, and from the prizes which would have fallen into our hands. For I must observe that the Indians, who are the principal mariners in that part of the world, are extremely docile and dexterous; and though they are not fit to struggle with the inclemencies of a cold climate, yet in temperate seas they are most useful and laborious seamen.
Thus then it appears what important revolutions might have been brought about by our squadron had it departed from England as early as it ought to have done: and from hence it is easy to conclude what immense advantages might have thence accrued to the public. For, as on our success it would have been impossible that the kingdom of Spain should have received any treasure from the provinces bordering on the South Seas, or should even have had any communication with them, it is certain that the whole attention of that monarchy would have been immediately employed in endeavouring to regain these inestimable territories, either by force of arms or compact. By the first of these methods it was scarcely possible they could succeed; for it must have been at least a twelvemonth after our arrival before any ships from Spain could have got into the South Seas, and when they had been there, they would have found themselves without resource, since they would probably have been separated, disabled, and sickly, and would then have had no port remaining in their possession where they could either rendezvous or refit. Whilst we might have been supplied across the isthmus with whatever necessaries, stores, or even men we wanted; and might thereby have supported our squadron in as good a plight as when it first set sail from St. Helens. In short, it required but little prudence so to have conducted this business as to have rendered all the efforts of Spain, seconded by the power of France, ineffectual, and to have maintained our conquest in defiance of them both. Whence they must either have resolved to have left Great Britain mistress of the wealth of South America (the principal support of all their destructive projects), or they must have submitted to her terms, and have been contented to receive these provinces back again, as an equivalent for such restrictions to their future ambition as she in her prudence should have dictated to them. Having thus discussed the prodigious weight which the operations of our squadron might have added to the national influence of this kingdom, I shall here end this second book, referring to the next the passage of the shattered remains of our force across the Pacific Ocean, and all their subsequent transactions till the commodore's arrival in England.