Arnoldson Klas Pontus
Pax mundi
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
In other ways the European powers have shown that, with a little willingness to do so, they can work together in the interests of peace.
We have an illustrative instance of this in the Danube Commission, which, since 1856, has watched over the traffic in the Delta of the Danube, neutralized by the Treaty of Paris.
This commission, which is composed of members from all the great powers and Turkey and Roumania, and was originally appointed only for a short time, has, in consideration of its great value as an international institution, been renewed from year to year, and has had its power gradually extended. The commission possesses its own flag, its customs and pilotage, its police, its little fleet, and so on. It has for thirty years exercised an almost unlimited power over the mouths of the Danube, has made laws, raised a loan, carried out works, and in many other respects given evidence of the possibility of united co-operation amongst the powers under many changing and intricate international relations.
In the so-called European concert is seen a commencement of an extended co-operation in a similar direction. The war between Servia and Bulgaria was confined within certain limits by the united will of the powers, and Greece was obliged to subdue her fierce military ardour.
Again, so far as concerns such coalitions as it is evident are not formed for the whole of Europe, but are said to aim at securing peace by accumulating forces, it could hardly be expected, from their very nature, that they would fulfil the alleged design in themselves. But, on the other side, it would be short-sighted to overlook their importance as a link in the gradually progressive development of the interests of various nations in the common concerns of Europe. One token in this direction is the proposal which was brought forward in the beginning of 1888 by a number of deputies in the Austrian Parliament, urging the Government, after procuring the consent of the Hungarian Government, to initiate negotiations with Germany for the purpose of getting a Germano-Austrian Alliance adopted by the Parliaments of both realms, and constitutionally incorporated in the fundamental law of both States. This proposal may have hardly any practical result, but it is worth notice as one of the small rays of light which from time to time point the way to a common goal.
Thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for disarmament which now and then crop up, but which, quite naturally, fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of arbitration does not prevail in Europe.
"Europe's only salvation is a general disarmament," cries the illustrious Frenchman Jules Simon, and yet louder the Italian ex-minister, Bonghi. The latter a distinguished Conservative statesman, utters these powerful words in the International Review (Rome).
"The ideas of peace, which I have just expressed and which are also entertained by the masses, sound almost like a jest in the menaces of war which we hear around us. And they are ridiculous if the policy which the Government follows is considered serious. The great thing is to be able to guess how long the ludicrous shall be regarded as serious, and the serious as ludicrous; and how long a proceeding so devoid of sound reason as that of the great European powers will be counted as sense. I, for my part, am persuaded that such a confusion as to the meaning of the words cannot endure continually, and that the present condition of things, whether people will or not, must soon cease. But we ought not to wait until the change is brought about by violence, nor indeed till it comes by violence from – below. Dynasties must give heed to this, and must hold me responsible for saying it – I, who am a royalist by conviction."
In the English House of Commons, Mr. A. Illingworth, May 30th, 1889, questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. W.H. Smith, "Whether the Government had recently made a proposal to the continental Governments that they should agree upon a considerable and early reduction of armaments? and with what result? And if not, whether Her Majesty's Government would without delay initiate such negotiations, having for their object to lessen the military burdens and the dangers which menace the peace of Europe."
In his answer the First Lord of the Treasury26 said: "If any favourable opportunity manifested itself, the Government would have pleasure in using its influence in the direction indicated by the honourable member. But the questioner should bear in mind, that an interference in a question of this sort often does more harm than good to the object he wishes to attain. I can assure him that the Government is as deeply impressed with this question as himself, and it has often expressed its view in the House, that the present armed condition of Europe is a great misfortune and a danger to the peace of the world."
In the German Parliament, also, similar utterances may be heard; in the latest instance from one of the Centre, Reichensperger, who in the military debate, June 28th, 1890, expressed the wish that they could set in motion a general disarmament. The speaker had certainly spoken in favour of the Government bill for adding 18,000 men to the peace footing of the army. But he wished alongside of that to say, that as the decision of the Emperor in summoning a conference of working men from all parts of Europe had been greeted with applause, so would the civilized world, with still greater applause greet the tidings that William II. had advocated a general disarmament.
Many entertain the belief that the first condition of such a disarmament must be to absolve the rulers themselves from the dangerous power they possess in being able at their discretion to declare war, conclude peace, and make alliances one with another for warlike aims.
In our country many propositions have been brought forward for limiting this power especially with regard to the concluding of treaties without so much as consulting the whole Swedish Cabinet.
As is well known, even in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, the royal power did not extend beyond the king having to consult the Riksdag, and to obtain its consent, whether he were engaging in a war or entering into an alliance with foreign powers. The absolute monarchs seized upon greater power, and the law-makers of 1809 simply ratified this dangerous extension of it.
Now we are unceasingly told, when the subject of defence is on, about sacrifices. They declare to us that no sacrifice should be esteemed too great. The State has the right of enlisting soldiers by compulsion, fathers, husbands and sons, for the defence of the country; and not only when it is really a question of defence, but when it is a matter of preparation for defence, that is drill, even if this extend to years of barrack life in time of peace.
These are the sacrifices demanded from the people.
There are those who think, would it not be much better if the people, on their side, demanded a little security that the country should not be far too thoughtlessly plunged into war – war which can no longer be carried on by paid volunteers, but with members of families conscripted by force, by means of compulsory service?
Such security could be effected by changing the formulas of government §§ 12 and 13, and the constitutional law § 26, partly so that the conclusion of treaties should require the confirmation of a united meeting of the Swedo-Norse cabinet councils, and partly also, that certain treaties, namely such as include a greater political intricacy, should be subjected to the confirmation of the Riksdag and the Storting, as has been the case with certain treaties of commerce – bagatelles in comparison with the entanglement of the kingdoms in war.
It is simply an assertion, refuted by experience, that the king cannot make use of the law here treated of.
During the Crimean war, according to a treaty, we should have been entangled in the war, had not the Peace of Paris intervened. So also during the last Dano-German war, when interference on our part, as the result of a treaty, would have taken place, had not the death of King Frederic VII. occurred.
The same thing would have happened during the last Franco-German war, if the battle of Wörth had not thrown out the reckoning, according to a treaty which entailed our interference. Into all these treaties the king could enter without giving the whole Cabinet the opportunity of expressing its opinion.
The danger of such a power begins to be increasingly felt, especially in England. In 1886, Henry Richard raised in the House of Commons the question of abolishing the right of the sovereign to declare war without the consent of Parliament. The proposition was certainly rejected, but with the large minority of 109 against 115 votes. That the proposition could gather round it such a minority may certainly be regarded as a remarkable sign of the times. In 1889, W.R. Cremer made a similar motion in the House. He proposed that a "parliamentary committee should be chosen to examine and arrange foreign matters, which were then to be laid before Parliament." This proposal fell through but progress was made, and Mr. Cremer still awaits a suitable occasion for renewing it.
A characteristic expedient is pointed out by the well-known Belgian professor of political economy, de Molinari, in an article published in the Times.
He shows, in the first place, how solidarity among the civilized States of the world has lately increased in a marvellous degree, for not long ago the foreign trade of a civilized nation and the capital invested in other States was of very small importance. Each country produced nearly all the requisites for its own consumption, and employed its capital in its own undertakings. In 1613, the whole of England's imports and exports amounted to only five million pounds sterling. A hundred years later, indeed, the united foreign trade of the whole of Europe did not amount to so much as the present foreign trade of little Belgium. Still more unimportant were the foreign loans. Holland was the only country whose capitalists lent to foreign Governments, and persons were hardly to be found who ventured to put their money into industrial undertakings in foreign lands, or even beyond the provinces in which they dwelt. Consequently at that time a neutral State suffered little or no injury when two States were at war. A quarrel between France and Spain or Germany then did no more harm to English interests than a war between China and Japan would do now.
At present it is quite otherwise. Trade and capital have in our day become international. While the foreign traffic of the civilized world two hundred years ago did not exceed one hundred millions sterling, it runs up now to about five thousand millions; and foreign loans have augmented in the same degree. In every country there is a constantly increasing portion of the population dependent for its subsistence upon relations with other peoples, either for the manufacture or exportation of goods, or for the importation of foreign necessaries. In France a tenth part of the population is dependent in this way upon foreign countries, a third in Belgium, and in England probably not far from a third.
So long as there is peace, this increasing community of interests is a source of well-being, and advances civilization; but if a war breaks out, that which was a blessing is turned into a common ill. For, not to mention the burden which preparations for defence impose upon the neutral nations, they suffer from the crisis which war causes in the money market, and from the cessation or curtailing of their trade with the belligerent powers.
From these facts, de Molinari deduces a principle of justice – Neutral States have the right to forbid a war, as it greatly injures their own lawful interests.
If two duellists fight out their quarrel in a solitary place, where nobody can be injured by their balls or swords, they may be allowed without any great harm to exercise their right of killing. But if they set to work to shoot one another in a crowded street, no one can blame the police if they interfere, since their action exposes peacable passers-by to danger. It is the same with war between States. Neutral States would have small interest in hindering war, if war did not do them any particular harm; and under those circumstances their right to interfere might be disputed. But when, as is now the case, war cannot be carried on without menacing a great and constantly increasing portion of the interests of neutrals, yes, even their existence, their right to come in and maintain order is indisputable.
The worst is that, after all, the belligerent nation itself never decides its own fate. That is settled by a few politicians and military men, who have quite other interests than those of business. It is often done by a single man; and it may be said without exaggeration, that the world's peace depends upon the pleasure of three or four men, sovereigns or ministers, who can any day, at their discretion, let slip all the horrors of war. They can thereby bring measureless misery and ills upon the whole civilized world's peaceable industries, not excepting even those of neutral nations, with whom they have nothing to do. The most absolute despots of the rude old times had no such power.
Self-interests of purely political nature give the neutral States, especially the smaller ones, the right to do what they can to prevent war between other powers; because it is an old experience that war among the great powers readily spreads itself to the little ones.
De Molinari states further that the neutral States may so much the more easily ward off all this evil, as they have not only the right, but also the power, if they would set themselves to do it.
Thereupon he unfolds his proposition: —
"With England at the head, and with Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark as members, there might be formed a confederation, 'The Neutral League,' for the purpose of attacking any of the other powers who should begin a war, and of helping the attacked. The States named have a united strength of 460,000 men, and can place on a war footing 1,200,000. To these may be added the fleets of England, Holland and Denmark, which together form the strongest naval power in the world."27
Suppose that a complication takes place between two great powers on the continent of Europe – Germany, France, Austria, or Russia – there can be no doubt that if the "League" united its strength with the threatened power, that power would become thereby so superior to its opponent that victory would be certain.
For this reason a peaceable interference on the part of the League before the war broke out, would make the most warlike amongst the powers consider.
But the fact that no State could stir up a war without meeting a crushing superior force would lead to a constant and lasting state of peace, and disarmament.
De Molinari thinks his plan would be advanced by forming an association in the countries named, which should work for an agreement between them in the above-named direction.
The proposition will never of itself lead to any practical result. But it is at least useful in having pointed out the growing interest which neutral powers have in maintaining peace unmolested. This interest shows itself already in general politics in the zealous pains with which, on the outbreak of war, all powers not implicated unite to "localize" war, that is, to limit it to as few partisans, and to as, small an area, as possible. The peace interests of neutral States become year by year more powerful factors in politics.
Here we must bear in mind that more States are continually passing over into the condition of unconsciously forming "a neutral league." They are approaching the goal which they have long been striving after by arms and by diplomacy. "They are," to quote Bismarck, "satisfied and do not strive for more." Such States are Germany and Italy, which have achieved their unity, and Hungary, which has gained its freedom.
Nevertheless all great causes of war are not thereby eradicated from Europe.
In the forenamed article by the Russian jurist, Kamarowski, light is thrown upon this circumstance with scientific clearness.
He says respecting Germany, that this country has essentially realized its national unity, and thereby reached a justifiable object; but at the same time has been guilty of two serious violations of the principles of international right.
"It carried on the war against France with an inflexible and altogether unnecessary severity, and it tore from that State Elsass-Lothringen."
The attempt is certainly made to justify this by the fact that both these provinces formerly belonged to Germany, and that it was an absolute necessity for Germany to acquire a military guarantee against a fresh attack on the part of France.
Kamarowski shows both these grounds to be untenable. If nations should continually look back to the past, and strive to renew the old conditions, they never could found a more durable or righteous state of things in the present.
What ought to be decisive is, that in these unhappy provinces the sympathy of the great part of the population is completely on the side of France.
The possession of Strasburg and Metz has not only failed to give Germany the anticipated security; it has, on the other hand, compelled the Germans to live since 1871 in perpetual unrest; to keep on foot an immense army, and to expend their last resources in building fortresses. Besides, this possession cripples German activity in both internal and external political questions. The situation of France is equally unenviable; constantly kept in suspense, and with the feeling of having been unjustly treated, and longing for revenge. Is it possible, with this deadly hatred between two of Europe's most civilized states, to think of a lasting peace?
And what can the Governments of these nations do with respect to this evil, unless they set themselves to eradicate it?
Kamarowski proposes three different solutions of the question of Elsass-Lothringen. A European congress might arrange the destiny of these provinces, by dividing them, for example, so that Elsass should remain united to Germany, and Lothringen to France; or by forming them into two or more cantons united to Switzerland; or lastly, by letting them become an independent State with a self-chosen mode of government, but with the sine quâ non that they shall be neutralized, and placed under the guarantee of combined Europe.
It would be almost immaterial to Europe which of these three expedients were chosen; therefore the choice might be left to the inhabitants of Elsass-Lothringen themselves; and the opportunity might be given them of expressing themselves by a plebiscite, uncontrolled by any influence from either the French or German side.
This naturally affects Danish South Jutland in an equal degree, which Germany wrenched from Denmark by a gross breach of international law. That the writer does not adduce this instance may be simply because he does not regard it as involving any danger of war.
Kamarowski finds this to be much more pronounced with regard to the Eastern Question.
This is more threatening than that of Elsass-Lothringen. Ever since the close of the last century the Turkish Empire has, on account of its internal condition, been doomed to fall to pieces, and its final dissolution is only a question of time. It is difficult to say what is to be done with the remains.
The only reasonable and righteous settlement is to allow the Christian peoples who were in the past subjected by the Turks, and who compose the great majority of the population in European Turkey, to form independent States. Manifold causes have hitherto prevented the organization of the political life of these nations, shorn of political maturity in consequence of protracted thraldom, mutual jealousy, and influences of the great powers, who under all manner of excuses have played their own game at the cost of these people, pretending to protect them, while they sought to make them into their subjects. Russia has doubtless, even if unintentionally, in the greatest degree helped to set these nations free, and to produce the present position by which Servia and Roumania have been changed, from being subject to Turkey, into independent States; and Bulgaria, instead of being a Turkish province, has now a less subject position as regards Turkey. "It is," says the writer, "not altogether without reason that the Russians accuse their Southern Sclav brethren of ingratitude"; but he admits that Russia ought partly to blame herself. She has, for instance, at times shown a decided inclination to force her forms of thought and policy upon them, and to get the whole of their inner national life placed under her authority. This action of Russia is blameworthy, both because it violates the independence which belongs of right to every State, and because it is foolishly opposed to Russia's own well-known interests. By such a policy she can only betray her Sclav mission, create more than one new Poland for herself, and artificially shift her political power from north to south, thereby weakening her national strength.
Kamarowski further describes the selfish schemes of England and Austria in the Balkan peninsula.
These plans are even more distasteful to the Christian population than Russia's, because it stands in the closest relation to that country both as to race and a common religion. England and Austria seek to entice this people by the prospect of freer institutions and greater economic well-being but they can only drag them into their net at the cost of their national and moral independence. And the jealousy between these powers, Russia on the one hand and Austria and England on the other, each wanting to get the advantage, or to possess itself of the remains of the dying realm, is a standing menace to the peace of Europe. This danger would disappear if people could be satisfied to let these nations belong to themselves.
Now that Austria has carried out the injunction laid upon her by the Berlin Congress – for the present to undertake the management and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina – she ought to withdraw from these provinces, whose population should be allowed to decide their own fate by universal suffrage, whether this would result in the union of Bosnia with Servia, and of Herzegovina with Montenegro, or whether the situation should be arranged in some other way. All that Austria has any ground for requiring is, the free navigation of the Danube and the straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), and therewith her true interests in this region would be abundantly satisfied.
The Christian States which, alongside of Turkey, have spread over the Balkan peninsula, are Greece, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. The last named still stands in subjection to Turkey, but has the same right to full independence as the neighbour States. It is evidently their vocation to divide amongst themselves the remains of Turkey in Europe, for their population in an overwhelming proportion consists of Southern Sclavs and Greeks. But unhappily they seem to have little conception of this their task, because they live in a constant state of jealousy and bickering. These States are all only just in the embryo. They have not yet by a long way attained their natural boundaries. A large number of Greeks and Bulgarians are still under the direct government of Turkey. It would be labour lost to attempt to guess how many small States will form themselves out of the ruins of Turkey, or what political form they will take. The author remarks that it would be best for them to arrange themselves into one or more confederations with self-government for each single State composing this alliance.
Europe, in harmony with international justice, should see to it: (1) that the peoples of the Balkan peninsula should not become the prey of any foreign power; (2) that they should not be allowed to trespass upon each other's domains; (3) that their development should as far as possible proceed in a peaceful and law-abiding way; (4) that they should divide the inheritance of Turkey in a thoroughly just manner, so that the political boundaries should be marked out in harmony with the wishes and interests of the inhabitants; (5) that they themselves do not invade the domains of other States, and that they recognise all the maxims of international justice.
A European congress, co-operating in such an arrangement of the conditions of the Balkan peninsula, would contribute in no small degree to remove the causes of war in Europe, and would do effective work in the cause of freedom and civilization. Greece would acquire all the islands of the Archipelago, together with Candia and Cyprus. Macedonia would, according to the conditions of its nationalities, be divided between Greece and Bulgaria. The natural boundary of the latter would be the Danube on the one side and the Archipelago on the other. Constantinople would remain the capital of a Bulgarian kingdom, or of a Southern Sclav federation; or again, a free city with a small independent territory.28 The fortifications on both sides the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be destroyed, and both these straits be thrown open to the navigation of all nations.
After being obliterated from the list of European nations, Turkey would peacefully continue its existence in Asia.
But not even so are all the causes of war removed from our continent. Many are to be found in the relations between Russia and England especially two, says Kamarowski.
One is the opposition between the dissimilar forms of government in these countries. England is the advocate of liberal social institutions all over the continent, but Russia poses as the mainstay of unlimited sovereign power and of conservative principles. Yet doubtless Russia will sooner or later, with a firmness and consistency hitherto lacking, strike into the path of political reform, and then this contrast will be assimilated.
The other consists in the opposing interests of the two powers upon the Eastern Question. But if this question is solved as the author proposes, by the whole Balkan peninsula being permitted to form itself into independent States under the guarantee of united Europe, this cause of strife would also be removed. Russia need no longer threaten India. Russia's true well-being can never consist in spreading herself over the deserts and wastes of Asia, or in the endless compulsory subjection of hostile races under her. She will doubtless in time perceive this.
Historical facts have already marked out the domain of both realms and the boundaries of their influence. The greater part of Southern Asia is more or less subjected to England. The whole of Northern and Central Asia belongs to Russia. Russia and England have a common mission in Asia – to promote the Christian civilization of the world; and in this direction each has her special call.
Also in the relations between Russia and Germany are found indeed inflammable materials; but with wise action on both sides they may be got rid of.
Russia has, more than any other power, promoted the unity and powerful position of Germany. Except during the strife between the Empress Elizabeth and Frederic II., constant friendly relations have obtained between Russia and Prussia; so, under Frederick II. and Catherine II., and during Prussia's struggle against Napoleon I. while the friendship between Alexander II. and William I. made possible the wars of 1866 and 1870-71. The House of Hohenzollern, which has never been any friend of popular freedom, felt drawn to Russia upon the ground of its devotion to conservative modes of thought and its absolutism.
But since Prussia has realized her goal – that of being the leading power in Germany – the relations with Russia have become more and more strained.
One of the chief causes has been the disputes caused by economic questions, and that of the customs in particular.
In addition to this is the general misunderstanding fomented by the press. The political press, says Kamarowski, ought to serve the cause of peace to-day more than ever. Unhappily it by no means does. With few exceptions it helps to fan and feed national hatred, and to stir up enmity between the European States. Most of the principal organs have a narrower horizon than this. Some of these papers and periodicals are worked only as business undertakings, to make the greatest possible profit to the shareholders; the best of them defend with gross one-sidedness the interests of their own country; seldom do they disclose any insight into great, purely humanitarian interests. The political press is, therefore, for the most part a constant source of reciprocal suspicion and hatred, which hinders the States of Europe from entering into the condition of peace they all inwardly so long for. Dip at random into a heap of most of the great papers, and you will find the strangest ideas respecting international justice; rank self-assertion in judgment, and purely barbarous sentiments respecting subjugating and destroying so-called hereditary enemies.
Lastly, there is a cause of tension between Russia and Germany in their opposing attitude with regard to the Sclav question; and if a satisfactory solution is not found for this question in a peaceable way, a crowd of complications will arise, into which Russia will inevitably be drawn.
We have first the Polish question. In our day Russia is entering, through the power of circumstances, more and more into her historic vocation of giving freedom and unity to the Sclavs. But this undertaking stands in direct opposition to the policy which was expressed in the partition of Poland.
Russia's future rôle may be to favour a confederation of all the Sclav peoples. Her true mission cannot be to subdue or trample down any Sclav nationality, but much rather to emancipate them all. Emancipate from what? From the yoke of Turkey and of Germany. So far as the former is concerned, a great part of the work has been already carried out. With regard to the Germans, Russia cannot think of the restoration of the disputed and long obliterated boundaries of the Sclav races, which were lost in the struggle with the Germans; but she may assist the organization of the bodies politic of the Sclav races, and co-operate in revivifying those branches of the nation which are not altogether dead.