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Dimitrius Parker

Competitive Democracy Theoretical Foundations and Institutional Model

Scientific Monograph

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«Издательские решения»

Parker D.

Competitive Democracy Theoretical Foundations and Institutional Model. Scientific Monograph / D. Parker — «Издательские решения»,

This monograph analyzes D. Parker's concept of «Competitive Democracy» — a model combining meritocracy and direct democracy. All leadership positions are filled through open competitive contests. Citizens vote on bills directly or delegate their reversible vote to political parties as competing expert centers. The citizen is regarded as the owner of the state, with a right to a share of state revenues. This work is intended for researchers, lecturers, and students in political science.

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Competitive Democracy Theoretical Foundations and Institutional Model Scientific Monograph

Dimitrius Parker

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D. PARKER'S COMPETITIVE DEMOCRACY: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS, INSTITUTIONAL MODEL, AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

2026
Scientific Monograph

Dimitrius Parker

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INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the Study

Contemporary political systems are developing amid the simultaneous growing complexity of public-administration mechanisms, rising public expectations regarding the quality of public services, and expanding technological opportunities for direct citizen participation in political decision-making. The digitalisation of public administration, the development of electronic voting, social networks, and platform-based forms of political communication create the preconditions for reconsidering the traditional division between citizens and institutions of political representation.

The question of whether existing models of democracy can simultaneously ensure effective public administration, political competition, direct citizen participation in lawmaking, executive accountability, and institutional incentives for the state's long-term development has become particularly relevant. In traditional representative democracies, citizens primarily participate in the formation of political power through periodic elections of representatives, while their direct participation in drafting and adopting laws is substantially limited. At the same time, the increasing complexity of public tasks makes the professional competence of decision-makers more important.

It is at the intersection of these problems that the concept of «Competitive Democracy» emerges. It is presented in the work under examination, *The State Franchise. Competitive Democracy*, by D. Parker (2026, Ridero). The book defines it as a universal system of state governance based on the competitive allocation of leadership positions and citizens' direct access to lawmaking, oriented towards achieving a high standard of living, security, and a favourable psychological environment. The concept envisages the possibility of applying the proposed institutions modularly in different states.

A fundamental feature of the proposed model is its attempt to combine the meritocratic principle of selecting managers with the democratic principle of direct citizen participation. In particular, it proposes that the highest executive authority be constituted through an open, multi-stage competition, while citizens are given the opportunity to participate directly in legislative decision-making. The concept expressly distinguishes the functions of the General Manager and the President: the former is regarded primarily as the professional head of state, while the latter is responsible for institutional oversight of the transparency and independence of key systems.

Another significant element is the proposed transformation of political representation. According to the concept, the traditional body of elected deputies is replaced by direct electronic voting by citizens on draft laws. At the same time, citizens retain the option of delegating their votes to a political party. This implies a transformation of the parties themselves: from predominantly electoral organisations into expert-political centres competing for citizens' trust.

Thus, the relevance of this study is determined by the need for political-science analysis of a model that proposes reconsidering several fundamental principles of contemporary representative democracy: the mechanism for forming the executive, the nature of political representation, forms of citizen participation in lawmaking, the system of political incentives, and the relationship between democratic legitimacy and the professional competence of managers.

The concept's international dimension is also significant. In the work under examination, states are viewed not only as domestic political orders but also as competing models of social organisation capable of attracting human capital, economic resources, technology, and political influence. In this respect, «Competitive Democracy» claims relevance not merely as a means of reforming individual state institutions, but also as a potentially universal model of state organisation.

Aim of the Study

The aim of this study is to analyse D. Parker's concept of «Competitive Democracy» from a political-science perspective as a proposed model for organising state power, and to identify its institutional structure, theoretical foundations, differences from classical models of democracy, and political-institutional potential.

Research Objectives

To achieve this aim, the study sets out to:

— reconstruct the main propositions of «Competitive Democracy» and identify its basic institutional elements;

— examine the proposed mechanism for constituting the executive through competition, including the institutions of the General Manager and the President;

— analyse the concept of direct citizen participation in lawmaking and the proposed model for delegating votes to political parties;

— investigate the anticipated transformation of political parties if traditional representation by elected deputies is abandoned;

— examine the proposed electronic voting system and its transparency and audit mechanisms;

— compare the principal propositions of «Competitive Democracy» with the theoretical approaches of J. Schumpeter, R. Dahl, the Public Choice school, and other theories;

— identify similarities and differences between the model under examination and the concepts of competitive democracy, polyarchy, political representation, and rational choice;

— analyse the proposed political and economic incentive mechanisms, including executive remuneration and limits on terms of office;

— consider the concept as a modular model of institutional reform that can be adapted gradually to different national contexts. The book emphasises the need to take each country's specific characteristics into account and to pursue an evolutionary rather than a coercive transition;

— identify the principal theoretical opportunities and potential institutional problems of the proposed model.

Object of the Study

The object of the study is the modern state's political system and the institutions through which state power is organised and exercised amid the development of digital technologies and the expansion of mechanisms for citizen political participation.

Subject of the Study

The subject of the study is D. Parker's concept of «Competitive Democracy», including its proposed mechanisms for the competitive selection of state leaders, direct citizen participation in lawmaking, delegation of political votes, the functioning of political parties, electronic voting, institutional oversight, and the creation of incentives for effective public administration.

Research Methods

The methodological foundation of the study consists of a combination of general scientific and specialised methods of political analysis.

The institutional method is used to examine the structure of the proposed political system and the distribution of powers among the General Manager, the President, citizens, political parties, and judicial, audit, and competition-related institutions.

The comparative political-science method is applied to compare «Competitive Democracy» with existing and theoretically developed models of democracy. Particular importance is attached to comparison with J. Schumpeter's conception of democracy as competition among political elites, R. Dahl's concept of polyarchy, and the propositions of public choice theory.

The systems method makes it possible to consider «Competitive Democracy» not as a set of separate reforms, but as an interconnected political-institutional system in which changes to the formation of the executive are linked to changes in the legislative process, party system, voting, and mechanisms of public oversight.

Structural-functional analysis is used to identify the functions of the proposed institutions and examine their interrelationships. For example, the separation of the General Manager and the President in the concept is analysed through the distinction between their respective functions: professional state management and institutional oversight.

Conceptual analysis is applied to reconstruct the principal concepts of the model, including «competition», «competitive democracy», «Competitive Democracy», «management franchise», «direct lawmaking», «vote delegation», «favourable psychological environment», and «freedom index».

Normative analysis is used to examine the values and objectives of the concept, including effective public administration, political equality, freedom, security, transparency, and citizen participation.

In addition, comparative theoretical analysis is used to determine Parker's concept's place in relation to existing currents of political thought. At the same time, the author's normative proposals are deliberately distinguished from their possible empirical consequences: the effects claimed by the concept are treated in this study as hypotheses to be tested through political-science research, rather than as established facts.

Source Base and Theoretical Framework

The primary source for the study is the author's work under examination, *The State Franchise. Competitive Democracy*, by D. Parker (2026), which sets out the main propositions of the proposed model of state organisation. The source base is supplemented by the author's own ideas. The work provides a conceptual definition of the system and describes mechanisms for constituting the executive, the legislative process, political parties, electronic voting, competitive selection of leaders, and a number of socio-economic institutions.

Particular importance as a source is attached to the section devoted to competition between states. It treats state systems as competing governance models capable of competing for human capital, markets, resources, and financial and scientific-technological influence. This makes it possible to consider «Competitive Democracy» both as a theory of domestic state organisation and as a concept of international competition between political systems.

The second group of sources consists of classical and contemporary theoretical works on democracy and political competition, including the works of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, as well as research within the Public Choice tradition. Schumpeter's theory is particularly important for comparison with Competitive Democracy because it interprets the democratic process through competition among political leaders for the acquisition of power. This approach makes it possible to examine how the proposed competition among candidates for a management position differs from classical electoral competition.

R. Dahl's theoretical framework is used to analyse political participation, competition, inclusiveness, and polyarchy. Of particular importance to this study is the comparison between the traditional representative mechanism and the direct participation in legislative decision-making proposed by Competitive Democracy.

Finally, public choice theory provides tools for analysing the behaviour of political and state actors in terms of incentives, rational self-interest, institutional constraints, and corruption-oriented behaviour. This is especially relevant to Parker's proposed system of material remuneration for state leaders, deferred payments, and an independent audit after their terms of office. Parker's Competitive Democracy explicitly links the amount and structure of executive remuneration to the goal of reducing corruption risks.

Research Problem

The central research problem is to determine whether the combination of professional competitive selection of those exercising executive power and direct digital citizen participation in the legislative process can constitute an independent model of democracy, distinct from both traditional representative democracy and the models of competitive democracy and polyarchy described in political science.

The study proceeds from the premise that the proposed concept is of interest not only as a normative project of political reform but also as an object of theoretical analysis. Its defining feature is the attempt to apply the logic of competitive selection of professional managers to state governance while expanding citizens' direct participation in the legislative process. The transition to the model is considered an evolutionary process involving the gradual introduction of individual elements in accordance with the institutional specificities of each state.

This combination of competition for state leadership, meritocratic selection, direct digital citizen participation, and institutional oversight defines the research novelty of the concept under consideration and provides a basis for its independent study within political science.

State of Research on the Problem

The organisation of democratic power has a long history of theoretical reflection and is represented by a broad range of political-philosophical and political-science concepts. Classical political philosophy developed ideas concerning popular sovereignty, direct citizen participation, and representation; contemporary political science has further developed these issues in theories of competitive, representative, polyarchic, participatory, and deliberative democracy.

The first group consists of studies of classical democracy and political representation, represented by the works of J.-J. Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and Hanna Pitkin. These works make it possible to reconstruct the historical problem of the relationship between popular sovereignty and political representation. Pitkin's concept is particularly important because it demonstrates that representation cannot be reduced to the simple delegation of powers; rather, it comprises a complex set of relationships between citizens and representatives. Contemporary scholarship continues to treat this tension as one of the central problems of democratic theory.

The second group consists of theories of competitive democracy and polyarchy. The works of J. Schumpeter and R. Dahl occupy a central place here. Schumpeter views democracy primarily as a competitive mechanism for selecting political leadership, whereas Dahl associates democratic governance with a combination of political competition, participation, and opposition. These concepts are directly comparable with Parker's Competitive Democracy, since the latter also makes competition a central principle of the political system. In Parker's model, however, competition extends beyond the electoral sphere to the professional selection of state leaders.

The third group comprises theories of participatory and deliberative democracy. The works of Carole Pateman, Jürgen Habermas, Benjamin Barber, and other scholars make it possible to consider citizen participation not only as a procedure for legitimising authority but also as an independent political process. Contemporary research shows that political participation can take the form of direct decision-making, influence over government, and public deliberation.

The fourth group includes research in public choice theory and institutional economics. The works of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, William Niskanen, and Dennis Mueller make it possible to examine political institutions in terms of individual incentives, rational behaviour, collective action, bureaucratic behaviour, and rent-seeking. This theoretical tradition is particularly important for analysing Parker's proposed mechanisms for financially incentivising state leaders.

The fifth group consists of research on digital democracy and democratic innovations. The works of Pippa Norris, Stephen Coleman, Jay G. Blumler, Graham Smith, and other scholars make it possible to assess the opportunities and limitations of using information technology to expand political participation. Research on democratic innovations includes, among other things, direct lawmaking, citizens' assemblies, participatory budgeting, and experiments in electronic democracy.

Thus, the individual theoretical elements used in Parker's Competitive Democracy have been substantially explored in the literature. Competition among political elites has been studied by Schumpeter; political participation and competition by Dahl; representation by Pitkin and subsequent scholarship on representation; collective choice and political incentives by public choice theorists; and direct participation and democratic innovations by researchers in participatory and digital democracy.

At the same time, the possibility of synthesising these elements into a single institutional model remains insufficiently explored. Such a model would combine professional competition in the formation of the executive; direct citizen decision-making on legislation; a hybrid mechanism of voluntary vote delegation in place of conventional representation; the transformation of political parties into expert-political centres; digital infrastructure as a permanent mechanism of political participation; material incentives for state leaders designed in accordance with public choice theory;

and a conception of the state as both a domestic political system and a competing international «management franchise».

This combination defines the research gap within which Parker's Competitive Democracy can be studied as an independent object of political-science analysis.

At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the theoretical origins of the concept and the evidentiary status of the proposed solutions. The existence of similar ideas in earlier scholarly literature does not mean that existing research confirms the effectiveness of the entire system of «Competitive Democracy». Rather, the task of research is to establish which elements of the concept have a theoretical foundation, which constitute original institutional proposals, and which require independent empirical testing.

CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL ORIGINS AND CONTEXT OF THE EMERGENCE OF D. PARKER'S CONCEPT

1.1. The Crisis of Classical Models of Democracy in Political Philosophy

Throughout the history of political thought, the problem of democracy has been associated with the search for an optimal way of combining two principles: popular sovereignty and the state's ability to make competent, timely, and effective decisions. Even in ancient political philosophy, it was recognised that direct citizen participation in government had democratic advantages as well as certain limitations.

Athenian democracy is a historical example of the most direct participation of citizens in political decision-making. Citizens participated directly in adopting laws and making major state decisions. At the same time, some public functions could be allocated by lot. This reflected the principle of political equality among citizens, but also meant that managers were not necessarily selected through professional assessment of their competence.

Modern democratic systems developed in large part in response to the limitations of direct participation in states with much larger populations. Representative democracy made it possible to entrust a substantial share of political decision-making to specially elected representatives. This made the governance of large states practically feasible, but also created a new distance between citizens and the decision-making process.

The historical development of democracy can therefore be viewed not as a straightforward expansion of political rights, but as a continuing search for a compromise between direct popular rule, administrative competence, and the scale of the modern state.

Modern representative democracy addresses the problem of scale through political representation. This mechanism, however, has a fundamental limitation: a citizen's direct political influence over an elected representative is periodic.

In most representative systems, citizens have a direct opportunity to influence the composition of political power only once every several years. After an election, the political mandate remains in force for a prescribed term, irrespective of how closely the elected official's actual policies correspond to voters' initial expectations.

This creates a temporal mismatch between changes in public preferences and the ability to express those changes institutionally.

A citizen may change their mind the day after an election. The political system, however, does not provide a corresponding mechanism for changing that political choice before the next election.

This temporal gap is one of the key issues addressed by Parker's Competitive Democracy.

In traditional representative democracy, citizens transfer a substantial part of their political influence to a representative for a specified period. The representative is then able to make numerous decisions independently, and those decisions may differ significantly from the expectations of some voters.

The divergence between pre-election statements and subsequent political practice presents a particular problem. Election campaigns involve competition among political programmes, promises, and visions of the future; once a mandate has been obtained, however, a politician is no longer subject to the same continuous, direct dependence on voters.

This creates conditions for what public and political discourse describes as «campaign rhetoric»: statements made while competing for votes may be perceived as instruments of electoral competition rather than unconditional commitments governing future political conduct.

As a result, citizens may find that they supported a political actor on the basis of one set of promises but encountered a different policy after the election, while lacking a simple institutional mechanism for changing their political preference immediately.

D. Parker's concept proposes to change this very arrangement.

Instead of periodic political choice, it envisages the possibility of continuously changing one's political preference. A citizen can delegate their vote to a political party and then change that decision at any time, or withdraw the delegation and vote independently.

In this way, the political relationship between the citizen and the political actor ceases to be exclusively periodic.

In a classical representative system, a politician receives a mandate for a fixed term. Under «Competitive Democracy», by contrast, a political party must continuously retain the citizen's trust. The ability to change a delegation through a single action turns trust from the outcome of a periodic electoral procedure into a continuously operative political resource.

Accordingly, one of the central features of Parker's concept is a transition:

— from periodic political accountability to continuous accountability;

— from mandatory political mediation to voluntary mediation;

— from a political choice fixed for several years to a choice that can be changed at any time.

This makes it possible to view «Competitive Democracy» as an attempt to address one of the structural shortcomings of representative democracy without abandoning the advantages of political representation as such.

Citizens are not required to choose between direct and representative democracy once and for all. Instead, the system itself allows them to decide which form of participation they need at a particular moment.

They can participate directly in adopting a law or draw on the expertise of a political party. If their assessment of the party changes, they can change their delegation without waiting for the next nationwide election.

This is the fundamental difference between the proposed model and classical representation.

Representation becomes not a permanent or obligatory, but an instrument of political participation that citizens may choose voluntarily.

1.2. Direct Democracy as a Foundational Element of «Competitive Democracy»

One of the fundamental elements of D. Parker's concept of Competitive Democracy is the direct participation of citizens in the legislative process.

In classical direct democracy, citizens make political decisions themselves. Athenian democracy is the best-known historical example of this form of political organisation. However, the scale of modern states, the complexity of legislation, and the high degree of specialisation in public policy have made a full recreation of the ancient model practically impossible.

This led to the dominance of representative democracy.

The development of information technology has, however, changed the technical preconditions of the problem. In an ancient city, direct participation was limited by the physical possibility of assembling citizens and holding a vote. Modern digital infrastructure potentially makes it possible to organise mass participation in decision-making without requiring citizens to be physically present in one place.

Parker's concept makes use of this possibility.

In the proposed model, citizens are given the opportunity to vote directly on draft laws. The legislative function is thereby returned directly to the citizen.

Parker's Competitive Democracy does not, however, propose a simple return to the ancient model.

The main difference lies in combining direct voting with the possibility of delegating one's voting right to a political party.

Citizens are therefore offered two alternatives:

— to participate independently in deciding on a particular law;

— to transfer their voting right to a political party of their choice and rely on its political and expert assessment.

Such delegation is reversible.

Citizens can change the political party to which they entrust their vote at any time. They can also withdraw the delegation and resume voting independently. The work under analysis proposes an online resource through which citizens can vote on a draft law themselves within a 24-hour period. The resource would also allow them to select the party to which their vote would be allocated if they did not vote personally, and to change that party at any time.

This means that representation ceases to be the only form of citizen participation and becomes one of the instruments available within direct democracy.

Under this interpretation, «Competitive Democracy» combines two principles that have historically often been treated as opposites.

The Athenian element consists in citizens' direct adoption of laws.

The representative element consists in the possibility of using political parties as centres of expert assessment and decision-making on behalf of citizens who have delegated their votes to them.

It is crucial, however, that the second element does not eliminate the first.

Citizens are not obliged to use representation.

Consequently, «Competitive Democracy» can be understood as a system in which representative democracy becomes a voluntary module within a broader system of direct popular rule.

This makes it possible to pose the question of political representation in a new way. If a citizen can reclaim the right to vote directly at any time, a representative no longer possesses an autonomous political mandate independent of the citizen's current will.

In such a system, a political party must continually demonstrate the value of its expertise and political proposals.

1.3. The Meritocratic Component and the Maximisation of Political Competition

Another fundamental element of Parker's concept of Competitive Democracy is the competitive selection of the highest-level professional manager.

Here, «Competitive Democracy» acquires a pronounced meritocratic character.

In the political sense, meritocracy entails giving priority in access to managerial opportunities to people who possess the necessary abilities, knowledge, and competencies. Classical democratic systems, however, face a tension between equality of political rights and the need for professional governance.

Citizens have an equal right to participate in forming the government, but this does not in itself guarantee that the elected politician will be the most competent manager.

Parker's concept attempts to separate these two tasks institutionally.

Citizens retain the right to elect the President directly. The President has democratic legitimacy and performs institutional oversight functions. At the same time, executive governance is entrusted to a General Manager selected through an open professional competition.

The system thus has two distinct bases of legitimacy:

— democratic legitimacy, derived from direct election by citizens;

— managerial legitimacy, derived from an open competition and the demonstrated ability of the successful candidate to govern the state.

This arrangement differs fundamentally from the classical representative mechanism, in which victory in an election simultaneously confers political legitimacy and the right to lead the executive directly.

In Parker's Competitive Democracy, these functions are separated.

The President is directly elected by citizens and serves as the democratic guarantor of the system.

The General Manager is authorised to govern the state professionally as a result of competitive selection.

A detailed examination of the division of powers between these two institutions belongs to the next chapter. For the theoretical analysis here, the key point is that democratic choice and professional selection cease to be mutually exclusive mechanisms.

This makes it possible to view «Competitive Democracy» as a partially meritocratic democracy in which selection on the basis of ability is applied directly to the highest state-management position.

At the same time, the meritocratic element of Parker's model is more explicitly competitive than the usual mechanism for selecting political elites through elections.

Ordinary electoral competition involves candidates competing for voters' support. Its outcome may be influenced by name recognition, party affiliation, financial resources, political reputation, media resources, lobbying, and other factors.

Parker's model proposes an open competition among candidates for a management position, consisting of successive selection stages. Competition is thus focused directly on a candidate's ability to demonstrate their suitability for governing.

This is why the term «Competitive Democracy» has a particular significance in Parker's concept.

In Schumpeter's theory, competition primarily means competition among political leaders to obtain an electoral mandate. In Parker's model, two levels of competition emerge.

The first level is competition among candidates for the position of General Manager.

The second is continuous competition among political parties for citizens' trust.

Both levels differ from traditional electoral competition in their continuity and directness.

The management competition is intended to identify the most capable candidate, while party competition is to be continually tested through citizens' actual behaviour.

For this reason, Parker's «Competitive Democracy» claims to correspond more literally to the concept of competition than traditional models described as «competitive democracy».

Here, competition is not merely a metaphor for the contest between political programmes.

It becomes a structuring principle of the entire political system.

1.4. D. Parker's «Competitive Democracy» and Joseph Schumpeter's Competitive Democracy

Comparing Parker's concept of Competitive Democracy with Joseph Schumpeter's conception of democracy is particularly important for identifying its theoretical specificity.

Schumpeter rejected the view of democracy solely as the direct implementation of the people's general will. In his interpretation, democracy is primarily an institutional method through which political leaders compete for the right to make decisions.

This approach had a substantial influence on the subsequent development of political science. Democracy came to be understood not only as a system of popular participation, but also as a mechanism for the competitive selection of the political elite.

In Parker's concept, however, competition has a considerably broader meaning.

First, it extends directly to the professional selection of the highest-ranking state manager.

Second, competition among political parties ceases to be exclusively periodic.

In a traditional system, a party seeks to win votes in an election and then receives a specified period in which to implement its programme. In Parker's model of Competitive Democracy, a party must continually retain citizens' trust.

Political competition is therefore transformed from a periodic event into a continuous process.

This difference can be expressed as follows:

Schumpeter: competition — choice — mandate — period of governance.

Parker: competition — choice — continuous assessment — the possibility of immediately changing support — renewed competition.

The distinction therefore concerns not only the technical mechanism of voting, but also the very understanding of political competition.

For Schumpeter, competition is a means of forming political power.

For Parker, competition becomes a means of continuously maintaining the right to exert political influence.

In addition, Parker's concept combines competition for political influence with competition for professional governance. This creates a system in which political competition and managerial competition operate simultaneously, but are not identical.

1.5. «Competitive Democracy» as an Attempt to Bridge the Gap between the Democratic Ideal and Polyarchy

Robert Dahl, who developed the concept of polyarchy, made a major contribution to contemporary democratic theory.

Dahl proceeded from the premise that existing democratic states do not perfectly embody the democratic ideal. Rather, they are institutional systems that provide relatively high levels of political competition and participation.

In this sense, polyarchy can be regarded as a practically attainable form of democracy under the conditions of a complex modern state.

Yet this is precisely where a fundamental theoretical question raised by Parker's concept emerges.

If a political system is technically capable of providing citizens with continuous participation in lawmaking, the ability to change political delegation immediately, and a choice between voting independently and using an expert party, to what extent are the limits on participation imposed by the traditional representative system still necessary?

«Competitive Democracy» can be interpreted as an attempt to bring a real political system closer to the democratic ideal, which classical theory has often treated as practically unattainable in large societies.

At the same time, Parker's model does not propose abandoning the institutions that make the modern state governable.

On the contrary, it seeks to replace mandatory representation with voluntary representation and to combine political selection with a professional competition.

This is the fundamental difference between the proposed model and a simple expansion of polyarchy.

Polyarchy addresses the question of how existing institutions can provide high levels of competition and participation.

«Competitive Democracy» poses a more radical question: can new technologies and changes to institutional rules bring a functioning state closer to the idea of democracy as the direct exercise of popular sovereignty?

Accordingly, this study advances a proposition for further investigation: Parker's «Competitive Democracy» may claim not merely the status of another variety of polyarchy, but that of a normative model seeking to bring the actual political system closer to the democratic ideal.

1.6. A Synthesis of Direct Democracy, Representation, and Meritocracy

The theoretical specificity of «Competitive Democracy» is most clearly expressed in its combination of several principles that have traditionally been considered separately.

The first principle is direct popular sovereignty.

Citizens are given the opportunity to participate independently in the legislative process.

The second principle is voluntary political representation.

A citizen may delegate their vote to a political party, but this decision is reversible and can be changed at any time.

The third principle is meritocratic selection for governance.

The highest professional management function is assigned not automatically to the political actor who wins an election, but to a candidate who has passed an open competition.

The fourth principle is continuous competition.

Political parties must continually compete for citizens' trust, while candidates for managerial positions must compete directly with one another for the right to govern the state.

The fifth principle is the separation of democratic and managerial functions.

The President obtains direct democratic legitimacy through election and performs the function of institutional oversight, whereas the General Manager obtains professional legitimacy through competition and carries out the principal functions of state governance.

The system therefore does not propose replacing democracy with meritocracy, or direct democracy with representation.

Instead, it seeks to incorporate different forms of political organisation into a single system.

In its most concise form, the structure can be represented as follows:

1. Direct democracy — citizens participate directly in the legislative process.

2. Voluntary representation — citizens may delegate their votes to a political party and may reverse that decision at any time.

3. Meritocratic selection — the highest professional management position is filled through an open competition.

4. Continuous competition — parties compete continually for citizens' trust, while candidates compete for the right to manage the state.

5. Institutional separation — the President safeguards the system, while the General Manager conducts professional executive governance.

Table Synthesis of Theoretical Elements in D. Parker's Concept of «Competitive Democracy»

Theoretical Element	Core Principle	Implementation in D. Parker's CD Model	Institutional Outcome
Direct democracy	Citizens' direct participation in making decisions of public importance.	Citizens vote directly on legislative proposals through a digital system.	Citizens retain direct influence over the legislative process.
Representative democracy	The use of political intermediaries to represent citizens' interests.	A citizen may voluntarily delegate their vote to a political party acting as an expert center.	Expert knowledge can be used without requiring citizens to transfer their political choice for an entire electoral term.
Reversible delegation	The ability to reconsider a decision to delegate authority or trust.	A citizen may change the selected party, terminate delegation, or vote independently.	Parties remain continuously accountable, while citizens retain control over their political choices.
Meritocracy	Selection of people for public management on the basis of abilities, experience, and professional competence.	The General Manager is selected through an open, multi-stage competition.	A professional selection mechanism is introduced for the state's highest managerial position.
Political competition	Competition among political actors for support and influence.	Parties compete continuously for delegated votes, while candidates compete for the position of General Manager.	Competition extends beyond periodic elections to an ongoing contest for public trust and the managerial position.
Separation of legitimacy and functions	Distinguishing democratic authorization from professional managerial competence.	The President derives legitimacy from direct election and oversees compliance with institutional safeguards; the General Manager is selected through competition and is responsible for executive governance.	Democratic oversight and professional state administration are institutionally separated.
Digital democracy	The use of digital technologies to expand political participation.	Digital infrastructure enables voting on legislation, delegation and revocation of delegation, access to information, and oversight of procedures.	A technological foundation is established for continuous and scalable citizen participation.

An especially important feature of this arrangement is that citizens do not lose the opportunity to participate directly after delegating their votes.

If a citizen considers a party's expert assessment to be more reliable, they can use it. If they consider it necessary to make a decision independently, they can reclaim the right to vote directly.

The system thus allows citizens to determine for themselves the degree of political representation they require.

This is what makes it possible to speak of a qualitatively different understanding of political mediation.

1.7. The Place of Parker's Competitive Democracy in the Development of Democratic Theory

The analysis conducted makes it possible to view D. Parker's «Competitive Democracy» as a concept that emerged at the intersection of several currents of political thought.

From ancient direct democracy, it adopts the principle of citizens' direct participation in lawmaking.

From representative democracy, it adopts the political party as a mechanism for aggregating interests and providing political expertise.

From the meritocratic tradition, it adopts the idea of selecting a leader on the basis of ability rather than popularity alone.

From Schumpeter's competitive democracy, it adopts the principle of political competition.

From Public Choice theory, it adopts an orientation towards creating institutional rules that alter the incentives of politicians and bureaucracies.

From contemporary digital democracy, it adopts the use of information technology for direct interaction between citizens and the state.

However, I recognise that mechanically combining already known elements does not, by itself, establish the emergence of a new political theory.

The central question for further research is therefore whether combining these elements produces a qualitatively new institutional logic.

Several distinguishing features can provisionally be identified.

First, democracy ceases to be exclusively a periodic procedure.

Second, representation ceases to be mandatory.

Third, political competition is no longer limited to the struggle for a periodic mandate.

Fourth, the professional competence of the manager becomes an independent criterion for forming the executive.

Fifth, democratic legitimacy and professional governance are institutionally separated between the President and the General Manager.

Sixth, digital infrastructure is used not merely to improve existing democracy, but to change its basic procedures.

It is this combination of features that raises the question of whether the term «Competitive Democracy» can serve as a new designation for an independent model of democracy, distinct from previously existing concepts of competitive democracy.

At the same time, the final conclusion as to whether this constitutes an independent theory must not be based on a declarative similarity or difference between terms, but on further comparative analysis of its institutions, mechanisms, and theoretical implications.

The first chapter therefore makes it possible to formulate the study's starting proposition:

D. Parker's «Competitive Democracy» represents an attempt to move from democracy as a periodic procedure for choosing representatives to democracy as a continuously operating system of competition, direct participation, voluntary representation, and professional selection for state governance.

If this arrangement does in fact provide higher levels of political accountability, competition, participation, and managerial competence than existing models, this may provide grounds for further consideration of «Competitive Democracy» as an independent direction in the development of democratic theory.

The subsequent chapters are devoted to examining this proposition.

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