Dodd George
The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan 1856-7-8
The provision that each of the members nominated by the Crown shall be selected as the representative of some particular branch of the service in India, is still more objectionable. Not only would it preclude the nomination of the most distinguished man, if the seat in council appropriated to the department in which he had served were not at the time vacant, but it would introduce a principle which cannot be too strongly deprecated – that of class legislation. The council should comprise the greatest attainable variety of knowledge and experience; but its members should not consider themselves as severally the representatives of a certain number of class interests.
The clause which continues to the Proprietors the power of electing some portion of the council is, so far, deserving of support; and the principle of enlarging the constituency by the addition of persons of a certain length of Indian service and residence is, in itself, unexceptionable; but unless guarded by provisions, such as have never yet been introduced into any electoral system, so large and scattered a constituency as that proposed would greatly add to the inconvenience of canvass: especially as it is not certain that the new electoral body would adopt, from the old, the salutary custom of re-electing, as the general practice, whoever has been once chosen, and has not, by misconduct or incapacity, deserved to forfeit their confidence. The duties of a member of council would be entirely incompatible with a continually-recurring canvass of the constituency.
Respecting the proposition for giving the choice of five members of council to the parliamentary constituencies of five great towns, the Court of Directors can only express a feeling of amazement. It is not the mere fact of election by a multitude that constitutes the benefits of the popular element in government. To produce those benefits, the affairs of which the people are enabled to control the management must be their own affairs. Election by multitudinous bodies, the majority of them of a very low average of education, is not an advantage of popular government, but, on the contrary, one of its acknowledged drawbacks. To assign to such a constituency the control, not of their own affairs, but of the affairs of other people on the other side of the globe, is to incur the disadvantages of popular institutions without any of the benefits. The Court of Directors willingly admit the desirableness, if not necessity, of some provision for including an English element in the Council of India; but a more objectionable mode than the one proposed of attaining the object, could scarcely, in their opinion, be devised.
Besides the provisions which relate to the organ of government in England, the bills contain provisions relating to India itself, which are open to the strongest objection.
The appointments to the councils at Calcutta and at the subordinate presidencies, which are now made by the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Crown, are transferred by both bills to the governor-general, and to the governors of Madras and Bombay. The Court of Directors are convinced that this change would greatly impair the chances of good government in India. One of the causes which has most contributed to the many excellences of Indian administration is, that the governor-general and governors have always been associated with councillors selected by the authorities at home from among the most experienced and able members of the Indian service, and who, not owing their appointments to the head of the government, have generally brought to the consideration of Indian affairs an independent judgment. In consequence of this, the measures of a government, necessarily absolute, have had the advantage, seldom possessed in absolute governments, of being always preceded by a free and conscientious discussion; while, as the head of the government has the power, on recording his reasons, to act contrary to the advice of his council, no public inconvenience can ever arise from any conflict of opinion. These important officers, who, by their participation in the government, form so salutary a restraint on the precipitancy of an inexperienced, or the wilfulness of a despotically tempered, governor-general or governor, are henceforth to be appointed by the great functionary whom they are intended to check. And this restraint is removed, when the necessity for an independent council will be greater than ever; since the power of appointing the governor-general, and of recalling him, is taken away from the Company, and from the body which is to be their substitute. It may be added that the authorities at home have had the opportunity of being acquainted with the conduct and services of candidates for council from the commencement of their career. The governor-general or governor would often have to nominate a councillor soon after their arrival in India, when necessarily ignorant of the character and merits of candidates, and would be entirely dependent on the recommendation of irresponsible advisers.
Another most objectionable provision demands notice, which is to be found only in the second bill. A commission, appointed in England, is to proceed to India, for the purpose of inquiring and reporting on the principles and details of Indian finance, including the whole revenue system, and, what is inseparably involved in it, the proprietary rights and social position of all the great classes of the community. The Court of Directors cannot believe that such a project will be persisted in. It would be a step towards the disorganisation of the fabric of government in India. A commission from England, independent of the local government of the country, deriving its authority directly from the higher power to which the local government is subordinate, and instructed to carry back to the higher power information on Indian affairs which the local government is not deemed sufficiently trustworthy to afford, would give a most serious shock to the influence of the local authorities, and would tend to impress all natives with the belief that the opinions and decisions of the local government are of small moment, and that the thing of real importance is the success with which they can contrive that their claims and objects shall be advocated in England. Up to the present time, it has been the practice of the home government to uphold in every way the authority of the governments on the spot; even when reversing their acts, to do so through the governments themselves, and to employ no agency except in subordination to them.
From this review of the chief provisions of the bills, which embody the attempts of two great divisions of English statesmen to frame an organ of government for India, it will probably appear to the proprietors, that neither of them is grounded on any sufficient consideration of past experience, or of the principles applicable to the subject; that the passing of either would be a calamity to India; and that the attempt to legislate while the minds of leading men are in so unprepared a state, is altogether premature.
The opinion of your Directors is, that by all constitutional means the passing of either bill should be opposed; but that if one or the other should be determined on for the purpose of transferring the administration, in name, from the East India Company to the Crown, every exertion should be used in its passage through committee to divest it of the mischievous features by which both bills are now deformed, and to maintain, as at present, a really independent council, having the initiative of all business, discharging all the duties, and possessing all the essential powers of the Court of Directors. And it is the Court’s conviction, that measures might be so framed as to obviate whatever may be well founded in the complaints made against the present system – retaining the initiative of the council, and that independence of action on their part which should be regarded as paramount and indispensable.
E. I. Company’s Objections to the Third India Bill: June 1858. (See p. 570.)
1. Although the bill which has been newly brought in by her Majesty’s ministers ‘for the better government of India,’ has not yet been formally communicated to the Court of Directors, the Court, influenced by the desire which they have already expressed to give all aid in their power towards rendering the scheme of government, which it is the pleasure of parliament to substitute for the East India Company, as efficient for its purposes as possible, have requested us194 to lay before your lordship,195 and through you before her Majesty’s government, a few observations on some portions of the bill.
2. Having in documents which have been presented to parliament expressed their sentiments fully on all the general features of the subject, the Court refrain from offering any further arguments on points upon which the government and the House of Commons seem to have pronounced a decided opinion. The joint government of a minister and a council, composed in majority of persons of Indian experience, deriving their appointments only partially from ministerial nomination, and all of them holding office on a tenure independent of the minister, is a combination which fulfils to a considerable extent the conditions of a good organ of government for India. The Court would have much preferred that in the constitution of the council more extensive recourse had been had to the elective principle. But if they cannot hope that this course will be adopted, they see many advantages in the provision by which one-half the number, instead of being named by the government, will be selected by a responsible body, intimately connected with India, to whom the qualification of candidates will in general be accurately known, and who will be under strong inducements to make such a choice as will tend to increase the credit and consideration of the body.
3. With regard to the qualifications prescribed for members of council, the Court desire to offer a suggestion. Her Majesty’s present government have, on many occasions, expressed a desire to secure the Crown appointments against the evils of abuse of patronage. The security against such abuse has hitherto consisted in the strict limitation of the appointments to persons who have served a considerable number of years in India. While the Court fully agree with her Majesty’s government in recognising the desirableness of an English element, it does not seem to them advisable that this element should extend to nearly half the council, only a bare majority being reserved for persons of Indian experience. Knowledge of India is, after all, the most important requisite for a seat in the Indian Council; while it is chiefly in the English nominations that there is any present danger lest appointments should be obtained through political or parliamentary influence – from which influence, unless introduced through that channel, the council, like the Court of Directors, may be expected to be altogether free. The Court, therefore, recommend that the qualification of ten years’ Indian service or residence be made imperative on at least two-thirds instead of a mere majority of the fifteen members of council. They also think it questionable if the interests of India will be promoted by the exclusion of the whole of the members of the council from seats in parliament. These are the only modifications which we are requested to suggest in the provisions respecting the composition of the council.
[The remaining objections made by the Directors were little more than a repetition of those made against the first and second bills (given in extenso in a preceding page); and need not be reproduced here. The Directors expressed a dislike or apprehension of the subordinate position in which the Council would be placed; of the autocratic power to be possessed by the Secretary for India; of the transference of the powers of the Secret Committee wholly and solely to him; of the proposed mode of making appointments and exercising patronage; of any disturbance in the mode of auditing accounts; and of the appointment of any Commission of Inquiry in India which should appear derogatory to the dignity of the local governments. Many of these objections were listened to, and were productive of modifications during the discussion of the bill. The result will be seen in the next article of this Appendix.]
Abstract of Act for the Better Government of India – 21 and 22 Vict. cap. 106. – Received Royal Assent August 2, 1858. (See p. 573.)
Transfer of Governing Powers
I. Governing powers transferred from the East India Company to the Crown.
II. All rights, territories, revenues, and liabilities similarly transferred.
III. A Secretary of State to exercise all the governing powers heretofore exercised by Court of Directors, Court of Proprietors, and Board of Control.
IV. Provision concerning sitting of secretary and under-secretary in House of Commons.
V. Concerning re-election of secretaries to House of Commons.
VI. Secretary of State for India to receive salary equal to those of other secretaries of state.
Council of India
VII. A Council of India, of 15 persons, to be formed.
VIII. Court of Directors to elect 7 members of this Council, from among persons possessing certain qualifications; and the Crown to appoint the other 8.
IX. Vacancies among the 8 to be filled up by the Crown; and among the other 7, by election by the Council.
X. Nine members of the Council, at least, must have had not less than ten years’ experience in India.
XI. Members to hold office for life, or during good behaviour.
XII. Members not to sit in parliament.
XIII. Annual salary of £1200 to each member.
XIV. Members may resign; if after ten years’ service, on a pension of £500, subject to certain conditions.
XV. Secretaries and other officers of Company to become officers of Council of India – subject to any changes afterwards made by Privy Council and sanctioned by parliament.
XVI. Secretary in Council to make all subsequent appointments in the home establishment.
XVII. Compensation to such officers of the Company as are not retained permanently by the Council.
XVIII. Any officer of the Company, transferred to the service of the Council, to have a claim to the same pension or superannuation allowance as if the change of government had not taken place.
Duties and Proceedings of the Council
XIX. Council to conduct affairs of India in England; but all correspondence to be in the name of the Secretary of State.
XX. Secretary of State may divide the Council into committees.
XXI. Secretary of State to sit and vote as president, and appoint vice-president.
XXII. Five to be a quorum; meetings convened by Secretary of State not fewer than one each week.
XXIII. Secretary of State to decide questions on which members differ. Any dissentient member may require his opinion to be placed upon record.
XXIV. Secretary’s proceedings to be open to all the Council, except in ‘secret service’ dispatches.
XXV. Secretary to give reasons for any exercise of his veto against the decision of the majority.
XXVI. Secretary allowed to overrule the two preceding clauses in urgent cases.
XXVII. Functions of the ‘secret committee’ transferred to Secretary of State.
XXVIII. Dispatches marked ‘secret’ not to be opened by members of Council.
Appointments and Patronage
XXIX. Of the high appointments in India, some to be made by the Crown, some by the Council, and some by the Governor-general.
XXX. Inferior appointments to be made as heretofore, except transference of patronage from Court of Directors to Council.
XXXI. Special provision for civil service in India.
XXXII. Secretary in Council to make rules for examination of persons intended for junior situations in civil service of India.
XXXIII. Appointments to naval and military cadetships to vest in the Crown.
XXXIV. Competitive examinations for engineers and artillery of the Indian army.
XXXV. A certain ratio of cadetships to be given to the sons of persons who have served in India.
XXXVI. All the other cadetships to be in the gift of the members of the Council, subject to approval; the Secretary of State to have twice as many nominations as an ordinary member.
XXXVII. In all unchanged rules concerning appointments, power of Court of Directors to be vested in Council.
XXXVIII. The same in reference to any dismissal from service.
Transfer of Property
XXXIX. Company’s property, credits, and debits, to revert to the Crown – except the East India Stock and the dividends thereon.
XL. Secretary in Council may buy, sell, or borrow, in the name of the Crown, for the service of India.
Revenues
XLI. Expenditure of revenues in India wholly under Secretary in Council.
XLII. Liabilities of Company, and dividends on India stock, to be borne by Secretary in Council out of revenues of India.
XLIII. Secretary in Council to keep a cash account with the Bank of England, and to be responsible for all payments in relation to India revenue.
XLIV. Transfer of cash balance from the Company to the Council.
XLV. A stock account to be opened at Bank of England.
XLVI. Transfer of stock accounts.
XLVII. Mode of managing Council’s finances at the Bank.
XLVIII. Transfer of Exchequer bills, &c., from Company to Council.
XLIX. Power of issuing bonds, debentures, &c.
L. Provisions concerning forgery.
LI. Regulations of audit department.
LII. The Crown to appoint auditor of Indian accounts, to whom all needful papers are to be sent by Secretary in Council.
LIII. Annual accounts to be furnished to parliament of the revenue and expenditure of India; accompanied by reports on the moral and material progress of the several presidencies.
LIV. War in India to be made known to parliament within a specified period.
LV. India revenues not to pay for wars unconnected with India.
Existing Establishments
LVI. Company’s army and navy transferred to the Crown, but with all existing contracts and engagements holding good.
LVII. Future powers as to conditions of service.
LVIII. All commissions held under the Company to be valid as under the Crown.
LIX. Regulations of service to be subject to future change, if deemed necessary.
LX. Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors cease to hold power in reference to government of India.
LXI. Board of Control abolished.
LXII. Records and archives of Company to be given up to Council – except stock and dividend books.
LXIII. Powers of Governor-general, on assuming duties of that office.
LXIV. Existing enactments and provisions to remain in force, unless specially repealed.
Actions and Contracts
LXV. Secretary in Council may sue and be sued as a body corporate.
LXVI. And may take the place of the Company in any still-pending actions.
LXVII. Treaties and covenants made by the Company to remain binding.
LXVIII. Members not personally liable for such treaties or covenants.
LXIX. A Court of Directors still to exist, but in smaller number than before, and having powers relating only to the management of the Company’s dividend and a few minor subjects.
LXX. Quarterly courts not in future obligatory.
LXXI. Company’s liability ceases, on all matters now taken under the care of the Council.
Saving of Certain Rights of the Company
LXXII. Secretary in Council to pay dividends on India stock out of India revenue.
LXXIII. Dividends to constitute a preferential charge.
Commencement of the Act
LXXIV. Commences thirty days after day of receiving royal assent.
LXXV. Company’s orders to be obeyed in India until the change of government shall have been proclaimed in the several presidencies.
The Indian Mutiny Relief Fund. (See p. 226.)
This noble manifestation of kind feeling towards the sufferers in India, which originated in a public meeting held in London on the 25th of August 1857, assumed munificent proportions during the next following year, when the colonists and Englishmen residing abroad had had time to respond to the appeal made to them. In a report prepared by the Committee, on the 1st of November 1858, it was announced that the sum placed in their charge amounted, up to that time, to £434,729. They had remitted £127,287 to India, there to be distributed by auxiliary local committees; they had assisted sufferers after their return to, or during their residence in, the home country, to the extent of £35,757; and their management expenses had amounted to £6224. There remained, invested at interest, the sum of £265,461, applicable to further cases of need. It is interesting to notice the kind of persons to whom relief was afforded, on account of the varied privations to which the mutiny had subjected them. The sum of £35,757 expended in England, was mostly in donations to the following numbers and classes of persons:
