Emperor of the French Napoleon III
History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

IT is, perhaps, not without interest, in publishing the second volume of the History of Julius Cæsar, written by the Emperor Napoleon III., to call to memory the names of Sovereigns and Princes who have employed themselves upon the same subject.

The King of France, Charles VIII., showed an especial admiration for the Commentaries of Cæsar, and the celebrated monk, Robert Gaguin, presented to him, in 1480, the translation he had made in French of the eight books of the War in Gaul. We are informed of this in the edition of the translation by the learned monk, printed in 1500. This edition, in large 4to, is from the press of Antoine Verard. (See J. Ch. Brunet, Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 518, and the Biographie Universelle, article Charles VIII.)

Charles V., who professed a great admiration for Cæsar, left a copy of the Commentaries filled with marginal notes, written with his own hand. It was at his instigation that the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferdinand Gonzaga, sent a scientific mission into France to study Cæsar’s campaigns on the localities. The forty plans which were made by the members of this commission, and among which that of Alise is found, were published in 1575, in the edition of James Strada.

The Sultan Soliman II., contemporary of Charles V., whom he had taken for his model, sent through all Europe to procure as many copies of Cæsar’s Commentaries as could be found, which he ordered to be collated, and caused a translation to be made into the Turkish language for his own daily reading.

The King of France, Henri IV., translated the two first books of Cæsar’s Commentaries. The manuscript of this translation was deposited in the Bibliothèque du Roi, and M. des Noyers took it thence to deliver it to Louis XIII., who, in his turn, translated the two last books of the Commentaries. These two translations were joined together, and printed at the Louvre in 1630.

Louis XIV. translated the first book of the Commentaries. His translation was printed at Paris in 1651, in folio, with figures. This work has not been reprinted; it is now very rare. The reader may consult on this subject the Méthode d’étudier l’Histoire of the Abbé Lenglet-Dufresnoy, tom. II., p. 481; and J. Ch. Brunet, Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 519.

The great Condé, who had studied with care the campaigns of Cæsar, encouraged the translation of the Commentaries undertaken by Nicolas Perrot d’Ablancourt; it was the translation most esteemed and the most in vogue during the last century.

Christina, Queen of Sweden, had composed Reflections on the Life and Actions of Cæsar, as we are informed by J. Arckenholz in his work entitled Mémoires concernant Christine, Reine de Suède, Amsterdam, 1751-1760, tom. IV., No. 6, p. 4.

Louis Philippe Joseph d’Orléans, surnamed Egalité, was a great reader of the Commentaries. He caused a map of Cæsar’s campaigns in Gaul to be made.

Lastly, the Emperor Napoleon I., at St. Helena, dictated a Précis des Guerres de César to Comte Marchand, who published it in Paris in 1836, in 8vo.

BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”

CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR

Enterprising Character of the Gauls.

I. THERE are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom. Such had been the Gauls.

The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise. Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now Western Hungary); the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country lying between those mountains and the Po.¹ The invaders soon transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took the name of Cisalpine Gaul. More than two centuries afterwards, the descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the Capitol.² Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube,³ ravaging Northern Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple of Delphi.⁴ Others, arriving at Byzantium,⁵ pass into Asia, establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount Taurus, since called Gallo-Græcia, or Galatia, and maintain in it a sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus.⁶

These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364 to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of colonies.

Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, ich have already been spoken of in the first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive, crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic, when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy, they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years. The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time, Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia (565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).

Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps.

II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian tribes of the Maritime Alps,⁷ for the first time carried their arms to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche, and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve stadia (2·22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable them to pass through Gaul into Spain.⁸ Nevertheless, the legions pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards,⁹ the proconsul C. Sextius Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of Aix (Aquæ Sextiæ).¹⁰

The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former, and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue (Sulgas), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus, grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus, king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of Allobrogicus.¹¹ The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans;¹² they remained independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute.¹³

In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius, which gave its name to the Roman province called Narbonensis.¹⁴

The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century of the foundation of Rome it seems to have re-commenced with greater intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones,¹⁵ after ravaging Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M. Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647;¹⁶ lastly, in the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio¹⁷ and Cn. Manlius Maximus. The two last each lost his army.¹⁸ The very existence of Rome was threatened.

Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653), destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.

The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones; sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea. Sallust¹⁹ ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn. Manlius, and Cicero²⁰ designates under the same name the barbarians who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.

From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus, and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their revelations.²¹

The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne,²² which was devoted to the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C. Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after, the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Cæsar,” says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls, thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion.”²³

Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the Gauls.

III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight.”²⁴ On his part, Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all our wise men have looked upon Gaul as the most redoubtable enemy of Rome. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us until now from combating them all.”²⁵

In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such circumstances.²⁶ In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy en masse ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was forbidden to touch except in that eventuality.²⁷ Accordingly, when, in 705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.²⁸

War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia, and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation. If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the North rushing eagerly upon Italy?

And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul. Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,²⁹ and even twenty,³⁰ for Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices during sixty days.³¹

When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly estimating the causes which have produced them.

The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course. We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as Cicero says,³² “he had already done enough for his glory, if he had not done enough for the Republic;” and the same orator adds: “Why would Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable than the multiplicity of Cæsar’s victories? Can he find limits farther off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours? Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the affection of the people.”³³

Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy, claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.

If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul, sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from the Sambre as far as the Saône.³⁴ He keeps within the limit of his government without making any preparation which indicates hostile intentions,³⁵ wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by justice rather than by arms.³⁶ In fact, he has collected so little money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily renounce their pay.³⁷ Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of the country.

Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul.

IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Cæsar,” he says, “has written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art, his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and luminous brevity.”³⁸ Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it was composed.”³⁹

If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient geography did not furnish corresponding names.

The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments. The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text, will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.

CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR

(See Plate I.)

Geographical Description.

I. TRANSALPINE Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes (the Orléanais) was considered to be its centre.⁴⁰

An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by the Southern Cévennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais, and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cévennes), and declines continually with the mountains of the Charolais and the Côte-d’Or, until it reaches the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse, the western crests of the Argonne and the Ardennes, and terminates, in decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.

This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed. It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean. These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.

The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the Monts Faucilles, the southern extremity of the Vosges, called Le trouée de Belfort, the Jura, the Jorat (the heights which surround the Lake of Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the Helvetic Alps. In its upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake of Constance to Bâle. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern part of the great line of watershed (the mountains of the Meuse, the Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence to Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides into two arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time of Cæsar, the name of Waal (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse⁴¹ below Nimeguen. To the west of the basin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms a secondary basin.

The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saône, is sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and the Monts Faucilles; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the Côte-d’Or, and the Cévennes; on the east, by the Jura, the Jorat, and the Alps. The Rhone crosses the Valais and the Lake of Geneva, follows an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins, we may reckon those of the Aude, the Hérault, and the Var.

The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the south-east to the north-west. The basin of the Seine, which includes that of the Somme, is separated from the basin of the Loire by a line of heights which branches from the Côte-d’Or under the name of the mountains of the Morvan, and is continued by the very low hills of Le Perche to the extremity of Normandy. A series of heights, extending from north to south, from the hills of Le Perche to Nantes, enclose the basin of the Loire to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of Brittany.

The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long chain starting from Mont Lozère, comprising the mountains of Auvergne, those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gatine, and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.

The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire, extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour and the Charente.

The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west, and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind three groups of interior mountains – first, the Vosges; second, the Jura; third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the Cévennes.

The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear of that river.

The Jura, separated from the Vosges by the Gap (trouée) of Belfort, rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from uniting with those of the Saône.

The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the valleys whence flow, to the north, the Allier and the Loire; to the west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south, the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.

The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented – thanks to the fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access – natural ways of communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to that of the Saône, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore, remarks justly that Sequania (Franche-Comté) has always been the road of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy.⁴² From east to west the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal. Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.

Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild temperature and an extreme fertility,⁴³ the central and northern part was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it is at present;⁴⁴ yet the centre produced in abundance wheat, rye, millet, and barley.⁴⁵ The greatest of all these forests was that of the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the country of the Nervii.⁴⁶ The “Commentaries” speak also of forests existing among the Carnutes,⁴⁷ in the neighbourhood of the Saône,⁴⁸ among the Menapii⁴⁹ and the Morini,⁵⁰ and among the Eburones.⁵¹ In the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation,⁵² and the pastures of Belgic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses.⁵³ In the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead.⁵⁴

The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons,⁵⁵ since there still remain traces of Celtic roads, and since Cæsar makes known the existence of bridges on the Aisne,⁵⁶ the Rhone,⁵⁷ the Loire,⁵⁸ the Allier,⁵⁹ and the Seine.⁶⁰

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet we may presume, from the contingents furnished by the different states, that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls.⁶¹

Political Divisions.

II. Gaul, according to Cæsar, was divided into three great regions, distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic Gaul, between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul, between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps, and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, between the Garonne and the Pyrenees.⁶² (See Plate 2.) We must, nevertheless, comprise in Gaul the Roman province, or the Narbonnese, which began at Geneva, on the left bank of the Rhone, and extended in the south as far as Toulouse. It answered, as nearly as possible, to the limits of the countries known in modern times as Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, Lower Languedoc, and Roussillon. The populations who inhabited it were of different origins: there were found there Aquitanians, Belgæ, Ligures, Celts, who had all long undergone the influence of Greek civilisation, and especially establishments founded by the Phocæans on the coasts of the Mediterranean.⁶³

These three great regions were subdivided into many states, called civitates– an expression which, in the “Commentaries,” is synonymous with nations⁶⁴– that is, each of these states had its organisation and its own government. Among the peoples mentioned by Cæsar, we may reckon twenty-seven in Belgic Gaul, forty-three in Celtic, and twelve in Aquitaine: in all, eighty-two in Gaul proper, and seven in the Narbonnese. Other authors, admitting, no doubt, smaller subdivisions, carry this number to three or four hundred;⁶⁵ but it appears that under Tiberius there were only sixty-four states in Gaul.⁶⁶ Perhaps, in this number, they reckoned only the sovereign, and not the dependent, states.

1. Belgic Gaul. The Belgæ were considered more warlike than the other Gauls,⁶⁷ because, strangers to the civilisation of the Roman province and hostile to commerce, they had not experienced the effeminating influence of luxury. Proud of having escaped the Gaulish enervation, they claimed with arrogance an origin which united them with the Germans their neighbours, with whom, nevertheless, they were continually at war.⁶⁸ They boasted of having defended their territory against the Cimbri and the Teutones, at the time of the invasion of Gaul. The memory of the lofty deeds of their ancestors inspired them with a great confidence in themselves, and excited their warlike spirit.⁶⁹

The most powerful nations among the Belgæ were the Bellovaci,⁷⁰ who could arm a hundred thousand men, and whose territory extended to the sea,⁷¹ the Nervii, the Remi, and the Treviri.

2. Celtic Gaul.⁷² The central part of Gaul, designated by the Greek writers under the name of Celtica, and the inhabitants of which constituted in the eyes of the Romans the Gauls properly so named (Galli), was the most extensive and most populous. Among the most important nations of Celtic Gaul were reckoned the Arverni, the Ædui, the Sequani, and the Helvetii. Tacitus informs us that the Helvetii had once occupied a part of Germany.⁷³

These three first peoples often disputed the supremacy of Gaul. As to the Helvetii, proud of their independence, they acknowledged no authority superior to their own. In the centre and south of Celtic Gaul dwelt peoples who had also a certain importance. On the west and north-west were various maritime populations designated under the generic name of Armoricans, an epithet which had, in the Celtic tongue, the meaning of maritime. Small Alpine tribes inhabited the valleys of the upper course of the Rhone, at the eastern extremity of Lake Lémon, a country which now forms the Valais.

3. Aquitaine.⁷⁴ Aquitaine commenced on the left bank of the Garonne: it was inhabited by several small tribes, and contained none of those agglomerations which were found among the Celts and the Belgæ. The Aquitanians, who had originally occupied a vast territory to the north of the Pyrenees, having been pushed backward by the Celts, had but a rather limited portion of it in the time of Cæsar.

The three regions which composed Gaul were not only, as already stated, divided into a great number of states, but each state (civitas) was farther subdivided into pagi,⁷⁵ representing, perhaps, the same thing as the tribe among the Arabs. The proof of the distinct character of these agglomerations is found in the fact that in the army each of them had its separate place, under the command of its own chieftains. The smallest subdivision was called vicus.⁷⁶ Such, at least, are the denominations employed in the “Commentaries,” but which were certainly not those of the Celtic language. In each state there existed principal towns, called indifferently by Cæsar urbs or oppidum;⁷⁷ yet this last name was given by preference to considerable towns, difficult of access and carefully fortified, placed on heights or surrounded by marshes.⁷⁸ It was to these oppida that, in case of attack, the Gauls transported their grain, their provisions, and their riches.⁷⁹ Their habitations, established often in the forests or on the bank of a river, were constructed of wood, and tolerably spacious.⁸⁰

Manners.

III. The Gauls were tall in stature, their skin was white, their eyes blue, their hair fair or chestnut, which they dyed, in order to make the colour more brilliant.⁸¹ They let their beard grow; the nobles alone shaved, and preserved long moustaches.⁸² Trousers or breeches, very wide among the Belgæ, but narrower among the southern Gauls, and a shirt with sleeves, descending to the middle of the thighs, composed their principal dress.⁸³ They were clothed with a mantle or saie,⁸⁴ magnificently embroidered with gold or silver among the rich,⁸⁵ and held about the neck by means of a metal brooch. The lowest classes of the people used instead an animal’s skin. The Aquitanians covered themselves, probably according to the Iberic custom, with cloth of coarse wool unshorn.⁸⁶

The Gauls wore collars, earrings, bracelets, and rings for the arms, of gold or copper, according to their rank; necklaces of amber, and rings, which they placed on the third finger.⁸⁷

They were naturally agriculturists, and we may suppose that the institution of private property existed among them, because, on the one hand, all the citizens paid the tax, except the Druids,⁸⁸ and, on the other, the latter were judges of questions of boundaries.⁸⁹ They were not unacquainted with certain manufactures. In some countries they fabricated serges, which were in great repute, and cloths or felts;⁹⁰ in others they worked the mines with skill, and employed themselves in the fabrication of metals. The Bituriges worked in iron, and were acquainted with the art of tinning.⁹¹ The artificers of Alesia plated copper with leaf-silver, to ornament horses’ bits and trappings.⁹²

The Gauls fed especially on the flesh of swine, and their ordinary drinks were milk, ale, and mead.⁹³ They were reproached with being inclined to drunkenness.⁹⁴

They were frank and open in temper, and hospitable toward strangers,⁹⁵ but vain and quarrelsome;⁹⁶ fickle in their sentiments, and fond of novelties, they took sudden resolutions, regretting one day what they had rejected with disdain the day before;⁹⁷ inclined to war and eager for adventures, they showed themselves hot in the attack, but quickly discouraged in defeat.⁹⁸ Their language was very concise and figurative;⁹⁹ in writing, they employed Greek letters.

The men were not exempt from a shameful vice, which we might have believed less common in this county than among the peoples of the East.¹⁰⁰ The women united an extraordinary beauty with remarkable courage and great physical force.¹⁰¹

The Gauls, according to the tradition preserved by the Druids, boasted of being descended from the god of the earth, or from Pluto (Dis), according to the expression of Cæsar.¹⁰² It was for this reason that they took night for their starting-point in all their divisions of time. Among their other customs, they had one which was singular: they considered it as a thing unbecoming to appear in public with their children, until the latter had reached the age for carrying arms.¹⁰³

When he married, the man took from his fortune a part equal to the dowry of the wife. This sum, placed as a common fund, was allowed to accumulate with interest, and the whole reverted to the survivor. The husband had the right of life and death over his wife and children.¹⁰⁴ When the decease of a man of wealth excited any suspicion, his wives, as well as his slaves, were put to the torture, and burnt if they were found guilty.

The extravagance of their funerals presented a contrast to the simplicity of their life. All that the defunct had cherished during his life, was thrown into the flames after his death; and even, before the Roman conquest, they joined with it his favourite slaves and clients.¹⁰⁵

In the time of Cæsar, the greater part of the peoples of Gaul were armed with long iron swords, two-edged (σπἁθη), sheathed in scabbards similarly of iron, suspended to the side by chains. These swords were generally made to strike with the edge rather than to stab.¹⁰⁶ The Gauls had also spears, the iron of which, very long and very broad, presented sometimes an undulated form (materis, σαὑνιον).¹⁰⁷ They also made use of light javelins without amentum,¹⁰⁸ of the bow, and of the sling. Their helmets were of metal, more or less precious, ornamented with the horns of animals, and with a crest representing some figures of birds or savage beasts, the whole surmounted by a high and bushy tuft of feathers.¹⁰⁹ They carried a great buckler, a breastplate of iron or bronze, or a coat of mail – the latter a Gaulish invention.¹¹⁰ The Leuci and the Remi were celebrated for throwing the javelin.¹¹¹ The Lingones had party-coloured breastplates.¹¹² The Gaulish cavalry was superior to the infantry;¹¹³ it was composed of the nobles, followed by their clients;¹¹⁴ yet the Aquitanians, celebrated for their agility, enjoyed a certain reputation as good infantry.¹¹⁵ In general, the Gauls were very ready at imitating the tactics of their enemies.¹¹⁶ The habit of working mines gave them a remarkable dexterity in all underground operations, applicable to the attack and defence of fortified posts.¹¹⁷ Their armies dragged after them a multitude of wagons and baggage, even in the less important expeditions.¹¹⁸

Although they had reached, especially in the south of Gaul, a tolerably advanced degree of civilisation, they preserved very barbarous customs: they killed their prisoners. “When their army is ranged in battle,” says Diodorus, “some of them are often seen advancing from the ranks to challenge the bravest of their enemies to single combat. If their challenge is accepted, they chaunt a war-song, in which they boast of the great deeds of their forefathers, exalting their own valour and insulting their adversary. After the victory, they cut off their enemy’s head, hang it to their horse’s neck, and carry it off with songs of triumph. They keep these hideous trophies in their house, and the highest nobles preserve them with great care, bathed with oil of cedar, in coffers, which they show with pride to their guests.”¹¹⁹

When a great danger threatened the country, the chiefs convoked an armed council, to which the men were bound to repair, at the place and day indicated, to deliberate. The law required that the man who arrived last should be massacred without pity before the eyes of the assembly. As a means of intercommunication, men were placed at certain intervals through the country, and these, repeating the cry from one to another, transmitted rapidly news of importance to great distances. They often, also, stopped travellers on the roads, and compelled them to answer their questions.¹²⁰

The Gauls were very superstitious.¹²¹ Persuaded that in the eyes of the gods the life of a man can only be redeemed by that of his fellow, they made a vow, in diseases and dangers, to immolate human beings by the ministry of the Druids. These sacrifices had even a public character.¹²² They sometimes constructed human figures of osier of colossal magnitude, which they filled with living men; to these they set fire, and the victims perished in the flames. These victims were generally taken from among the criminals, as being more agreeable to the gods; but if there were no criminals to be had, the innocent themselves were sacrificed.

Cæsar, who, according to the custom of his countrymen, gave to the divinities of foreign peoples the names of those of Rome, tells us that the Gauls honoured Mercury above all others. They raised statues to him, regarded him as the inventor of the arts, the guide of travellers, and the protector of commerce.¹²³ They also offered worship to divinities which the “Commentaries” assimilate to Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva, without informing us of their Celtic names. From Lucan,¹²⁴ we learn the names of three Gaulish divinities, Teutates (in whom, no doubt, we must recognise the Mercury of the “Commentaries”), Hesus or Esus, and Taranis. Cæsar makes the remark that the Gauls had pretty much the same ideas with regard to their gods as other nations. Apollo cured the sick, Minerva taught the elements of the arts, Jupiter was the master of heaven, Mars the arbiter of war. Often, before fighting, they made a vow to consecrate to this god the spoils of the enemy, and, after the victory, they put to death all their prisoners. The rest of the booty was piled up in the consecrated places, and nobody would be so impious as to take anything away from it. The Gauls rendered also, as we learn from inscriptions and passages in different authors, worship to rivers, fountains, trees, and forests: they adored the Rhine as a god, and made a goddess of the Ardenne.¹²⁵

Institutions

IV. There were in Gaul, says Cæsar, only two classes who enjoyed public consideration and honours,¹²⁶ the Druids and the knights. As to the people, deprived of all rights, oppressed with debts, crushed with taxes, exposed to the violences of the great, their condition was little better than that of slaves. The Druids, ministers of religion, presided over the sacrifices, and preserved the deposit of religious doctrines. The youth, greedy of instruction, pressed around them. The dispensers of rewards and punishments, they were the judges of almost all disputes, public or private. To private individuals, or even to magistrates, who rebelled against their decisions, they interdicted the sacrifices, a sort of excommunication which sequestrated from society those who were struck by it, placed them in the rank of criminals, removed them from all honours, and deprived them even of the protection of the law. The Druids had a single head, and the power of this head was absolute. At his death, the next in dignity succeeded him; if there were several with equal titles, these priests had recourse to election, and sometimes even to a decision by force of arms. They assembled every year in the country of the Carnutes, in a consecrated place, there to judge disputes. Their doctrine, it was said, came from the isle of Britain, where, in the time of Cæsar, they still went to draw it as at its source.¹²⁷

The Druids were exempt from military service and from taxes.¹²⁸ These privileges drew many disciples, whose novitiate, which lasted sometimes twenty years, consisted in learning by heart a great number of verses containing their religious precepts. It was forbidden to transcribe them. This custom had the double object of preventing the divulgation of their doctrine and of exercising the memory. Their principal dogma was the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies. A belief which banished the fear of death appeared to them fitted to excite courage. They explained also the movement of the planets, the greatness of the universe, the laws of nature, and the omnipotence of the immortal gods. “We may conceive,” says the eminent author of the Histoire des Gaulois, “what despotism must have been exercised over a superstitious nation by this caste of men, depositaries of all knowledge, authors and interpreters of all law, divine or human, remunerators, judges, and executioners.”¹²⁹

The knights, when required by the necessities of war, and that happened almost yearly, were all bound to take up arms. Each, according to his birth and fortune, was accompanied by a greater or less number of attendants or clients. Those who were called ambacti¹³⁰ performed in war the part of esquires.¹³¹ In Aquitaine, these followers were named soldures; they shared the good as well as the evil fortune of the chief to whom they were attached, and, when he died, not one of them would survive him. Their number was considerable: we shall see a king of the Sotiates possess no less than six hundred of them.¹³²

The states were governed either by an assembly, which the Romans called a senate, or by a supreme magistrate, annual or for life, bearing the title of king,¹³³ prince,¹³⁴ or vergobret.¹³⁵

The different tribes formed alliances among themselves, either permanent or occasional; the permanent alliances were founded, some on a community of territorial interests,¹³⁶ others on affinities of races,¹³⁷ or on treaties,¹³⁸ or, lastly, on the right of patronage.¹³⁹ The occasional alliances were the results of the necessity of union against a common danger.¹⁴⁰

In Gaul, not only each state and each tribe (pagus), but even each family, was divided into two parties (factiones); at the head of these parties were chiefs, taken from among the most considerable and influential of the knights. Cæsar calls them principes.¹⁴¹ All those who accepted their supremacy became their clients; and, although the principes did not exercise a regular magistracy, their authority was very extensive. This organisation had existed from a remote antiquity; its object was to offer to each man of the people a protection against the great, since each was thus placed under the patronage of a chief, whose duty it was to take his cause in hand, and who would have lost all credit if he had allowed one of his clients to be oppressed.¹⁴² We see in the “Commentaries” that this class of the principes enjoyed very great influence. On their decisions depended all important resolutions;¹⁴³ and their meeting formed the assembly of the whole of Gaul (concilium totius Galliæ).¹⁴⁴ In it everything was decided by majority of votes.¹⁴⁵

Affairs of the state were allowed to be treated only in these assemblies. It appertained to the magistrates alone to publish or conceal events, according as they judged expedient; and it was a sacred duty for any one who learnt, either from without or from public rumour, any news which concerned the civitas, to give information of it to the magistrate, without revealing it to any other person. This measure had for its object to prevent rash or ignorant men from being led into error by false reports, and from rushing, under this first impression, into extravagant resolutions.

In the same manner as each state was divided into two rival factions, so was the whole of Gaul (with the exception of Belgic Gaul and Helvetia) divided into two great parties,¹⁴⁶ which exercised over the others a sort of sovereignty (principatus);¹⁴⁷ and when, in extraordinary circumstances, the whole of Gaul acknowledged the pre-eminence of one particular state, the chief of the privileged state took the name of princeps totius Galliæ, as had been the case with the Arvernan Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix.¹⁴⁸

This supremacy, nevertheless, was not permanent; it passed from one nation to another, and was the object of continual ambitions and sanguinary conflicts. The Druids, it is true, had succeeded in establishing a religious centre, but there existed no political centre. In spite of certain federative ties, each state had been more engaged in the consideration of its own individuality than in that of the country in general. This egoistic carelessness of their collective interests, this jealous rivality among the different tribes, paralysed the efforts of a few eminent men who were desirous of founding a nationality, and the Gauls soon furnished the enemy with an easy means of dividing and combating them. The Emperor Napoleon I. was thus right in saying: “The principal cause of the weakness of Gaul was the spirit of isolation and locality which characterised the population; at this epoch the Gauls had no national spirit or even provincial spirit; they were governed by a spirit of town. It is the same spirit which has since forged chains for Italy. Nothing is more opposed to national spirit, to general ideas of liberty, than the particular spirit of family or of town. From this parcelling it resulted that the Gauls had no army of the line kept up and exercised; and therefore no art and no military science. Every nation which should lose sight of the importance of an army of the line perpetually on foot, and which should trust to levies or national armies, would experience the fate of the Gauls, without even having the glory of opposing the same resistance, which was the effect of the barbarism of the time and of the ground, covered with forests, marshes, and bogs, and without roads, which rendered it difficult to conquer and easy to defend.”¹⁴⁹ Before Cæsar came into Gaul, the Ædui and the Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Ædui, the allies of the Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in several combats.¹⁵⁰ The Ædui had lost their nobility, a part of their territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed;¹⁵¹ the Senate was too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Cæsar was destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome their old preponderance.¹⁵²

CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII

(Year of Rome 696.)

(Book I. of the “Commentaries.”)

Projects of Invasion by the Helvetii.

I. CÆSAR, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and Illyria.¹⁵³ Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence caused a great sensation.

The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature, and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south of Gaul.

As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish themselves in the country of the Santones (the Saintonge), situated on the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential personages – one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns, their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with them. Each furnished himself with meal¹⁵⁴ for three months; and after persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci,¹⁵⁵ the Tulingi, and the Latobriges,¹⁵⁶ to imitate their example and follow them, and having drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the day of the equinox).¹⁵⁷

There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the Jura (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse), and where the wagons could with difficulty pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province, after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river was fordable in several places.¹⁵⁸ At Geneva, the extreme limit of the territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.¹⁵⁹

Cæsar’s Arrival at Geneva.

II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached Geneva in eight days.¹⁶⁰ As he had in the province only a single legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country. Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April (8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the Jura.¹⁶¹ If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry.¹⁶²

Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone.

III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces (millia passuum decem novem).¹⁶³ It is on the space comprised between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called in the “Commentaries” murus fossaque. This could not be a continuous work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines, and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells us.¹⁶⁴ The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (See Plate 3.)¹⁶⁵

This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour, was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear Cæsar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would oppose it with all his means.

Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country without opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by force. Several times – sometimes by day, and sometimes by night – they crossed the Rhone, some by fording, others with the aid of boats joined together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment (operis munitione), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers who hastened to the threatened points (concursu et telis), they abandoned the attack.¹⁶⁶

The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar unites his Troops.

IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii charged the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their convention, they exchanged hostages.¹⁶⁷

When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province.¹⁶⁸

But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts, therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of Illyria,¹⁶⁹ the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the 7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps (see Plate 4) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul.¹⁷⁰ The Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges (see page 24, note), posted on the heights,¹⁷¹ attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (Usseau),¹⁷² the extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone.¹⁷³

These operations took two months;¹⁷⁴ the same time had been employed by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (See Plate 4.) The slowness of their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from 8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it.¹⁷⁵ Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that river.

He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it, from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen to their prayers.¹⁷⁶

Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône.

V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the Sequani,¹⁷⁷ flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges, crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp towards midnight (de tertia vigilia) (see note 1 on page 69) with three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans, towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This disaster fell upon the Tigurini (the inhabitants of the Cantons of Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne), one of the four tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which, in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L. Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.¹⁷⁸

After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.

Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones, by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the Bourbince. (See Plate 4.) This broken country, moreover, permitted them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun, vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at Decize.¹⁷⁹

Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness; wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised. The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them, Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name of vergobret; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus, a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment. Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of power among them.

The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme, at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part, began his march at two o’clock in the morning (de quarta vigilia),¹⁸⁰ preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of Cæsar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been blinded by a groundless terror.

Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces, without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle.¹⁸¹

Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.

VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve kilomètres a day.¹⁸² According to our reckoning, it must have been the end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs, on the Cressonne, near Ternant.

Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two days,¹⁸³ and as, moreover, Bibracte (Mont Beuvray),¹⁸⁴ the greatest and richest town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles (twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to Bibracte. (See Plate 4.) The enemy was informed of this circumstance by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion¹⁸⁵ of the auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.

Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill – that which rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the Petit-Marié (see Plate 5) – and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans, in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (sarcinæ)¹⁸⁶ with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons, collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first line.¹⁸⁷

Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his own,¹⁸⁸ harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the pilum,¹⁸⁹ break the enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same pilum, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn, deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000 paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting attack their right flank.¹⁹⁰ The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front (conversa signa bipartito intulerunt) in his third line, and opposes it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii who had already been repulsed.¹⁹¹

This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire, as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back. Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels, wounded them with long pikes (mataræ ac tragulæ). The women and children, too, shared desperately in the combat.¹⁹² At the end of an obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.

This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (see Plate 4): they had, no doubt, passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in pursuit of the enemy.¹⁹³

Pursuit of the Helvetii.

VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Cæsar to treat for their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms, and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni (Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne) fled, either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and the frontiers of Germany.

On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish them with wheat.¹⁹⁴ These measures had for their object not to leave Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw thither the Germans of the other side the Rhine, who would thus become borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in all their rights and privileges.

In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other, that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii – together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those who returned home was 110,000.¹⁹⁵ The emigration was thus reduced to less than one-third.

The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar’s march, in the following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of which we are now going to enter.

Observations.

VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions – the 10th, which he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and 9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and 12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000 auxiliaries,¹⁹⁶ we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost one-fourth near the Saône.

In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout, doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it impossible for it to act.

CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS

(Year of Rome 696.)

(Book I. of the “Commentaries.”)

Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes.

I. ON the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly. Cæsar gave his consent.

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine, from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these failed, they were fed upon grass.¹⁹⁷ Masters of themselves from infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons, bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses, though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle, often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving.¹⁹⁸ The belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them the contempt for life.¹⁹⁹ They boasted of being surrounded by immense solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported, indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded, for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners.²⁰⁰

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis forests. (See Plate 2.) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is, the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians. It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march.²⁰¹ The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of Wurtemberg.²⁰² To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (partly in Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria);²⁰³ to the north, the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the west, the Marcomanni (the upper and middle course of the Maine) and the Sedusii (between the Maine and the Neckar); to the south, the Harudes (on the north of the Lake of Constance), the Tulingi, and the Latobriges (the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (the territory of Bâle and part of the Brisgau); the Triboces (part of Alsace and of the Grand Duchy of Baden): on the right bank were the Nemetes (opposite Spire); the Vangiones (opposite Worms); the Ubii, from the Odenwald to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe. Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north, towards the mouth of the Rhine. (See Plate 2.)

The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance.

II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made the following complaints against Ariovistus: – “The German king,” they said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a third of their territory;²⁰⁴ another third is on the point of being given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his arms, and by the fame of his recent victory.”

Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny, and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy. Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards Strasburg),²⁰⁵ as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized. Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M. Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people.”

By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law, enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required exceptional laws.²⁰⁶ The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud: —

“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui; the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter under a roof.”²⁰⁷

March of Cæsar upon Besançon.

III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing to cross the Rhine.²⁰⁸ Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey, and Dancevoir, led to Langres.²⁰⁹ (See Plate 4.) After three long days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of it, and placed a garrison there.²¹⁰

The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature, that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet,²¹¹ which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and connects it with the oppidum.”²¹²

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous cavalry.

Panic in the Roman Army.

IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect. Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the innumerable solicitations of influential people.²¹³ This panic had begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the illegality of the enterprise.²¹⁴

Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated the German race in the revolt of the slaves;²¹⁵ that the Helvetii had often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is already ripe in the fields (jamque esse in agris frumenta matura). As to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns (signa laturi).²¹⁶ Words like these would not shake him; the soldier despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty. If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the 10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise and of those whose services he affected to disdain, – this proud assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the war, as that appertained only to the general.²¹⁷

March towards the Valley of the Rhine.

V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier communications. (See Plate 4.)

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),²¹⁸ which is represented by a semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres.) At this moment, Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Cæsar did not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following.²¹⁹ In the interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus, who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides, they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter, unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to make us prætorians, and he makes us knights.”²²⁰

Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly equal distance from either camp.²²¹ This was the place of meeting of the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen. When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety; the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price, he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may undertake.”

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked, the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free, since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her own laws.”

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants. Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were spies.²²²

Movements of the two Armies.

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another position at the foot of the Vosges (sub monte), at a distance of 6,000 paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the Lauch. (See Plate 6.) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the Lingones.²²³ (See the Map of Gaul, 2.) The two armies thus encamped at a short distance from each other. During the five following days, Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle at the head of his camp (pro castris suas copias produxit), but was not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000 horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up with the horses, running and holding by the mane.²²⁴

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them, chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works. Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his tactics (instituto suo) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and placed them in order of battle (paulum a majoribus castris progressus, aciem instruxit). In spite of this advanced position (ne tum quidem), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.²²⁵

Battle against the Germans.

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he led them up to the enemy’s camp (usque ad castra hostium accessit). This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,²²⁶ drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals – Harudes, Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.²²⁷

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.²²⁸ He led the attack in person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great that the Romans, not having time to use the pilum, throw it away, and fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of three or four hundred men,²²⁹ and cover their bare heads with their bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they still remain standing.²³⁰ Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and striking the enemies from above.²³¹ The short and sharp-pointed swords of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the Germans.²³² Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness with which they kept their ranks.²³³ Ariovistus’s left did not resist long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat. Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle.²³⁴ They descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (See Plate 4.) Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a boat²³⁵ he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and Appian,²³⁶ 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit. Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain, and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable number of the fugitives.

Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the season required – at the beginning of September – and left them under the command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in Cisalpine Gaul.²³⁷

Observations.

IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign: —

1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (alarii), by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a greater number of legions.

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P. Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the following manner: —

CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ

(Year of Rome 697.)

(Book II. of the “Commentaries.”)

League of the Belgæ. Cæsar advances from Besançon to the Aisne.

I. THE brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania. The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.

Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of spring,²³⁸

sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant Q. Pedius.²³⁹ It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount Pœrinus (Great St. Bernard), after having traversed the country of the Salassi (Valley of Aosta), and that this latter people offered at first to assist Cæsar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that, towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy.²⁴⁰

As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person, probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering into campaign.

His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of 5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was, in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least 60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines, drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius, amounted to a very considerable number.²⁴¹

After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the second fortnight in May, passed the Saône at Seveux (see Plate 4), crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François.²⁴²

The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (qui proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt). Astonished at his sudden appearance, they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every kind of succour. They informed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms, and that the Germans on that side of the Rhine had joined the coalition; for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgæ,” they added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly, each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents: – The Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii, 7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000; the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000; in all, about 296,000 men.”²⁴³

Cæsar’s Camp at Berry-au-Bac.

II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the formidable character of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus, in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his presence, and the children of the principes to be brought to him as hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him, he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the extremity of the territory of the Remi (quod est in extremis Remorum finibus),²⁴⁴ and encamp there in a strong position, to await the enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the village of Berry-au-Bac. (See Plate 7.) He marched in great haste towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (See Plate 8.) This hill, called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of the bridge, where he established a post (see Plates 8 and 9),²⁴⁵ and he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.²⁴⁶

Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman camp (see Plate 7), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax (Vieux-Laon).²⁴⁷ The Belgæ attacked it vigorously, and it was defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts, attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants, throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour. Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides. This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses, they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).

The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in his eyes an incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres) in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established redoubts, in which were placed military machines.²⁴⁸

Battle on the Aisne.

III. Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two newly-raised legions to serve as a reserve in case of need, Cæsar placed the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the retrenchments. The enemy also drew out his troops and deployed them in face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Cæsar, perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes, withdrew his legions. The Belgæ immediately left their position to move towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could, the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the Romans drew their supplies.

The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac;²⁴⁹ he immediately gave information to Cæsar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and, descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage, the Belgæ, after having experienced considerable loss, advance intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded by the cavalry and massacred.²⁵⁰

Retreat of the Belgæ.

IV. The Belgæ having failed in taking the oppidum of Bibrax, in drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river, and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home, to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci by Divitiacus and the Ædui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths. Towards ten o’clock in the evening, the Belgæ withdrew in such disorder that their departure resembled a flight. Cæsar was informed immediately by his spies, but, fearing that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,²⁵¹ and ordered Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they had received, returned to the camp.²⁵²

The coalition of the Belgæ, so renowned for their valour, was thus dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of importance to the Roman general, in order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered upon that of the Remi.

Capture of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium.

V. The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from their fright, Cæsar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long day’s march (45 kilomètres) before Noviodunum (Soissons) (see Plate 7), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered covered galleries to be advanced (vineas agere),²⁵³ and all things necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of fugitive Suessiones threw themselves into the town during the following night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the foundations of a terrace²⁵⁴ to pass the fosse (aggere jacto) were established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the greatness and novelty of these works, so promptly executed, offered to surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.

Cæsar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all they possessed, in the oppidum of Bratuspantium (Breteuil).²⁵⁵ The army was only at about five miles’ distance from it, when all the aged men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the generosity of the Roman general; when he had arrived under the walls of the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.

Divitiacus, in the name of the Ædui, interceded in their favour. After the retreat of the Belgæ and the disbanding of his troops, he had returned to the presence of Cæsar. The latter, who had, at the prayer of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones, displayed, at the solicitation of the Ædui, the same indulgence towards the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among the Belgæ the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them; but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.

It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the “Commentaries,” that a certain Divitiacus, an Æduan chieftain, the most powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.

Cæsar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who surrendered without resistance.²⁵⁶

March against the Nervii.

VI. The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached the other Belgæ for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to accept peace on any condition. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two neighbouring peoples, the Atrebates and the Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at Mons.²⁵⁷

After the submission of the Ambiani, Cæsar left Amiens to proceed to the country of the Nervii; and after three days’ march on their territory, he arrived probably at Bavay (Bagacum), which is considered to have been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no more than ten miles (fifteen kilomètres) distant from the Sambre, and that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the river.²⁵⁸ He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were assembled on the right bank.²⁵⁹ (See Plate 7.)

In accordance with the informations he had received, Cæsar sent out a reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection of a spot favourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number of the Belgæ, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him, and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (sarcinæ); that this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily embraced by the Belgæ, as the nature of the locality favoured its execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the eye.²⁶⁰ As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of the Roman army, the Nervii resolved to hide themselves in the woods which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment when it would debouch on the opposite heights of the Sambre, to wait till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush upon the troops which preceded.²⁶¹ (See Plate 10.)

Battle on the Sambre.

VII. The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the establishment of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen mètres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 mètres), reckoning from the Sambre; and then the woods began, which covered the upper parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgæ remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry. (See Plate 10.)

Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped, directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two legions recently raised, who closed the march.

The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched. Arrived on the place chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun their work, when the Belgæ, perceiving the first portion of the baggage (which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted, rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at once – at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments. The Roman army is taken off its guard.

Cæsar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to arms,²⁶² to sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines, harangue the troops, give the word of order.²⁶³ In this critical situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats, and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns,²⁶⁴ nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.

The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions, separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command, everything was ruled by accident.

Cæsar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then, proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them already engaged.

The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the pilum, and fall, sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance, out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank. The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position, form again, and renew the combat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and, continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp. In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the heights, where the combat still continued.

While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus, had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left bank; they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right wing (aperto latere).

As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously, and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror. Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed, and flying on all sides, they believed that all was lost, took the road for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the Roman army was destroyed.

Cæsar had repaired from the left wing to the other points of the line. When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined soon afterwards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this extreme danger, Cæsar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself: having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions by their names and exciting the soldiers, he draws the 12th legion forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive their courage. Each man, under the eyes of their general, shows new energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of assailants. Cæsar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy in opposite directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Cæsar is thus occupied, the two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage (the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste, and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T. Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself master of the enemy’s camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and servants, the greatness of the danger with which Cæsar is threatened, and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre, and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the rear of the Nervii.

On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed; and the cavalry,²⁶⁵ to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn; the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own pila. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Cæsar, “that such men dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for their courage?” They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.

After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no hopes of safety, surrendered.²⁶⁶ In dwelling on the misfortune of their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar, to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence.²⁶⁷

Siege of the Oppidum of the Aduatuci.

VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones. He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above, were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.

As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii, they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and retired, with all they possessed, into one oppidum, remarkably fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated²⁶⁸ answers sufficiently to this description. (See Plate 11.)

On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was surrounded by a countervallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of 15,000 feet,²⁶⁹ with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their oppidum. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine, placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive. But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace, demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed, like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained quiet.

The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack. The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were sold publicly to the number of 53,000.²⁷⁰

Subjugation of Armorica by P. Crassus

IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome, the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings.²⁷¹

These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar, offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities where Crassus had been making war.²⁷² They were probably échelonnés in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.

Expedition of Galba into the Valais.

X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni (peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper Valais), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges, Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (Martigny). This town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (the Drance). Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (gæsa). Having to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus, the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain.[273] In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.[273a]

CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)

(Book III. of the “Commentaries.”)

WAR OF THE VENETI – VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI – SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE – MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII

Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples.

I. WHILE Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,²⁷³ M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean. The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be restored.

Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great: they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast; they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their oppida, and transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (See Plate 12.) They allied themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Scheldt,²⁷⁴ and demanded succour from the isle of Britain.²⁷⁵

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter, possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.²⁷⁶

War against the Veneti.

II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T. Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri, with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli, the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,²⁷⁷ who had arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,²⁷⁸ received the command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted. His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against the Veneti.²⁷⁹

We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine. Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain possession of the principal oppida where the inhabitants took refuge. Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for terraces (aggere ac molibus), and forming approaches towards the place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide; but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the oppidum, this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful in the attack.²⁸⁰

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded in taking several of these oppida. But all their labours were thrown away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they evacuated the oppidum, embarked with all their goods on board their numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring oppida, the situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner. Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (See Plate 12.)

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen, they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides, and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams (transtra), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen, or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support, with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the grappling-irons (copulæ).²⁸¹

Naval Combat against the Veneti.

III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was at length enabled to set sail.²⁸² It quitted the Loire, and directed its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (See Plate 12.) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped, which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean. Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops, which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly, the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,²⁸³ when, to remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in 492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks (falces) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses (non absimili forma muralium falcium).²⁸⁴ The falx was an iron with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which, suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without the means of defending any longer their oppida, they surrendered themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the insurrection.²⁸⁵

Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli.

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined, a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops. Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.²⁸⁶ (See Plate 13.) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti.²⁸⁷

Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.²⁸⁸ He believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (in convalle), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the oppidum of the Sotiates (the town of Sos), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus,²⁸⁹ supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called soldures, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the oppidum; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an oppidum fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy.²⁹⁰ He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of Aquitaine²⁹¹ submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission.²⁹²

March against the Morini and the Menapii.

VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns²⁹³ or under the tent.²⁹⁴ Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to retire.²⁹⁵ He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently vanquished.²⁹⁶

Observations.

VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time, entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain, for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations, named præfecti fabrorum. They rendered him the most signal services. Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,²⁹⁷ who prepared the material of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,²⁹⁸ who, in spite of the bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his genius during the wars in Gaul.

CHAPTER VII.
(Year of Rome 699.)

(Book IV of the “Commentaries.”)

INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI – FIRST PASSAGE OF THE RHINE – FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN – CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII

Cæsar’s March against the Usipetes and the Tencteri.

I. THE Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples driven out of their place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii (established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves²⁹⁹ and Xanten) (see Plate 14), and, after taking possession of the whole country, lived the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.

Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.

To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual (maturius quam consuerat), and joined the army in the countries of the Aulerci and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal, the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi, the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war, for the number of the Tencteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than 430,000 individuals – men, women, and children. If we admit that among these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is, one-fourth of the total population, we see that the Romans had to combat more than 100,000 enemies.³⁰⁰

Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht, where he crossed the Meuse. (See Plate 14.) He was only a few days’ march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty language, an arrangement: – “Driven from their country, they have not taken the initiative in the war; but they will not seek to avoid it. The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they know no people capable of resisting them.” Cæsar imposed upon them, as a first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, “Those who have not been able to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;” and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,³⁰¹ beyond the Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.

At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a delay of three days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept Cæsar’s conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem, yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to provoke a combat, but to confine itself in case of being attacked, to remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.

When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen, the German deputation.

The vanguard, consisting of 5,000 cavalry, marched without distrust, reckoning on the truce which had been concluded. Suddenly, 800 horsemen (all at the disposal of the Germans, since the greater part of their cavalry had passed the Meuse) appeared bearing down upon Cæsar’s cavalry from the greatest distance at which they could be seen. In an instant the ranks of the latter are thrown into disorder. They have succeeded in forming again, when the German horsemen, according to their custom, spring to the ground, stab the horses in the bellies, and overthrow their riders, who fly in terror till they come in sight of the legions. Seventy-four of the cavalry perished, among whom was the Aquitanian Piso, a man of high birth and great courage, whose grandfather had wielded the sovereign power in his country, and had obtained from the Senate the title of “Friend.” His brother, in the attempt to save him, shared his fate.

This attack was a flagrant violation of the truce, and Cæsar resolved to enter into no further negotiation with so faithless an enemy. Struck with the impression produced by this single combat on the fickle minds of the Gauls, he was unwilling to leave them time for reflection, but decided on delaying battle no longer; besides, it would have been folly to give the Germans leisure to wait the return of their cavalry. Next morning their chiefs came to the camp in great numbers, to offer their justification for the previous day’s attack in defiance of the convention, but their real object was to obtain by deception a prolongation of the truce. Cæsar, satisfied at seeing them deliver themselves into his power of their own accord, judged right to make use of reprisals, and ordered them to be arrested. The Roman army, then encamped on the Niers, was only eight miles distant from the Germans.³⁰²

Rout of the Usipetes and the Tencteri.

II. Cæsar drew all the troops out of his camp, formed the infantry in three lines,³⁰³ and placed the cavalry, still intimidated by the late combat, in the rear guard. After marching rapidly over the short distance which separated him from the Germans, he came upon them totally unexpected. Struck with terror at the sudden appearance of the army, and disconcerted by the absence of their chiefs, they had the time neither to deliberate nor to take their arms, and hesitated for a moment between flight and resistance.³⁰⁴ While their cries and disorder announce their terror, the Romans, provoked by their perfidious conduct on the previous day, rush upon the camp. As many of the Germans as are quick enough to gain their arms attempt to defend themselves, and combat among the baggage and wagons. But the women and children fly on every side. Cæsar sends the cavalry to pursue them. As soon as the barbarians, who still resisted, hear behind them the cries of the fugitives, and see the massacre of their companions, they throw down their arms, abandon their ensigns, and rush headlong out of the camp. They only cease their flight when they reach the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, where some are massacred and others are swallowed up in the river.³⁰⁵ This victory, which did not cost the Romans a single man, delivered them from a formidable war. Cæsar restored their liberty to the chiefs he had retained; but they, fearing the vengeance of the Gauls, whose lands they had ravaged, preferred remaining with him.³⁰⁶

First Passage of the Rhine.

III. After so brilliant a success, Cæsar, to secure the results, considered it a measure of importance to cross the Rhine, and so seek the Germans in their homes. For this purpose, he must choose the point of passage where the right bank was inhabited by a friendly people, the Ubii. The study of this and the following campaigns leads us to believe that this was Bonn.³⁰⁷ From the field of battle, then, he proceeded up the valley of the Rhine; he followed a direction indicated by the following localities: Gueldres, Crefeld, Neuss, Cologne, and Bonn. (See Plate 14.) Above all, it was Cæsar’s intention to put a stop to the rage of the Germans for invading Gaul, to inspire them with fears for their own safety, and to prove to them that the Roman army dared and could cross a great river. He had, moreover, a plausible motive for penetrating into Germany – the refusal of the Sicambri to deliver up to him the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them after the battle. The Sicambri had replied to his demand, that the empire of the Roman people ended with the Rhine, and that beyond it Cæsar had no further claims. At the same time, the Ubii, who alone of the peoples beyond the Rhine had sought his alliance, claimed his protection against the Suevi, who were threatening them more seriously than ever. It would be a sufficient guarantee for their safety, they said, to show himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so great was the renown of the Roman army among even the most remote of the German nations, since the defeat of Ariovistus and the recent victory; and they offered him boats for passing the river. Cæsar declined this offer. It did not appear to him worthy of the dignity of himself or of the Roman people to have recourse to barbarians, and he judged it unsafe to transport the army in boats. Therefore, in spite of the obstacles presented by a wide, deep, and rapid river, he decided on throwing a bridge across it.

It was the first time that a regular army attempted to cross the Rhine. The bridge was constructed in the following manner. (See Plate 15.) Two trees (probably in their rough state), a foot and a half in thickness, cut to a point at one of their extremities, and of a length proportionate to the depth of the river, were bound together with cross-beams at intervals of two feet from each other; let down into the water, and stuck into the ground by means of machines placed in boats coupled together, they were driven in by blows of a rammer, not vertically, like ordinary piles, but obliquely, giving them an inclination in the direction of the current. Opposite them, and at a distance of forty feet below, another couple of piles were placed, arranged in the same manner, but inclined in a contrary direction, in order to resist the violence of the river. In the interval left between the two piles of each couple, a great beam was lodged, called the head-piece, of two feet square; these two couples (hæc utraque) were bound together on each side, beginning from the upper extremity, by two wooden ties (fibulæ), so that they could neither draw from nor towards each other, and presented, according to the “Commentaries,” a whole of a solidity so great, that the force of the water, so far from injuring it, bound all its parts tighter together.³⁰⁸ This system formed one row of piles of the bridge; and as many of them were established as were required by the breadth of the river. The Rhine at Bonn being about 430 mètres wide, the bridge must have been composed of fifty-six arches, supposing each of these to have been twenty-six Roman feet in length (7·70 mètres). Consequently, there were fifty-four rows of piles. The floor was formed of planks reaching from one head-piece to the other, on which were placed transversely smaller planks, which were covered with hurdles. Besides this, they drove in obliquely, below each row of piles, a pile which, placed in form of a buttress (quæ pro ariete subjectæ), and bound in with it, increased the resistance to the current. Other piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above the rows of piles, so as to form stockades, intended to stop trunks of trees and boats which the barbarians might have thrown down in order to break the bridge.

These works were completed in ten days, including the time employed for the transport of the materials. Cæsar crossed the river with his army, left a strong guard at each extremity of the bridge, and marched towards the territory of the Sicambri, proceeding, no doubt, up the valley of the Sieg and the Agger, (See Plate 14.) During his march, deputies from different peoples came to solicit his alliance. He gave them a friendly reception, and exacted hostages. As to the Sicambri, at the beginning of the erection of the bridge, they had fled to the deserts and forests, terrified by the reports of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them.

Cæsar remained only eighteen days beyond the Rhine. During this time he ravaged the territory of the Sicambri, returned to that of the Ubii, and promised them succour if they were attacked by the Suevi. The latter having withdrawn to the centre of their country, he renounced the prospect of combating them, and considered that he had thus accomplished his design.

It is evident, from what precedes, that Cæsar’s aim was not to make the conquest of Germany, but to strike a great blow which should disgust the barbarians with their frequent excursions across the Rhine. No doubt he hoped to meet with the Suevi, and give them battle; but learning that they had assembled at a great distance from the Rhine, he thought it more prudent not to venture into an unknown country covered with forests, but returned into Gaul, and caused the bridge to be broken.

It was not enough for Cæsar to have intimidated the Germans; he formed a still bolder project, that of crossing the sea, to go and demand a reckoning of the Britons for the succour which, in almost all his wars, and particularly in that of the Veneti, they had sent to the Gauls.³⁰⁹

Description of Britain in the time of Cæsar.

IV. The Romans had but imperfect information relating to Britain, which they owed to certain Greek writers, such as Pytheas of Marseilles, who had visited the Northern Sea in the fourth century before our era, and Timæus of Tauromenium. The Gauls who visited Britain for the sake of traffic, knew hardly more than the southern and south-eastern coasts. Nevertheless, a short time before the arrival of the Romans, one of the populations of Belgic Gaul, the Suessiones, then governed by Divitiacus, had extended their domination into this island.³¹⁰

It was only after having landed in Britain that Cæsar was able to form a tolerably exact idea of its form and extent. “Britain,” he says, “has the form of a triangle, the base of which, about 500 miles in extent, faces Gaul. The side which faces Spain, that is, the west, presents a length of about 700 miles. In this direction the island is separated from Hibernia (Ireland) by an arm of the sea, the breadth of which is apparently the same as the arm of the sea which separates Britain from Gaul;” and he adds that “the surface of Hibernia represents about one half the surface of Britain. The third part of the triangle formed by this latter island is eastward turned to the north, and 800 miles long; it faces no land; only one of the angles of this side looks towards Germany.”³¹¹ These imperfect estimates, which were to give place in the following century to others less inaccurate,³¹² led the great captain to ascribe to the whole of Britain twenty times 100,000 paces in circuit. He further gathered some information still more vague on the small islands in the vicinity of Britain. “One of them,” he writes, “is called Mona (the Isle of Man), and is situated in the middle of the strait which separates Britain from Hibernia.” The Hebrides, the Shetland islands (Acmodæ of the ancients), and the Orcades, which were only known to the Romans at the commencement of our era,³¹³ were confounded, in the minds of Cæsar and his contemporaries, with the archipelago of the Feroe isles and Scandinavia. Caledonia (Scotland) appeared only in an obscure distance.

Cæsar represents the climate of Britain as less cold and more temperate than that of Gaul. With the exception of the beech (fagus) and the fir (abies), the same timbers were found in the forests of this island as on the neighbouring continent.³¹⁴ They grew wheat there, and bred numerous herds of cattle.³¹⁵ “The soil, if it is not favourable to the culture of the olive, the vine, and other products of warm climates,” writes Tacitus,³¹⁶ “produces in their place grain and fruits in abundance. Although they grow quickly, they are slow in ripening.”

Britain contained a numerous population. The interior was inhabited by peoples who believed themselves to be autochthones, and the southern and eastern coasts by a race who had emigrated from Belgic Gaul, and crossed the Channel and the Northern Sea, attracted by the prospect of plunder. After having made war on the natives, they had established themselves in the island, and became agriculturalists.³¹⁷ Cæsar adds that nearly all these tribes which had come from the continent had preserved the names of the civitates from whence they had issued. And, in fact, among the peoples of Britain named by geographers in the ages subsequent to the conquest of Gaul, we meet, on the banks of the Thames and the Severn, with the names of Belgæ and Atrebates.

The most powerful of the populations of Belgic origin were found in Cantium (Kent), which was placed, by its commercial relations, in more habitual intercourse with Gaul.³¹⁸ The “Commentaries” mention only a small number of British nations. These are the Trinobantes (the people of Essex and Middlesex), who proved the most faithful to the Romans,³¹⁹ and whose principal oppidum was probably already, in the time of Cæsar, Londinium (London), mentioned by Tacitus;³²⁰ the Cenimagni³²¹ (Suffolk, to the north of the Trinobantes); the Segontiaci (the greater part of Hampshire and Berkshire, southern counties); the Bibroci (inhabiting a region then thickly wooded, over which extended the celebrated forest of Anderida);³²² their territory comprised a small part of Hampshire and Berkshire, and embraced the counties of Surrey and Sussex and the most western part of Kent; the Ancalites (a more uncertain position, in the north of Berkshire and the western part of Middlesex); the Cassii (Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, central counties). Each of these little nations was governed by a chieftain or king.³²³

The Belgæ of Britain possessed the same manners as the Gauls, but their social condition was less advanced. Strabo³²⁴ gives this proof, that, having milk in abundance, the Britons did not know how to make cheese, an art, on the contrary, carried to great perfection in certain parts of Gaul. The national character of the two populations, British and Gaulish, presented a great analogy: – “The same boldness in seeking danger, the same eagerness to fly from it when it is before them,” writes Tacitus; “although the courage of the Britons has more of pride in it.”³²⁵ This resemblance of the two races showed itself also in their exterior forms. Yet, according to Strabo, the stature of the Britons was taller than that of the Gauls, and their hair was less red. Their dwellings were but wretched huts made of stubble and wood;³²⁶ they stored up their wheat in subterranean repositories; their oppida were situated in the middle of forests, defended by a rampart and a fosse, and served for places of refuge in case of attack.³²⁷

The tribes of the interior of the island lived in a state of greater barbarism than those of the maritime districts. Clothed in the skins of animals, they fed upon milk and flesh.³²⁸ Strabo even represents them as cannibals; and assures us that the custom existed among them of eating the bodies of their dead relatives.³²⁹ The men wore their hair very long, and a moustache; they rubbed their skin with woad, which gave them a blue colour, and rendered their aspect as combatants singularly hideous.³³⁰ The women also coloured themselves in the same manner for certain religious ceremonies, in which they appeared naked.³³¹ Such was the barbarism of the Britons of the interior, that the women were sometimes common to ten or twelve men, a promiscuousness which was especially customary amongst the nearest relatives. As to the children who were born of these incestuous unions, they were considered to belong to the first who had received into his house the mother while still a girl.³³² The Britons of the Cape Belerium (Cornwall) were very hospitable, and the trade they carried on with foreign merchants had softened their manners.³³³

The abundance of metals in Britain, especially of tin, or plumbum album, which the Phœnicians went to seek there from a very remote antiquity,³³⁴ furnished the inhabitants with numerous means of exchange. At all events, they were not acquainted with money, and only made use of pieces of copper, gold, or iron, the value of which was determined by weighing. They did not know how to make bronze, but received it from abroad.³³⁵

The religion of the Britons, on which Cæsar gives us no information, must have differed little from that of the Gauls, since Druidism passed for having been imported from Britain into Gaul.³³⁶ Tacitus, in fact, tells us that the same worship and the same superstitions were found in Britain as among the Gauls.³³⁷ Strabo speaks, on the authority of Artemidorus, of an island neighbouring to Britain, where they celebrated, in honour of two divinities, assimilated by the latter to Ceres and Proserpine, rites which resembled those of the mysteries of Samothrace.³³⁸ Under the influence of certain superstitious ideas, the Britons abstained from the flesh of several animals, such as the hare, the hen, and the goose, which, nevertheless, they domesticated as ornamental objects.³³⁹

The Britons, though living in an island, appear to have possessed no shipping in the time of Cæsar. They were foreign ships which came to the neighbourhood of Cape Belerium to fetch the tin, which the inhabitants worked with as much skill as profit.³⁴⁰ About a century after Cæsar, the boats of the Britons were still only frames of wicker-work covered with leather.³⁴¹ The inhabitants of Britain were less ignorant in the art of war than in that of navigation. Protected by small bucklers,³⁴² and armed with long swords, which they handled with skill, but which became useless in close combat, they never combated in masses: they advanced in small detachments, which supported each other reciprocally.³⁴³ Their principal force was in their infantry;³⁴⁴ yet they employed a great number of war-chariots armed with scythes.³⁴⁵ They began by driving about rapidly on all sides, and hurling darts, seeking thus to spread disorder in the enemy’s ranks by the mere terror caused by the impetuosity of the horses and the noise of the wheels; then they returned into the intervals of their cavalry, leaped to the ground, and fought on foot mixed with the horsemen. During this time the drivers withdrew themselves with the chariots so as to be ready in case of need to receive the combatants.³⁴⁶ The Britons thus united the movableness of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; daily exercise had made them so dexterous that they maintained their horses at full speed on steep slopes, drew them in or turned them at will, ran upon the shaft, held under the yoke, and thence threw themselves rapidly into their chariots.³⁴⁷ In war they used their dogs as auxiliaries, which the Gauls procured from Britain for the same purpose. These dogs were excellent for the chase.³⁴⁸

In short, the Britons were less civilised than the Gauls. If we except the art of working certain metals, their manufactures were limited to the fabrication of the coarsest and most indispensable objects; and it was from Gaul they obtained collars, vessels of amber and glass, and ornaments of ivory for the bridles of their horses.³⁴⁹

It was known also that pearls were in the Scottish sea, and people easily believed that it concealed immense treasures.

These details relating to Britain were not collected until after the Roman expeditions, for that country was previously the subject of the most mysterious tales; and when Cæsar resolved on its conquest, this bold enterprise excited people’s minds to the highest degree by the ever-powerful charm of the unknown. As to him, in crossing the Channel, he obeyed the same thought which had carried him across the Rhine: he wished to give the barbarians a high notion of Roman greatness, and prevent them from lending support to the insurrections in Gaul.

First Expedition to Britain.

V. Although the summer approached its end, the difficulties of a descent upon Britain did not stop him. Even supposing, indeed, that the season should not permit him to obtain any decisive result by the expedition, he looked upon it as an advantage to gain a footing in that island, and to make himself acquainted with the locality, and with the ports and points for disembarking. None of the persons whom he examined could or would give him any information, either on the extent of the country, or on the number and manners of its inhabitants, or on their manner of making war, or on the ports capable of receiving a large fleet.

Desirous of obtaining some light on these different points before attempting the expedition, Cæsar sent C. Volusenus, in a galley, with orders to explore everything, and return as quickly as possible with the result of his observations. He proceeded in person with his army into the country of the Morini, from whence the passage into Britain was shortest. There was on that coast a port favourably situated for fitting out an expedition against this island, the Portius Itius, or, as we shall endeavour to prove farther on, the port of Boulogne. The ships of all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.

The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he appreciated, enjoyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.

While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain: he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission: as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.

The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450 horses.

Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port with a sufficient force.

They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage, and a certain number of galleys, which were distributed among the quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels, destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little port (that of Ambleteuse) situated eight miles to the north of Boulogne.³⁵⁰ (See Plate 16.)

Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above (Ambleteuse); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of the day (ten o’clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.

From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the heights could reach the beach.³⁵¹ The place appeared to him in no respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of “coasts surmounted by immense rocks.”³⁵² (See Plate 17.) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours, Appendix B), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.

When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o’clock, the wind and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal for raising their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory,³⁵³ the point of the South Foreland (see Plate 16), he stopped before the open and level shore which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.

From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude, could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.

In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the galleys – lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the barbarians – and directed them by force of rowing upon the enemy’s uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons, struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle, leaps into the sea and induces them to follow.³⁵⁴ This example is imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy, taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys’ boats and the small vessels which served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had not been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.

In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner. Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a rock,³⁵⁵ whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence, and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions. When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.

The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships left at anchor not far from the shore.

The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini, with whom they lived on friendly terms,³⁵⁶ and Commius, the King of the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.

Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain, and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island, where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.

This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full moon; the Romans were ignorant of the fact that this was the period of the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.

At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage³⁵⁷ they determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into Britain.

A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away. Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet, soon led him to anticipate what would happen. He therefore took his measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again, with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.

During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities; but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair to the only spot which remained to reap (pars una erat reliqua), had concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with their cavalry and chariots.

This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had experienced considerable loss.³⁵⁸ Continual rains, during some days, rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians, believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty, assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.

Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed, would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could use them with advantage;³⁵⁹ he drew up his legions in battle at the head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp, after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a vast circuit.

The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask for peace. Cæsar doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only obeyed this order.

As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and were nearly all massacred.³⁶⁰

Chastisement of the Morini and Menapii.

VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Cotta rejoined Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of thanksgiving.³⁶¹

Order for Rebuilding the Fleet. Departure for Illyria.

VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired also to have greater breadth in the vessels on account of the baggage and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls.³⁶² He procured from Spain all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.

Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the assembly of Citerior Gaul, and afterwards started for Illyria, on the news that the Pirustes (peoples of the Carnic Alps) were laying the frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established tranquillity.³⁶³

Points of Embarking and Landing. Date of the Arrival in Britain.

VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain. Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the first place, the terms used in the “Commentaries” lead us to suppose it; next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne; and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both occasions at the same spot.³⁶⁴ It is, then, convenient to treat here the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to certain facts.

Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant, others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I, in his Précis des Guerres de César, has not hesitated in preferring Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of Boulogne is the Portus Itius, which alone answers the necessities of the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a considerable expedition.³⁶⁵

To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data. The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani,³⁶⁶ and was to end at Gesoriacum (Boulogne), since the Itinerary of Antoninus traces it thus.³⁶⁷ It was at Boulogne that Caligula caused a pharos to be raised,³⁶⁸ and that Claudius embarked for Britain.³⁶⁹ It was thence that Lupicinus, under the Emperor Julian,³⁷⁰ and Theodosius, under the Emperor Valentinian,³⁷¹ Constantius Chlorus,³⁷² and lastly, in 893, the Danes,³⁷³ set sail. This port, then, was known and frequented a short time after Cæsar, and continued to be used during the following centuries, while Wissant and Calais are only mentioned by historians three or four centuries later. Lastly, at Boulogne, Roman antiquities are found in abundance; none exist at Calais or Wissant. Cæsar’s camp, of which certain authors speak as situated near Wissant, is only a small modern redoubt, incapable of containing more than 200 men.

To this first presumption in favour of Boulogne we may add another: the ancient authors speak only of a single port on the coast of Gaul nearest to Britain; therefore, they very probably give different names to the same place, among which names figures that of Gesoriacum. Florus³⁷⁴ calls the place where Cæsar embarked the port of the Morini. Strabo³⁷⁵ says that this port was called Itius; Pomponius Mela, who lived less than a century after Cæsar, cites Gesoriacum as the port of the Morini best known;³⁷⁶ Pliny expresses himself in analogous terms.³⁷⁷

Let us now show that the port of Boulogne agrees with the conditions specified in the “Commentaries.”

1. Cæsar, in his first expedition, repaired to the country of the Morini, whence the passage from Gaul to Britain is shortest. Now, Boulogne is actually situated on the territory of that people which, occupying the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, was the nearest to England.

2. In his second expedition, Cæsar embarked at the port Itius, which he had found to offer the most convenient passage for proceeding to Britain, distant from the continent about thirty Roman miles. Now, even at the present day, it is from Boulogne that the passage is easiest to arrive in England, because the favourable winds are more frequent than at Wissant and Calais. As to the distance of about thirty miles (forty-four kilometres), Cæsar gives it evidently as representing the distance from Britain to the Portus Itius: it is exactly the distance from Boulogne to Dover, whereas Wissant and Calais are farther from Dover, the one twenty, the other twenty-three Roman miles.

3. To the north, at eight miles’ distance from the Portus Itius, existed another port, where the cavalry embarked. Boulogne is the only port on this coast at eight miles from which, towards the north, we meet with another, that of Ambleteuse. The distance of eight miles is exact, not as a bird flies, but following the course of the hills. To the north of Wissant, on the contrary, there is only Sangatte or Calais. Now Sangatte is six Roman miles from Wissant, and Calais eleven.

4. The eighteen ships of the upper port were prevented by contrary winds from rallying the fleet at the principal port. We understand easily that these ships, detained at Ambleteuse by winds from the south-west or west-south-west, which prevail frequently in the Channel, were unable to rally the fleet at Boulogne. As to the two ships of burthen, which, at the return of the first expedition, could not make land in the same port as the fleet, but were dragged by the current more to the south, nothing is said in the “Commentaries” which would show that they entered a port; it is probable, indeed, that they were driven upon the shore. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that they may have landed in the little fishers’ ports of Hardelot and Camiers. (See Plate 15.)

We see from what precedes that the port of Boulogne agrees with the text of the “Commentaries.” But the peremptory reason why, in our opinion, the port where Cæsar embarked is certainly that of Boulogne, is, that it would have been impossible to prepare elsewhere an expedition against England, Boulogne being the only place which united the conditions indispensable for collecting the fleet and embarking the troops. In fact, it required a port capable of containing either eighty transport ships and galleys, as in the first expedition, or 800 ships, as in the second; and extensive enough to allow the ships to approach the banks and embark the troops in a single tide. Now these conditions could only be fulfilled where a river sufficiently deep, flowing into the sea, formed a natural port; and, on the part of the coasts nearest to England, we find only at Boulogne a river, the Liane, which presents all these advantages. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, all the coast has been buried in sand. It appears that it is not more than a century and a half that the natural basin of Boulogne has been partly filled; and, according to tradition and geological observations, the coast advanced more than two kilomètres, forming two jetties, between which the high tide filled the valley of the Liane to a distance of four kilomètres inland.

None of the ports situated to the north of Boulogne could serve as the basis of Cæsar’s expedition, for none could receive so great a number of vessels, and we cannot suppose that Cæsar would have left them on the open coast, during more than a month, exposed to the tempests of the ocean, which were so fatal to him on the coasts of Britain.

Boulogne was the only point of the coast where Cæsar could place in safety his depôts, his supplies, and his spare stores. The heights which command the port offered advantageous positions for establishing his camps,³⁷⁸ and the little river Liane allowed him to bring with ease the timber and provisions he required. At Calais he would have found nothing but flats and marshes, at Wissant nothing but sands, as indicated by etymology of the word (white sand).

It is worthy of remark, that the reasons which determined Cæsar to start from Boulogne were the same which decided the choice of Napoleon I. in 1804. In spite of the difference in the times and in the armies, the nautical and practical conditions had undergone no change. “The Emperor chose Boulogne,” says M. Thiers, “because that port had long been pointed out as the best point of departure of an expedition directed against England; he chose Boulogne, because its port is formed by the little river Liane, which allowed him, with some labour, to place in safety from 1,200 to 1,300 vessels.”

We may point out, as another similarity, that certain flat boats, constructed by order of the Emperor, had nearly the same dimensions as those employed by Cæsar. “There required,” says the historian of the ‘Consulate and the Empire,’ “boats which would not need more, when they were laden, than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which would go with oars, so as to pass, either in calm or fog, and strand without breaking on the flat English shores. The great gun-boats carried four pieces of large bore, and were rigged like brigs, that is, with two masts, manœuvred by twenty-four sailors, and capable of carrying a company of a hundred men, with its staff, and its arms and munitions… These boats offered a vexatious inconvenience, that of falling to the leeward, that is, yielding to the currents. This was the result of their clumsy build, which presented more hold to the water than their masts to the wind.”³⁷⁹

Cæsar’s ships experienced the same inconvenience, and, drawn away by the currents in his second expedition, they went to the leeward rather far in the north.

We have seen that Cæsar’s transport boats were flat-bottomed, that they could go either with sails or oars; carry if necessary 150 men, and be loaded and drawn on dry ground with promptness (ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque). They had thus a great analogy with the flat-bottomed boats of 1804. But there is more, for the Emperor Napoleon had found it expedient to imitate the Roman galleys. “He had seen the necessity,” says M. Thiers, “of constructing boats still lighter and more movable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of water, and calculated for landing anywhere. They were large boats, narrow, sixty feet long, having a movable deck which could be laid or withdrawn at will, and were distinguished from the others by the name of pinnaces. These large boats were provided with sixty oars, carried at need a light sail, and moved with extreme swiftness. When sixty soldiers, practised in handling the oar as well as the sailors, set them in motion, they glided over the sea like the light boats dropped from the sides of our great vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of their course.”

The point of landing has been equally the subject of a host of contrary suppositions. St. Leonards, near Hastings, Richborough (Rutupiœ), near Sandwich, Lymne, near Hythe, and Deal, have all been proposed.

The first of these localities, we think, must be rejected, for it answers none of the conditions of the relation given in the “Commentaries,” which inform us that, in the second expedition, the fleet sailed with a gentle wind from the south-west. Now, this is the least favourable of all winds for taking the direction of Hastings, when starting from the coasts of the department of the Pas-de-Calais. In this same passage, Cæsar, after having been drawn away from his course during four hours of the night, perceived, at daybreak, that he had left Britain to his left. This fact cannot possibly be explained if he had intended to land at St. Leonards. As to Richborough, this locality is much too far to the north. Why should Cæsar have gone so far as Sandwich, since he could have landed at Walmer and Deal? Lymne, or rather Romney Marsh, will suit no better. This shore is altogether unfit for a landing-place, and none of the details furnished by the “Commentaries” can be made to suit it.³⁸⁰

There remains Deal; but before describing this place, we must examine if, on his first passage, when Cæsar sailed, after remaining five days opposite the cliffs of Dover, the current of which he took advantage carried him towards the north or towards the south. (See Page 177.) Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr. Airy, have studied this question; but they agree neither on the place where Cæsar embarked, nor on that where he landed. We may, nevertheless, arrive at a solution of this problem by seeking the day on which Cæsar landed. The year of the expedition is known by the consulate of Pompey and Crassus – it was the year 699. The month in which the departure took place is known by the following data, derived from the “Commentaries;” the fine season was near its end, exuigua parte œstatis reliqua (IV. 20); the wheat had been reaped everywhere, except in one single spot, omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento, una pars erat reliqua (IV. 32); the equinox was near at hand, propinqua die œquinoctii (IV. 36). These data point sufficiently clearly to the month of August. Lastly, we have, relative to the day of landing, the following indications: – After four days past since his arrival in Britain… there arose suddenly so violent a tempest… That same night it was full moon, which is the period of the highest tides of the ocean, Post diem quartam, quam est in Britanniam ventum(³⁸¹)… tanta tempestas subita coorta est… Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos æstus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit.

According to this, we consider that the tempest took place after four days, counted from the day of landing; that the full moon fell on the following night; and lastly, that this period coincided not with the highest tide, but with the highest tides of the ocean. Thus we believe that it would be sufficient for ascertaining the exact day of landing, to take the sixth day which preceded the full moon of the month of August, 699; now this phenomenon, according to astronomical tables, happened on the 31st, towards three o’clock in the morning. On the eve, that is, on the 30th, the tempest had occurred; four full days had passed since the landing; this takes us back to the 25th. Cæsar then landed on the 25th of August. Mr. Airy, it is true, has interpreted the text altogether differently from our explanation: he believes that the expression post diem quartum may be taken in Latin for the third day; on another hand, he doubts if Cæsar had in his army almanacks by which he could know the exact day of the full moon; lastly, as the highest tide takes place a day and a half after the full moon, he affirms that Cæsar, placing these two phenomena at the same moment, must have been mistaken, either in the day of the full moon, or in that of the highest tide; and he concludes from this that the landing may have taken place on the second, third, or fourth day before the full moon.

Our reasoning has another basis. Let us first state that at that time the science of astronomy permitted people to know certain epochs of the moon, since, more than a hundred years before, during the war against Perseus, a tribune of the army of Paulus Æmilius announced on the previous day to his soldiers an eclipse of the moon, in order to counteract the effect of their superstitious fears.³⁸² Let us remark also, that Cæsar, who subsequently reformed the calendar, was well informed in the astronomical knowledge of his time, already carried to a very high point of advance by Hipparchus, and that he took especial interest in it, since he discovered, by means of water-clocks, that the nights were shorter in Britain than in Italy.

Everything, then, authorises us in the belief that Cæsar, when he embarked for an unknown country, where he might have to make night marches, must have taken precautions for knowing the course of the moon, and furnished himself with calendars. But we have put the question independently of these considerations, by seeking among the days which preceded the full moon of the end of August, 699, which was the one in which the shifting of the currents of which Cæsar speaks could have been produced at the hour indicated in the “Commentaries.”

Supposing, then, the fleet of Cæsar at anchor at a distance of half a mile opposite Dover, as it experienced the effect of the shifting of the currents towards half-past three o’clock in the afternoon, the question becomes reduced to that of determining the day of the end of the month of August when this phenomenon took place at the above hour. We know that in the Channel the sea produces, in rising and falling, two alternate currents, one directed from the west to the east, called flux (flot), or current of the rising tide; the other directed from the east to the west, named reflux (jusant), or current of the falling tide. In the sea opposite Dover, at a distance of half a mile from the coast, the flux begins usually to be sensible two hours before high tide at Dover, and the reflux four hours after.

So that, if we find a day before the full moon of the 31st of August, 699, on which it was high tide at Dover, either at half-past five in the afternoon or at midday, that will be the day of landing; and further, we shall know whether the current carried Cæsar towards the east or towards the west. Now, we may admit, according to astronomical data, that the tides of the days which preceded the full moon of the 31st of August, 699, were sensibly the same as those of the days which preceded the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857; and, as it was the sixth day before the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857, that it was high tide at Dover towards half-past five in the afternoon (see the Annuaire des Marées des Côtes de France for the year 1857),³⁸³ we are led to conclude that the same phenomenon was produced also at Dover on the sixth day before the 31st of August, 699; and that it was on the 25th of August that Cæsar arrived in Britain, his fleet being carried forward by the current of the rising tide.

This last conclusion, by obliging us to seek the point of landing to the north of Dover, constitutes the strongest theoretic presumption in favour of Deal. Let us now examine if Deal satisfies the requirements of the Latin text.

The cliffs which border the coasts of England towards the southern part of the county of Kent form, from Folkestone to the castle of Walmer, a vast quarter of a circle, convex towards the sea, abrupt on nearly all points; they present several bays or creeks, as at Folkestone, at Dover, at St. Margaret’s, and at Oldstairs, and, diminishing by degrees in elevation, terminate at the castle of Walmer. From this point, proceeding towards the north, the coast is flat, and favourable for landing on an extent of several leagues.

The country situated to the west of Walmer and Deal is itself flat as far as the view can reach, or presents only gentle undulations of ground. We may add that it produces, in great quantities, wheat of excellent quality, and that the nature of the soil leads us to believe that it was the same at a remote period. These different conditions rendered the shore of Walmer and Deal the best place of landing for the Roman army.

Its situation, moreover, agrees fully with the narrative of the “Commentaries.” In the first expedition, the Roman fleet, starting from the cliffs of Dover and doubling the point of the South Foreland, may have made the passage of seven miles in an hour; it would thus have come to anchor opposite the present village of Walmer. The Britons, starting from Dover, might have made a march of eight kilomètres quickly enough to oppose the landing of the Romans. (See Plate 16.)

The combat which followed was certainly fought on the part of the shore which extends from Walmer Castle to Deal. At present the whole extent of this coast is covered with buildings, so that it is impossible to say what was its exact form nineteen centuries ago; but, from a view of the locality, we can understand without difficulty the different circumstances of the combat described in Book IV. of the “Commentaries.”

Four days completed after the arrival of Cæsar in Britain, a tempest dispersed the eighteen ships which, after quitting Ambleteuse, had arrived just within sight of the Roman camp. All the sailors of the Channel who have been consulted believe it possible that the same hurricane, according to the text, might have driven one part of the ships towards the South Foreland and the other part towards the coast of Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The conformation of the ground itself indicates the site of the Roman camp on the height where the village of Walmer rises. It was situated there at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 mètres from the beach, in a position which commanded the surrounding country. And it is thus easy to understand, from the aspect of the locality, the details relative to the episode of the 7th legion, surprised while it was mowing.³⁸⁴ It might be objected that at Deal the Roman camp was not near to a water-course, but they could dig wells, which is the only method by which the numerous population of Deal at the present day obtain water.

From all that has just been said, the following facts appear to us to be established in regard to the first expedition. Cæsar, after causing all his flotilla to go out of the port the day before, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August, towards midnight, from the coast of Boulogne, and arrived opposite Dover towards six o’clock in the morning. He remained at anchor until half-past three in the afternoon, and then, having wind and tide in his favour, he moved a distance of seven miles and arrived near Deal, probably between Deal and Walmer Castle, at half-past four. As in the month of August twilight lasts till after half-past seven, and its effect may be prolonged by the moon, which at that hour was in the middle of the heaven, Cæsar had still four hours left for landing, driving back the Britons, and establishing himself on the British soil. As the sea began to ebb towards half-past five, this explains the anecdote of Cæsius Scæva told by Valerius Maximus; for, towards seven o’clock, the rocks called the Malms might be left uncovered by the ebb of the tide.

After four entire days, reckoned from the moment of landing, that is, on the 30th of August, the tempest arose, and full moon occurred in the following night.

This first expedition, which Cæsar had undertaken too late in the season, and with too few troops, could not lead to great results. He himself declares that he only sought to make an appearance in Britain. In fact, he did not remove from the coast, and he left the island towards the 17th of September, having remained there only twenty-three days.³⁸⁵

Résumé of the Dates of the Campaign of 699.

IX. We recapitulate as follows the probable dates of the campaign of 699: —

CHAPTER VIII
(Year of Rome 700.)

(Book V. of the “Commentaries.”)

MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI – SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN

Inspection of the Fleet. March against the Treviri.

I. CÆSAR, after having appeased the troubles of Illyria, and passed some time in Italy, rejoined the army in the country of the Belgæ, at the beginning of June in the year 700. Immediately on his arrival, he visited all his quarters, and the naval arsenal established, according to Strabo, at the mouth of the Seine.³⁸⁶ He found his fleet ready for sea. In spite of the scarcity of necessary materials, the soldiers had laboured in building it with the greatest zeal. He rewarded them with commendations, complimented those who had directed the works, and appointed for the general rendezvous the Portus Itius (Boulogne).

The concentration of the fleet required a considerable length of time, of which Cæsar took advantage to prevent the effects of the agitation which had shown itself among the Treviri. These populations, rebelling against his orders, and suspected of having called the Germans from beyond the Rhine, did not send their representatives to the assemblies. Cæsar marched against them with four legions, without baggage, and 800 cavalry, and left troops in sufficient number to protect the fleet.

The Treviri possessed, in addition to a considerable infantry, a more numerous cavalry than any other people in Gaul. They were divided into two factions, whose chiefs, Indutiomarus and his son-in-law Cingetorix, disputed the chief power. The latter was no sooner informed of the approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus, on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several chiefs (principes), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy.³⁸⁷

Departure for the Isle of Britain.

II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet, perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of the Meldæ,³⁸⁸ which a tempest had driven back to their point of departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total amounted to 800 sail.³⁸⁹ The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul and in Spain;³⁹⁰ but the expeditionary body was composed only of five legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the principal citizens, of each people (principes ex omnibus civitatibus), and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.

It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain. The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.

On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had left Britain to his left. (See Plate 16.) But then came on the shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the reflux (jusant), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on several points at once,³⁹¹ without any appearance of the enemy. Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights.³⁹²

March into the interior of the Country.

III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good position, near the sea.³⁹³ The fleet, left at anchor near the shore, on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired him with no uneasiness.³⁹⁴ As soon as he knew where the enemy was posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten cohorts³⁹⁵ and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a stream of water now called the Little Stour.³⁹⁶ These caused their cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream, seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but, repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in former times in their intestine wars.³⁹⁷ Numerous abatis of felled trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their oppidum; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country, and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.³⁹⁸

Destruction of a part of the Fleet.

IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies, and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q. Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them in the camp by a new retrenchment.³⁹⁹ The soldiers employed ten entire days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.⁴⁰⁰

Cæsar resumes the offensive.

V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.⁴⁰¹ This chief had heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord, agreed in giving him the command.

The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in this action.

The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.

This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence.⁴⁰²

The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated, harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length.⁴⁰³

March towards the Thames.

VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus, passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (See Plate 16.) Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up on the opposite bank.⁴⁰⁴ It was defended by a palisade of sharp pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and, although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe.⁴⁰⁵

Submission of a part of Britain.

VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about 4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six essedarii to the chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660 carriages.) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.

Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain, sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.

The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (see p. 168

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1

Justin, XXIV. 4. – Titus Livius, V. 48.

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2

Polybius, II. 17-19. – Titus Livius, V. 35.

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3

Pausanias, X. 19-23. – Diodorus Siculus, Eclog., XXII. 13.

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4

Strabo, IV. p. 156, edit. Dübner and Müller. – Justin, XXXII. 3.

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5

Polybius, IV. 46.

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6

Justin, XXV. 2. – Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 16. – Pausanias, VII. 6, § 5.

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7

Polybius, XXXIII. 7, 8. – Titus Livius, Epitome, XLVII.

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8

Strabo, IV., p. 169.

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9

Titus Livius, Epitome, LX.

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10

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXI.

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11

Strabo, IV., pp. 154, 159. – Titus Livius, Epitome, LXI. – Florus, III. 2. – Velleius Paterculus, II. 10.

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12

Lucan, I. 424.

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13

Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, I. 45. – Strabo, IV., p. 158.

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14

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXII. – Eutropius, IV. 10. – Velleius Paterculus, I. 15.

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15

Strabo, VII., p. 243.

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16

This victory was gained by the Tigurini, a people of Helvetia, on the territory of the Allobroges. According to the Epitome of Titus Livius (LXV.), the battle took place in the district of the Nitiobriges, a people inhabiting the banks of the Garonne, which is not very probable.

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17

After pillaging the temple of Toulouse.

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18

Titus Livius, Epitome, LXVII. – Tacitus, Germania, 37.

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19

Jugurtha, 114.

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20

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

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21

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

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22

The fugitives from Vienne founded the town which subsequently took the name of Lugdunum, in a place called Condate, which is synonymous with confluence. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 50.)

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23

Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

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24

Jugurtha, 114.

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25

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 13.

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26

Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, I. 19.

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27

Plutarch, Cæsar, 41. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

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28

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

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29

Plutarch, Cæsar, 41. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

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30

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 41.

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31

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 11. – Dio Cassius, XL. 50.

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32

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus, 14.

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33

Cicero, Orat. de Provinciis Cousularibus, 12.

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34

It is stated in the “Commentaries” that Cæsar placed in winter quarters four legions among the Belgæ, and the same number among the Ædui. (De Bello Gallico, VIII. 54.) – “Cæsar had with him but 5,000 men and 300 horse. He had left the rest of his army beyond the Alps.” (Plutarch, Cæsar, 36, and Appian, Civil Wars, II. 34.)

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35

Appian, Civil Wars, II. 35.

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36

De Bello Gallico, VIII. 55.

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37

Suetonius, Cæsar, 68.

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38

In Suetonius, Cæsar, 56. – Cicero, Brutus, 75.

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39

Preface of Hirtius to Book VIII. of the “Commentaries.”

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40

De Bello Gallico, VI. 13.

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41

De Bello Gallico, IV. 10.

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42

Strabo, IV. 3, p. 160

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43

The Narbonnese reminded the Romans of the climate and productions of Italy. (Strabo, IV. 1, p. 147.)

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44

Pomponius Mela, who compiled in the first century, from old authors an abridgement of Geography, says that Gaul was rich in wheat and pastures, and covered with immense forests: “Terra est frumenti præcipue ac pabuli forax, et amœna lucis immanibus.” (De Situ Orbis, III. 2.) – (De Bello Gallico, I, 16.) – The winter was very early in the north of Gaul. (De Bello Gallico, IV. 20.) Hence the proverbial expression at Rome of heims Gallica. (Petronius, Satir. 19. – Strabo, IV., 147-161.) – See the “Memoire on the Forests of Gaul” read before the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, by M. Alfred Maury.

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45

Strabo, IV., p. 147. – Diodorus Siculus, V. 26.

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46

Cæsar, after having said (V. 3) that the forests of the Ardennes extended from the Rhine to the frontier of the Remi, ad initium Remorum, adds (VI. 29) that it extended also towards the Nervii, ad Nervios. Nevertheless, according to chapter 33 of book VI., we believe that this forest extended, across the country of the Nervii, to the Scheldt. How otherwise could Cæsar have assigned to the forests of the Ardennes a length of 500 miles, if it ended at the eastern frontier of the Nervii? This number is, in any case, exaggerated, for from the Rhine (at Coblentz) to the Scheldt, towards Ghent and Antwerp, it is but 300 kilomètres, or 200 miles.

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47

De Bello Gallico, VIII. 5.

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48

“Citra flumen Ararim … reliqui sese fugæ mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 12.)

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49

“Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti.” (De Bello Gallico, VI. 5.)

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50

“(Morini et Menapii) … silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque contulerunt.” (De Bello Gallico, III. 28.)

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51

“(Sugambri) primos Eburonum fines adeunt … non silvæ morantur.” (De Bello Gallico, VI. 35.)

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52

Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.

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53

De Bello Gallico, IV. 2.

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54

Strabo, pp. 121, 155, 170, edit. Didot.

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55

“Carpenta Gallorum.” (Florus, I. 13) – “Plurima Gallica (verba) valuerunt, ut reda ac petorritum.” (Quintilian, De Institutione Oratoria, lib. I., cap. v. 57.) – “Petorritum enim est non ex Græcia dimidiatum, sed totum transalpibus, nam est vox Gallica. Id scriptum est in libro M. Varronis quarto decimo Rerum Divinarum; quo in loco Varro, quum de petorrito dixisset, esse id verbum Gallicum dixit.” (Aulus Gellius, XV. 30.) – “Petoritum et Gallicum vehiculum est, et nomen ejus dictum esse existimant a numero quatuor rotarum. Alii Osce, quod hi quoque petora quatuor vocent. Alii Græce, sed αἱλικὡς dictum.” (Festus, voc. Petoritum, p. 206, edit. Müller.) – “Belgica esseda, Gallicana vehicula. Nam Belga civitas est Galliæ in qua hujusmodi vehiculi repertus est usus.” (Servius, Commentaries on the Georgics of Virgil, lib. III. v. 204. – Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, IV. 33, and passim.

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56

De Bello Gallico, II. 5.

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57

De Bello Gallico, I. 7.

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58

De Bello Gallico, VII. 11.

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59

De Bello Gallico, VII. 34, 53.

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60

De Bello Gallico, VII. 58.

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61

The reckoning of these contingents is the most positive element for estimating the state of the population. We find in the “Commentaries” three valuable statements: 1st, the numerical state of the Helvetian immigration in 696 (De Bello Gallico, I. 29.); 2nd, that of the Belgic troops, in the campaign of 697 (De Bello Gallico, II. 4.); 3rd, the census of the Gaulish army which, in 702, attempted to raise the siege of Alesia (De Bello Gallico, VII. 75.) Of 368,000 men, composing the agglomeration of the Helvetii and their allies, 92,000 were able to bear arms; that is, about a quarter of the population. In the campaign of 697, the Belgic coalition counted 296,000 combatants, and, in 702, at the time of the blockade of Alesia, the effective force of a great part of Gaul amounted to 281,000 men. But, in order not to count twice the different contingents of the same states, we suppress from the enumeration of the year 702 the contingents of the countries already mentioned in the census of 697, which reduces the effective force to 201,000 men. Yet this number cannot represent the total of men fit for war; it comprises only the troops which could easily be sent out of the territory, and which were more numerous accordingly as the people to which they belonged were nearer to the theatre of military operations. Thus Cæsar informs us that the Bellovaci, who could bring into the field 100,000 men, only furnished 60,000 picked men in 697, and 10,000 in 702. The contingent of the Atrebates, which had been 15,000 men in 697, was reduced to 4,000 in 702; that of the Nervii, of 50,000 in the former year, sank to 5,000; and that of the Morini similarly from 25,000 to 5,000. From these circumstances we may be allowed to infer that the Gauls armed three-fifths of their male population when the enemy was near their territory, and only one-fifth, or even one-sixth, when he was more distant.

If, then, we would form an idea of the total number of men able to carry arms in Gaul, we must augment the contingents really furnished, sometimes by two-fifths, sometimes in a higher proportion, according to the distances which separated them from the seat of war. By this calculation, the levies of 697 represent 513,600 men capable of carrying arms, and those of 702, at least 573,600; we add together these two numbers, because, as stated above, each army comprises different populations, which gives 1,087,200 men, to whom we must add 92,000 Helvetii; moreover, it is indispensable to take into account the contributive capability of the populations which are not mentioned in the “Commentaries” among the belligerents at the two epochs indicated above, such as the Pictones, the Carnutes, the Andes, the Remi, the Treviri, the Lingones, the Leuci, the Unelli, the Redones, the Ambivareti, and the peoples of Armorica and Aquitaine. By an approximate estimate of their population according to the extent of their territory, we shall obtain the number of 625,000 men. Adding together these four numbers, to obtain the total number of men capable of bearing arms, we shall get 513,600 + 573,600 + 92,000 + 625,000 = 1,804,200 men. Quadrupling this number to get, according to the proportion applied to the Helvetii, the total of the population, we shall have 7,216,800 inhabitants for Gaul, the Roman province not included. In fact, Diodorus Siculus, who wrote in the first century of our era, says (lib. V., c. 25) that the population of the different nations of Gaul varies from 200,000 to 50,000 men, which would make a mean of 125,000 men. If we take the word ἁνδρες in the sense of inhabitants, and if we admit with Tacitus that there were in Gaul sixty-four different nations, we should have the number of 8,000,000 inhabitants, very near the preceding.

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62

Pliny expresses himself thus: “The country comprised under the name of Gallia Comata is divided into three peoples, generally separated by rivers. From the Scheldt to the Seine is Belgic Gaul; from the Seine to the Garonne, Celtic, called also Lyonnese; from thence to the Pyrenees is Aquitaine.” (Hist. Nat., IV. xxxi. 105.)

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63

Peoples composing the Roman Province:

The Albici (the south of the department of the Lower Alps, and the north of the Var). (De Bello Civil., I. 34; II. 2.)

The Allobroges, probably of Celtic origin, inhabited the north-west of Savoy, and the greater part of the department of the Isère.

The Helvii, inhabitants of the ancient Vivarais (the southern part of the department of the Ardèche), separated from the Arverni by the Cévennes. (De Bello Gallico, VII. 8.)

The Ruteni of the province (Ruteni Provinciales), a fraction of the Celtic nation of the Ruteni, incorporated into the Roman province, and whose territory extended over a part of the department of the Tarn.

The Sallyes, or Salluvii (the Bouches-du-Rhône, and western part of the Var). (De Bello Civil., I. 35, edit. Nipperdey.)

The Vocontii (department of the Drôme and Upper Alps, southern part of the Isère, and the northern part of the Ardèche).

The Volcæ occupied all Lower Languedoc, from the Garonne to the Rhone. They had emigrated from the north of Gaul. They were subdivided into the Volcæ Tectosages, who had Tolosa (Toulouse) for their principal town; and the Volcæ Arecomici.

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64

De Bello Gallico, III. 10.

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65

Four hundred, according to Appian (Civil War, II. 150); three hundred and five, according to Flavius Josephus (Wars of the Jews, II. xxviii. 5); three hundred, according to Plutarch (Cæsar, 15); about a hundred and forty, according to Pliny (Hist. Nat., III. 5; IV. 31-33).

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66

“Nevertheless, it was said at Rome that it was not only the Treviri and the Ædui who revolted, but the sixty-four states of Gaul.” (Tacitus, Annal., III. 44.) – The revolt in question was that of Sacrovir, under Tiberius.

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67

Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.

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68

Although of Germanic origin, like the Nervii, and glorying in it (Tacitus, Germania, 28), the Treviri were often at war with the Germans. (Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, VII. 68.)

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69

Peoples of Belgic Gaul:

The Aduatuci, who occupied a part of the province of Namur.

The Ambiani, a people of the department of the Somme. Their chief town was Samarobriva (Amiens).

The Ambivareti, established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the south of the marsh of Peel.

The Atrebates, the people of the ancient Artois, and a part of French Flanders. Their principal oppidum was Nemetocenna (Arras).

The Bellovaci, occupying the greater part of the department of the Oise (the ancient Beauvaisis), and who extended, probably, to the sea. (Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. 17.)

The Caletes, whose territory answered to the ancient Pays de Caux (the western and central part of the department of the Seine-Inférieure).

The Leuci, who occupied the southern part of the department of the Meuse, the greater part of that of the Meurthe, and the department of the Vosges.

The Mediomatrices. They extended from the upper course of the Meuse to the Rhine (department of the Moselle, and part of the departments of the Meuse, the Meurthe, the Upper Rhine, and the Lower Rhine).

The Menapii, who occupied the territory comprised between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt.

The Morini, who inhabited the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, and extended to near the mouths of the Scheldt.

The Nervii, established between the Sambre and the Scheldt (French and Belgic Hainaut, provinces of Southern Brabant, of Antwerp, and part of Eastern Flanders). The writers posterior to Cæsar mention Bagacum (Bavay) as their principal town.

The Remi, whose territory embraced the greater part of the departments of the Marne and the Ardennes, a fraction of the departments of the Aisne and the Meuse, and of the province of Luxemburg. Their principal town was Durocortorum (Rheims).

The Suessiones, the people of the ancient Soissonais, whose territory comprised the greater part of the department of the Aisne. Principal oppidum, Noviodunum (Soissons).

The Treviri, separated from Germany by the Rhine, and occupying the whole lower basin of the Moselle (Rhenish Luxemburg, Prussia, and Bavaria). The Treviri had for clients —

The Condrusi, established to the south of the Meuse, in the ancient Condroz, and who reached almost to Aix-la-Chapelle.

The Eburones, occupying part of the provinces of Liége and Limburg, and reaching to the Rhine through the ancient duchy of Juliers.

The Triboces, established on both banks of the Rhine, occupied the central part of the Grand Duchy of Baden and the north of the department of the Lower Rhine, perhaps already invaded, on the left bank. Their presence on the left bank of the Rhine appears from Cæsar’s account. (De Bello Gallico, IV. 10.)

The Veliocasses, whose territory embraced the ancient Vexin, and who occupied part of the departments of the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure.

The Veromandui, occupying the ancient Vermandois, the northern part of the Aisne, and the eastern part of the Somme.

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70

“Qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque præstabant.” (De Bello Gallico, II. 4, and VIII. 6.)

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71

Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. xxxi, 17.

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72

Peoples of Celtic Gaul:

The Arverni extended over a vast region, comprising the present departments of the Puy-de-Dôme and Cantal, and part of those of the Allier and the Upper Loire. Gergovia was their principal town. The Arverni had for clients —

The Cadurei Eleutheri, whose territory answered to the ancient Quercy (department of the Lot). [This epithet of Eleutheri, which is found in Cæsar (De Bello Gallico, VIII. 75) leads us to believe that in southern Quercy there existed Cadurci placed under the dominion of Rome.]

The Gabali, who occupied the ancient Gévaudan (the department of the Lozère).

The Vellavi, whose territory answered to the ancient Velay (department of the Upper Loire).

The Aulerci formed an extensive nation, which was subdivided into three great tribes, established over the country from the lower course of the Seine to the Mayenné.

1. The Aulerci Cenomanni, a fraction of whom was, as early as the sixth century of Rome, established in Cisalpine Gaul, between the Oglio and the Adige, and who occupied in Gaul the greater part of the territory now forming the department of the Sarthe;

2. The Aulerci Diablintes, the northern and central parts of the department of the Mayenne.

3. The Aulerci Eburovices, the central and southern part of the department of the Eure.

The Bituriges, a nation which had more than twenty towns. Avaricum (Bourges) was the principal. Their territory embraced the ancient Berry (departments of the Cher, the Indre, and part of the Allier).

The Carnutes occupied the greatest part of the present departments of Eure-et-Loir, Loir-et-Cher, and Loiret. Genabum (Gien) was one of their most important towns.

The Ædui occupied the modern departments of Saône-et-Loire and the Nièvre, and a part of the Côte-d’Or and the Allier. Their principal oppidum was Bibracte (Mont-Beuvray), the place of which was subsequently taken by Augustodunum (Autun). Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saône), Matisco (Mâcon), and Noviodunum, afterwards called Nivernum (Nevers), were also reckoned among their most important places. The Ædui had for clients —

The Ambarri, a small tribe situated between the Saône, the Rhone, and the Ain (department of the Ain).

The Ambluaretes, a people occupying a district around Ambierle (arrondissement of Roanne, department of the Loire). (?)

The Aulerci Brannovices, a tribe which dwelt between the Saône and the Loire, occupied the ancient country of Brionnais.

The Blannovii, who occupied a territory round Blanot (Saône-et-Loire). (?)

The Boii, a fraction of a great nomadic nation of this name, of Celtic origin, authorised by Cæsar to establish themselves on the territory of the Ædui, between the Loire and the Allier.

The Segusiavi, who occupied the ancient Forez (departments of the Rhône and the Loire), and extended to the left bank of the Saône.

The Essuvii, established in the department of the Orne.

The Helvetii, who were subdivided into four tribes or pagi; their territory occupied the part of Switzerland which extends from the north shore of the Léman to the Lake of Constance.

The Lemovices, whose territory answered to the Limousin (departments of the Upper Vienne and the greater part of the Corrèze and the Creuse).

The Lingones, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the department of the Haute-Marne and a fraction of the departments of the Aube, the Yonne, and the Côte-d’Or.

The Mandubii, established between the Ædui and the Lingones (department of the Côte-d’Or), occupied the ancient country of Auxois. Alesia (Alise) was their principal oppidum.

The Meldœ occupied the north of the department of the Seine-et-Marne and a small part of the department of the Oise.

The Nitiobriges occupied the greatest part of the department of the Lot-et-Garonne and a fraction of the Tarn-et-Garonne.

The Parisii, whose territory embraced the department of the Seine and a great part of the department of the Seine-et-Oise. Their principal town was Lutetia (Paris).

The Petrocorii, established in the ancient Périgord (department of the Dordogne).

The Rauraci, whose origin is perhaps German, established on both banks of the Rhine, towards the elbow which the river forms at Bâle.

The Ruteni occupied the ancient province of Rouergne (department of the Aveyron).

The Senones, established between the Loire and the Marne. Their principal town was Agedincum (Sens). Their territory comprised a part of the departments of the Yonne, the Marne, the Loiret, Seine-et-Marne, and the Aube.

The Sequani, whose territory embraced the ancient Franche-Comté (Jura, Doubs, Haute-Saône, and part of the Haut-Rhin). Principal town, Vesontio (Besançon).

The Turones, who occupied Touraine (department of Indre-et-Loire).

The peoples whom Cæsar calls maritime, or Armorican, were —

The Ambibari, established at the point where the departments of La Manche and Ille-et-Vilaine join.

The Ambiliates, whose territory comprised the part of the department of Maine-et-Loire situated to the south of the Loire.

The Andes, occupying Anjon (department of Maine-et-Loire and a fraction of the department of the Sarthe).

The Curiosolitæ, occupying the greatest part of the department of the Côtes-du-Nord.

The Lemovices Armorici, fixed to the south of the Loire, in the southern part of the department of the Loire-Inférieure and the west of that of Maine-et-Loire.

The Lexovii, occupying the department of Calvados, and a fraction of that of the Eure.

The Namnetes, who occupied, in the department of the Loire-Inférieure, the right bank of the Loire.

The Osismii, whose territory answered to the department of Finistère.

The Pictones, occupying Poitou (departments of La Vendée, the Deux-Sèvres, and the Vienne).

The Redones, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the department of Ille-et-Vilaine.

The Santones, occupying Saintonge, Aunis, and Angoumois (department of the Charente and the Charente-Inférieure, and a part of the department of the Gironde).

The Unelli, the people of the ancient Contentin (department of La Manche).

The Veneti, whose territory included the department of Morbihan.

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73

Tacitus. Germania, 28.

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74

Peoples of Aquitaine:

The Ausci, who occupied the central part of the department of the Gers, the most powerful of the nations of Aquitaine, according to Pomponius Mela (III. 2).

The Bigerriones occupied Bigorre (department of the Hautes-Pyrénées).

The Cocosates, established on the coasts of the Gulf of Gascony, in the Landes (the southern part of the department of the Gironde and the northern of the department of the Landes).

The Elusates occupied the north-west part of the department of the Gers and part of that of the Lot-et-Garonne.

The Gates, at the confluence of the Gers and the Garonne.

The Garumni, in the south of the department of the Haute-Garonne.

The Ptianes, probably towards Pau and Orthez.

The Sibuzates appear to have occupied the ancient country of Soule (Basses-Pyrénées).

The Sotiates occupied the south-west part of the department of Lot-et-Garonne and a part of the departments of the Landes and the Gers.

The Tarbelli occupied all the territory bordering upon the head of the Gulf of Gascony (departments of the Landes and the Basses-Pyrénées).

The Tarusates, established on the Adour, in the ancient Tursan (the south-east part of the department of the Landes). Peoples of Aquitaine (continued).

The Vasates or Vocates, established in the country of Bazas (the south-east part of the department of the Gironde).

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75

“Pagus, pars civitatis.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 12.)

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76

Cæsar mentions in different pasages the existence of vici among the Helvetii (I. 5), the Allobroges trans Rhodanum (I. 11), the Remi (II. 7), the Morini (III. 29), the Menapii (IV. 4), the Eburones (VI. 43), the Boii (VII. 14), the Carnutes (VIII. 5), and the Veragri (III. 1).

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77

De Bello Gallico VII. 15, 25, 68.

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78

The “Commentaries” name twenty-one oppida: Alesia, Avaricum, Bibracte, Bibrax, Bratuspantium, Cabillonum, Genabum, Genava, Gergovia, Gorgobina, Lutetia, Lemonum, Melodunum, Noviodunum Æduorum, Noviodunum Biturigum, Noviodunum Suessionum, Uxellodunum, Vellaunodunum, Vesontio, the oppidum Aduatucorum, and the oppidum Sotiatum.

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79

“Oppidum dictum quod ibi homines opes suas conferunt.” (Paulus Diaconus, p. 184, edit. Müller.)

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80

The Gauls lived in houses, or rather in huts, constructed of wood and with hurdles, tolerably spacious and of a circular form, covered with a high roof. (Strabo, IV. 163, edit. Didot.) – The Gauls, to avoid the heat, almost always built their habitations in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. (Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, VI. 30.)

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81

See a very curious passage in Solinus, chap. 25, on the practice of tattooing among the Gauls.

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82

Diodorus Siculus (V. 28) says that the Gauls were of tall stature, had white flesh, and were lymphatic in constitution. Some shaved; the majority had beards of moderate size. – According to Titus Livius, the Gauls possessed a tall stature (procera corpora), flowing hair of an auburn colour (promissæ et rutilatæ comæ), a white complexion (candida corpora). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 17, 21, and Ammianus Marcellinus, XV. 22.) The latter adds that the Gauls had generally a threatening and terrible tone of voice, which is also stated by Diodorus Siculus (V. 31). – The skeletons found in the excavations at Saint-Etienne-au-Temple are 1·80m. to 1·90m. in length.

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83

Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.

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84

Isidorus Hispalensis, Origines, I. 19, 24.

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85

Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.

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86

Diodorus Siculus, V. 33.

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87

Pliny, XXXIII. 24. – Gold was very abundant in Gaul; silver was much less common. The rich wore bracelets, rings on the leg, and collars, of the purest gold and tolerably massive; they had even breastplates of gold. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27.) – A great number of these rings and circles of gold, of very good workmanship, have been found in the Gaulish burying-places. The Museum of Saint-Germain contains bracelets and earrings of chased gold, found, in 1863, in a tumulus situated near Châtillon-sur-Seine.

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88

De Bello Gallico, VI. 14.

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89

De Bello Gallico, VI. 13.

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90

Pliny, Hist. Nat., VIII. xlviii. lxxiii., p. 127, edit. Sillig.

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91

De Bello Gallico, VII. 22. – Pliny, XXXIV. xvii., p. 162, edit. Sillig.

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92

“Deinde et argentum incoquere simili modo cœpere, equorum maxime ornamentis, jumentorumque ac jugorum, in Alesia oppido.” (Pliny, XXXIV. xvii., p. 162. – Florus, III. 2.)

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93

Milk and the flesh of wild or domestic animals, especially swine’s flesh fresh or salted, formed the principal food of the Gauls. (Strabo, IV., p. 163.) – Beer and mead were the principal drink of the Gauls. (Posidonius quoted by Athenæus, IV., p. 151, Fragmenta Historicum Græc., III. 260.) – This statement is made also by Diodorus Siculus (V. 26), who informs us that this beer was made with barley.

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94

Cicero already remarked the propensity of the Gauls to drunkenness (Orat. pro Fonteio), and Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12) also addresses the same reproach to them, which is again stated in Diodorus Siculus (V. 26).

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95

“The Gauls, in their great hospitality, invited the stranger to their meal as soon as he presented himself, and it was only after drinking and eating with them that they inquired his name and country.” (Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)

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96

Strabo (IV., p. 162) says that the Gauls were of a frank character and good-hearted (literally, without malice). – Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12), who wrote at the end of the fifth century, represents the Gauls as excessively vain. – Strabo (IV., p. 165) assures us that they were much inclined to disputes and quarrels.

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97

Cæsar often speaks of the fickleness of temper of this people, which, during a long period, gave great trouble to the Roman people. “Omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere, et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari.” (De Bello Gallico, III 10.) – Lampridius, in his Life of Alexander Severus, 59, expresses himself thus: “But the Gauls, those tempers hard to deal with, and who regret all they have ceased to possess, often furnished grave cares to the emperors.” – “Gallorum subita et repentina consilia.” (De Bello Gallico, III. 8.)

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98

De Bello Gallico, III. 19.

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99

Diodorus Siculus (V. 31) says that the language of the Gauls was very concise and figurative, and that the Gauls made use of hyperbole in blaming and praising.

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100

Diodorus Siculus, V. 32. – Strabo, IV., p. 165. – Athenæus, XIII., p. 603.

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101

De Bello Gallico, VII. 47 and 48. – Among the Gauls, the women were equal to the men, not only in size, but also in courage. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 32.) – The Gaulish women were tall and strong. – Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12) writes: “Several foreigners together could not wrestle against a single Gaul, if they quarrelled with him, especially if he called for help to his wife, who even exceeds her husband in her strength and in her haggard eyes. She would become especially formidable if, swelling her throat and gnashing her teeth, she agitated her arms, robust and white as snow, ready to act with feet or fists; to give blows as vigorous as if they came from a catapult.”

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102

De Bello Gallico, VI. 18: “Ab Dite patre prognatos.”

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103

De Bello Gallico, VI. 18.

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104

De Bello Gallico, VI. 19.

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105

The Gauls, like most of the barbarian peoples, looked upon the other life as resembling the present. And with this sentiment, at the funeral, they threw into the funereal pile, letters addressed to the dead, which they imagined he read. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)

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106

Titus Livius tells us (XXXVIII. 17) that the Gauls had long swords (prælongi gladii) and great bucklers (vasta scuta). In another passage (XXII. 46) he remarks that the swords of the Gauls were long and without point (prælongi ac sine mucronibus). – Their bucklers were long, narrow, and flat (scuta longa, cœterum ad amplitudinem corporum parum lata et ea ipsa plana). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 21.) – “Et Biturix longisque leves Suessones in armis.” (Lucan, Pharsalia, I. 422.) – Didorus Siculus (V. 30) says that the Gauls had iron coats of mail. He adds: “Instead of glaive (ξἱφος), they have long swords (σπἁθη), which they carry suspended to their right side by chains of iron or bronze. Some bind their tunics with gilt or silvered girdles. They have spears (λὁγχη or λογχἱς) having an iron blade a cubit long, and sometimes more. The breadth is almost two palms, for the blade of these saunions (the Gaulish dart) is not less than that of our glaive, and it is a little longer. Of these blades, some are forged straight, others present undulated curves, so that they not only cut in striking, but in addition they tear the wound when they are drawn out.”

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107

Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot. – Pseudo-Cicero (Ad Herennium, IV. 32) writes materis.

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108

The amentum was a small strap of leather which served to throw the javelin and doubled its distance of carriage, as recent trials have proved. In the De Bello Gallico, V. 48, there is mention of a Gaul throwing the javelin with the amentum; but this Gaul was in the Roman service, which explains his having more perfect arms. Strabo says that the Gauls used javelins like the Roman velites, but that they threw them with the hand, and not by means of a strap. (Strabo, edit. Didot, II. 65.)

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109

Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.

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110

Diodorus Siculus, V. 30. – Varro, De Lingua Latina, V. 116. – The Museum of Zurich possesses a Gaulish breastplate formed of long plates of iron. The Louvre and the Museum of Saint-Germain possess Gaulish breastplates in bronze.

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111

“Optimus excusso Lucus Remusque lacerto.” (Lucan, Pharsalia, I. 424.)

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112

“Pugnaces pictis cohibebant Lingonas armis.” (Lucan, Pharsalia, I. 398.)

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113

Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.

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114

Pausanias (Phocid., XIX. 10, 11), speaking of the ancient Gauls, who had penetrated to Delphi, says that “each horseman had with him two esquires, who were also mounted on horses; when the cavalry was engaged in combat, these esquires were poised behind the main body of the army, either to replace the horsemen who were killed, or to give their horse to their companion if he lost his own, or to take his place in case he were wounded, while the other esquire carried him out of the battle.”

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115

De Bello Civili, I. 39.

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116

De Bello Gallico, III. 20 and VII. 22.

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117

De Bello Gallico, III. 21 and VII. 22.

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118

De Bello Gallico, VIII. 14.

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119

Diodorus Siculus, V. 29. – See the bas-reliefs from Entremonts in the Museum of Aix, representing Gaulish horsemen, whose horses have human heads suspended to the poitrel.

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120

Cæsar, De Bello Gallico, IV. 5; VII. 3.

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121

Titus Livius (V. 46) represents the Gauls as very religious.

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122

The existence of human sacrifices among the Gauls is attested by a great number of authors. (Cicero, Orat. pro Fonteio, xiv. 31. – Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I. 38. – Lucan, Pharsalia, I. 444; III. 399, et seq.– Solinus, 21. – Plutarch, De Superstitione, p. 171. – Strabo, IV., p. 164, edit. Didot.)

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123

De Bello Gallico, VI. 17.

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124

Pharsalia, I., lines 445, 446.

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125

“So, in spite of their love of money, the Gauls never touched the piles of gold deposited in the temples and sacred woods, so great was their horror of sacrilege.” (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27.)

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126

De Bello Gallico, VI. 13, et seq.

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127

“The Gauls have poets who celebrate in rhythmic words, on a sort of lyre, the high deeds of heroes, or who turn to derision disgraceful actions.” (Diodorus Siculus, V. 31.) And he adds: “They have philosophers and theologians, who are held in great honour, and are named Druids (according to certain texts, Saronides). They have diviners, whose predictions are held in great respect. These consult the future by the aid of auguries and the entrails of the victims; and, in solemn circumstances, they have recourse to strange and incredible rites. They immolate a man by striking him with a sword above the diaphragm, and they draw presages from the manner in which he falls, in which he struggles, or in which the blood flows. They authority of the Druids and bards is not less powerful in peace than in war. Friends and enemies consult them, and submit to their decision; it has often been sufficient to arrest two armies on the point of engaging.” – Strabo (VI., p. 164, edit. Didot) relates nearly the same facts. He makes a distinction also between the bards, the priests, and the Druids.

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128

Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 9) speaks as follows of the ancient Druids: “The men of that country (Gaul), having become gradually polished, caused the useful studies to flourish which the bards, the euhages (prophets), and the Druids had begun to cultivate. The bards sang, in heroic verse, to the sound of their lyres, the lofty deeds of men; the euhages tried, by meditation, to explain the order and marvels of nature. In the midst of these were distinguished the Druids, who united in a society, occupied themselves with profound and sublime questions, raised themselves above human affairs, and sustained the immortality of the soul.” These details, which Ammianus Marcellinus borrows from the Greek historian Timagenes, a contemporary of Cæsar, and from other authors, show that the sacerdotal caste comprised three classes – 1, the bards; 2, the prophets; 3, the Druids, properly so called.

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129

Amédée Thierry, II. 1.

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130

See Paulus Diaconus, p. 4, edit. Müller.

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131

Diodorus Siculus, V. 29.

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132

De Bello Gallico; III. 22.

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133

Cæsar mentions the names of ten kings: 1. Catamantalœdes, among the Sequani (I. 3); 2. Divitiacus and Galba, among the Suessiones (II. 4, 13): 3. Commius, among the Atrebates (IV. 21, 27, 35; V. 22; VI. 6; VII. 75, 76, 79; VIII. 6, 7, 10, 21, 23, 47, 48); 4. Catuvolcus, among the Eburones (V. 24, 26; VI. 31); 5. Tasgetius, among the Carnutes (V. 25, 29); 6. Cavarinus, among the Treviri (V. 54; VI. 5); 7. Ambiorix, among the Eburones (V. 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 41; VI. 5, 6, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 47; VIII. 24, 25); 8. Moritasgus, among the Senones (V. 54); 9. Teutomatus, among the Nitiobriges (VII. 31, 46).

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134

De Bello Gallico, VII. 88; VIII. 12.

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135

De Bello Gallico, I. 16.

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136

Thus the Civitates Armoricæ (V. 53; VII. 75; VIII. 81); Belgium (V. 12, 24, 25; VIII. 46, 49, 54; the Aulerci Cenomanni and the Aulerci Eburovices (II. 34; III. 17; VII. 4, 75; VIII. 7). See the interesting memoir by Mr. Valentino Smith.

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137

Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Æduorum (I. 11); Suessiones fratres consanguineosque Remorum, qui eodem jure et iisdem legibus utuntur (II. 3); Suessiones qui Remis erant adtributi (VIII. 6).

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138

In fide; thus the Ædui with the Bellovaci (II. 14); with the Senones (VI. 4); with the Bituriges (VII. 5).

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139

Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Trevirorum clientes (IV. 6); Carnutes … usi deprecatoribus Remis, quorum erant in clientela (VI. 4); imperant Æduis atque eorum clientibus Segusiavis, Ambluaretis, Aulercis Brannovicibus, Brannoviis (VII. 75)

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140

The known federations of this kind are – 1, that of the Belgæ against the Romans, in the year 57 before Jesus Christ (De Bello Gallico, II. 4); 2, that of the Veneti with the neighbouring tribes, in the year 56 (De Bello Gallico, III. 9); 3, that of the Treviri, the Nervii, The Aduatuci, and the Menapii, in the year 53 (De Bello Gallico, VI. 2); 4, that of the peoples who invested Camulogenus with the supreme power, in 52 (De Bello Gallico, VII. 57); 5, the great federation which placed all the forces of Gaul under the command of Vercingetorix (De Bello Gallico, VII. 63).

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141

De Bello Gallico, VI. 11.

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142

De Bello Gallico, VI. 11.

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143

De Bello Gallico, V. 3, 54; VI. 11; VII. 75; VIII. 22.

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144

De Bello Gallico, I. 30.

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145

De Bello Gallico, VII. 63.

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146

De Bello Gallico, VI. 11.

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147

De Bello Gallico, VI. 12.

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148

De Bello Gallico, VII. 4.

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149

Précis des Guerres de César, by the Emperor Napoleon I., p. 53, Paris, 1836.

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150

The hostility which prevailed between the Sequani and the Ædui was further augmented, according to Strabo, by the following cause: “These two tribes, separated by the Arar (the Saône), both claimed the right of tolls.” (Strabo, p. 160, edit. Didot.)

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151

“Divitiacus, introduced to the Senate, explained the subject of his mission. He was offered a seat, but refused that honour, and pronounced his discourse leaning on his buckler.” (Eumenius, Panegyric of Constantine, cap. 3.)

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152

De Bello Gallico, VI. 12.

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153

The limits of Illyria, in the time of Cæsar, are hardly known; yet it appears that this province comprised the modern Istria and part of Carniola. Aquileia was its capital, situated at the head of the gulf of the Adriatic Sea, not far from the Isonzo. In fact, Strabo (I., p. 178) says that Aquileia was situated without the frontiers of the Veneti, in whose territory this town was included under Augustus. On another side, Titus Livius (XXXIX. 55) informs us that the colony of Aquileia had been founded in Istria; and Herodotus (I. 196), as well as Appian, reckons the Istrians among the peoples of Illyria.

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154

“Molita cibaria.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 5.)

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155

Inhabitants of the country of Bâle. The Rauraci inhabited the diocese of Bâle, which was called Augusta Rauracorum.

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156

Inhabitants of the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden. The town of Stulingen, near Schaffhausen, is believed to derive its name from the Tulingi.

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157

De Bello Gallico, I. 3, 4, and 5. – Scholars have taken great pains to determine the concordance between the ante-Julian calendar and the Julian calendar; unfortunately, the results at which they have arrived are very imperfect. We have asked M. Le Verrier to solve this difficult problem, and we owe to his courtesy the tables placed at the end of this volume. (Appendix A.)

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158

The bed of the Rhone has changed at several points since the time of Cæsar; at present, according to the report of those who live on its banks, there are no fords except between Russin, on the right bank, and the mill of Vert, on the left bank. (See Plate 3.)

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159

De Bello Gallico, I. 6.

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160

Plutarch, Cæsar, 18.

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161

This part of the Jura on the left bank of the Rhone is called the Mont du Vuache.

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162

De Bello Gallico, I. 8.

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163

M. Queypo, in his learned work on the weights and measures of the ancients, assigns to the Roman foot, subdivided into twelve inches, a length of 0·29630m. The Roman pace was five feet, so that the mile was equivalent to a length of 1481·50m.

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164

Dio Cassius says that “Cæsar fortified with retrenchments and walls the most important points.” (XXXVIII. 31.)

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165

The retrenchments which Cæsar calls murus fossaque could not be a wall, in the usual acceptation of the word: first, because a wall would have been but a weak obstacle; further, because the materials were not found on the spot; and lastly, because if so great a quantity of stones had been collected on the bank of the Rhone, we should still find traces of them. I have therefore sought another explanation, and thought that murus might be understood of a natural escarpment rendered steeper by a slight work. Penetrated with this idea, I sought Baron Stoffel, the commandant of artillery, to inspect the localities, and the result of his researches has fully confirmed my suppositions. The following is a summary of his report: —

Considered in its ensemble, from Geneva to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, the Rhone presents the appearance of an immense fosse from 100 to 120 mètres broad, with abrupt and very elevated scarp and counter-scarp. The parts where it does not present this character are few, and of relatively small extent. They are the only ones where operations for passing the river could be attempted – the only ones, consequently, which Cæsar would have need to fortify on the left bank.

1. From Geneva to the confluence of the Arve and the Rhone, an extent of 1½ kilomètres. Breadth of the river, 90 to 100 mètres. – The left bank is flat in the whole of this extent. The right bank has escarpments almost vertical, the height of which varies from 15 to 35 mètres. (See Plate 3, mean profile between Geneva and the Arve.) No attempt at passage could have taken place, neither at Geneva, nor between the town and the Arve.

2. From the Arve to the plateau of Aire-la-Ville, extent 12½ kilomètres. – After leaving the confluence of the Arve, the heights of the right bank of the Rhone increase in elevation; the escarpments become formidable. – The left bank is bordered with similar escarpments, and the river runs thus between high and abrupt banks, everywhere impassable. It preserves this character to a kilomètre above the ravine of Avril, near Peney. The profiles a a and b b give an idea of the escarpments of the banks from the Avre to the ravine of Avril. (See Plate 3.) – The heights which, on the right bank of the Rhone, extend from Vernier to Peney, sink gradually from one of these villages towards the other, and they form to the east of the ravine of Avril a plateau, the mean elevation of which above the bed of the river is only 20 mètres. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Aire-la-Ville. Length 1,700 mètres; breadth, 700 mètres; mean elevation above the bed of the Rhone, 20 to 25 mètres. The heights of the Peney are well disposed for the establishment of an army, and the plateau of Aire-la-Ville would permit an army, the Rhone once passed, to deploy easily. But, in spite of these advantages, it is certain that the Helvetii attempted no operation on this side, for the Rhone flows at the foot of a slope of the height of from 14 to 16 mètres and an inclination of at least 45 degrees.

3. From the plateau of Aire-la-Ville to the point of Epeisses, extent 6 kilomètres. – Down the river from the escarpments of Peney, the heights of the right bank (heights of Russin) form with those of the left bank an immense amphitheatre, nearly circular, the arena of which would be the ground represented green on Plate 3 (diameter, 1½ kilomètres). From the heights of Russin we can descend into the plain to the water of the river. The Rhone, in this part, has never been deep or rapid. The left bank is little elevated, entirely flat opposite the mill of Vert, and the slope of the heights which command it is far from impracticable.

Thus, it was here possible for the Helvetii to effect the passage of the river, and climb the heights of the left bank, if they had not been fortified or guarded. This operation presented least difficulty in the part t t o. And we can hardly doubt that the Romans fortified it to add to the natural obstacles, which were insufficient in this extent. (See the profile c c.)

An attentive examination of the locality, the discovery of certain irregularities of ground, which we may be allowed to consider as vestiges, lead us to explain in the following manner the expression murum fossamque perducit.

Cæsar took advantage of the mean heights at the foot of which the Rhone flows, to cause to be made, on the slope towards the river, and beginning with the crest, a longitudinal trench, of such a depth that the main wall had an elevation of 16 feet. The earth arising from the excavation was thrown down the side of the slope, and the crest was furnished with palisades. (See the profile of the retrenchment.) It was, properly speaking, a fosse, the scarp of which was higher than the counter-scarp.

The hills on the left bank, which rise opposite Russin, are accessible, especially in an extent of 900 mètres, reckoning from the point where the ravine which descends to Aire-la-Ville opens upon the river. They form there, among other peculiarities of the ground, a terrace 8 mètres in breadth, rising from 13 to 14 mètres above the plain, and descending to this by a tolerably uniform talus of 45 degrees.

The Romans would be able to prevent the access by means of the trench just described. They, no doubt, continued it to the point o, where the terrace ceases, and the heights become impracticable. It would then have been from 800 to 900 mètres long.

If we continue to descend the Rhone, we meet, on the left bank, first with the perpendicular escarpments of Cartigny, which are 70 or 80 mètres in height, and then abrupt beaches to near Avully. Below Cartigny, the Rhone surrounds a little plain, very slightly inclined towards the river, and presenting a projection of land (v r) from 5 to 6 mètres high, with a talus of less than 45 degrees. The bank being of small elevation, the Helvetii might have landed there. To prevent this, the Romans opened, in the talus which fronted the Rhone, a trench similar to the preceding; it was 250 mètres long.

The heights of Avully and Epeisses leave between them and the river a tolerably vast space, composed of two distinct parts. The first is formed of gentle slopes from Avully to a projection of land, q p; the other part is a plain comprised between this projection of land and the left bank of the river. On the right bank a torrent-like river, the London, debouches into flat ground named La Plaine. The Helvetii might have made their preparations for passing the Rhone there, and directed their efforts towards the western point of La Plaine, in face of the low and flat land comprised between the left bank and the escarpment q p. In this part the left bank is only from 1½ to 2 mètres high. Moreover, the slopes of Avully are not difficult to climb, and therefore the Romans must have sought to bar the passage in this direction. (See the broken profile d e f.) The escarpment q p, from its position and height, is easy to fortify. Its length is 700 mètres; its mean elevation above the plain, 18. It presents to the river a talus of less than 45 degrees. The Romans made in this talus, along the crest, a trench, forming wall and fosse. Its length was 700 mètres.

4. From the point of Epeisses to the escarpments of Etournel, extent 6 kilomètres. – From Epeisses to Chancy the Rhone flows in a straight line, and presents the appearance of a vast fosse, 100 mètres wide, the walls of which have an inclination of more than 45 degrees. (See the profile g g.)

At 200 mètres above Chancy, at k, the character of the banks changes suddenly. The heights on the right sink towards the river in tolerably gentle slopes, through an extent of 2,300 mètres, reckoning from k to the escarpments of Etournel. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Chancy. It presents to the Rhone, from k to z, in a length of 1,400 mètres, an irregular crest, distant from 50 to 60 mètres from the river, and commanding it by about 20 mètres. The side towards the Rhone, from k to z, presents slopes which are very practicable. (See the profile h h.)

The position of Chancy was certainly the theatre of the most serious attempts on the part of the Helvetii. Encamped on the heights of the right bank, they could easily descend to the Rhone, and there make their preparations for passing, on an extent of 1,500 mètres. The river once crossed, they had only before them, from k to z, slopes which were practicable to debouch on the plateau of Chancy.

The Romans had then to bar the gap k z by joining the impassable escarpments which terminate in k with those which commence at z, and which are also inaccessible. To effect this, they opened from one of these points to the other, in the upper part of the slope at the foot of which the Rhone flows, a longitudinal trench k z, similar to that already spoken of. It was 1,400 mètres in length.

5. From the escarpments of Etournel to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, an extent of 6 kilomètres. – At the escarpments of Etournel, the Rhone removes from the heights on the right, and only returns to them towards the hamlet of the Isles, 2 kilomètres farther down. These heights form a vast semi-elliptical amphitheatre, embracing a plain slightly inclined towards the river. It is marked by a green tint on Plate 3. People can descend from all sides and approach the Rhone, the bank of which is flat. Opposite, the left bank presents insurmountable obstacles until below Cologny, at s. But below this point, from s to y, the bank is flat, and the heights situated behind are accessible on an extent of 2 kilomètres.

The Helvetii, established on the heights of Pougny and Colonges, could descend to the Rhone, and cross it between Etournel and the hamlet of Les Isles. The Romans had thus to unite the escarpments which terminate at Cologny with the impracticable slopes of the mountain of Le Vuache. Here again we shall see that they took advantage of the peculiarities of the ground.

At the village of Cologny, the heights form a triangular plateau, s u x, of which the point s advances like a promontory towards the Rhone, which it commands perpendicularly by at least 20 mètres. A projection of land, s u, bounds it in front, and separates it from a plain which extends to the river. The escarpment produced by this projection of land presents to the Rhone a slope of about 45 degrees. It rises over the plain about 14 mètres towards its extremity s, but diminishes gradually in height, until it is only 2 to 3 mètres in height near the point u. (See the profile n n.) The Romans hollowed, on the slope of the escarpment from s to u, a length of 800 mètres, a trench forming wall and fosse. The plateau of Cologny, situated in the rear, offered a favorable position for the defence of this retrenchment. (See the profile p p.) They prolonged their works towards the west as far as y; beyond that, the heights presented sufficient natural obstacles. We may thus estimate that, from Cologny to the mountain of Le Vuache, the Romans executed from 1,600 to 1,700 mètres of retrenchments.

To sum up: the works executed on five principal points, between Geneva and the Jura, represent a total length of about 5,000 mètres, that is, less than the sixth part of the development of the course of the Rhone.

Admitting that Cæsar had at his disposal 10,000 men, we may suppose that he distributed them in the following manner: – 3,000 men on the heights of Avully, his head-quarters; 2,500 at Geneva; 1,000 on the plateau of Aire-la-Ville; 2,000 at Chancy; and 1,500 on the plateau of Cologny. These 10,000 men might be concentrated: in two hours, on the heights between Aire-la-Ville and Cartigny; in three hours, on the heights of Avully; in three hours and a half, on the plateau of Chancy; in three hours and a half, these troops, with the exception of those encamped at Geneva, might be brought together between Cologny and the fort of L’Ecluse. It would require five hours to carry the detachment from Geneva thither.

The detachments mentioned above, with the exception of that of Geneva, were established in what Cæsar calls the castella. These were constructed on the heights, in the proximity of the retrenchments which had to be defended – namely, at Aire-la-Ville, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. They consisted probably of earthen redoubts, capable of containing a certain number of troops. They are represented by squares in Plate 3.

Cæsar could reconnoitre every instant the march and designs of the Helvetii, the heights of the left bank of the Rhone presenting a great number of positions where it was easy to place advantageously posts of observation. Commandant Stoffel has pointed out six, which are marked on Plate 3. As it will be observed, the Helvetii, in crossing the Rhone, could not be disturbed by darts thrown from the top of the retrenchments, for these darts would not carry to the left bank of the river. Now there exists at present, between this bank and the foot of the heights in which these trenches were cut, flat ground of more or less extent. Admitting, then, that the Rhone flowed nineteen centuries ago in the same bed as at the present day, we may ask if the Romans did not construct, in these low parts near the bank, ordinary retrenchments, composed of a fosse and rampart. The excavations undertaken by the Commandant Stoffel have revealed everywhere, in these plains, the existence of ground formed by alluvium, which would lead us to believe that the Rhone once covered them. However, even if at that epoch these little plains had been already uncovered, either wholly or in part, we can hardly suppose that Cæsar would have raised works there, since the heights situated in the rear permitted him, with less labour, to create a more redoubtable defence – that of the trenches opened along the crests. As we see, the obstacle presented to the assailants began only with these trenches, at the top of the slopes.

As to the vestiges which still appear to exist, they may be described as follows. The slopes which the Romans fortified at Chancy, from k to z, and at Cologny, from s to y, present, in the upper parts, in some places, undulations of ground, the form of which denotes the work of man. On the slope of Chancy, for instance, the ground presents a projection, i i (see the profile h h), very distinctly marked, and having the remarkable peculiarity that it is about 11 feet high and 8 to 9 feet broad. Now, is it not evident that, if one of the fosses which have been described should get filled up, either naturally, by the action of time, or by the processes of agriculture, it would take absolutely the form i i, with the dimensions just indicated? It would not, therefore, be rash to consider these peculiarities of the ground, such as i i, as traces of the Roman trenches.

We must further mention the projection of land v r, situated below Cartigny. Its form is so regular, and so sharply defined, from the crest to the foot of the talus, that it is difficult not to see in it the vestiges of a work made by men’s hands.

It is easy to estimate approximately the time which it would have taken Cæsar’s troops to construct the 5,000 mètres of trenches which extended, at separate intervals, from Geneva to the Jura.

Let us consider, to fix our ideas, a ground A D V, inclined at 45 degrees, in which is to be made the trench A B C D. The great wall A B C had 16 Roman feet in elevation: we will suppose that A B was inclined at 5 on 1, and that the small wall D C was 6 feet high.

The amount of rubbish removed would be as follows: – Section A B C D = 64 square feet, or, reducing it into square mètres, A B C D = 5 square mètres 60 centimètres.

The mètre in length of the earth thrown out would give thus 5·60 cubic mètres.

If we consider the facility of labour in the trench, since the earth has only to be thrown down the slope, we shall see that two men can dig three mètres in length of this trench in two days. Therefore, admitting that the 10,000 men at Cæsar’s disposal had only been employed a quarter of the time, from two to three days would have been sufficient for the execution of the complete work.

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166

De Bello Gallico, I. 8.

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167

De Bello Gallico, I. 9. – The country of the Sequani comprised the Jura, and reached to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse. (See Plate 2, Map of Gaul.)

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168

It has been considered to have been an error of Cæsar to place the Santones in the proximity of the Tolosates: modern researchers have proved that the two peoples were not more than thirty or forty leagues from each other.

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169

Several authors have stated wrongly that Cæsar went into Illyria; he informs us himself (De Bello Gallico, III. 7) that he went thither for the first time in the winter of 698.

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170

We believe, with General de Gœler, from the itinerary marked on the Peutingerian table, that the troops of Cæsar passed by Altinum (Altino), Mantua, Cremona, Laus Pompei (Lodi Vecchio), Pavia, and Turin; but, after quitting this last place, we consider that they followed the route of Fenestrella and Ocelum. Thence they directed their march across the Cottian Alps, by Cesena and Brigantium (Briançon); then, following the road indicated by the Theodosian table, which appears to have passed along the banks of the Romanche, they proceeded to Cularo (Grenoble), on the frontier of the Vocontii, by Stabatio (Chahotte or Le Monestier, Hautes-Alpes), Durotineum (Villards-d’Arenne), Melloseeum (Misoen or Bourg-d’Oysans, Isère), and Catorissium (Bourg-d’Oysans or Chaource, Isère).

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171

“Locis superioribus occupatis.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 10.)

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172

There is difference of opinion as to the site of Ocelum. The following remark has been communicated to me by M.E. Celesia, who is preparing a work on ancient Italy: Ocelum only meant, in the ancient Celtic or Iberian language, principal passage. We know that, in the Pyrenees, these passages were called ports. There existed places of the name of Ocelum, in the Alps, in Gaul, and as far as Spain. (Ptolemy, II. 6.) – The itineraries found in the baths of Vicarello indicate, between Turin and Susa, an Ocelum, which appears to us to have been that of which Cæsar speaks; there was a place similarly named in Maurienne, on the left bank of the Arc, at an equal distance from the source of that river and the town of Saint-Jean; it is now Usseglio. There was another in the valley of the Lanzo, on the left bank of the Gara, from which appears to be derived the name of Garaceli or Graioceli; it was called Ocelum Lanciensium. The Ocelum of Cæsar, according to M. Celesia, who adopts the opinion of D’Anville, was called Ocelum ad Clusonem fluvium; it was situated in the valley of the Pragelatto, on the road leading from Pignerol to the defile of Fenestrella. This place has continued to preserve its primitive name of Ocelum, Occelum, Oxelum, Uxelum (Charta Adeladis, an. 1064), whence by corruption its modern name of Usseau. According to this hypothesis, Cæsar would have passed from the valley of Chiusone into that of Pragelatto, and thence, by Mount Genèvre, to Briançon, in order to arrive among the Vocontii. – Polyænus (Stratag., VIII. xxiii. 2) relates that Cæsar took advantage of a mist to escape the mountaineers.

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173

“Segusiavi sunt trans Rhodanum primi.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 10.) It is to be supposed that there existed a bridge on the Rhone, near Lyons.

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174

Cæsar had deferred his reply till the Ides of April (April the 8th). If it were then decided to bring the legions from Aquileia, the time necessary to bring them would have been as follows:

According to this reckoning, Cæsar required 60 days, reckoning from the moment when he decided on this course, to transport his legions from Aquileia to Lyons; that is to say, if he sent, as is probable, couriers on the 8th of April, the day he refused the passage to the Helvetii, the head of his column arrived at Lyons towards the 7th of June.

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175

To estimate the volume and weight represented by the provisions for three months for three hundred and sixty-eight thousand persons of both sexes and of all ages, let us allow that the ration of food was small, and consisted, we may say, only in a reserve of meal, trium mensium molita cibaria, at an average of ¾ of a pound (¾ of a pound of meal gives about a pound of bread); at this rate, the Helvetii must have carried with them 24,840,000 pounds, or 12,420,000 kilogrammes of meal. Let us allow also that they had great four-wheeled carriages, capable each of carrying 2,000 kilogrammes, and drawn by four horses. The 100 kilogrammes of unrefined meal makes 2 cubic hectolitres; therefore, 2,000 kilogrammes of meal make 4 cubic mètres, so that this would lead us to suppose no more than 4 cubic mètres as the average load for the four-wheeled carriages. On our good roads in France, levelled and paved, three horses are sufficient to draw, at a walking pace, during ten hours, a four-wheeled carriage carrying 4,000 kilogrammes. It is more than 1,300 kilogrammes per collar.

We suppose that the horses of the emigrants drew only 500 kilogrammes in excess of the dead weight, which would give about 6,000 carriages and 24,000 draught animals to transport the three months’ provisions.

But these emigrants were not only provided with food, for they had also certainly baggage. It appears to us no exaggeration to suppose that each individual carried, besides his food, fifteen kilogrammes of baggage on an average. We are thus left to add to the 6,000 provision carriages about 2,500 other carriages for the baggage, which would make a total of 8,500 carriages drawn by 34,000 draught animals. We use the word animals instead of horses, as at least a part of the teams would, no doubt, be composed of oxen, the number of which would diminish daily, for the emigrants would be led to use the flesh of these animals for their own food.

Such a column of 8,500 carriages, supposing them to march in file, one carriage at a time, on a single road, could not occupy less than thirty-two leagues in length, if we reckon fifteen mètres to each carriage. This remark explains the enormous difficulties the emigration would encounter, and the slowness of its movements: we need, then, no longer be astonished at the twenty days which it took three quarters of the column to pass the Saône.

We have not comprised the provisions of grain for the animals themselves: yet it is difficult to believe that the Helvetii, so provident for their own wants, had neglected to provide for those of their beasts, and that they had reckoned exclusively for their food on the forage they might find on the road.

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176

De Bello Gallico, I. 11.

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177

It is an error to translate Arar, quod per fines Æduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodamam influit, by the words, “the Saône, which forms the common boundary line of the Ædui and the Sequani.” Cæsar always understands by fines, territory, and not boundary line. He expresses himself very differently when he speaks of a river separating territories. (De Bello Gallico, I. 6, 83; VII. 5.) The expression per fines thus confirms the supposition that the territories of these two peoples extended on both sides of the Saône. (See Plate 2.)

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178

De Bello Gallico, I. 12. – The excavations, carried on in 1862 between Trévoux and Riottier, on the plateaux of La Bruyère and Saint-Bernard, leave no doubt of the place of this defeat. They revealed the existence of numerous sepulchres, as well Gallo-Roman as Celtic. The tumuli furnished vases of coarse clay, and many fragments of arms in silex, ornaments in bronze, iron arrow-heads, fragments of sockets. These sepultures are some by incineration, others by inhumation. In the first, the cremation had nowhere been complete, which proves that they had been burnt hastily, and excludes all notion of an ordinary cemetery. Two common fosses were divided each into two compartments, one of which contained cinders, the other human skeletons, thrown in pell-mell, skeletons of men, women, and children. Lastly, numerous country ovens line, as it were, the road followed by the Helvetii. These ovens, very common at the foot of the abrupt hills of Trévoux, Saint-Didier, Frans, Jassans, and Mizérieux, are found again on the left bank of the Ain and as far as the neighbourhood of Ambronay.

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179

Cæsar declares, on two different occasions, the fixed design of the Helvetii to establish themselves in the country of the Santones (I. 9 and 11), and Titus Livius confirms this fact in these words: “Cæsar Helvetios, gentem vagam, domuit, quæ, sedem quærens, in provinciam Cæsaris Narbonem iter facere volebat.” (Epitome, CIII.) Had they, for the execution of this project, the choice between several roads (the word “road” being taken here in the general sense)? Some authors, not considering the topography of France, have believed that, to go to the Santones, the Helvetii should have marched by the shortest line, from east to west, and passed the Loire towards Roanne. But they would have had first to pass, in places almost impassable, the mountains which separate the Saône from the Loire, and, had they arrived there, they would have found their road barred by another chain of mountains, that of Le Forez, which separates the Loire from the Allier.

The only means of going from the Lower Saône into Saintonge consists in travelling at first to the north-west towards the sources of the Bourbince, where is found the greatest depression of the chain of mountains which separates the Saône from the Loire, and marching subsequently to the west, to descend towards the latter river. This is so true, that at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle, did not pass by Roanne, but took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire. We understand, in exploring this mountainous country, why Cæsar was obliged to confine himself to pursuing the Helvetii, without being ever able to attack them. We cannot find a single point where he could have gained upon them by rapidity of movement, or where he could execute any manœuvre whatever.

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180

The Romans used little precision in the division of time. Forcellini (Lex., voce Hora) refers to Pliny and Censorinus. He remarks that the day – that is, the time between the rising and setting of the sun – was divided into twelve parts, at all seasons of the year, and the night the same, from which it would result that in summer the hours of the day were longer than in winter, and vice versa for the nights. – Galenus (De San. Tuend., VI. 7) observed that at Rome the longest days were equal to fifteen equinoctial hours. Now, these fifteen hours only reckoning for twelve, it happened that towards the solstice each hour was more than a quarter longer than towards the equinox. This remark was not new, for it is found in Plautus. One of his personages says to a drunkard: “Thou wilt drink four good harvests of Massic wine in an hour!” “Add,” replied the drunkard, “in an hour of winter.” (Plautus, Pseudolus, v. I, 302, edit. Ritschl.) – Vegetius says that the soldier ought to make twenty miles in five hours, and notes that he speaks of hours in summer, which at Rome, according to the foregoing calculation, would be equivalent to six hours and a quarter towards the equinox. (Vegetius, Mil., I. 9.)

Pliny (Hist. Nat., VII. 60) remarks that, “at the time when the Twelve Tables were compiled, the only divisions of time known were the rising and setting of the sun; and that, according to the statement of Varro, the first public solar dial was erected near the rostra, on a column, by M. Valerius Messala, who brought it from Catania in 491, thirty years after the one ascribed to Papirius; and that it was in 595 that Scipio Nasica, the colleague of M. Popilius Lænas, divided the hours of night and day, by means of a clepsydra or water-clock, which he consecrated under a covered building.”

Censorinus (De Die Natali, xxiii., a book dated in the year 991 of Rome, or 338 A.D.) repeats, with some additions, the details given by Pliny. “There is,” he says, “the natural day and the civil day. The first is the time which passes between the rising and setting of the sun; on the contrary, the night begins with the setting and ends with the rising of the sun. The civil day comprises a revolution of the heaven – that is, a true day and a true night; so that when one says that a person has lived thirty days, we must understand that he has lived the same number of nights.

“We know that the day and the night are each divided into twelve hours. The Romans were three hundred years before they were acquainted with hours. The word hour is not found in the Twelve Tables. They said in those times, ‘before or after mid-day.’ Others divided the day, as well as the night, into four parts – a practice which is preserved in the armies, where they divide the night into four watches.” Upon these and other data, M. Le Verrier has had the goodness to draw up a table, which will be found at the end of the volume, and which indicates the increase or decrease of the hours with the seasons, and the relationship of the Roman watches with our modern hours. (See Appendix B.)

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181

De Bello Gallico, I. 22.

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182

They reckon from Villefranche to Remilly about 170 kilomètres.

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183

Each soldier received twenty-five pounds of wheat every fortnight.

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184

It is generally admitted that Bibracte stood on the site of Autun, on account of the inscription discovered at Autun in the seventeenth century, and now preserved in the cabinet of antiquities at the Bibliothèque Impériale. Another opinion, which identifies Bibracte with Mont Beuvray (a mountain presenting a great surface, situated thirteen kilomètres to the west of Autun), had nevertheless already found, long ago, some supporters. It will be remarked first that the Gauls chose for the site of their towns, when they could, places difficult of access: in broken countries, these were steep mountains (as Gergovia, Alesia, Uxellodunum, &c.); in flat countries, they were grounds surrounded by marshes (such as Avaricum). The Ædui, according to this, would not have built their principal town on the site of Autun, situated at the foot of the mountains. It was believed that a plateau so elevated as that of Mont Beuvray (its highest point is 810 mètres above the sea) could not have been occupied by a great town. Yet the existence of eight or ten roads, which lead to this plateau, deserted for so many centuries, and some of which are in a state of preservation truly astonishing, ought to have led to a contrary opinion. Let us add that recent excavations leave no further room for doubt. They have brought to light, over an extent of 120 hectares, foundations of Gaulish towers, some round, others square; of mosaics, of foundations of Gallo-Roman walls, gates, hewn stones, heaps of roof tiles, a prodigious quantity of broken amphoræ, a semicircular theatre, &c… Everything, in fact, leads us to place Bibracte on Mont Beuvray: the striking resemblance of the two names, the designation of Φροὑριον, which Strabo gives to Bibracte, and even the vague and persistent tradition which, prevailing among the inhabitants of the district, points to Mont Beuvray as a centre of superstitious regard.

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185

The cavalry was divided into turmæ, and the turma into three decuries of ten men each.

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186

The word sarcinæ, the original sense of which is baggage or burthens, was employed sometimes to signify the bundles carried by the soldiers (De Bello Gallico, II. 17), sometimes for the heavy baggage (De Bello Civili, I, 81). Here we must take sarcinæ as comprising both. This is proved by the circumstance that the six legions of the Roman army were on the hill. Now, if Cæsar had sent the heavy baggage forward, towards Bibracte, as General de Gœler believes, he would have sent with it, as an escort, the two legions of the new levy, as he did, the year following, in the campaign against the Nervii. (De Bello Gallico, II. 19.)

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187

De Bello Gallico, I. 24. – In the phalanx, the men of the first rank covered themselves with their bucklers, overlapping one another before them, while those of the other ranks held them horizontally over their heads, arranged like the tiles of a roof.

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188

According to Plutarch (Cæsar, 20), he said, “I will mount on horseback when the enemy shall have taken flight.”

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189

The pilum was a sort of javelin thrown by the hand: its total length was from 1·70 to 2 mètres; its head was a slender flexible blade from 0·60 to 1 mètre long, weighing from 300 to 600 grammes, terminating in a part slightly swelling, which sometimes formed a barbed point.

The shaft, sometimes round, sometimes square, had a diameter of from 25 to 32 millimètres. It was fixed to the head by ferules, or by pegs, or by means of a socket.

Such are the characteristics presented by the fragments of pila found at Alise. They answer in general to the descriptions we find in Polybius (VI. 28), in Dionysius (V. 46), and in Plutarch (Marius). Pila made on the model of those found at Alise, and weighing with their shaft from 700 grammes to 1·200 kilog., have been thrown to a distance of 30 and 40 mètres: we may therefore fix at about 25 mètres the average distance to which the pilum carried.

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190

Latere aperto, the right side, since the buckler was carried on the left arm. We read, indeed, in Titus Livius: “Et cum in latus dextrum, quod parebat, Numidæ jacularentur, translatis in dextrum scutis,” &c. (XXII. 50.)

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191

Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 33) says on this subject that “the Helvetii were not all on the field of battle, on account of their great number, and of the haste with which the first had made the attack. Suddenly those who had remained in the rear came to attack the Romans, when they were already occupied in pursuing the enemy. Cæsar ordered his cavalry to continue the pursuit; with his legions, he turned against the new assailants.”

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192

Plutarch, Cæsar, 20.

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193

De Bello Gallico, I. 26. – Till now the field of battle where Cæsar defeated the Helvetii has not been identified. The site which we have adopted, between Luzy and Chides, satisfies all the requirements of the text of the “Commentaries.” Different authors have proposed several other localities; but the first cause of error in their reckonings consists in identifying Bibracte with Autun, which we cannot admit; and further, not one of these localities fulfils the necessary topographical conditions. In our opinion, we must not seek the place of engagement to the east of Bibracte, for the Helvetii, to go from the Lower Saône to the Santones, must have passed to the west, and not to the east, of that town. Cussy-la-Colonne, where the field of battle is most generally placed, does not, therefore, suit at all; and, moreover, Cussy-la-Colonne is too near to the territory of the Lingones to require four days for the Helvetii to arrive there after the battle.

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194

“He drove back this people into their country as a shepherd drives back his flock into the fold.” (Florus, II. x. 3.)

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195

De Bello Gallico, I. 29.

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196

Cæsar pursued the Helvetii, taking for auxiliaries about 20,000 Gaulish mountaineers. (Appian, De Rebus Gallicis, IV. 15, edit. Schweigh.)

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197

Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. i. 3.

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198

Tacitius (Germania, iv. 32.) speaks of this custom of the German horsemen of fighting on foot. Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) ascribes this practice to the Bastarni (the Moldavians.)

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199

Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. i. 3.

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200

De Bello Gallico, IV. 1, 2, 3. – General de Gœler, in our opinion, extends the territory of the Ubii much too far to the south.

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201

De Bello Gallico, VI. 25. – This statement agrees well enough with the length of the Black Forest and the Odenwald, which is sixty leagues.

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202

It is difficult to fix with precision the localities inhabited at this period by the German peoples, for they were nearly all nomadic, and were continually pressing one upon another. Cæsar, in his fourth book De Bello Gallico (cap. I), asserts that the Suevi never occupied the same territory more than one year.

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203

Strabo (VII., p. 244) relates, after Posidonius, that the Boii had inhabited first the Hercynian forest; elsewhere he says (V. 177) that the Boii established themselves among the Taurisci, a people dwelling near Noricum. The same author (VII. 243) places the solitudes inhabited by the Boii to the east of Vindelicia (Southern Bavaria and Western Austria). Lastly, he says (IV. 471) that the Rhætii and the Vindelicii are the neighbours of the Helvetii and the Boii. The Nemetes and the Vangiones subsequently passed over to the left bank of the Rhine, towards Worms and Spire, and the Ubii towards Cologne.

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204

Which formed the present Upper Alsace.

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205

We look upon it as certain, from the tenth chapter of Book IV. of the “Commentaries,” that the Triboci occupied also the left bank of the Rhine. We therefore naturally place among this German people the spot where the army of Ariovistus was assembled. Moreover, to understand the campaign about to be related, we must not seek this place, in the valley of the Rhine, higher than Strasburg.

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206

In the speech which Dio Cassius puts in the mouth of Cæsar before entering on the campaign against Ariovistus, he dilates upon the right which the governor of the Roman province has to act according to circumstances, and to take only his own advice. This speech is naturally amplified and arranged by Dio Cassius, but the principal arguments must be true. (Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 41. —De Bello Gallico, I. 33, 34, 35.)

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207

De Bello Gallico, I. 36.

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208

Since this information was given to Cæsar by the Treviri, it is certain that the Suevi assembled on the Rhine, opposite or not far from the country of the Treviri, and, in all probability, towards Mayence, where the valley of the Maine presents a magnificent and easy opening upon the Rhine.

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209

Between Tanlay and Gland, the Roman way is still called the Route de César. (See the map of the Etat-Major.)

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210

To explain this rapid movement upon Besançon, we must suppose that Cæsar, at the moment when he received news of the march of Ariovistus, believed him to be as near Besançon as he was himself. In fact, Cæsar might fear that during the time the news had taken to reach him, the German king, who had already advanced three days’ journey out of his territory, might have arrived in the neighbourhood of Mulhausen or Cernay. Now Cæsar was at Arc-en-Barrois, 130 kilomètres from Besançon, and the distance from this latter town to Cernay is 125 kilomètres.

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211

The “Commentaries” give here the erroneous number DC: the breadth of the isthmus which the Doubs forms at Besançon cannot have undergone any sensible variation; it is at present 480 mètres, or 1,620 Roman feet. The copyists have, no doubt, omitted an M before DC.

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212

De Bello Gallico, I. 38.

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213

“ … qui ex urbe, amicitiæ causa, Cæsarem secuti, non magnum in re militari usum habebant.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 39.) – We see in the subsequent wars Appius repairing to Cæsar to obtain appointments of military tribunes, and Cicero recommending for the same grade several persons, among others, M. Curtius, Orfius, and Trebatius. “I have asked him for a tribuneship for M. Curtius.” (Epist. ad Quint., II. 15; Epist. Famil., VII. 5, a letter to Cæsar.) Trebatius, though a bad soldier, was treated with kindness, and at once appointed a military tribune. “I wonder that you despise the advantages of the tribuneship, especially since they have allowed you to dispense with the fatigues of the military service.” (Cicero, Epist. Famil., VII. 8.) – “Resign yourself to the military service, and remain.” (Cicero, Epist. Famil., VII. 11.) – Trebatius appeared little satisfied, complained of the severity of the service, and, when Cæsar passed into Britain, he prudently remained on the Continent.

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214

Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 36.

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215

This shows that then, in Italy, a great number of slaves were Germans.

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216

This Latin phrase indicated the putting the troops in march.

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217

De Bello Gallico, I. 41.

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218

There has been much discussion on the meaning of the words millium amplius quinquaginta circuitu. Some pretend that the number of fifty miles means the whole distance, and that thus Cæsar would have taken seven days to travel fifty miles, which would make about seven kilomètres a day: this supposition is inadmissible. Others pretend, on the contrary, that we must add fifty miles to the direct distance. This last interpretation is refuted by a passage in the “Commentaries” (De Bello Civili, I. 64). We read there, Ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut, millium vi. ad iter addito circuito, &c. This shows that when Cæsar means to speak of a turn of road, to be added to the total length of the route, he is careful to indicate it. We consider it more simple, therefore, to admit that the fifty miles are only a part of the distance performed during the seven days’ march; that is, that after making a circular détour of fifty miles, which required three or four days, Cæsar had still to march some time before he met the enemy, following the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine. The study of the ground completely justifies this view, for it was sufficient for Cæsar to make a circuit of fifty miles (or seventy-five kilomètres) to turn the mass of mountains which extends from Besançon to Montbéliard.

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219

It is probable that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate intercommunication; for, if he had remained at a distance of thirty-six kilomètres from Cæsar, we should be obliged to admit that the German army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single day, to within nine kilomètres, had made a march of twenty-five kilomètres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it dragged after it wagons and women and children.

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220

De Bello Gallico, I. 42.

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221

Planities erat magna, et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis… (De Bello Gallico, I. 43) – This phrase would be sufficient itself to prove that the encounter of the two armies took place in the plains of Upper Alsace. We may ask how, in spite of a text so explicit, different writers should have placed the field of battle in the mountains of the Jura, where there is nowhere to be found a plain of any extent. It is only at Mulhausen, to the north of the Doller, that the vast plain of the valley of the Rhine opens.

Cæsar employs three times the word tumulus to designate the eminence on which his interview with Ariovistus took place, and he never calls it collis. Is it not evident from this that we must consider this tumulus as a rounded knoll, insulated in the plain? Now it is to be considered that the plain which extends to the north of the Doller, between the Vosges and the Rhine, contains a rather large number of small rounded eminences, to which the word collis would not apply, and which the word knoll or tumulus perfectly describes. The most remarkable of these are situated, one near Feldkirch, the other between Wittenheim and Ensisheim. We may suppose that the interview took place on one of these knolls, marked 231 on Plate 6.

General de Gœler has adopted as the place of the interview an eminence which rises on the left bank of the Little Doller, to the north of the village of Aspach-le-Bas. Cæsar would have called this eminence collis, for it is rather extensive, and, by its elongated form, but not rounded, does not at all represent to the eye what is commonly called a knoll or tumulus; moreover, contrary to the text, this elevation is not, properly speaking, in the plain. It is only separated from the hills situated to the south by a brook, and the plain begins only from its northern slope.

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222

De Bello Gallico, I. 47.

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223

It is not unworthy of remark that Cæsar’s communications with the Leuci and the Lingones remained open. We have seen that, in his address to the troops at Besançon, he reckoned on obtaining from these peoples a part of his supplies.

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224

Tacitus (Germania, VI. 32) and Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) speak of this method of fighting employed by the Germans.

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225

De Bello Gallico, I. 50. – The predictions of these priestesses, who pretended to know the future by the noise of waters and by the vortexes made by the streams in rivers, forbade their giving battle before the new moon. (Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.)

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226

“Having skirmished opposite their retrenchments and the hills on which they were encamped, he exasperated and excited them to such a degree of rage, that they descended and fought desperately.” (Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.)

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227

General de Gœler adopts this same field of battle, but he differs from us in placing the Romans with their back to the Rhine. It would be impossible to understand in this case how, after their defeat, the Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Cæsar cutting off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the Suevi, should have put Cæsar between him and the re-inforcements he expected.

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228

As the legions were six in number, the above phrase proves that in this campaign Cæsar had one quæstor and five lieutenants. (See Appendix D.)

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229

Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49. – We have adopted the version of Dio Cassius, as we cannot admit with Orosius that an army of more than 100,000 men could have formed only a single phalanx.

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230

Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.

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231

Orosius expresses himself thus: “United in one phalanx, and their heads protected by their bucklers, they attempted, thus covered, to break the Roman lines; but some Romans, not less agile than bold, rushed upon this sort of tortoise, grappled with the German soldiers body to body, tore from them their shields, with which they were covered as with scales, and stabbed them through the shoulders.” (Orosius, VI. 7.)

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232

Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.

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233

Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. 1, 3.

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234

The manuscripts followed by the early editors of the “Commentaries” gave some the number of 50 miles, others that of 5 miles. We believe that Cæsar wrote 50 miles. This is proved by the very words he employs, neque prius fugere destiterunt … which could not be applied to a flight of merely a few miles. Moreover, the testimony of old writers confirms the number of 50 miles: Paulus Orosius relates that the carnage extended over a space of 40 miles; Plutarch, over 300 or 400 stadia, that is, 35 or 50 miles, according to the editions; and J. Celsus (Petrarch) (De Vita J. Cæsaris, I., p. 40, edit. Lemaire) says, usque ad ripam Rheni fuga perpetua fuit, a phrase in which the word perpetua is significative.

Modern writers, supposing erroneously that Cæsar had indicated the distance, that is, the shortest line from the field of battle to the Rhine, have discussed lengthily the number to be adopted. They have overlooked the fact that the Latin text states, not exactly the distance from the field of battle to the Rhine, but the length of the line of retreat from the battle-field to the river. This line may have been oblique towards the Rhine, for it is probable that the retreat of the Germans lay down the valley of the Ill, which they had previously ascended. We must therefore seek towards Rhinau the point where they attempted to re-pass the river.

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235

According to Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 50), Ariovistus, followed by his cavalry, succeeded in escaping. Having reached the right bank, he collected the fugitives; but he died shortly afterwards (De Bello Gallico, V. 29), perhaps of his wounds.

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236

Appian. De Bello Celt., IV. 1, 3. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.

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237

De Bello Gallico, I. 53. – The war against Ariovistus became the subject of a poem by P. Terentius Varro Atacinus (De Bello Sequanico). (Priscian, X., p. 877, P.)

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238

“Inita æstate.” (De Bello Gallico, II. 2.) —Æstas according to Forcellini, signifies the period comprised between the two equinoxes of spring and autumn.

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239

See his biography, Appendix D.

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240

Strabo, IV. 171, V. 174.

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241

“In the year 642, the consul C. Manlius and the proconsul Q. Cæpio were defeated by the Cimbri and the Teutones, and there perished 80,000 Romans and allies and 40,000 valets (colones et lixæ). Of all the army, ten men only escaped.” (Orosius, V. 16.) These data are no doubt exaggerated, for Titus Livius (XXXVI. 38) pretends that Orosius took his information from Valerius of Antium, who habitually magnified his numbers.

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242

This route, the most direct from Besançon to the territory of the Remi, is still marked by the numerous vestiges of the Roman road which joined Vesontio with Durocortorum (Besançon with Rheims).

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243

De Bello Gallico, II. 4.

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244

The word fines in Cæsar, always signifies territory. We must therefore understand by extremi fines the part of the territory farthest removed from the centre, and not the extreme frontier, as certain translators have thought. The Aisne crossed the northern part of the country of the Remi, and did not form its boundary. (See Plate 2.)

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245

The retrenchments of this tête-du-pont, especially the side parallel to the Aisne, are still visible at Berry-au-Bac. The gardens of several of the inhabitants are made upon the rampart itself, and the fosse appears at the outside of the village in the form of a cistern. The excavations have displayed distinctly the profile of the fosse.

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246

The excavations undertaken in 1862, by bringing to light the fosses of the camp, showed that they were 18 feet wide, with a depth of 9 or 10. (See Plates 8 and 9.) If, then, we admit that the platform of earth of the parapet was 10 feet wide, it would have measured 8 feet in height, which, with the palisade of 4 feet, would give the crest of the parapet a command of 22 feet above the bottom of the fosse.

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247

The following localities have been suggested for Bibrax: Bièvre, Bruyères, Neufchâtel, Beaurieux, and the mountain called Vieux-Laon. Now that the camp of Cæsar has been discovered on the hill of Mauchamp, there is only room to hesitate between Beaurieux and Vieux-Laon, as they are the only localities among those just mentioned which, as the text requires, are eight miles distant from the Roman camp. But Beaurieux will not suit, for the reason that even if the Aisne had passed, at the time of the Gallic war, at the foot of the heights on which the town is situated, we cannot understand how the re-enforcements sent by Cæsar could have crossed the river and penetrated into the place, which the Belgian army must certainly have invested on all sides. This fact is, on the contrary, easily understood when we apply it to the mountain of Vieux-Laon, which presents towards the south impregnable escarpments. The Belgæ would have surrounded it on all parts except on the south, and it was no doubt by that side that, during the night, Cæsar’s re-enforcements would enter the town.

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248

De Bello Gallico, II. 7. – (Plate 9 gives the plan of the camp, which has been found entire, and that of the redoubts with the fosses, as they have been exposed to view by the excavations; but we have found it impossible to explain the outline of the redoubts.)

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249

De Bello Gallico, II. 12. – Sabinus evidently commanded on both sides the river.

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250

De Bello Gallico II. 12. – Sabinus evidently commanded on both sides the river.

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251

See the biographies of Cæsar’s lieutenants, Appendix D.

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252

De Bello Gallico, II. 11.

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253

The vineæ were small huts constructed of light timber work covered with hurdles and hides of animals. (Vegetius, Lib. IV. c. 16.) See the figures on Trajan column.

In a regular siege the vineæ were constructed out of reach of the missiles, and they were then pushed in file one behind the other up to the wall of the place attacked, a process which was termed agere vineas; they thus formed long covered galleries which, sometimes placed at right angles to the wall and sometimes parallel, performed the same part as the branches and parallels in modern sieges.

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254

The terrace (agger) was an embankment, made of any materials, for the purpose of establishing either platforms to command the ramparts of a besieged town, or viaducts to conduct the towers and machines against the walls, when the approaches to the place presented slopes which were too difficult to climb. These terraces were used also sometimes to fill up the fosse. The agger was most commonly made of trunks of trees, crossed and heaped up like the timber in a funeral pile. – (Thucydides, Siege of Platæa. – Lucan, Pharsalia. – Vitruvius, book XI., Trajan Column.)

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255

Antiquaries hesitate between Beauvais, Montdidier, or Breteuil. We adopt Breteuil as the most probable, according to the dissertation on Bratuspantium, by M. l’Abbé Devic, cure of Mouchy-le-Châtel. In fact, the distance from Breteuil to Amiens is just twenty-five miles, as indicated in the “Commentaries.” We must add, however, that M. l’Abbé Devic does not place Bratuspantium at Breteuil itself, but close to that town, in the space now comprised between the communes of Vaudeuil, Caply, Beauvoir, and their dependencies. – Paris, 1843, and Arras, 1865.

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256

De Bello Gallico, II. 15.

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257

De Bello Gallico, II. 14, 15, 16. Mons is, in fact, seated on a hill completely surrounded by low meadows, traversed by the sinuous courses of the Haine and the Trouille.

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258

According to scholars, the frontier between the Nervii and the Ambiani lay towards Fins and Bapaume. Supposing the three days’ march of the Roman army to be reckoned from this point, it would have arrived, in three days, of twenty-five kilomètres each, at Bavay.

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259

If Cæsar had arrived on the right bank of the Sambre, as several authors have pretended, he would already have found that river at Landrecies, and would have had no need to learn, on the third day of this march, that he was only fifteen kilomètres from it.

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260

It is worthy of remark, that still at the present day the fields in the neighbourhood of the Sambre are surrounded with hedges very similar to those here described. Strabo (II., p. 161) also mentions these hedges.

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261

De Bello Gallico, II. 17.

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262

“The signal for battle is a purple mantle, which is displayed before the general’s tent.” (Plutarch, Fabius Maximus, 24.)

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263

Signum dare, “to give the word of order.” In fact, we read in Suetonius: “Primo etiam imperii die signum excubanti tribuno dedit: Optimam matrem.” (Nero, 9; Caligula, 56. – Tacitus, Histor., III. 22.)

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264

The soldiers wore either the skins of wild beasts, or plumes or other ornaments, to mark their grades. “Excussit cristas galeis.” (Lucan, Pharsalia, line 158.)

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265

Except the Treviran cavalry, who had withdrawn.

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266

According to Titus Livius (Epitome, CIV.), 1,000 armed men succeeded in escaping.

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267

De Bello Gallico, II. 28.

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268

According to the researches which have been carried on by the Commandant Locquessye in the country supposed to have been formerly occupied by the Aduatuci, two localities only, Mount Falhize and the part of the mountain of Namur on which the citadel is built, appear to agree with the site of the oppidum of the Aduatuci. But Mount Falhize is not surrounded with rocks on all sides, as the Latin text requires. The countervallation would have had a development of more than 15,000 feet, and it would have twice crossed the Meuse, which is difficult to admit. We therefore adopt, as the site of the oppidum of the Aduatuci, the citadel of Namur.

Another locality, Sautour, near Philippeville, would answer completely to Cæsar’s description, but the compass of Sautour, which includes only three hectares, is too small to have contained 60,000 individuals. The site of the citadel of Namur is already in our eyes very small.

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269

We translate quindecim millium by 15,000 feet; the word pedum, employed in the preceding sentence, being understood in the text. When Cæsar intends to speak of paces, he almost always uses the word passus.

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270

De Bello Gallico, II. 33.

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271

De Bello Gallico, II. 35. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 20. – Cicero, Epist. Famil., I. 9, 17, 18.

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272

This passage has generally been wrongly interpreted. The text has, Quæ civitates propinquæ his locis erant ubi bellum gesserat. (De Bello Gallico, II. 35.) We must add the name of Crassus, overlooked by the copyists; for if Anjou and Touraine are near Brittany and Normandy, where Crassus had been fighting, they are very far from the Sambre and the Meuse, where Cæsar had carried the war.

[273] De Bello Gallico, III. 6

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273

Some manuscripts read Esuvios, but we adopt Unellos, because the geographical position of the country of the Unelli agrees better with the relation of the campaign.

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274

They leagued with the Osismii (the people of the department of Finistère), the Lexovii (department of Calvados), the Namnetes (Loire-Inférieure), the Ambiliates (on the left bank of the Loire, to the south of Angers), the Morini (the Boulonnais and bishopric of Saint-Omer), the Diablintes (Western Maine), and the Menapii (between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt). (De Bello Gallico, III. 9.)

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275

Orosius (VI. 8) confirms this fact as stated in the Commentaries.

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276

“The Veneti fought at sea against Cæsar; they had made their dispositions to prevent his passage, into the isle of Britain, because they were in possession of the commerce of that country.” (Strabo, IV. iv., p. 162, edit. Didot.)

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277

We must not confound him with M. Junius Brutus, the assassin of Cæsar. Decimus Junius Brutus was the adopted son of A. Postumius Albinus. (See Drumann, IV. 9, and Appendix D.)

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278

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 40.

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279

We suppose, in this enumeration, that the legion of Galba, cantoned the preceding winter among the Allobroges, had rejoined the army.

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280

I borrow this interpretation of the Roman works from the very instructive book of General de Gœler.

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281

De Bello Gallico, III. 13. – Strabo, IV., p. 162.

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282

The fleet of the Veneti, superior to that of the Romans in number, in the magnitude of their vessels, and in their rigging and sails, must have issued from the river Auray by the Morbihan entrance to the gulf, and met Brutus to fight him, instead of waiting for him at the head of the bay, where retreat would be impossible. This follows from Cæsar’s account: ex portu profectæ, nostris adversæ constiterunt. According to the memoir by M. le Comte de Grandpré, a post-captain, inserted in the Recueil de la Société des Antiquaires de France, tom. II., 1820, the wind must have been east or north-east, for it was towards the end of the summer. It appears that these winds usually prevail at that period, and that, when they have blown during the morning, there is a dead calm towards the middle of the day: it is just what happened in this combat; the calm came, probably, towards midday. It was necessary, indeed, that the wind should be between the north and the east, to allow, on one hand the Roman fleet to leave the Loire and sail towards the Point Saint-Jacques, and, on the other, to permit the fleet of the Veneti to quit the river Auray. These latter, in this position, could, in case of defeat, take refuge in the Bay of Quiberon, or fly to the open sea, where the Romans would not have dared to follow them.

With winds blowing from below, it matters not from what point, the Romans could not have gone in search of their enemies, or the latter come to meet them. Supposing that, in one tide, the Roman fleet had arrived at the mouth of the Loire towards five o’clock in the morning; it might have been towards ten o’clock, the moment when the battle commenced, between Haedik and Sarzeau. Supposing similarly that, as early as five o’clock in the morning, the movement of the Roman fleet had been announced to the Veneti, they could, in five hours, have issued from the river Auray, defiled by the entrance of the Morbihan, rallied and advanced in order of battle to meet the Romans in the part of the sea above described.

As to the place where Cæsar encamped, it is very probable, as we have said, that it was on the heights of Saint-Gildas; for from thence he could see the dispositions of the enemy, and perceive far off the approach of his fleet. In case of check, the Roman galleys found, under his protection, a place of refuge in the Vilaine. Thus, he had his rear secured; rested upon the towns of the coast which he had taken; could recall to him, if necessary, Titurius Sabinus; and lastly, could cross the Vilaine, to place that river between him and his enemies. Placed, on the contrary, on the other side of the Bay of Quiberon, he would have been too much enclosed in an enemy’s country, and would have had none of the advantages offered by the position of Saint-Gildas.

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283

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 41.

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284

We see, in fact, in Vegetius, that the word falces was applied to the head of a battering ram, armed with a point, and with a hook to detach the stones from the walls. “Quæ (trabes) aut adunco præfigitur ferro, et falx vocatur ab eo quod incurva est, ut de muro extrahat lapides.” (Vegetius, IV. 14.)

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285

De Bello Gallico, III. 17.

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286

This position is at the distance of seven kilomètres to the east of Avranches. The vestiges still visible of Chastellier are probably those of a camp made at a later period than this Gallic war, but we think that Sabinus had established his camp on the same site.

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287

De Bello Gallico, III. 19.

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288

Cæsar, after having said, in the first book of his “Commentaries”, that Aquitaine was one of the three parts of Gaul, states here that it formed the third part by its extent and population, which is not correct.

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289

Nicholas of Damascus (in Athenæus, Deipn., VI. 249) writes in this manner the name of King Adiatomus, and adds that the soldurii were clothed in royal vestments.

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290

This combat is remarkable as being the only one in the whole war in Gaul in which the Romans attack a fortified Gaulish camp.

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291

Of this number were the Tarbelli, The Bigerriones, The Ptiani, the Vasates, the Tarusates, the Elusates, the Gaites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibusates, and the Cocosates.

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292

De Bello Gallico, III. 27.

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293

Pliny, Hist. Nat., III. x. 6.

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294

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 44.

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295

Cæsar never entirely subjugated the north-west of Gaul. (See Sallust, cited by Ammianus Marcellinus, XV., 15.) Still, under the reign of Augustus, in 724 and 726, there were triumphs over the Morini.

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296

De Bello Gallico, III. 29.

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297

“In praetura, in consulatu præfectum fabrum detulit.” (Cicero, Orat. pro Balbo, 28.)

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298

Mamurra, a Roman knight, born at Formiæ. (Pliny, Hist. Nat., XXXVI. 7.)

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299

From Xanten to Nimeguen, for a length of fifty kilomètres, extends a line of heights which form a barrier along the left bank of the Rhine. All appearances would lead us to believe that the river flowed, in Cæsar’s time, close at the foot of these heights; but now it has removed from them, and at Emmerich, for instance, is at a distance of eight kilomètres. This chain, the eastern slope of which is scarped, presents only two passes; one by a large opening at Xanten itself, to the north of the mountain called the Furstenberg; the other by a gorge of easy access, opening at Qualburg, near Cleves. These two passes were so well defined as the entries to Gaul in these regions, that, after the conquest, the Romans closed them by fortifying the Furstenberg (Castra vetera), and founding, on the two islands formed by the Rhine opposite these entries, Colonia Trajana, now Xanten, and Quadriburgium, now Qualburg. The existence of these isles facilitated at that time the passage of the Rhine, and, in all probability, it was opposite these two localities just named that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the river to penetrate into Gaul.

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300

The account of this campaign is very obscure in the “Commentaries.” Florus and Dio Cassius add to the obscurities: the first, by placing the scene of the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri towards the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine; the second, by writing that Cæsar came up with the Germans in the country of the Treviri. Several authors have given to the account of these two historians more credit than to that of Cæsar himself, and they give of this campaign an explanation quite different from ours. General de Gœler, among others, supposes that the whole emigration of the Germans had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, where Cæsar came up with them, and that he had driven them from west to east, into the angle formed by the Moselle and the Rhine. From researches which were kindly undertaken by M. de Cohausen, major in the Prussian army, and which have given the same result as those of MM. Stoffel and De Locqueyssie, we consider this explanation of the campaign as inadmissible. It would be enough, to justify this assertion, to consider that the country situated between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too much broken and too barren to have allowed the German emigration, composed of 430,000 individuals, men, women, and children, with wagons, to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient roads; and if Cæsar had taken this direction, he must necessarily have crossed the forest of the Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not have failed to inform us. Besides, is it not more probable that, on the news of the approach of Cæsar, instead of directing their march towards the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans, at first spread over a vast territory, would have concentrated themselves towards the most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized – that of the Menapii?

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301

The Ambivariti were established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the west of Ruremonde, and to the south of the marshes of Peel.

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302

De Bello Gallico, IV. 13.

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303

“Acie triplici instituta.” Some authors have translated these words by “the army was formed in three columns;” but Cæsar, operating in a country which was totally uncovered and flat, and aiming at surprising a great mass of enemies, must have marched in order of battle, which did not prevent each cohort from being in column.

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304

Attacked unexpectedly in the afternoon, while they were sleeping. (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 48.)

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305

The study of the deserted beds of the Rhine leads us to believe that the confluence of the Waal and the Meuse, which is at present near Gorkum, was then much more to the east, towards Fort Saint-André. In that case, Cæsar made no mistake in reckoning eighty miles from the junction of the Waal and the Meuse to the mouth of the latter river.

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306

De Bello Gallico, IV. 14, 15.

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307

The following reasons have led us to adopt Bonn as the point where Cæsar crossed the Rhine: —

We learn from the “Commentaries” that in 699 he debouched in the country of the Ubii, and that two years later it was a little above (paulum supra) the first bridge that he established another, which joined the territory of the Treviri with that of the Ubii. Now everything leads to the belief that, in the first passage as in the second, the bridge was thrown across between the frontiers of the same peoples; for we cannot admit, with some authors, that the words paulum supra apply to a distance of several leagues. As to those who suppose that the passage was effected at Andernach, because, changing with Florus the Meuse (Mosa) into Moselle, they placed the scene of the defeat of the Germans at the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, we have given the reasons for rejecting this opinion. We have endeavoured to prove, in fact, that the battle against the Usipetes and the Tencteri had for its theatre the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine; and since, in crossing this latter river, Cæsar passed from the country of the Treviri into that of the Ubii, we must perceive that after his victory he must necessarily have proceeded up the valley of the Rhine to go from the territory of the Menapii to the Treviri, as far up as the territory of the Ubii, established on the right bank.

This being admitted, it remains to fix, within the limits assigned to these two last peoples, the most probable point of passage. Hitherto, Cologne has been adopted; but, to answer to the data of the “Commentaries,” Cologne appears to us to be much too far to the north. In fact, in the campaign of 701, Cæsar, having started from the banks of the Rhine, traversed the forest of the Ardennes from east to west, passed near the Segni and the Condrusi, since they implored him to spare their territory, and directed his march upon Tongres. If he had started from Cologne, he would not have crossed the countries in question. Moreover, in this same year, 2,000 Sicambrian cavalry crossed the Rhine thirty miles below the bridge of the Roman army. Now, if this bridge had been constructed at Cologne, the point of passage of the Sicambri, thirty miles below, would have been at a very great distance from Tongres, where, nevertheless, they seem to have arrived very quickly.

On the contrary, everything is explained if we adopt Bonn as the point of passage. To go from Bonn to Tongres, Cæsar proceeded, as the text has it, across the forest of the Ardennes; he passed through the country of the Segni and Condrusi, or very near them; and the Sicambri, crossing the Rhine thirty miles below Bonn, took the shortest line from the Rhine to Tongres. Moreover, we cannot place Cæsar’s point of passage either lower or higher than Bonn. Lower, that is, towards the north, the different incidents related in the “Commentaries” are without possible application to the theatre of the events; higher, towards the south, the Rhine flows upon a rocky bed, where the piles could not have been driven in, and presents, between the mountains which border it, no favourable point of passage. We may add that Cæsar would have been much too far removed from the country of the Sicambri, the chastisement of whom was the avowed motive of his expedition.

Another fact deserves to be taken into consideration: that, less than fifty years after Cæsar’s campaigns, Drusus, in order to proceed against the Sicambri – that is, against the same people whom Cæsar intended to combat – crossed the Rhine at Bonn. (Florus, IV. 12.)

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308

The following passage has given room for different interpretations: —

“Hæc utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum junctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur; quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura, ut, quo major vis aquæ se incitavisset, hoc arctius illigata tenerentur.” (De Bello Gallico, IV. 17.)

It has not been hitherto observed that the words hæc utraque relate to the two couples of one row of piles, and not to the two piles of the same couple. Moreover, the words quibus disclusis, &c., relate to these same two couples, and not, as has been supposed, to fibulis.

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309

De Bello Gallico, IV. 20.

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310

De Bello Gallico, II. 4.

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311

De Bello Gallico, V. 13.

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312

Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. 30, § 16.

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313

Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. 30, § 16. – Tacitus, Agricola, 10.

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314

De Bello Gallico, V. 12.

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315

Strabo, IV., p. 199.

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316

Agricola, 12.

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317

De Bello Gallico, V. 12.

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318

De Bello Gallico, V. 13 and 14.

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319

De Bello Gallico, V. 20.

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320

Annales, XIV. 33.

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321

Although the greater number of manuscripts read Cenimagni, some authors have made two names of it, the Iceni and the Cangi.

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322

The Anderida Silva, 120 miles in length by 30 in breadth, extended over the counties of Sussex and Kent, in what is now called the Weald. (See Camden, Britannia, edit. Gibson, I., col. 151, 195, 258, edit. of 1753.)

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323

Diodorus Siculus, V. 21. – Tacitus, Agricola, 12.

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324

IV., p. 200.

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325

Agricola, 11.

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326

Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.

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327

De Bello Gallico, V. 21.

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328

De Bello Gallico, V. 14.

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329

Strabo, IV., p. 200.

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330

De Bello Gallico, V. 14.

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331

Pliny, Hist. Nat., XXII. 1.

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332

De Bello Gallico, V. 14.

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333

Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.

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334

Diodorus Siculus, V. 22. – Strabo, IV., p. 200.

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335

De Bello Gallico, V. 12.

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336

De Bello Gallico, VI. 13.

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337

Agricola, 11.

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338

Strabo, IV., p. 199.

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339

De Bello Gallico, V. 12.

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340

Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.

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341

Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. 30, § 16.

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342

Tacitus, Agricola, 36.

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343

De Bello Gallico, V. 16.

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344

Tacitus, Agricola, 12.

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345

Frontinus, Stratagm., II. 3, 18. – Diodorus Siculus, V. 21. – Strabo, IV., p. 200.

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346

The account on page 213 confirms this interpretation, which is conformable to that of General Gœler.

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347

De Bello Gallico, IV. 32 and 33.

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348

Strabo, IV., p. 200.

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349

Strabo, IV., p. 201.

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350

From what will be seen further on, each transport ship, on its return, contained 150 men. Eighty ships could thus transport 12,000 men, but since, reduced to sixty-eight, they were enough to carry back the whole army to the continent, they can only have carried 10,200 men, which was probably the effective force of the two legions. The eighteen ships appropriated to the cavalry might transport 450 horses, at the rate of twenty-five horses each ship.

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351

The port of Dover extended formerly from the site of the present town, between the cliffs which border the valley of the Dour or of Charlton. (See Plate 17.) Indeed, from the facts furnished by ancient authors, and a geological examination of the ground, it appears certain that once the sea penetrated into the land, and formed a creek which occupied nearly the whole of the valley of Charlton. The words of Cæsar are just justified: “Cujus loci hæc erat natura, atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in littus telum adjici posset.” (IV. 23.)

The proofs of the above assertion result from several facts related in different notices on the town of Dover. It is there said that in 1784 Sir Thomas Hyde Page caused a shaft to be sunk at a hundred yards from the shore, to ascertain the depth of the basin at a remote period; it proved that the ancient bed of the sea had been formerly thirty English feet below the present level of the high tide. In 1826, in sinking a well at a place called Dolphin Lane, they found, at a depth of twenty-one feet, a bed of mud resembling that of the present port, mixed with the bones of animals and fragments of leaves and roots. Similar detritus have been discovered in several parts of the valley. An ancient chronicler, named Darell, relates that “Wilbred, King of Kent, built in 700 the church of St. Martin, the ruins of which are still visible near the market-place, on the spot where formerly ships cast anchor.”

The town built under the Emperors Adrian and Septimus Severus occupied a part of the port, which had already been covered with sand; yet the sea still entered a considerable distance inland. (See Plate 17.)

It would appear to have been about the year 950 that the old port was entirely blocked up with the maritime and fluvial alluvium which have been increasing till our day, and which at different periods have rendered it necessary to construct the dykes and quays which have given the port its present form.

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352

“Constat enim aditus insulæ esse munitos mirificis molibus.” (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, IV. 16.)

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353

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 51.

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354

The Emperor Julian (p. 70, edit. Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he had been the first to leap down from the ship.

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355

It is in the text, in scopulum vicinum insulæ, which must be translated by “a rock near the isle of Britain,” and not, as certain authors have interpreted it, “a rock isolated from the continent.” (Valerius Maximus, III. ii. 23.) – In fact, these rocks, called Malms, are distinctly seen at low water opposite the arsenal and marine barracks at Deal.

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356

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 51.

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357

Cæsar himself had only carried three servants with him, as Cotta relates. (Athenæus, Deipnosophist., VI. 105.)

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358

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 53.

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359

At the battle of Arcola, in 1796, twenty-five horsemen had a great influence on the issue of the day. (Mémoires de Montholon, dictées de Sainte-Hélène, II. 9.)

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360

De Bello Gallico, IV. 36 and 37.

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361

De Bello Gallico, IV. 38.

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362

Dio Cassius, XL. 1. – See Strabo, IV., p. 162, edit. Didot.

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363

De Bello Gallico, V. I.

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364

Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 56. XL. 1.

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365

This opinion has been already supported by learned archæologists. I will cite especially M. Mariette; Mr. Thomas Lewin, who has written a very interesting account of Cæsar’s invasions of England; and lastly, M. l’Abbé Haigneré, archivist of Boulogne, who has collected the best documents on this question.

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366

Strabo, IV. 6, p. 173.

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367

According to the Itinerary of Antoninus, the road started from Bagacum (Bavay), and passed by Pons-Scaldis (Escaut-Pont), Turnacum (Tournay), Viroviacum (Werwick), Castellum (Montcassel, Cassel), Tarvenna (Thérouanne), and thence to Gesoriacum (Boulogne). According to Mariette, medals found on the road demonstrate that it had been made in the time of Agrippa; moreover, according to the same Itinerary of Antoninus, a Roman road started from Bavay, and, by Tongres, ended at the Rhine at Bonn. (See Jahrbücher des Vereins von Alterthums Freunden, Heft 37, Bonn, 1864. Now, admitting that there had been already under Augustus a road which united Boulogne with Bonn, we understand the expression of Florus, who explains that Drusus amended this road by constructing bridges on the numerous water-courses which it crossed, Bonnam et Gesoriacum pontibus junxit. (Florus, IV. 12.)

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368

Suetonius, Caligula, 46. – The remains of the pharos of Caligula were still visible a century ago.

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369

Suetonius, Claudius, 17.

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370

Ammianus Marcellinus, XX. 1.

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371

Ammianus Marcellinus, XX. 7, 8.

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372

Eumenius, Panegyric of Constantinus Cæsar, 14.

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373

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, cited by Mr. Lewin.

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374

“Qui tertia vigilia Morino solvisset a portu.” (Florus, III. 10.)

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375

Strabo, IV. 5, p. 166.

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376

“Ultimos Gallicarum gentium Morinos, nec portu quam Gesoriacum vocant quicquam notius habet.” (Pomponius Mela, III. 2.) – “Μορινὡν Γησοριακον ἑπἱνειον.” (Ptolemy, II. ix. 3.)

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377

“Hæc [Britannia] abest a Gesoriaco Morinorum gentis litore proximo trajectu quinquaginta M.” (Pliny, Hist. Nat., IV. 30.)

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378

The camp of Labienus, during the second expedition, was, no doubt, established on the site now occupied by the high town. From thence it commanded the surrounding country, the sea, and the lower course of the Liane.

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379

Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire, tom. IV., I. 17.

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380

What is now called Romney Marsh is the northern part of a vast plain, bounded on the east and south by the sea, and on the west and north by the line of heights at the foot of which the military canal has been cut. It is difficult to determine what was the aspect of Romney Marsh in the time of Cæsar. Nevertheless, the small elevation of the plain above the level of the sea, as well as the nature of the soil, lead us to conclude that the sea covered it formerly up to the foot of the heights of Lymne, except at least in the part called Dymchurch-Wall. This is a long tongue of land, on which are now raised three forts and nine batteries, and which, considering its height above the rest of the plain, has certainly never been covered by the sea. These facts appear to be confirmed by an ancient chart in the Cottonian collection in the British Museum.

Mr. Lewin appears to have represented as accurately as possible the appearance of Romney Marsh in the time of Cæsar, in the plate which accompanies his work. The part not covered by the sea extended, no doubt, as he represents it, from the bay of Romney to near Hythe, where it terminated in a bank of pebbles of considerable extent. But it appears to us that it would have been difficult for the Roman army to land on a bank of pebbles at the very foot of the rather steep heights of Lymne. Mr. Lewin places the Roman army, in the first expedition, at the foot of the heights, on the bank of pebbles itself, surrounded on almost all sides by the sea. In the second expedition, he supposes it to have been on the heights, at the village of Lymne; and, to explain how Cæsar joined his fleet to the camp by retrenchments common to both, he admits that this fleet was drawn on land as far as the slope of the heights, and shut up in a square space of 300 mètres each side, because we find there the ruins of an ancient castle called Stutfall Castle. All this is hardly admissible.

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381

Word for word, this expression signifies that the ships set sail four days after the arrival of the Romans in England. The Latin language often employed the ordinal number instead of the cardinal number. Thus, the historian Eutropius says, “Carthage was destroyed 700 years after it was founded, Carthago septingentesimo anno quam condita erat deleta est.” Are we, in the phrase, post diem quartum, to reckon the day of the arrival? – Virgil says, speaking of the seventeenth day, septima post decimam. – Cicero uses the expression post sexennium in the sense of six years. It is evident that Virgil counts seven days after the tenth. If the tenth was comprised in this number, the expression septima post decimam would signify simply the sixteenth day. On his part, Cicero understands clearly the six years as a lapse of time which was to pass, starting from the moment in which he speaks. Thus, the post diem quartum of Cæsar must be understood in the sense of four days accomplished, without reckoning the day of landing.

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382

Titus Livius, XLIV. 37.

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383

We must now go back to the fourteenth day before the full moon, that is, to the 17th of August, 699, to find a day on which high tide took place at Dover towards midday.

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384

Mr. Lewin has stated that the country between Deal and Sandwich produces no wheat. This assertion is tolerably true for the tongue of marshy land which separates those two localities; but what does it signify, since wheat grows in great quantities in all the part of the county of Kent situated to the west of the coast which extends from the South Foreland to Deal and Sandwich?

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385

It is almost impossible to fix with certainty the day when Cæsar quitted Britain; we know only that it was a short time before the equinox (propinqua die æquinoxii), which, according to the calculations of M. Le Verrier, fell on the 26th of September, and that the fleet started a little after midnight. If we admit a passage of nine hours, with a favorable wind (ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus), as on the return of the second expedition, Cæsar would have arrived at Boulogne towards nine o’clock in the morning. As the fleet could not enter the port until the tide was in, it is sufficient, to know approximatively the date of Cæsar’s return, to seek what day in the month of September, 699, there was high tide at that hour at Bolougne. Now, in this port, the tide is always at its height towards nine o’clock in the morning two or three days before full moon and before new moon; therefore, since the full moon of the month of September, 699, took place on the 14th, it must have been about the 11th or 12th of September that Cæsar returned to Gaul. As to the two ships which were driven farther down, Mr. Lewin (Invasion of Britain by J. Cæsar) explains this accident in a very judicious manner. He states that we read in the tide-tables of the English Admiralty the following recommendation: “In approaching Boulogne when the tide is flowing in, great attention must be paid, because the current, which, on the English side, drags a ship towards the east, on the Boulogne side drags them, on the contrary, towards the Somme.” Nothing, then, is more natural than that the two Roman transport ships should be driven ashore to the south of Boulogne.

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386

“It was there (the mouth of the Seine) that Cæsar established his naval arsenal, when he passed over to that island (Britain.)” (Strabo, II. 160.)

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387

De Bello Gallico, V. 3, 4.

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388

The Meldæ dwelt on the Marne, in the country around Meaux; and as we have seen, according to Strabo, that Cæsar had established his naval arsenal at the mouth of the Seine, there is nothing extraordinary in the circumstance that some of the ships were built near Meaux. But it is not reasonable to suppose, with some writers, that the Meldæ dwelt at the mouth of the Scheldt, and believe that Cæsar had left important shipyards in an enemy’s country, and out of reach of protection.

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389

The five legions which Cæsar led into Britain made, at about 5,000 men each, 25,000 men. There were, in addition to these, 2,000 cavalry. If we suppose, as in the first expedition, twenty-five horses per ship, it would require eighty to contain the cavalry. In the preceding year, eighty transport ships had been sufficient for two legions, without baggage – 200 ought to have been enough for five legions; but as the “Commentaries” give us to understand that those vessels were narrower, and that the troops had their baggage, it may be believed that they required double the number of ships, that is, 400, for the transport of the five legions, which would make about sixty-two men in a ship. There would remain 160 transport ships for the Gaulish and Roman chiefs, the valets, and the provisions. The twenty-eight galleys were, no doubt, the true ships of war, destined to protect the fleet and the landing.

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390

According to a passage in the “Commentaries” (Book V. 26), there was in the Roman army a body of Spanish cavalry.

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391

Dio Casstas, XL. 1.

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392

De Bella Galtico, V. 8.

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393

This appears to us to be evident, since we shall see subsequently Cæsar inclosed his fleet within the retrenchments contiguous to his camp.

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394

As in the first expedition the disaster which happened to his fleet must have proved to Cæsar the danger to which the vessels were exposed on the coast, the above reflection indicates that, in his second expedition, he chose a better anchorage, at a few kilomètres farther to the north.

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395

Ten cohorts formed a legion; but Cæsar does not employ this last expression, because, no doubt, he drew from each of his legions two cohorts, which he left for the guard of the camp. In this manner he preserved the tactical number of five legions, which was more advantageous, and caused each legion to participate in the honour of combating.

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396

If from the sea-shore, near Deal, where we suppose that the Romans established their camp, we describe, with a radius of twelve miles, an arc of a circle, we cut towards the west, the villages of Kingston and Barham, and more to the north, the village of Littlebourne, a stream called the Little Stour, which rises near Lyminge, flows from south to north across a rather irregular country, and falls into the Great Stour. This stream is incontestably the flumen of the “Commentaries.” There is the less room for error, as we find no other stream in the part of the county of Kent comprised between the coast of Deal and the Great Stour, and as this latter runs too far from Deal to answer to the text. Although the Little Stour is not, between Barham and Kingston, more than from three to four mètres broad, we need not be astonished at the denomination of flumen given to it by Cæsar, for he employs the same expression to designate simple rivulets, such as the Ose and the Oserain. (De Bello Gallico, VII. 69, Alesia.)

But did Cæsar reach the Little Stour towards Barham and Kingston or towards Littlebourne? The doubt is allowable. We believe, nevertheless, that the country of Barham and Kingston agrees best with the idea we form from reading the “Commentaries.” The heights on the left bank of the Little Stour are not so broken as to prevent chariots and cavalry from manœuvring on them, and the Britons might have occupied, as the text requires, a commanding position, locus superior, on the banks which end at the river in gentle slopes.

This stream, considering its little depth, does not form any real obstacle. Now it appears, in fact, to result from the recital of the “Commentaries,” that the engagement as it was not of a serious character, and that Cæsar’s cavalry passed it without difficulty. This last fact forms an objection to the Great Stour, which several authors, and among others General de Gœler, take for the flumen of the text; it is sufficiently broad and sufficiently steep-banked towards Sturry, where they place the scene of the action, to render the passage difficult for cavalry. Moreover, Sturry is fifteen, and not twelve miles from the coast of Deal.

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397

It is evident that this place must not be sought at more than a few kilomètres from the Little Stour; for it must be remembered that the Romans had landed the day before, that they had made a night march of twelve miles, and that they have just given battle. Unfortunately, the country situated to the west of Kingston is so much broken and wooded, that it is impossible to choose one site rather than another to make a British oppidum. Perhaps it might be placed towards Bursted or Upper Hardres.

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398

De Bello Gallico, V. 9.

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399

It has appeared to us interesting to explain how Cæsar could join the fleet to his camp.

The Roman camp must have been on flat ground, to allow of the possibility of drawing up the ships of the fleet. Supposing that the mean size of each ship was twenty-five mètres long by six mètres broad, and that the 800 ships composing the fleet had been placed at two mètres from each other, on five lines separated by a distance of three mètres, the fleet would have covered a rectangle of 1,280 mètres by 140, joined with the camp by other trenches. It is, of course, understood that the lightest boats would form the line farthest from the sea.

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400

De Bello Gallico, V. 11.

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401

This is the expression of Cæsar, but it is certain that this number does not indicate the shortest distance from the Thames to the Straits. Cæsar, no doubt, meant to tell us the length of the route he took from the sea to the Thames.

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402

On the chariots of the Britons consult Strabo (IV., p. 166), and Dio Cassius (LXXVI. 12). Cæsar spoke of many thousand cavalry and war-chariots, in the third book of a Memoir addressed to Cicero, but which is lost. (Junius Philargyrus, Comm. on the Georgics of Virgil, III., p. 204.)

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403

De Bello Gallico, V. 17.

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404

There remains not the slightest vestige in the county of Kent which might help us in tracing the march of the Roman army. The camp of Holwood, near Keston, which the English maps call Cæsar’s Camp, does not belong to the period of which we are treating. On St. George’s Hill, near Walton-on-the-Thames, no camp ever existed.

Unfortunately, it is no more possible to ascertain the exact place where Cæsar crossed the Thames by a ford. We are convinced of this by the researches of all kinds made by the officers Stoffel and Hamelin. The boatmen of the Thames all assured them that between Shepperton and London there are now reckoned eight or nine places fordable; the most favourable is that at Sunbury. At Kingston, where General de Gœler places the passage, nothing leads us to suppose that a ford ever existed. The same thing must be said of Coway Stakes. At Halliford, in spite of the termination of the word, the inhabitants have no tradition of an ancient ford. The only thing which appears to us evident is, that the Roman army did not pass below Teddington. We know that this village, the name of which comes from Tide-end-town, marks the last point of the Thames where the tide is felt. We cannot believe that Cæsar would expose himself to be surprised during his passage by an increase of the volume of water.

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405

De Bello Gallico, V. 18. – Polyænus expresses himself thus: “Cæsar, when he was in the isle of Britain, sought to pass a great river. Cassivellaunus, King of the Britons, opposed the passage with a numerous cavalry and many chariots. Cæsar had a very great elephant, an animal which the Britons had never seen; he armed it with iron flakes, and placed on its back a great tower filled with archers and slingers, all men of skill, and caused it to advance into the river. The Britons were struck with astonishment at the view of such an enormous animal, which was unknown to them. And is it necessary to say that their horses were frightened at it, since we know that, even among the Greeks, the presence of an elephant causes the horses to flee? Much more were those of the barbarians unable to support the view of an elephant armed and loaded with a tower from which flew stones and arrows. Britons, horses, and chariots, all equally took flight; and the Romans, by means of the terror caused by a single animal, passed the river without danger.” (Strateg., VIII. 23, § 5.)

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