Андрей Тихомиров
International relations in Europe in the 17th century
French hegemony
If in the 16th century Spain played the first role in the international relations of Europe, then in the 17th century we can talk about the real hegemony of France. France emerged from the period of great civil unrest in the second half of the 16th century as a strong and established absolute monarchy. The numerous and hardworking peasantry of France and the rich bourgeoisie provided the treasury with enormous funds in the form of taxes. These funds allowed the French king and his nobility to pursue an energetic foreign policy and put France first in Europe. The experience of the long and ruinous wars of the 16th century, which ended in the civil war in France, was not in vain. Any desire of the new state to expand was met with resistance from other similar states; any claim to conquest, and even more so to world domination (on the scale of the 16th century) evoked hostile coalitions. Politicians and diplomats of the 17th century, summarizing this experience, formulated a number of provisions that had the character of international principles. True, these principles were very often violated. Nevertheless, it was precisely these systematic violations, given the extreme instability of international relations of that time, that caused the need for some kind of norm. In particular, the ideas of “natural boundaries” and “political balance” had such a “normative” character.
Politicians – contemporaries of Henry IV and, first of all, his chief assistant Sully – constantly emphasized that you can only capture what can be preserved. The power of the state has its limits: having crossed them, it provokes against itself the united forces of enemies and envious people. Sully in his famous memoirs “Principles of State Economy” wrote: “Every king of France should rather think about acquiring friends and allies firmly connected with him by common interests – and this is the most reliable connection – than attract unquenchable hatred and enmity with projects that exceed his own strength.” “You strive,” says the remarkable French diplomat Etienne Pasquier in his dialogue between the philosopher and the sovereign, “to give good borders to your state; It is necessary that you first set proper boundaries for your hopes and desires.”
Where to look for these boundaries? Sully knows well that Charlemagne restored the empire, and that under the Capetians France was confined to “narrow state borders, in which it remains to this day.” He states that France has a natural border in the south – the Pyrenees. He understands perfectly well that returning France to its former glory means returning “the neighboring territories that once belonged to it,” i.e. Savoy, Franche-Comté, Lorraine, Gennegau, Artois, the Netherlands. “But is it possible to claim all this without arousing the hatred of enemies and ruinous wars? And the French kings themselves have such an ambition that for France is worse than all the hatred of foreigners.” France is well-fed: it is strong enough not to be afraid of anyone and to be terrible for everyone. However, Sully also dreamed of French hegemony over the civilized world, over all Christian peoples. This is where one strange draft of an international agreement comes from, which Sully attributed to his king, but probably composed himself. The “great plan” of King Henry IV was, according to Sully, to reduce the Habsburgs to the level of sovereigns of one Iberian Peninsula, drive the Turks and Tatars to Asia, restore the Byzantine Empire and then redraw the entire political map of Europe. Europe will be divided into six hereditary monarchies, five elective monarchies and five republics. At the head of all these states a special council will be placed, which will protect the general peace and resolve disputes between states, between sovereigns and their subjects. The president of this unique republic of Christian states will be the pope; France will be his first minister. Sully's secret thought behind this entire seventeenth-century League of Nations project was clear. To weaken the enemies of France, to strengthen her vassals, to surround her with a belt of neutral states that would legally be under her protection, and in fact under her command – this was this fantastic “grand design” of the first servant of King Henry IV.
Sully's plan is known only from his memoirs. The reality was far from such projects. This was demonstrated by King Henry IV himself with his practical policies, and even more so by his brilliant successor, the greatest of the noble politicians of absolutist France, Cardinal Richelieu.
