A war between America and England is always to be deprecated. Notwithstanding that the countries are severed, still the Americans are our descendants; they speak the same language, and (although they do not readily admit it) still look up to us as their mother country. It is true that this feeling is fast wearing away, but still it is not yet effaced. It is true also that, in their ambition and their covetousness, they would destroy the mutual advantages derived by both countries from our commercial relations, that they might, by manufacturing as well as producing, secure the whole profits to themselves. But they are wrong; for great as America is becoming, the time is not yet arrived when she can compete with English capital, or work for herself without it. But there is another reason why a war between the two countries is so much to be deprecated, which is, that is must ever be a cruel and an irritating war. To attack the Americans by invasion will always be hazardous, and must ultimately prove disastrous. In what manner, then, is England to avenge any aggression that may be committed by the Americans? All she can do is to ravage, burn, and destroy; to carry the horrors of war along their whole extended line of coast, distressing the non-combatants, and wreaking vengeance upon the defenceless.
Dreadful to contemplate as this is, and, even more dreadful the system of stimulating the Indian tribes to join us, adding scalping, and the murdering of women and children, to other horrors, still it is the only method to which England could resort, and, indeed, a method to which she would be warranted to resort, in her own behoof. Moreover, in case of a future war, England must not allow it to be of such short duration as was the last; the Americans must be made to feel it, by its being protracted until their commerce is totally annihilated, and their expenses are increased in proportion with the decrease of their means.
Let it not be supposed that England would harass the coasts of America, or raise the Indian tribes against her, from any feeling of malevolence, or any pleasure in the sufferings which must ensue. It would be from the knowledge of the fact that money is the sinews of war; and consequently that, by obliging the Americans to call out so large a force as she must do to defend her coast and to repel the Indians, she would be put to such an enormous expense, as would be severely felt throughout the Union, and soon incline all parties to a cessation of hostilities. It is to touch their pockets that this plan must and will be resorted to; and a war carried on upon that plan alone, would prove a salutary lesson to a young and too ambitious a people. Let the Americans recollect the madness of joy with which the hats and caps were thrown up in the air at New York, when, even after so short a war with England, they heard that the treaty of peace had been concluded; and that too at a time when England was so occupied in a contest, it may be said, with the whole world, that she could hardly divert a portion of her strength to act against America: then let them reflect how sanguinary, how injurious, a protracted war with England would be, when she could direct her whole force against them. It is, however, useless to ask a people to reflect who are governed and ruled by the portion who will not reflect. The forbearance must be on our part; and, for the sake of humanity, it is to be hoped that we shall be magnanimous enough to forbear, for so long as may be consistent with the maintenance of our national honour.
It may be inferred that I naturally directed my attention to everything connected with the American marine, and circumstances eventually induced me to search much more minutely into particulars than at first I had intended to do.
The present force of the American navy is rated as follows:—
Ships of the Line
Frigates, 1st Class.
Frigates, 2nd Class
Sloops
Schooners
Vessels of War of the United States Navy, September 1837.
Ships of the Line
Frigates, 1st Class
Frigates, 2nd Class
Sloops of War
Schooners
Exploring Vessels
The ratings of these vessels will, however, very much mislead people as to the real strength of the armament. The 74’s and 80’s are in weight of broadside equal to most three-decked ships; the first-class frigates are double-banked of the scantling, and carrying the complement of men of our 74’s. The sloops are equally powerful in proportion to their ratings, most of them carrying long guns. Although flush vessels, they are little inferior to a 36-gun frigate in scantling, and are much too powerful far any that we have in our service, under the same denomination of rating. All the line-of-battle ships are named after the several states, the frigates after the principal rivers, and the sloops of war after the towns, or cities, and the names are decided by lot.
It is impossible not to be struck with the beautiful architecture in most of these vessels. The Pennsylvania, rated 120 guns, on four decks, carrying 140, is not by any means so perfect as some of the line-of-battle ships.
Note. The following are the dimensions given me of the ship of the line Pennsylvania:—
Burthen 3366 tons, and has ports for 140 guns, all long thirty-two pounders, throwing 2240 pounds of ball at each broadside, or 4480 pounds from the whole.
The Ohio is, as far as I am a judge, the perfection of a ship of the line. But in every class you cannot but admire the superiority of the models and workmanship. The dock-yards in America are small, and not equal at present to what may eventually be required, but they have land to add to them if necessary. There certainly is no necessity for such establishments or such store-houses as we have, as their timber and hemp are at hand when required; but they ate very deficient both in dry and wet docks. Properly speaking, they have no great naval depot. This arises from the jealous feeling existing between the several states. A bill brought into Congress to expend so many thousand dollars upon the dock-yard at Boston, in Massachusetts, would be immediately opposed by the state of New York, and an amendment proposed to transfer the works intended to their dock-yard at Brooklyn. The other states which possess dock-yards would also assert their right, and thus they will all fight for their respective establishments until the bill is lost, and the bone of contention falls to the ground.
The sheet-anchor, made at Washington, weighs 11,660 pounds
Main-topsail contains 1,531 yards.
The number of yards of canvass for one suit of sails is 18,341, and for bags, hammocks, boat-sails, awnings, etcetera, 14,624; total 32,965 yards.
The Americans considered that in the Pennsylvania they possessed the largest vessel in the world, but this is a great mistake; one of the Sultan’s three-deckers is larger. Below are the dimensions of the Queen, lately launched at Portsmouth
Note. There are seven navy yards belonging to, and occupied for the use of the United States, viz.—The navy yard at Portsmouth, NH, is situated on an island, contains fifty-eight acres, cost 5,500 dollars.
The navy yard at Charlestown, near Boston, is situated on the north side of Charles river, contains thirty-four acres, and cost 32,214 dollars.
The navy yard at New York is situated on Long Island, opposite New York, contains forty acres, and cost 40,000 dollars.
The navy yard at Philadelphia is situated on the Delaware river, in the district of Southwark, contains eleven acres to low water mark, and cost 27,000 dollars.
It is remarkable that along the whole of the eastern coast of America, from Halifax in Nova Scotia down to Pensacola in the Gulf of Mexico, there is not one good open harbour. The majority of the American harbours are barred at the entrance, so as to preclude a fleet running out and in to manoeuvre at pleasure; indeed, if the tide does not serve, there are few of them in which a line-of-battle ship, hard pressed, could take refuge. A good spacious harbour, easy of access, like that of Halifax in Nova Scotia, is one of the few advantages, perhaps the only natural advantage, wanting in the United States.
The American navy list is as follows:—
The pay of these officers is on the following scale. It must be observed, that they do not use the term “half pay;” but when unemployed the officers are either attached to the various dockyards or on leave. I have reduced the sums paid into English money, that they may be better understood by the reader:
The navy yard at Washington, in the district of Columbia, is situated on the eastern branch of the Potomac, contains thirty-seven acres, and cost 4,000 dollars. In this yard are made all the anchors, cables, blocks, and almost all things requisite for the use of the navy of the United States.
The navy-yard at Portsmouth, near Norfolk in Virginia, is situated on the south branch of Elizabeth river contains sixteen acres, and cost 13,000 dollars.
There is also a navy-yard at Pensacola in Florida, which is merely used for repairing ships on the West India station.
It will be perceived by the above list how very much better all classes in the American service are paid in comparison with those in our service. But let it not be supposed that this liberality is a matter of choice on the part of the American government; on the contrary, it is one of necessity. There never was, nor never will be, anything like liberality under a democratic form of government. The navy is a favourite service, it is true, but the officers of the American navy have not one cent more than they are entitled to, or than they absolutely require. In a country like America, where any one may by industry, in a few years, become an independent, if not a wealthy man, it would be impossible for the government to procure officers if they were not tolerably paid; no parents would permit their children to enter the service unless they were enabled by their allowances to keep up a respectable appearance; and in America everything, to the annuitant or person not making money, but living upon his income, is much dearer than with us. The government, therefore, are obliged to pay them, or young men would not embark in the profession; for it is not in America as it is with us, where every department is filled up, and no room is left for those who would crowd in; so that in the eagerness to obtain respectable employment, emolument becomes a secondary consideration. It may, however, be worth while to put in juxtaposition the half-pay paid to officers of corresponding ranks in the two navies of England and America:
My object in making the comparison between the two services is not to gratify an invidious feeling. More expensive as living in America certainly is, still the disproportion is such as must create surprise; and if it requires such a sum for an American officer to support himself in a creditable and gentlemanlike manner, what can be expected from the English officer with his miserable pittance, which is totally inadequate to his rank and station! Notwithstanding which, our officers do keep up their appearance as gentlemen, and those who have no half pay are obliged to support themselves. And I point this out, that when Mr Hume and other gentlemen clamour against the expense of our naval force, they may not be ignorant of one fact, which is, that not only on half-pay, but when on active service, a moiety at least of the expenses necessarily incurred by our officers to support themselves according to their rank, to entertain, and to keep their ships in proper order, is, three times out of four, paid out of their own pockets, or those of their relatives; and that is always done without complaint, as long as they are not checked in their legitimate claims to promotion.
In the course of this employment in the Mediterranean, one of our captains was at Palermo. The American commodore was there at the time, and the latter gave most sumptuous balls and entertainments. Being very intimate with each other, our English captain said to him one day, “I cannot imagine how you can afford to give such parties; I only know that I cannot; my year’s pay would be all exhausted in a fortnight.” “My dear fellow,” replied the American commodore, “do you suppose, that I am so foolish as to go to such an expense, or to spend my pay in this manner; I have nothing to do with them except to give them. My purser provides everything, and keeps a regular account, which I sign as correct, and send home to government, which defrays the whole expenses, under the head of conciliation money.” I do not mean to say that this is requisite in our service: but still it is not fair to refuse to provide us with paint and other articles, such as leather, etcetera, necessary to fit out our ships; thus, either compelling us to pay for them out of our own pockets, or allowing the vessels under our command to look like anything but men-of-war, and to be styled, very truly, a disgrace to the service. Yet such is the well-known fact. And I am informed that the reason why our admiralty will not permit these necessary stores to be supplied is that, as one of the lords of the admiralty was known to say, “if we do not provide them, the captains most assuredly will, therefore let us save the government the expense.”
During my sojourn in the United States I became acquainted with a large portion of the senior officers of the American navy, and I found them gifted, gentleman-like, and liberal. With them I could converse freely upon all points relative to the last war, and always found them ready to admit all that could be expected. The American naval officers certainly form a strong contrast to the majority of their countrymen, and prove, by their enlightened and liberal ideas, how much the Americans, in general, would be improved if they enjoyed the same means of comparison with other countries which the naval officers, by their profession, have obtained. Their partial successes during the late war were often the theme of discourse, which was conducted with candour and frankness on both sides. No unpleasant feeling was ever excited by any argument with them on the subject, whilst the question, raised amongst their “free and enlightened” brother citizens, who knew nothing of the matter, was certain to bring down upon me such a torrent of bombast, falsehood, and ignorance, as required all my philosophy to submit to with apparent indifference. But I must now take my leave of the American navy, and notice their merchant marine.
Before I went to the United States I was aware that a large proportion of our seamen were in their employ. I knew that the whole line of packets, which is very extensive, was manned by British seamen; but it was not until I arrived in the states that I discovered the real state of the case.
During my occasional residence at New York, I was surprised to find myself so constantly called upon by English seamen, who had served under me in the different ships I had commanded since the peace. Every day seven or eight would come, touch their hats, and remind me in what ships, and in what capacity, they had done their duty. I had frequent conversations with them, and soon discovered that their own expression, “We are all here, sir,” was strictly true. To the why and the wherefore, the answer was invariably the same. “Eighteen dollars a-month, sir.” Some of them, I recollect, told me that they were going down to New Orleans, because the sickly season was coming on; and that during the time the yellow fever raged they always had a great advance of wages, receiving sometimes as much as thirty dollars per month. I did not attempt to dissuade them from their purpose; they were just as right to risk their lives from contagion at thirty dollars a-month, as to stand and be fired at a shilling a day. The circumstance of so many of my own men being in American ships, and their assertion that there were no other sailors than English at New York, induced me to enter very minutely into my investigation, of which the following are the results:—
The United States, correctly speaking, have no common seamen, or seamen bred up as apprentices before the mast. Indeed a little reflection will show how unlikely it is that they ever should have; for who would submit to such a dog’s life (as at the best it is), or what parent would consent that his children should wear out an existence of hardship and dependence at sea, when he could so easily render them independent on shore? The same period of time requisite for a man to learn his duty ay an able seaman, and be qualified for the pittance of eighteen dollars per month, would be sufficient to establish a young man as an independent, or even wealthy, land-owner, factor, or merchant. That there are classes in America who do go to sea is certain, and who and what these are I shall hereafter point out; but it may be positively asserted that, unless by escaping from their parents at an early age, and before their education is complete, they become, as it were, lost, there is in the United States of America hardly an instance of a white boy being sent to sea, to be brought up as a foremast man.
It may be here observed that there is a wide difference in the appearance of an English seaman and a portion of those styling themselves American seamen, who are to be seen at Liverpool and other seaports; tall, weedy, narrow-shouldered, slovenly, yet still athletic men, with their knives worn in a sheath outside of their clothes, and not with a lanyard round them, as is the usual custom of English seamen. There is, I grant, a great difference in their appearance, and it arises from the circumstance of those men having been continually in the trade to New Orleans and the South, where they have picked up the buccaneer airs and customs which are still in existence there; but the fact is, that, though altered also by climate, the majority of them were Englishmen born, who served their first apprenticeship in the coasting trade, but left it at an early age for America. They may be considered as a portion of the emigrants to America, having become in feeling, as well as in other respects, bona fide Americans.
The whole amount of tonnage of the American mercantile manner may be taken, in round numbers, at 2,000,000 tons, which may be subdivided as follows:
The American merchant vessels are generally sailed with fewer men than the British calculate five men to one hundred tons, which I believe to be about the just proportion. Mr Carey, in his work, estimates the proportion of seamen in American vessels to be 44 to every one hundred tons, and I shall assume his calculation as correct. The number of men employed in the American mercantile navy will be as follows:—
And now I will submit, from the examinations I have made, the proportions of American and British seamen which are contained in this aggregate of 85,799 men.
In the foreign trade we have to deduct the masters of the ships, the mates, and the boys who are apprenticed to learn their duty, and rise to mates and masters (not to serve before the mast). These I estimate at:—
which, deducted from 30,333, will leave 22,333 seamen in the foreign trade; who, with a slight intermixture of Swedes, Danes, and, more rarely, Americans, may be asserted to be all British seamen.
The next item is that of the men employed in the whale fishery; and, as near as I can ascertain the fact, the proportions are two-thirds Americans to one-third British. The total is 5,633; out of which 3,756 art Americans, and 1,877 British seamen.
The coasting trade employs 39,000 men; but only a small proportion of them can be considered as seamen, as it embraces all the internal river navigation.
The steam navigation employs 6,500 men, of whom of course not one in ten is a seaman.
The fisheries for cod and herring employ about 4,333 men; they are a mixture of Americans, Nova Scotians, and British, but the proportions cannot be ascertained; it is supposed that about one-half are British subjects, i.e. 2,166.
When, therefore, I estimate that the Americans employ at least thirty thousand of our seamen in their service, I do not think, as my subsequent remarks will prove, that I am at all overrating the case.
The questions which are now to be considered are, the nature of the various branches in which the seamen employed in the American marine are engaged, and how far they will be available to America in case of a war.
The coasting trade is chiefly composed of sloops, manned by two or three men and boys. The captain is invariably part, if not whole, owner of the vessel, and those employed are generally his sons, who work for their father, or some emigrant Irishmen, who, after a few months practice, are fully equal to this sort of fresh-water sailing. From the coasting trade, therefore, America would gain no assistance. Indeed, the majority of the coasting trade is so confined to the interior, that it would not receive much check from a war with a foreign country.
The coast fisheries might afford a few seamen, but very few; certainly not the number of men required to man her ships of war. As in the coasting trade, they are mostly owners or partners. In the whale fishery much the same system prevails; it is a common speculation; and the men embarking stipulate for such a proportion of the fish caught as their share of the profits. They are generally well to do, are connected together, and are the least likely of all men to volunteer on board of the American navy. They would speculate in privateers, if they did anything.
From steam navigation, of course, no seamen could be obtained.
Now, as all service is voluntary, it is evident that the only chance America has of manning her navy is from the thirty thousand British seamen in her employ, the other branches of navigation either not producing seamen, or those employed in them being too independent in situation to serve as foremast men. When I was at the different seaports, I made repeated inquiries as to the fact, if ever a lad was sent to sea as foremast-man, and I never could ascertain that it ever was the case. Those who are sent as apprentices, are learning their duty to receive the rating of mates, and ultimately fulfil the office of captains; and it may here be remarked, that many Americans, after serving as captains for a few years, return on shore and become opulent merchants; the knowledge which they have gained during their maritime career proving of the greatest advantage to them. There are a number of free black and coloured lads who are sent to sea, and who, eventually, serve as stewards and cooks; but it must be observed, that the masters and mates are not people who will enter before the mast and submit to the rigorous discipline of a government vessel, and the cooks and stewards are not seamen; so that the whale dependence of the American navy, in case of war, is upon the British seamen who are in her foreign trade and whale fisheries, and in her men-of-war in commission during the peace.
If America brings up none of her people to a seafaring life before the mast, now that her population is upwards of 13,000,000, still less likely was she to have done it when her population was less, and the openings to wealth by other channels were greater: from whence it may be fairly inferred, that, during our continued struggle with France, when America had the carrying trade in her hands, her vessels were chiefly manned by british seamen; and that when the war broke out between the two countries, the same British seamen who were in her employ manned her ships of war and privateers. It may be surmised that British seamen would refuse to be employed against their country. Some might; but there is no character so devoid of principle as the British sailor and soldier. In Dibdin’s songs, we certainly have another version, “True to his country and king,” etcetera, but I am afraid they do not deserve it: soldiers and sailors are mercenaries; they risk their lives for money; if is their trade to do so; and if they can get higher wages they never consider the justice of the cause, or whom they fight for. Now, America is a country peculiarly favourable for those who have little conscience or reflection; the same language is spoken there; the wages are much higher, spirits are much cheaper, and the fear of dejection or punishment is trifling: nay, there is none; for in five minutes a British seaman may be made a bona fide American citizen, and of course an American seaman. It is not surprising, therefore, that after sailing for years out of the American ports, in American vessels, the men, in case of war, should take the oath and serve. It is necessary for any one wanting to become an American citizen, that he should give notice of his intention; this notice gives him, as soon as he has signed his declaration, all the rights of an American citizen, excepting that of voting at elections, which requires a longer time, as specified in each state. The declaration is as follows:—
“That it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign power, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly to Victoria, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to whom he is now a subject.” Having signed this document, and it being publicly registered, he becomes a citizen, and may be sworn to as such by any captain of merchant vessel or man-of-war, if it be required that he should do so.
During the last war with America, the Americans hit upon a very good plan as regarded the English seamen whom they had captured in our vessels. In the daytime the prison doors were shot and the prisoners were harshly treated; but at night, the doors were left open: the consequence was, that the prisoners whom they had taken added to their strength, for the men walked out, and entered on board their men-of-war and privateers.
This fact alone proves that I have not been too severe in my remarks upon the character of the English seamen; and since our seamen prove to be such “Dugald Dalgettys,” it is to be hoped that, should we be so unfortunate as again to come in collision with America, the same plan may be adopted in this country.
Now, from the above remarks, three points are clearly deducible:—
1. That America always has obtained, and for a long period to come will obtain, her seamen altogether from Great Britain.
2. That those seamen can be naturalised immediately, and become American seamen by law.
3. That, under present circumstances, England is under the necessity of raising seamen, not only for her own navy, but also for the Americans; and that, in proportion as the commerce and shipping of America shall increase, so will the demand upon us become more onerous; and that should we fail in producing the number of seamen necessary for both services, the Americans will always be full manned, whilst any defalcation must fall upon ourselves.
And it may be added that, in all cases, the Americans have the choice and refusal of our men; and, therefore, they have invariably all the prime and best seamen which we have raised.
The cause of this is as simple as it is notorious; it is the difference between the wages paid in the navies and merchant vessels of the two nations:
It will be observed, that in the American men-of-war the able-seaman’s pay is only 2 pounds; the consequence is that they remain for months in port without being able to obtain men.
But we must now pass by this cause, and look to the origin of it; or, in other words, how is it that the Americans are able to give such high wages to our seamen as to secure the choice of any number of our best men for their service; and how is it that they can compete with, and even under-bid, our merchant vessels in freight, at the same time that they sail at a greater expense?
This has arisen partly from circumstances, partly from a series of mismanagement on our part, and partly from the fear of impressment. But it is principally to be ascribed to the former peculiarly unscientific mode of calculating the tonnage of our vessels; the error of which system induced the merchants to build their ships so as to evade the heavy channel and river duties; disregarding all the first principles of naval architecture, and considering the sailing properties of vessels as of no consequence.
The fact is, that we over-taxed our shipping.
In order to carry as much freight as possible, and, at the same time, to pay as few of the onerous duties, our mercantile shipping generally assumed more the form of floating bores of merchandise than sailing vessels; and by the false method of measuring the tonnage, they were enabled to carry 600 tons, when, by measurement, they were only taxed as being of the burden of 400 tons: but every increase of tonnage thus surreptitiously obtained, was accompanied with a decrease in the sailing properties of the vessels. Circumstances, however, rendered this of less importance during the war, as few vessels ran without the protection of a convoy; and it must be also observed, that vessels being employed in one trade only, such as the West India, Canada, Mediterranean, etcetera, their voyages during the year were limited, and they were for a certain portion of the year unemployed.
During the war the fear of impressment was certainly a strong inducement to our seamen to enter into the American vessels, and naturalise themselves as American subjects; but they were also stimulated even at that period, by the higher wages, as they still are now that the dread of impressment no longer operates upon them.
It appears, then, that from various causes, our merchant vessels have lost their sailing properties, whilst the Americans are the fastest sailers in the world; and it is for that reason, and no other, that, although sailing at a much greater expense, the Americans can afford to outbid us, and take all our best seamen.