Вальтер Скотт
Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Volume III
CAPITULATION OF ULM.
Meanwhile, Mack found himself, with the remains of his army, cooped up in Ulm, as Wurmser had been in Mantua. He published an order of the day, which intimated an intention to imitate the persevering defence of that heroic veteran. He forbade the word surrender to be used by any one – he announced the arrival of two powerful armies, one of Austrians, one of Russians, whose appearance would presently raise the blockade – he declared his determination to eat horse-flesh rather than listen to any terms of capitulation. This bravado appeared on the 16th October, and the conditions of surrender were subscribed by Mack on the next day, having been probably in the course of adjustment when he was making these notable professions of resistance.134
The course of military misconduct which we have traced, singular as it is, might be perhaps referred to folly or incapacity on the part of Mack, though it must be owned it was of that gross kind which civilians consider as equal to fraud. But another circumstance remains to be told, which goes far to prove that this once celebrated and trusted general had ingrafted the traitor upon the fool. The terms of capitulation, as subscribed on the 17th October, bore, that there should be an armistice until 26th October at midnight; and that if, during this space, an Austrian or Russian army should appear to raise the blockade, the army at Ulm should have liberty to join them, with their arms and baggage. This stipulation allowed the Austrian soldiers some hope of relief, and in any event it was sure to interrupt the progress of Buonaparte's successes, by detaining the principal part of his army in the neighbourhood of Ulm, until the term of nine days was expired. But Mack consented to a revision of these terms, a thing which would scarcely have been proposed to a man of honour, and signed on the 19th a second capitulation, by which he consented to evacuate Ulm on the day following;135 thus abridging considerably, at a crisis when every minute was precious, any advantage, direct or contingent, which the Austrians could have derived from the delay originally stipulated. No reason has ever been alleged for this concession. Buonaparte, indeed, had given Mack an audience136 previous to the signing of this additional article of capitulation, and what arguments he then employed must be left to conjecture.137
The effects of Mack's poltroonery, want of skill, and probable treachery, were equal to the results of a great victory. Artillery, baggage, and military stores, were given up to an immense extent. Eight general officers surrendered upon parole, upwards of 20,000 men became prisoners of war, and were marched into France. The numbers of the prisoners taken in this campaign were so great, that Buonaparte distributed them amongst the agriculturists, that their work in the fields might make up for the absence of the conscripts, whom he had withdrawn from such labour. The experiment was successful; and from the docile habits of the Germans, and the good-humour of their French employers, this new species of servitude suited both parties, and went some length to soften the hardships of war. For not the field of battle itself, with its wounded and dead, is a more distressing sight to humanity and reflection, than prison-barracks and hulks, in which hundreds and thousands of prisoners are delivered up to idleness, and all the evils which idleness is sure to introduce, and not unfrequently to disease and death. Buonaparte meditated introducing this alteration into the usages of war upon a great scale, and thought of regimenting his prisoners for the purpose of labouring on public works. His jurists objected to the proposal as contrary to the law of nations.138 This scruple might have been avoided, by employing only volunteers, which would also have prevented the appearance of retrograding towards those barbarous times, when the captive of the sword became the slave of his victor. But national character would, in most instances, render the scheme impracticable. Thus, an attempt was afterwards made to dispose of the Spanish prisoners in a similar way, who in most cases made their escape, and in some rose upon and destroyed their taskmasters. A French soldier would, in like manner, make an indifferent serf to an English farmer, an English prisoner a still more intractable assistant to a French agriculturist. The advantages of comparative freedom would be in both cases counterbalanced, by a feeling of degradation in the personal subjection experienced.
When the general officers of the Austrians139 were admitted to a personal interview with the French Emperor, he behaved with courtesy to Klenau and others of reputation, whose character had become known to him in the Italian campaigns. But he complained of the politics of their court, which he said had forced him into war when he knew not what he was fighting for. He prophesied the fall of the House of Austria, unless his brother the Emperor hastened to make peace, and reprobated the policy which brought the uncivilized Russians to interfere in the decision of more cultivated countries than their own. Mack140 had the impudence to reply, that the Emperor of Austria had been forced into the war by Russia. "Then," said Napoleon, "you no longer exist as an independent power." The whole conversation appeared in the bulletin141 of the day, which also insinuates, with little probability, that the Austrian officers and soldiers concurred generally in blaming the alliance between their own Emperor and Alexander.142 From this we infer, that the union between those two powerful sovereigns was, even in the moment of this great success, a subject of apprehension to Buonaparte; whose official notes are sometimes expressed with generosity towards the vanquished, who had ceased to struggle, but always with an eager tone of reproach and offence towards those from whom an animated resistance was to be apprehended.
CHAPTER XXXII
Position of the French Armies – Napoleon advances towards Vienna – The Emperor Francis leaves his Capital – French enter Vienna on the 13th November – Review of the French Successes in Italy and the Tyrol – Schemes of Napoleon to force on a General Battle – Battle of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined Austro-Russian Armies completely Defeated – Interview betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon – The Emperor Alexander retreats towards Russia – Treaty of Presburgh signed on the 26th December – Its Conditions – Fate of the King of Sweden – and of the Two Sicilies.
POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES.
The tide of war now rolled eastward, having surmounted and utterly demolished the formidable barrier which was opposed to it. Napoleon placed himself at the head of his central army.143 Ney, upon his right, was ready to repel any descent which might be made from the passes of the Tyrol. Murat, on his left, watched the motions of the Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, who, refusing to join in the unworthy capitulation of Ulm, had cut their way into Bohemia, and there united themselves with other forces, either stationed in that kingdom, or who had, like themselves, escaped thither. Lastly, the division of Augereau, (who had recently advanced from France at the head of an army of reserve,) occupying part of Swabia, served to protect the rear of the French army against any movement from the Vorarlberg; and at the same time menaced the Prussians, in case, acting upon the offence given by the violation of their territory, they should have crossed the Danube, and engaged in the war.144
If, however, the weight of Prussia had been thrown into the scale with sufficient energy at this decisive moment, it would not probably have been any resistance which Augereau could have offered that could have saved Napoleon from a perilous situation, since the large armies of the new enemy would have been placed in his rear, and, of course, his communications with France entirely cut off. It was a crisis of the same kind which opened to Austria in the year 1813; but she was then taught wisdom by experience, and availed herself of the golden opportunity which Prussia now suffered to escape. Buonaparte had reckoned with accuracy upon the timid and fluctuating councils of that power. The aggression on their territories of Anspach and Bareuth was learned at Berlin; but then the news of the calamity sustained by the Austrians at Ulm succeeded these tidings almost instantly, and while the first article of intelligence seemed to urge instant hostilities, the next was calculated to warn them against espousing a losing cause.
Thus, trusting to the vacillating and timid policy of Prussia,145 Napoleon, covered on his flank and rear as we have stated, continued to push forward146 with his central forces towards Vienna, menaced repeatedly in the former wars, but whose fate seemed decided after the disaster of Ulm. It is true, that an army, partly consisting of Russians and partly of Austrians, had pressed forward to prevent that disgraceful calamity, and, finding that the capitulation had taken place, were now retreating step by step in front of the advancing French; but, not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they were unable to make any effectual stand upon the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, or in any other position which might have covered Vienna. They halted, indeed, repeatedly, made a considerable show of resistance, and fought some severe though partial actions; but always ended by continuing their retreat, which was now directed upon Moravia, where the grand Russian, army had already assembled, under the command of the Emperor Alexander, and were expecting still further reinforcements under General Buxhowden.147
Some attempts were made to place Vienna in a state of defence, and the inhabitants were called upon to rise in mass for that purpose. But as the fortifications were ancient and in disrepair, an effort at resistance could only have occasioned the destruction of the city. The Emperor Francis saw himself, therefore, under the necessity of endeavouring to provide for the safety of his capital by negotiation, and for that of his person by leaving it. On the 7th November, accordingly, he departed from Vienna for Brunn in Moravia, in order to place himself under the protection of the Russian forces.
On the same day, but late in the evening, Count Giulay arrived at Buonaparte's headquarters, then established at Lintz, with a proposal for an armistice, previous to a general negotiation for peace. Napoleon refused to listen to the proposal, unless Venice and the Tyrol were put into his hands. These terms were too hard to be accepted.148 Vienna, therefore, was left to its fate; and that proud capital of the proud House of Austria remained an unresisting prize to the invader.
VIENNA TAKEN.
On the 13th November the French took possession of Vienna, where they obtained an immense quantity of military stores, arms, and clothing;149 a part of which spoils were bestowed by Napoleon on his ally the Elector of Bavaria, who now witnessed the humiliation of the Imperial House which had of late conducted itself so haughtily towards him. General Clarke was appointed Governor of Vienna; and by a change as rapid as if it had taken place on the stage, the new Emperor of France occupied Schonbrun, the splendid palace of the long-descended Emperor of Austria. But though such signal successes had crowned the commencement of the campaign, it was necessary to defeat the haughty Russians, in whose aid the Emperor of Austria still confided, before the object of the war could be considered as attained. The broken and shattered remnant of the Austrian forces had rallied from different quarters around the yet untouched army of Alexander; and although the latter retreated from Brunn towards Olmutz, it was only with the purpose of forming a junction with Buxhowden, before they hazarded a general battle.
In the meantime, the French army, following close on their back into Moravia, fought one or two partial actions, which, though claimed as victories, were so severely disputed as to make Napoleon aware that he had to do with a more obstinate enemy than he had of late encountered in the dispirited Austrians. He waited, therefore, until the result of his skilful combinations should have drawn around him the greatest force he could expect to collect, ere venturing upon an engagement, of which, if he failed to obtain a decisive victory, the consequences were likely to be fatal to him.
At this period, success had smiled on the French in Italy, and in the Tyrol, as well as in Germany. In the former country, it may be remembered that the Archduke Charles, at the head of seventy-five or eighty thousand men, exclusive of garrisons, was opposed to Massena, whose forces considerably exceeded that amount. The prince occupied the left bank of the Adige, with the purpose of maintaining a defensive warfare, until he should hear news of the campaign in Germany. Massena, however, after some fighting, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river at Verona, and in occupying the village of St. Michael. This was on the 20th October. Soon afterwards, the account of the surrender at Ulm reached the Frenchman, and determined him on a general attack along the whole Austrian line, which was strongly posted near Caldiero. The assault took place on the 30th October, and was followed by a very desperate action; for the Austrians, confident in the presence of their favourite commander, fought with the greatest courage. They were, however, defeated; and a column of five thousand men, under General Hellinger, detached for the purpose of attacking the French in the rear, failed in their purpose, and being themselves surrounded, were obliged to lay down their arms. The victors were joined by General St. Cyr, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, who had evacuated the kingdom of Naples, upon a treaty of neutrality entered into with the King, and now came to join their countrymen in Lombardy.
In the midst of his own misfortunes, the Archduke Charles received the fatal intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm, and that the French were advancing in full march towards Vienna. To cover his brother's capital became a matter of more pressing necessity than to attempt to continue the defence of Italy, which circumstances rendered almost hopeless. He commenced his retreat, therefore, on the night of the 1st of November, determining to continue it through the mountain passes of Carinthia, and so on into Hungary. If he had marched by the Tyrol, he would have found Augereau in his front, with Ney and Marmont threatening his flanks, while Massena, before whom he was now retreating, pressed on his rear.
The archduke commenced this dispiriting and distressing movement, over nearly the same ground which he had passed while retreating before Buonaparte himself in 1797. He did not, however, as on that occasion, avail himself of the Tagliamento, or Palma Nova. His purpose was retreat, not defence; and, though pursued closely by Massena, he halted no longer at these strong posts than was necessary to protect his march, and check the vivacity of the French advance. He effected at length his retreat upon Laybach, where he received tidings from his brother the Archduke John, whose situation on the Tyrol was not more agreeable than his own in Italy; and who, like Charles himself, was desirous to escape into the vicinity of Hungary with what forces remained to him.
The distress of the Archduke John was occasioned by an army of French and Bavarians, commanded by Ney, who had penetrated into the Tyrol by paths deemed impracticable; taken the forts of Schwatz, Neustadt, and Inspruck itself, and placed the archduke's army in the most precarious situation. Adopting a determination worthy of his birth, the Austrian prince resolved at all risks to effect a junction with his brother, and, though hard pressed by the enemy, he accomplished his purpose. Two considerable corps of Austrians, being left in an insulated situation by these movements of the two princes, were obliged to surrender. These were the divisions of Jellachich, in the Vorarlberg, and of the Prince of Rohan, in Lombardy. The whole of the north of Italy, with the Tyrol and all its passes, was left to the undisturbed and unresisted occupation of the French.150
The army of the royal brothers had, however, become formidable by their junction, and was daily growing stronger. They were in communication with Hungary, the brave inhabitants of which warlike country were universally rising in arms. They were also joined by volunteers from Croatia, the Tyrol, and all those wild and mountainous countries, which have so long supplied the Austrian army with the finest light troops in the world.
It might seem to counterbalance these advantages, that Massena had also entered into communications with the French army of Germany at Clagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. But having left great part of his troops in Italy, he had for the time ceased to be formidable to the Austrian princes, who now meditated advancing on the French grand army, which the audacity of its leader had placed in a situation extremely perilous to any other than French troops acting under the eye of their Emperor.
SUCCESSION OF GRAND MANŒUVRES.
Nothing, it is true, could be more admirably conceived and satisfactorily accomplished than the succession of grand manœuvres, which, distinguishing the opening of the campaign, had produced the great, yet cheaply-purchased success of Ulm, and the capture of Vienna. Nor was the series of combination less wonderful, by which, clearing the Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and the north of Italy of the enemy, Napoleon had placed almost all the subordinate divisions of his own army at his disposal, ready to assist him in the grand enterprise against the Austro-Russian forces. But he has been considered by military critics as having trusted too great a risk upon the precarious event of battle, when he crossed the Danube, and plunged into Moravia, where a defeat, or even a check, might have been attended with the most fatal consequences. The position of the Archdukes Charles and John; the organisation of the Hungarian insurrection, which proceeded rapidly; the success of the Archduke Ferdinand, in raising a similar general levy in Bohemia, threatened alarming operations in the French rear; while Prussia, with the sword drawn in her hand, and the word war upon her lips, watched but the slightest waning of Buonaparte's star, to pronounce the word, and to strike a blow at the same moment.
Napoleon accordingly, though he had dared the risk, was perfectly sensible that as he had distinguished the earlier part of this campaign by some of the most brilliant manœuvres which military history records, it was now incumbent upon him, without delay, to conclude it by a great and decisive victory over a new and formidable enemy. He neglected, therefore, no art by which success could be ensured. In the first place, it was necessary to determine the allies to immediate battle; for, situated in the heart of an enemy's country, with insurrection spreading wide and wider around him, an immediate action was as desirable on his part, as delay would have been advantageous to his opponents.
Some attempts at negotiation were made by the Austrians, to aid which Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, made his appearance in the French camp with the offer of his master's mediation, but with the alternative of declaring war in case it was refused. To temporize with Prussia was of the last consequence, and the French Emperor found a willing instrument in Haugwitz. "The French and Austrian outposts," said Napoleon, "are engaged; it is a prelude to the battle which I am about to fight – Say nothing of your errand to me at present – I wish to remain in ignorance of it. Return to Vienna, and wait the events of war."151 Haugwitz, to use Napoleon's own expression, was no novice, and returned to Vienna without waiting for another hint; and doubtless the French Emperor was well pleased to be rid of his presence.152
Napoleon next sent Savary153 to the Russian camp, under pretence of compliment to the Emperor Alexander, but in reality as a spy upon that monarch and his generals. He returned, having discovered, or affected to discover, that the Russian sovereign was surrounded by counsellors, whom their youth and rank rendered confident and presumptuous, and who, he concluded, might be easily misguided into some fatal act of rashness.154
Buonaparte acted on the hint, and upon the first movement of the Austro-Russian army in advance, withdrew his forces from the position they had occupied. Prince Dolgorucki, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, was despatched by him to return the compliments which had been brought him. He too was, doubtless, expected to use his powers of observation, but they were not so acute as those of the old officer of police. Buonaparte, as if the interior of his camp displayed scenes which he did not desire Dolgorucki to witness, met the prince at the outposts, which the soldiers were in the act of hastily covering with field-works, like an army which seeks to shelter conscious weakness under intrenchments. Encouraged by what he thought he saw of the difficulties in which the French seemed to be placed, Dolgorucki entered upon politics, and demanded in plain terms the cession of the crown of Italy. To this proposal Buonaparte listened with a patience which seemed to be the effect of his present situation. In short, Dolgorucki carried back to his imperial master the hastily conceived opinion, that the French Emperor was retreating, and felt himself in a precarious posture.155 On this false ground the Russian council of war determined to act. Their plan was to extend their own left wing, with the purpose of turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank and rear.
AUSTERLITZ.
It was upon the 1st December at noon that the Russians commenced this movement, by which, in confidence of success, they abandoned a chain of heights where they might have received an attack with great advantage, descended into ground more favourable to the enemy, and, finally, placed their left wing at too great a distance from the centre. The French general no sooner witnessed this rash manœuvre, than he exclaimed, "Before to-morrow is over, that army is my own." In the meantime, withdrawing his outposts, and concentrating his forces, he continued to intimate a conscious inferiority, which was far from existing.
The two armies seem to have been very nearly of the same strength. For though the bulletin, to enhance the victory, makes the opposite army amount to 100,000 men, yet there were not actually above 50,000 Russians, and about 25,000 Austrians, in the field of battle.156 The French army might be about the same force. But they were commanded by Napoleon, and the Russians by Kutousof; a veteran soldier indeed, full of bravery and patriotism, and accustomed to war as it was waged against the Turks; but deficient in general talent, as well as in the alertness of mind necessary to penetrate into and oppose the designs of his adversary, and, as is not unusual, obstinate in proportion to the narrowness of his understanding, and the prejudices of his education.
Meanwhile Buonaparte, possessed of his enemy's plan by the demonstrations of the preceding day, passed the night in making his arrangements.157 He visited the posts in person, and apparently desired to maintain an incognito which was soon discovered. As soon as the person of the Emperor was recognised, the soldiers remembered that next day [2d December] was the anniversary of his coronation. Bunches of lighted hay, placed on the end of poles, made an extempore illumination, while the troops, with loud acclamations, protested they would present him on the following day with a bouquet becoming the occasion; and an old grenadier, approaching his person, swore that the Emperor should only have to combat with his eyes, and that, without his exposing his person, the whole colours and artillery of the Russian army should be brought to him to celebrate the festival of the morrow.158
In the proclamation which Napoleon, according to his custom, issued to the army, he promises that he will keep his person out of the reach of fire; thus showing the full confidence, that the assurance of his personal safety would be considered as great an encouragement to the troops, as the usual protestation of sovereigns and leaders, that they will be in the front, and share the dangers of the day.159 This is, perhaps, the strongest proof possible of the complete and confidential understanding which subsisted between Napoleon and his soldiers. Yet there have not been wanting those, who have thrown the imputation of cowardice on the victor of a hundred battles, and whose reputation was so well established amongst those troops who must be the best judges, that his attention to the safety of his person was requested by them, and granted by him, as a favour to his army.
BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.
The Battle of Austerlitz, fought against an enemy of great valour but slender experience, was not of a very complicated character. The Russians, we have seen, were extending their line to surround the French flank. Marshal Davoust, with a division of infantry, and another of dragoons, was placed behind the convent of Raygern, to oppose the forces destined for this manœuvre, at the moment when they should conceive the point carried. Soult commanded the right wing; Lannes conducted the left, which last rested upon a fortified position called Santon, defended by twenty pieces of cannon. Bernadotte led the centre, where Murat and all the French cavalry were stationed. Ten battalions of the Imperial Guard, with ten of Oudinot's division, were kept in reserve in the rear of the line, under the eye of Napoleon himself, who destined them, with forty field-pieces, to act wherever the fate of battle should render their services most necessary. Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of his own army, strove to decide the destinies of Europe. The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy; it was that sun of Austerlitz which Napoleon, upon so many succeeding occasions apostrophised, and recalled to the minds of his soldiers. As its first beams rose above the horizon, Buonaparte appeared in front of the army, surrounded by his marshals, to whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.160
The column detached from the left of the Austro-Russian army was engaged in a false manœuvre, and it was ill executed. The intervals between the regiments of which it consisted were suffered to become irregular, and the communications between this attacking column itself and the main body were not maintained with sufficient accuracy. When the Russians thought themselves on the point of turning the right flank of the French, they found themselves suddenly, and at unawares, engaged with Davoust's division, of whose position behind the convent of Raygern, they had not been aware. At the same time, Soult, at the head of the French right wing, rushed forward upon the interval between the Austro-Russian centre and left, caused by the march of the latter upon Raygern, and, completely intersecting their line, severed the left wing entirely from the centre.
The Emperor of Russia perceived the danger, and directed a desperate attempt to be made upon Soult's division by the Russian Guards, for the purpose of restoring the communication with his left. The French infantry were staggered by this charge, and one regiment completely routed. But it was in such a crisis that the genius of Buonaparte triumphed. Bessières had orders to advance with the Imperial Guard, while the Russians were disordered with their own success. The encounter was desperate, and the Russians displayed the utmost valour before they at length gave way to the discipline and steadiness of Buonaparte's veterans. Their artillery and standards were lost, and Prince Constantine, the Emperor's brother, who fought gallantly at their head, was only saved by the speed of his horse.
The centre of the French army now advanced to complete the victory, and the cavalry of Murat made repeated charges with such success, that the Emperors of Russia and Austria, from the heights of Austerlitz, beheld their centre and left completely defeated. The fate of the right wing could no longer be protracted, and it was disastrous even beyond the usual consequences of defeat.161 They had been actively pressed during the whole battle by Lannes, but now the troops on their left being routed, they were surrounded on all sides, and, unable to make longer resistance, were forced down into a hollow, where they were exposed to the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. Many attempted to escape across a lake, which was partially frozen; but the ice proving too weak gave way under them, or was broken by the hostile cannonade. This fatality renewed, according to Buonaparte's description, the appearance of the battle with the Turks at Aboukir, where so many thousand men, flying from the battle, perished by drowning. It was with the greatest difficulty, that, rallying the remains of their routed forces around them, and retiring in the best manner they could, the Emperors effected their personal retreat. Only the devoted bravery of the Russians, and the loyalty of the Austrian cavalry, who charged repeatedly to protect the retrograde movement, could have rendered it possible, since the sole passage to the rear lay along a causeway, extending between two lakes. The retreat was, however, accomplished, and the Emperors escaped without sustaining the loss in the pursuit which might have been expected. But in the battle, at least twenty thousand men had remained, killed, wounded, and prisoners; and forty standards, with a great proportion of the hostile artillery, were the trophies of Napoleon, whose army had thus amply redeemed their pledge. It was, however, at a high rate that they had purchased the promised bouquet. Their own ranks had lost probably five thousand men, though the bulletin diminishes the numbers to two thousand five hundred.162