Фредерик Марриет
Diary in America, Series Two
The downfall of the Roman empire may equally be traced to the undue weight obtained by the people by the appointment of the tribunes, and so it will be proved in almost every instance: the reason why the excess of power is more destructive when in the hands of the people is, that either they, by retaining the power in their own hands, exercise a demoralising despotism, or if they have become sufficient venal, they sell themselves to be tyrannised over in their turn.
I have made these remarks, because I wish to corroborate my opinion, that, “power once gained by the people is never to be recovered, except by bribery and corruption,” and that until then, every grant is only the forerunner of an extension; and that although the undue balance of power of the higher classes occasionally may be, that in the hands of the people is invariably attended by the downfall of the institution.
At the same time, I do not intend to deny the right of the people to claim an extension of their privileges, in proportion as they rise by education to the right of governing themselves; unfortunately these privileges have been given, or taken, previous to their being qualified. A republic is certainly, in theory, the most just form of government, but, up to the present day, history has proved that no people have yet been prepared to receive it.
That there is something very imposing in the present rapid advance of the United States, I grant, but this grandeur is not ascribed by the Americans to its true source: it is the magnificent and extended country, not their government and institutions, which has been the cause of their prosperity. The Americans think otherwise, and, as I have before observed, they are happy in their own delusions—they do not make a distinction between what they have gained by their country, and what they have gained by their institutions. Everything is on a vast and magnificent scale, which at first startles you; but if you examine closely and reflect, you are convinced that there is at present more show than substance, and that the Americans are actually existing (and until they have sufficient labourers to sow and reap, and gather up the riches of their land, must continue to exist) upon the credit and capital of England.
The American republic was commenced very differently from any other, and with what were real advantages, if she had not been too ambitious and too precipitate in seizing upon them. A republic has generally been considered the most primitive form of rule; it is, on the contrary, the very last pitch of refinement in government, and the cause of its failure up to the present has been, that no people have as yet been sufficiently enlightened to govern themselves. Republics, generally speaking, have at their commencement been confined to small portions of territory having been formed by the extension of townships after the inhabitants had become wealthy and ambitious. In America, on the contrary, the republic commenced with unbounded territory—a vast field for ambition and enterprise, that has acted as a safety-valve to carry off the excess of disappointed ambition, which, like steam, is continually generating under such a form of government. And, certainly, if ever a people were in a situation, as far as education, knowledge, precepts and lessons for guidance and purity of manners could enable them, to govern themselves, those were so who first established the American independence.
Fifty years have passed away, and the present state of America I have already shown. From purity of manners, her moral code has sunk below that of most other nations. She has attempted to govern herself—she is dictated to by the worst of tyrannies. She has planted the tree of liberty; instead of its flourishing, she has neither freedom of speech nor of action. She has railed against the vices of monarchical forms of government, and every vice against which she has raised up her voice, is still more prevalent under her own. She has cried out against corruption—she is still more corrupt: against bribery—her people are to be bought and sold: against tyranny—she is in fetters. She has proved to the world that, with every advantage on her side, the attempt at a republic has been a miserable failure, and that the time is not yet come when mankind can govern themselves. Will it ever come? In my opinion, never!
Although the horizon may be clear at present, yet I consider that the prospect of the United States is anything but cheering. It is true that for a time the States may hold together, that they may each year rapidly increase in prosperity and power, but each year will also add to their demoralisation and to their danger. It is impossible to say from what quarter of the compass the clouds may first rise, or which of the several dangers that threaten them they will have first to meet and to oppose by their energies. At present, the people, or majority, have an undue power, which will yearly increase, and their despotism will be more severe in proportion. If they sell their birthright (which they will not do until the population is much increased, and the higher classes are sufficiently wealthy to purchase, although their freedom will be lost) they will have a better chance of happiness and social order. But a protracted war would be the most fatal to their institutions, as it would, in all probability, end in the dismemberment of the Union, and the wresting of their power from the people by the bayonets of a dictator.
The removal of the power and population to the West, the rapid increase of the coloured population, are other causes of alarm and dread; but, allowing that all these dangers are steered clear of, there is one (a more remote one indeed, but more certain), from which it has no escape—that is, the period when, from the increase of population, the division shall take place between the poor and the rich, which no law against entail will ever prevent, and which must be fatal to a democracy.
Mr Sanderson, in his “Sketches of Paris,” observes—“If we can retain our democracy when our back woodlands are filled up; when New York and Philadelphia have become a London and Paris; when the land shall be covered with its multitudes, struggling for a scanty living, or with passions excited by luxurious habits and appetites. If we can then maintain our universal suffrage and our liberty, it will be fair and reasonable enough in us to set ourselves up for the imitation of others. Liberty, as far as we yet know her, is not fitted to the condition of these populous and luxurious countries. Her household gods are of clay, and her dwelling where the icy gales of Alleghany sing through the crevices of her hut.”
I have observed, in my introduction to the first three volumes of this work, that our virtues and our vices are mainly to be traced to the form of government, climate, and circumstances, and I think I can show that the vices of the Americans are chiefly to be attributed to their present form of government.
The example of the Executive is most injurious. It is insatiable in its ambition, regardless of its faith, corrupt in the highest degree; never legislating for morality, but always for expediency. This is the first cause of the low standard of morals; the second is the want of an aristocracy, to set an example and give the tone to society. These are followed by the errors incident to the voluntary system of religion, and a democratical education. To these must be superadded the want of moral courage, arising from the dread of public opinion, and the natural tendency of a democratic form of government to excite the spirit of gain, as the main-spring of action, and the summum bonum of existence.
Dr Channing observes—“Our present civilisation is characterised and tainted by a devouring greediness of wealth; and a cause which asserts right against wealth, must stir up bitter opposition, especially in cities where this divinity is most adored.” “The passion for gain is every where sapping pure and generous feeling, and every where raises up bitter foes against any reform which may threaten to turn aside a stream of wealth. I sometimes feel as if a great social revolution were necessary to break up our present mercenary civilisation, in order that Christianity, now repelled by the almost universal worldliness, may come into new contact with the soul, and may reconstruct society after its own pure and disinterested principles.” Channing’s Letter to Birney, 1837.
All the above evils may be traced to the nature of their institutions; and I hold it as an axiom, that the chief end of government is the happiness, social order, and morality of the people; that no government, however perfect in theory, can be good which in practice demoralises those who are subjected to it. Never was there a nation which commenced with brighter prospects; the experiment has been made and it has failed; this is not their fault. They still retain all the qualities to constitute a great nation, and a great nation, or assemblage of nations, they will eventually become. At present, all is hidden in a futurity much too deep for any human eye to penetrate; they progress fast in wealth and power, and as their weight increases, so will their speed be accelerated, until their own rapid motion will occasion them to split into fragments, each fragment sufficiently large to compose a nation of itself. What may be the eventual result of this convulsion, what may be the destruction, the loss of life, the chaotic scenes of strife and contention, before the portions may again be restored to order under new institutions, it is as impossible to foresee as it is to decide upon the period at which it may take place; but one thing is certain, that come it will, and that every hour of increase of greatness and prosperity only adds to the more rapid approach of the danger, and to the important lesson which the world will receive.
I have not written this book for the Americans; they have hardly entered my thoughts during the whole time that I have been employed upon it, and I am perfectly indifferent either to their censure or their praise. I went over to America well-inclined towards the people, and anxious to ascertain the truth among so many conflicting opinions. I did expect to find them a people more virtuous and moral than our own, but I confess on other points I had formed no opinions; the results of my observations I have now laid before the English public, for whom only they have been written down. Within these last few years, that is, since the passing of the Reform Bill, we have made rapid strides towards democracy, and the cry of the multitude is still for more power, which our present rulers appear but too willing to give them. I consider that the people of England have already as much power as is consistent with their happiness and with true liberty, and that any increase of privilege would be detrimental to both. My object in writing these pages is, to point out the effects of a democracy upon the morals, the happiness, and the due apportionment of liberty to all classes; to shew that if, in the balance of rights and privileges, the scale should turn on one side or the other, as it invariably must in this world, how much safer it is, how much more equitable I may add, it is that it should preponderate in favour of the intelligent and enlightened portion of the nation. I wish that the contents of these pages may render those who are led away by generous feelings and abstract ideas of right, to pause before they consent to grant to those below them what may appear to be a boon, but will in reality prove a source of misery and danger to all parties—that they may confirm the opinions of those who are wavering, and support those who have true ideas as to the nature of government. If I have succeeded in the most trifling degree in effecting these ends, which I consider vitally important to the future welfare of this country—if I have any way assisted the cause of Conservatism—I am content, and shall consider that my time and labour have not been thrown away.
Volume Two—Chapter Eleven
Appendix. Constitution of the United States
We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Article 1.—Section 1
1. All legislative powers herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
Section 2
I. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.
2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three; Massachusetts eight; Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one; Connecticut five; New York six; New Jersey four; Pennsylvania eight; Delaware one; Maryland six; Virginia ten; North Carolina five; South Carolina five; and Georgia three.
4. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill up such vacancies.
5. The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment.
Section 3
1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and each senator shall have one vote.
2. Immediately after they shall be first assembled, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided, as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class, at the expiration of the fourth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year; so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointment until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.
3. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.
5. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President, pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.
7. Judgment, in case of impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.
Section 4
1. The times, places, and manners of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.
2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section 5
1. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorised to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.
2. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.
3. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.
4. Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 6
1. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to or returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
2. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.
Section 7
1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.
2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objection at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If, after such re-consideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.
3. Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, (except on a question of adjournment,) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.
Section 8
The Congress shall have power—
1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States.
2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.
4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalisation, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.
5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof; and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.
6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States.
7. To establish post-offices and post-roads.
8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court: to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations.
10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.
11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.
12. To provide and maintain a navy.
13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.
14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
15. To provide for organising, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and,
17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Section 9
1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.
2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
3. No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed.
4. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.
5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given to any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.
6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditure of all public money shall be published from time to time.
7. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.
Section 10
1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.
2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the neat produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Article 2.—Section 1
1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:
2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding any office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
3. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the said House shall, in like manner, choose the President. But, in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors, shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them, by ballot, the Vice-President.
4. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States.
5. No person, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President: neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.
6. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
7. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.
8. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:—
9. “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
Section 2
1. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
