Томас Джефферсон
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 6 (of 9)
TO JOHN ADAMS
Monticello, June 15, 1813.
Dear Sir,—I wrote you a letter on the 27th of May, which probably would reach you about the 3d instant, and on the 9th I received yours of the 29th of May. Of Lindsay's Memoirs I had never before heard, and scarcely indeed of himself. It could not, therefore, but be unexpected, that two letters of mine should have anything to do with his life. The name of his editor was new to me, and certainly presents itself for the first time under unfavorable circumstances. Religion, I suppose, is the scope of his book; and that a writer on that subject should usher himself to the world in the very act of the grossest abuse of confidence, by publishing private letters which passed between two friends, with no views to their ever being made public, is an instance of inconsistency as well as of infidelity, of which I would rather be the victim than the author.
By your kind quotation of the dates of my two letters, I have been enabled to turn to them. They had completely vanished from my memory. The last is on the subject of religion, and by its publication will gratify the priesthood with new occasion of repeating their comminations against me. They wish it to be believed that he can have no religion who advocates its freedom. This was not the doctrine of Priestley; and I honored him for the example of liberality he set to his order. The first letter is political. It recalls to our recollection the gloomy transactions of the times, the doctrines they witnessed, and the sensibilities they excited. It was a confidential communication of reflections on these from one friend to another, deposited in his bosom, and never meant to trouble the public mind. Whether the character of the times is justly portrayed or not, posterity will decide. But on one feature of them they can never decide, the sensations excited in free yet firm minds by the terrorism of the day. None can conceive who did not witness them, and they were felt by one party only. This letter exhibits their side of the medal. The federalists, no doubt, have presented the other in their private correspondences as well as open action. If these correspondences should ever be laid open to the public eye, they will probably be found not models of comity towards their adversaries. The readers of my letter should be cautioned not to confine its view to this country alone. England and its alarmists were equally under consideration. Still less must they consider it as looking personally towards you. You happen, indeed, to be quoted, because you happened to express more pithily than had been done by themselves, one of the mottos of the party. This was in your answer to the address of the young men of Philadelphia. [See Selection of Patriotic Addresses, page 198.] One of the questions, you know, on which our parties took different sides, was on the improvability of the human mind in science, in ethics, in government, &c. Those who advocated reformation of institutions, pari passu with the progress of science, maintained that no definite limits could be assigned to that progress. The enemies of reform, on the other hand, denied improvement, and advocated steady adherence to the principles, practices and institutions of our fathers, which they represented as the consummation of wisdom, and acme of excellence, beyond which the human mind could never advance. Although in the passage of your answer alluded to, you expressly disclaim the wish to influence the freedom of inquiry, you predict that that will produce nothing more worthy of transmission to posterity than the principles, institutions and systems of education received from their ancestors. I do not consider this as your deliberate opinion. You possess, yourself, too much science, not to see how much is still ahead of you, unexplained and unexplored. Your own consciousness must place you as far before our ancestors as in the rear of our posterity. I consider it as an expression lent to the prejudices of your friends; and although I happened to cite it from you, the whole letter shows I had them only in view. In truth, my dear Sir, we were far from considering you as the author of all the measures we blamed. They were placed under the protection of your name, but we were satisfied they wanted much of your approbation. We ascribed them to their real authors, the Pickerings, the Wolcotts, the Tracys, the Sedgwicks, et id genus omne, with whom we supposed you in a state of duress. I well remember a conversation with you in the morning of the day on which you nominated to the Senate a substitute for Pickering, in which you expressed a just impatience under "the legacy of secretaries which General Washington had left you," and whom you seemed, therefore, to consider as under public protection. Many other incidents showed how differently you would have acted with less impassioned advisers; and subsequent events have proved that your minds were not together. You would do me great injustice, therefore, by taking to yourself what was intended for men who were then your secret, as they are now your open enemies. Should you write on the subject, as you propose, I am sure we shall see you place yourself farther from them than from us.
As to myself, I shall take no part in any discussions. I leave others to judge of what I have done, and to give me exactly that place which they shall think I have occupied. Marshall has written libels on one side; others, I suppose, will be written on the other side; and the world will sift both and separate the truth as well as they can. I should see with reluctance the passions of that day rekindled in this, while so many of the actors are living, and all are too near the scene not to participate in sympathies with them. About facts you and I cannot differ; because truth is our mutual guide. And if any opinions you may express should be different from mine, I shall receive them with the liberality and indulgence which I ask for my own, and still cherish with warmth the sentiments of affectionate respect, of which I can with so much truth tender you the assurance.
TO MR. SHORT
Monticello, June 18, 1813.
Dear Sir,—Yours of the 2d is received, and a copy of Higgenbotham's mortgage is now enclosed. The journey to Bedford which I proposed in my last, my engagements here have obliged me to postpone till after harvest, which is now approaching; it is the most unpromising one I have seen. We have been some days in expectation of seeing M. Correa. If he is on the road, he has had some days of our very hottest weather. My thermometer has been for two days at 92 and 92½°, the last being the maximum ever seen here. Although we usually have the hottest day of the year in June, yet it is soon interrupted by cooler weather. In July the heat, though not so great, is more continuous and steady.
On the duration of the war I think there is uncertainty. Ever since the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, the object of Great Britain has visibly been the permanent conquest of the ocean, and levying a tribute on every vessel she permits to sail on it, as the Barbary powers do on the Mediterranean, which they call their sea. She must be conscious she cannot from her own resources maintain the exaggerated fleet she now has, and which is necessary to maintain her conquest; she must, therefore, levy the deficiency of duties of transit on other nations. If she should get another ministry with sense enough to abandon this senseless scheme, the war with us ought to be short, because there is no material cause now existing but impressment; and there our only difference is how to establish a mode of discrimination between our citizens which she does not claim, and hers which it is neither our wish or interest ever to employ. The seamen which our navigation raises had better be of our own. If this be all she aims at, it may be settled at Saint Petersburg. My principle has ever been that war should not suspend either exports or imports. If the piracies of France and England, however, are to be adopted as the law of nations, or should become their practice, it will oblige us to manufacture at home all the material comforts.
This may furnish a reason to check imports until necessary manufactures are established among us. This offers the advantage, too, of placing the consumer of our produce near the producer, but I should disapprove of the prohibition of exports even to the enemy themselves, except indeed refreshments and water to their cruisers on our coast, in order to oblige them to intermit their cruises to go elsewhere for these supplies. The idea of starving them as to bread, is a very idle one. It is dictated by passion, not by reason. If the war is lengthened we shall take Canada, which will relieve us from Indians, and Halifax, which will put an end to their occupation of the American seas, because every vessel must then go to England to repair every accident. To retain these would become objects of first importance to us, and of great importance to Europe, as the means of curtailing the British marine. But at present, being merely in posse, they should not be an impediment to peace. We have a great and a just claim of indemnifications against them for the thousand ships they have taken piratically, and six thousand seamen impressed. Whether we can, on this score, successfully insist on curtailing their American possessions, by the meridian of Lake Huron, so as to cut them off from the Indians bordering on us, would be matter for conversation and experiment at the treaty of pacification. I sometimes allow my mind to wander thus into the political field, but rarely, and with reluctance. It is my desire as well as my duty to leave to the vigor of younger minds to settle concerns which are no longer mine, but must long be theirs. Affectionately adieu.
TO –
Your kind answer of the 16th entirely satisfies my doubts as to the employment of the navy, if kept within striking distance of our coast; and shows how erroneous views are apt to be with those who have not all in view. Yet as I know from experience that profitable suggestions sometimes come from lookers on, they may be usefully tolerated, provided they do not pretend to the right of an answer. They would cost very dear indeed were they to occupy the time of a high officer in writing when he should be acting. I intended no such trouble to you, my dear Sir, and were you to suppose I expected it, I must cease to offer a thought on our public affairs. Although my entire confidence in their direction prevents my reflecting on them but accidentally, yet sometimes facts, and sometimes ideas occur, which I hazard as worth the trouble of reading but not of answering. Of this kind was my suggestion of the facts which I recollected as to the defence of the Chesapeake, and of what had been contemplated at the time between the Secretaries of War and the Navy and myself. If our views were sound, the object might be effected in one year, even of war, and at an expense which is nothing compared to the population and productions it would cover. We are here laboring under the most extreme drought ever remembered at this season. We have had but one rain to lay the dust in two months. That was a good one, but was three weeks ago. Corn is but a few inches high and dying. Oats will not yield their seed. Of wheat, the hard winter and fly leave us about two-thirds of an ordinary crop. So that in the lotteries of human life you see that even farming is but gambling. We have had three days of excessive heat. The thermometer on the 16th was at 92°, on the 17th 92½°, and yesterday at 93°. It had never before exceeded 92½ at this place; at least within the periods of my observations. Ever and affectionately yours.
TO COLONEL MONROE
Monticello, June 18, 1813.
Dear Sir,—Your favors of the 7th and 16th are received, and I now return you the memoir enclosed in the former. I am much gratified by its communication, because, as the plan appeared in the newspapers soon after the new Secretary of War came into office, we had given him the credit of it. Every line of it is replete with wisdom; and we might lament that our tardy enlistments prevented its execution, were we not to reflect that these proceeded from the happiness of our people at home. It is more a subject of joy that we have so few of the desperate characters which compose modern regular armies. But it proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier; this was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free State. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done.
I have been persuaded, ab initio, that what we are to do in Canada must be done quickly; because our enemy, with a little time, can empty pickpockets upon us faster than we can enlist honest men to oppose them. If we fail in this acquisition, Hull is the cause of it. Pike, in his situation, would have swept their posts to Montreal, because his army would have grown as it went along. I fear the reinforcements arrived at Quebec will be at Montreal before General Dearborne, and if so, the game is up. If the marching of the militia into an enemy's country be once ceded as unconstitutional (which I hope it never will be), then will their force, as now strengthened, bid us permanent defiance. Could we acquire that country, we might perhaps insist successfully at St. Petersburg on retaining all westward of the meridian of Lake Huron, or of Ontario, or of Montreal, according to the pulse of the place, as an indemnification for the past and security for the future. To cut them off from the Indians even west of the Huron would be a great future security.
Your kind answer of the 16th, entirely satisfies my doubts as to the employment of a navy, if kept within striking distance of our coast, and shows how erroneous views are apt to be with those who have not all in view. Yet, as I know by experience that profitable suggestions sometimes come from lookers on, they may be usefully tolerated, provided they do not pretend to the right of an answer. They would cost very dear, indeed, were they to occupy the time of a high officer in writing when he should be acting. * * * * * * *
TO MR. MATTHEW CARR
Monticello, June 19, 1813.
Sir,—I thank you for the copy of Mr. Clarke's sketches of the naval history of the United States, which you have been so kind as to send me. It is a convenient repository of cases of that class, and has brought to my recollection a number of individual cases of the Revolutionary war which had escaped me. I received, also one of Mr. Clarke's circulars, asking supplementary communications for a second edition. But these things are so much out of the reach of my inland situation, that I am the least able of all men to contribute anything to his desire. I will indulge myself, therefore, in two or three observations, of which you will make what use you may think they merit. 1. Bushnel's Turtle is mentioned slightly. Would the description of the machine be too much for the sale of the work? It may be found very minutely given in the American Philosophical transactions. It was excellently contrived, and might perhaps, by improvement, be brought into real use. I do not know the difference between this and Mr. Fulton's submarine boat. But an effectual machine of that kind is not beyond the laws of nature; and whatever is within these, is not to be despaired of. It would be to the United States the consummation of their safety. 2. The account of the loss of the Philadelphia, does not give a fair impression of the transaction. The proofs may be seen among the records of the Navy office. After this loss, Capt. Bainbridge had a character to redeem. He has done it most honorably, and no one is more gratified by it than myself. But still the transaction ought to be correctly stated. 3. But why omit all mention of the scandalous campaigns of Commodore Morris? A two years' command of an effective squadron, with discretionary instructions, wasted in sailing from port to port of the Mediterranean, and a single half day before the port of the enemy against which he was sent. All this can be seen in the proceedings of the court on which he was dismissed; and it is due to the honorable truths with which the book abounds, to publish those which are not so. A fair and honest narrative of the bad, is a voucher for the truth of the good. In this way the old Congress set an example to the world, for which the world amply repaid them, by giving unlimited credit to whatever was stamped with the name of Charles Thompson. It is known that this was never put to an untruth but once, and that where Congress was misled by the credulity of their General (Sullivan). The first misfortune of the Revolutionary war, induced a motion to suppress or garble the account of it. It was rejected with indignation. The whole truth was given in all its details, and there never was another attempt in that body to disguise it. These observations are meant for the good of the work, and for the honor of those whom it means to honor. Accept the assurance of my esteem and respect.
TO PRESIDENT MADISON
Monticello, June 21, 1813.
Dear Sir,—Your favor of the 6th has been received, and I will beg leave to add a few supplementary observations on the subject of my former letter. I am not a judge of the best forms which may be given to the gunboat; and indeed I suppose they should be of various forms, suited to the various circumstances to which they would be applied. Among these, no doubt, Commodore Barney's would find their place. While the largest and more expensive are fitted for moving from one seaport to another, coast-wise, to aid in a particular emergency, those of smaller draught and expense suit shallower waters; and of these shallow and cheap forms must be those for Lynhaven river. Commodore Preble, in his lifetime, undertook to build such in the best manner for two or three thousand dollars. Colonel Monroe, to whose knowledge of the face of the country I had referred, approves, in a letter to me, of such a plan of defence as was suggested, adding to it a fort on the middle grounds; but thinks the work too great to be executed during a war. Such a fort, certainly, could not be built during a war, in the face of an enemy. Its practicability at any time has been doubted, and although a good auxiliary, is not a necessary member of this scheme of defence. But the canal of retreat is really a small work, of a few months' execution; the laborers would be protected by the military guard on the spot, and many of these would assist in the execution, for fatigue, rations, and pay. The exact magnitude of the work I would not affirm, nor do I think we should trust for it to Tatham's survey: still less would I call in Latrobe, who would immediately contemplate a canal of Languedoc. I would sooner trust such a man as Thomas Monroe to take the level, measure the distances, and estimate the expense. And if the plan were all matured the ensuing winter, and laborers engaged at the proper season, it might be executed in time to mitigate the blockade of the next summer. On recurring to an actual survey of that part of the country, made in the beginning of the Revolutionary war, under the orders of the Governor and Council, by Mr. Andrews I think, a copy of which I took with great care, instead of the half a dozen miles I had conjectured in my former letter, the canal would seem to be of not half that length. I send you a copy of that part of the map, which may be useful to you on other occasions, and is more to be depended on for minutia, probably, than any other existing. I have marked on that the conjectured route of the canal, to wit, from the bridge on Lynhaven river to King's landing, on the eastern branch. The exact draught of water into Lynhaven river you have in the Navy office. I think it is over four feet.
When we consider the population and productions of the Chesapeake country, extending from the Génissee to the Saura towns and Albemarle Sound, its safety and commerce seem entitled even to greater efforts, if greater could secure them. That a defence at the entrance of the bay can be made mainly effective, that it will cost less in money, harass the militia less, place the inhabitants on its interior waters freer from alarm and depredation, and render provisions and water more difficult to the enemy, is so possible as to render thorough inquiry certainly expedient. Some of the larger gun-boats, or vessels better uniting swiftness with force, would also be necessary to scour the interior, and cut off any pickaroons which might venture up the bay or rivers. The loss on James' river alone, this year, is estimated at two hundred thousand barrels of flour, now on hand, for which the half price is not to be expected. This then is a million of dollars levied on a single water of the Chesapeake, and to be levied every year during the war. If a concentration of its defence at the entrance of the Chesapeake should be found inadequate, then we must of necessity submit to the expenses of detailed defence, to the harassment of the militia, the burnings of towns and houses, depredations of farms, and the hard trial of the spirit of the Middle States, the most zealous supporters of the war, and, therefore, the peculiar objects of the vindictive efforts of the enemy. Those north of the Hudson need nothing, because treated by the enemy as neutrals. All their war is concentrated on the Delaware and Chesapeake; and these, therefore, stand in principal need of the shield of the Union. The Delaware can be defended more easily. But I should not think one hundred gun-boats (costing less than one frigate) an over-proportioned allotment to the Chesapeake country, against the over-proportioned hostilities pointed at it.
I am too sensible of the partial and defective state of my information, to be over-confident, or pertinacious, in the opinion I have formed. A thorough examination of the ground will settle it. We may suggest, perhaps it is a duty to do it. But you alone are qualified for decision, by the whole view which you can command; and so confident am I in the intentions, as well as wisdom, of the government, that I shall always be satisfied that what is not done, either cannot, or ought not to be done. While I trust that no difficulties will dishearten us, I am anxious to lessen the trial as much as possible. Heaven preserve you under yours, and help you through all its perplexities and perversities.
