Fotheringham John Knight
The Political History of England – Vol XI
Ferdinand VII. of Spain had fallen so entirely under the influence of his fourth and last queen, Maria Christina of Naples, as to repeal by a pragmatic sanction the Salic law which the treaty of Utrecht had established as the rule of succession in Spain. The result of this edict was to leave the succession to his infant daughter Isabella instead of his brother Don Carlos, the leader of the Spanish absolutists. When Ferdinand died on September 29, 1833, Don Carlos was absent from the kingdom, supporting the cause of his fellow-pretender Dom Miguel. Isabella received the hearty support of the constitutional party and was almost universally acknowledged as queen. It was only in Biscay, where the centralising tendency of the Spanish constitution, published on April 10, 1834, seemed to entrench upon local liberty, that Don Carlos met with much active support. His cause, like that of Miguel in Portugal, was the more popular, but his adherents were as yet almost entirely devoid of organisation. Peter's partisans had already made substantial progress towards a complete victory, and Santha Martha, the Miguelite commander-in-chief, had surrendered in the beginning of April, when on April 22 a triple alliance, already signed between Great Britain, Maria Christina, Queen-regent of Spain, and Peter, as regent of Portugal, was converted into a quadruple alliance by the adhesion of France. This treaty provided for the co-operation of Spain and Portugal to expel Dom Miguel and Don Carlos from the Portuguese dominions. Great Britain was to assist by the employment of a naval force, and France was to render assistance, if required, in such manner as should be settled afterwards by common consent of the four contracting powers. The Spanish general, Rodil, immediately crossed the frontier. He met with no resistance, and on May 26 Miguel signed a convention at Evora, by which he accepted a pension, renounced his rights to the Portuguese throne, and agreed to quit the country.
THE CARLIST WAR.
Don Carlos, however, refused to renounce his rights to the Spanish throne, and all that the British navy could do was to convey the two pretenders, Carlos to England and Miguel to Genoa. Although Miguel, on June 20, repudiated his abdication, the Portuguese question was really at an end. The Spanish question was, however, merely entering on its critical stage. Don Carlos secretly left London on July 1, and nine days later appeared at the Carlist headquarters in Spain. Here he had the assistance of the ablest general of this war, Zumalacarregui. Melbourne's succession to the premiership in July left Palmerston at the foreign office, and was followed by no change in foreign policy. On August 18 an additional article to the quadruple alliance provided that France was to prevent reinforcements or warlike stores from reaching Don Carlos from the French side of the frontier, while Great Britain was to supply arms and stores to the Spanish royalists and, if necessary, intervene with a naval force. The short interlude of conservative government, with Peel as premier and Wellington as foreign secretary, was not marked by any change of policy nor yet by any new aggressions. Wellington's only interference with the course of hostilities was the mission of Lord Eliot to Navarre, which induced the combatants to abandon for the time being those cruelties to prisoners which had been the disgrace of the Spanish civil wars.
Shortly after the return of Melbourne and Palmerston to power, Zumalacarregui won a victory in the valley of Amascoas on April 21 and 22, 1835, which opened to him the road to Madrid. The Madrid government now appealed to France to send 12,000 men to occupy the Basque provinces. By the terms of the quadruple alliance the assent of Great Britain and Portugal was necessary in order to determine the manner in which France was to render assistance. Thiers, on behalf of Louis Philippe, suggested a separate French expedition on the lines of that of 1823. Palmerston, like Canning before him, refused to sanction such an expedition, though he was prepared to allow France to make the expedition on her own responsibility. He suggested in return that Great Britain should intervene. But Louis Philippe was equally opposed to the separate action of his own country and of Great Britain, and the result was that neither government sent any troops. The Spanish government was, however, permitted to enlist volunteers, and actually received the assistance of an English legion, a French legion, and 6,000 Portuguese. The immediate danger was averted by the obstinacy of Don Carlos, who refused to permit Zumalacarregui to march on Madrid till the conquest of Biscay was complete. The Carlist general turned aside in consequence to the siege of Bilbao, in which a few weeks later he met his death.
In February, 1836, some changes in the French ministry increased the power of Thiers, who had so recently advocated the policy of intervention. Palmerston now proposed a French expedition to the Basque provinces, while the British were to occupy St. Sebastian and Pasages. Thiers did not, however, feel strong enough to accept this offer, and Palmerston determined to act alone. A British squadron under Lord John Hay was despatched to the Spanish coast with instructions to assist the royalist forces. This squadron is probably entitled to the principal share in the credit for the successful resistance of Bilbao to the Carlist armies. In May, however, a conservative government entered upon office in Spain, and France became more ready to grant assistance. Isturiz, the new Spanish premier, persuaded Louis Philippe to send some troops to Spain; but by leaning on foreign support Isturiz had overreached himself. Spanish indignation found vent in a revolutionary movement, accompanied by bloodshed; one town after another declared for the constitution of 1812, which the queen-regent was forced to sign on August 13, and on the following day a progressist ministry was installed in office. Austria, Prussia, and Russia withdrew their ambassadors from Madrid after the riots of the 13th, and Louis Philippe recalled the forces he had sent to the assistance of the Spanish government. Had Don Carlos listened to the advice of the eastern powers and given such assurances as might have won over the more moderate of Isabella's supporters, he would probably have proved successful. As it was the war dragged on, but De Lacy Evans, who was in command of the British legion, left Spain on June 10, 1837, and most of his men followed soon after. The question of intervention had, however, put an end to that cordial co-operation of Great Britain and France which had existed ever since the July revolution, and left Great Britain as isolated in the counsels of Europe as she had been when Canning and Wellington dissociated themselves from the other powers at Verona.
The settlement of the Greek question proceeded very slowly. While the powers were seeking a possible king, Capodistrias exercised an autocratic sway as president. However, in the spring of 1831, the Mainots of southern Laconia and the Hydriots revolted against him, and got possession of the Greek fleet. Capodistrias appealed to Russia for assistance, and a Russian squadron was sent to blockade the Greek fleet at Poros. But Miaoulis, the Greek admiral, sank his ships in order to save them from the Russians. The situation was simplified by the assassination of Capodistrias on October 9, which left two rival national assemblies struggling for the mastery. The French troops failed to maintain order, and the way was clear for a king who would have the prestige of an international treaty and an independent revenue to support his position. This was the situation when on February 13, 1832, a protocol was signed at London, offering the Greek crown to Otto, the second son of King Lewis of Bavaria, a boy of seventeen. The boundary was to be fixed where Palmerston, while still a member of the Wellington administration, had wished to fix it, along a line running from the Gulf of Arta to that of Volo. King Lewis would not, however, agree to accept the crown for his son unless he should be granted the title of king, instead of prince, and should be guaranteed a loan to enable him to meet the expenses of his position. On May 7, 1832, the London protocol was embodied in a treaty of London; the crown was definitely conferred on Otto, who was given the title of king, guaranteed a loan, not exceeding £2,400,000, and allowed to take out 3,500 Bavarian troops with him. The Turkish consent to the proposed boundary was given on July 21; Greece accepted the treaty in August, and the new king left for his kingdom in December.137
VICTORIES OF IBRAHIM.
Greece now disappears from the eastern question. But Ibrahim Pasha, whose successes in Greece had induced Canning to interfere, had already disclosed a new phase of that question by successes gained in another quarter. Mehemet Ali had quickly repaired the losses which his fleet and army had sustained in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile he demanded from Sultan Mahmud that Ibrahim should be compensated with a part of Syria for the loss of the Morea, which had been promised him as a reward for his services in Greece. The sultan refused to grant this insolent demand, and Mehemet Ali determined to conquer the province for himself. Abdallah, Pasha of Acre, had taken under his protection some fugitive peasants, and Mehemet Ali, in spite of the sultan's prohibition, sent Ibrahim with an army of 30,000 men against him. He laid siege to Acre on December 9, 1831, and took it on May 27, 1832. On July 8 he routed a Turkish army at Homs; on the 29th he routed a larger army at the pass of Beilan, and on the 31st he entered Antioch. In November he was at Konieh. The Tsar Nicholas had, with Palmerston's approval, already sent Lieutenant-General Muraviov on a mission to Constantinople, offering military and naval support; but the sultan preferred to seek British assistance first.
Unfortunately the message came at a time when the British fleet was preparing to blockade the coasts of the Netherlands, and could not be spared for service In the Mediterranean. An appeal to France was equally unsuccessful. She had by this time formed the siege of the citadel of Antwerp, and was moreover naturally averse from a struggle with Ibrahim, whose army had been organised and trained by French officers. The sultan therefore decided to avail himself of the offers made by Russia. Indeed he had no choice, for the news now came that on December 21 Ibrahim had completely defeated the Turkish general, Reshid, at Konieh and that there was no army between him and Constantinople. Muraviov was sent on a vain mission to Alexandria with authority to cede Acre to Mehemet Ali if he would surrender his fleet to the sultan. Ibrahim advanced to Kiutayeh and his advance-guard came as far as Broussa. The sultan on February 2, 1833, requested the assistance of the Russian navy, and on the 20th a Russian squadron appeared at Constantinople.
The powers that had refused to move to save Turkey from Ibrahim were quick enough to interfere when the danger was from Russia and not from an oriental. Ibrahim might have been expected to make a stronger ruler than the sultan, whose fall seemed imminent. A Russian protectorate was a different matter. Roussin, the French ambassador at Constantinople, protested against the Russian alliance and threatened to leave Constantinople. A French envoy was, at his suggestion, permitted to offer Mehemet the governorship of the Syrian pashaliks of Tripoli and Acre. On March 8 Mehemet rejected these terms, and declared that if his own terms were not accepted within six weeks his troops would march upon Constantinople. The sultan then turned to Russia again and asked for troops. Fifteen thousand Russians were in consequence landed on the shores of the Bosphorus, and in the beginning of April an army of 24,000, which had remained in Moldavia ever since the war of 1828-29, prepared to march southwards. Constantinople at least was thus rendered safe from Ibrahim, and there was therefore more hope that Mehemet would come to terms. The British, French, and Austrian ambassadors spared no effort to induce the Porte to offer terms that might be accepted, and their representations were probably rendered the more persuasive by the appearance of British and French fleets in the Ægean. Roussin especially urged that it was better to surrender Syria than to reconquer it by Russian troops. At last the sultan yielded, and on April 10 a peace was signed at Kiutayeh, though not ratified by the sultan till May 15. This treaty granted to Mehemet Ali Syria and Cilicia, but restored the bulk of Asia Minor to the Porte.
CONFERENCE OF MÜNCHENGRÄTZ.
Turkey had been saved by the western powers, but only because they dreaded the possibility of her being saved by Russia. A few weeks later their worst fears seemed on the point of realisation. The Russian troops on the Bosphorus were a sure guarantee of the predominance of Russian influence at Constantinople, and this was illustrated in a marked degree by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, signed on July 8, which provided for a defensive alliance for eight years between Russia and the Porte. Russia was, when required, to provide the sultan with both military and naval forces, to be provisioned by him, but otherwise maintained by Russia. A secret article, soon made known, provided that Russia would not ask for material aid if at war, but that in that event the Porte would close the Dardanelles to the warships of other nations. Great Britain had already obtained the rights of the most favoured nation, so far as the passage of the Dardanelles was concerned, and therefore maintained that the treaty did not affect her right to pass those straits; and France joined her in presenting identical notes declaring their intention of ignoring the treaty in event of war. British public opinion, already wounded by the conquest of Poland, was even more vehemently affected than British policy. The treaty was regarded as the establishment in Turkey of a Russian protectorate, which it was necessary for Great Britain to destroy, and the antagonism thus produced has lasted to our own day. Matters were not improved when the tsar asked for the cession of the Danubian principalities, which were still occupied by Russia, in return for a remission of the war indemnity owing since 1829. Austria, France, and Great Britain protested against this proposal, and in consequence nothing came of it.
Austria then assumed the rôle of mediator. A friendly request for explanation elicited a declaration from Russia, disclaiming all intention of self-aggrandisement, and promising to accept the mediation of Austria in any case where the treaty could be invoked. Austria in consequence endeavoured to persuade the western powers that there was no immediate danger, and that she would use her mediation to remove any danger that might arise. Meanwhile she endeavoured to allay distrust of Russia by inducing that power to evacuate the Danubian principalities. But before this result could be accomplished the negotiations between Austria and Russia had taken a turn which gave Austria, in English eyes, the appearance of an accomplice rather than of a mediator. The revolutionary movements of 1830 and following years had produced grave apprehensions in the minds of the rulers of the three eastern powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and the coercion of Holland and Portugal caused them to feel a deep distrust of the policy of Great Britain and France, and to grasp the necessity of united action against the revolutionary forces at work in Europe. For this purpose it was considered necessary to revive Metternich's policy of 1820 as defined at Troppau. The three powers had for some time been drawing together, and in September, 1833, the Emperors Francis and Nicholas and the Crown Prince of Prussia met at Münchengrätz in Bohemia, where a secret convention was signed on the 18th. They refused to recognise Isabella as Queen of Spain in the event of Ferdinand's death; they arranged for mutual assistance against the Poles; and agreed to combine to resist any change of dynasty in Turkey and any extension of Arab rule into Europe. In the event of a collapse of the Ottoman empire, Austria and Russia were to act together in settling the reversion. On October 15 the three powers signed a further convention at Berlin, containing one public and two secret articles. The latter recognised the right, already asserted at Troppau, of intervention in the internal affairs of a country whose sovereign expressed a desire for foreign assistance. There can be little doubt that Austria and Russia were in earnest in their professed desire to maintain the integrity of the Turkish dominions, but an opinion gained ground in England that they had already agreed to partition them between themselves.
On January 29, 1834, Austrian mediation bore fruit in a definite treaty for the evacuation of the Danubian principalities. Russia merely reserved to herself the appointment of the first hospodar of each principality. The first act, however, of Alexander Ghika, the new hospodar of Wallachia, was to forbid any change of statute without the consent of Russia. Silistria alone remained in Russian hands till a third part of the indemnity should be paid. The remaining two-thirds Russia consented to abandon. A revolt among the Syrian mountaineers gave Russia an opportunity of demonstrating her pacific intentions. The sultan supported the revolt and also sent troops to conquer Urfa which Ibrahim had neglected to surrender. Russia, however, refused to support the sultan in an aggressive war, and the powers negotiated a peace. The Syrian revolt was quelled, and Urfa surrendered to the sultan. In 1835 the Tsar Nicholas and the new Austrian emperor, Ferdinand, met at Teplitz where they renewed the agreements concluded at Münchengrätz. Metternich proposed a conference at Vienna to settle the eastern question, but the tsar, who really possessed the decisive voice so long as the question remained open, refused to hear of this. Finally in September, 1836, the Russian evacuation of Silistria was obtained by a payment of 30,000,000 piastres, borrowed, for the most part, in England. The Eastern question now seemed to have entered upon a quieter phase, and the military reforms which European officers, including Moltke, afterwards famous in a different region, were carrying out in Turkey, gave promise that she might be able to hold her own in future against domestic foes.
CHAPTER XIX.
BRITISH INDIA
When Pitt resigned office in 1801, the Marquis Wellesley had already reached the climax, though by no means the close, of his brilliant proconsulate. This remarkable man, whose fame has been unduly eclipsed by that of his younger brother, may justly be considered the second founder of our Indian Empire. This empire, recognised at last, in the vote of thanks passed by the house of commons on the fall of Seringapatam, was soon to be aggrandised by three important accessions of dominion. The first of these was the annexation of the Karnátik on the well-founded plea that its nabob was too weak even for the semblance of independence, that he was incapable of governing tolerably, and that he had been in correspondence with Tipú. The effect of this and two minor annexations was to place the entire south-western and south-eastern coasts of the Indian peninsula under the British rule. The next step was the system of subsidiary treaties, whereby the British government assumed a protectorate over native states, providing a fixed number of troops for their defence and receiving an equivalent in subsidies. The Nizám of Haidarábád was already in a condition little removed from vassalage, and now surrendered considerable districts in lieu of a pecuniary tribute.
A similar course was taken with the Nawáb Wazír of Oudh whose territory was threatened on one side by the Afghán king, Zemán Sháh, and on another by the Maráthá lord, Daulat Ráo Sindhia, who had gained possession of Delhi. By forcible negotiations Wellesley obtained from him the cession of all his frontier provinces, including Rohilkhand, and consolidated the power of the Indian government along the whole line of the Jumna and Ganges. The last and greatest object of the governor-general's ambition was the conquest of the confederate Maráthá states, and for this a pretext was not long wanting. His forward policy, it is true, had already excited alarm and criticism at home, while the peace of Amiens had ostensibly removed the chief justification of it – the necessity of combating the aggressive designs of France. But, in the case of India, far more than of the American colonies, "months passed and seas rolled between the order and the execution"; for in those days ships conveying despatches occupied at least four or five months on their voyage, and decisions taken in Leadenhall Street might be utterly stultified by accomplished facts before they could be read in Calcutta.
WELLESLEY AND LAKE.
The Peshwá, at Poona, still maintained a show of independent authority over the other great Maráthá chieftains, Sindhia, Holkar, and the Rájá of Nágpur or Berár. But the real military power of the Maráthás rested with these leaders, and their predatory troops of horsemen terrorised all Central India. Happily for Wellesley's purpose, they were often at feud with each other, and the Peshwá, though aided by Sindhia, was utterly defeated by Jaswant Ráo Holkar. He fled to Bassein near Bombay, where, on December 31, 1802, a treaty was signed by which not only the Peshwá but the Nizám of Haidarábád was placed under British protection. The Peshwá was conducted back to Poona by a British force under Arthur Wellesley in May, 1803, but the other Maráthá chiefs naturally resented this fresh encroachment on their independence, and a league was shortly formed between the Rájá of Nágpur and Sindhia, which it was hoped that Holkar would ultimately join. By this time, a rupture of the peace with France was known to be impending, and Lord Wellesley eagerly seized the opportunity to crush Sindhia, while he urged the home government to seize the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius. Two expeditions were directed against Sindhia's territory, the one under Arthur Wellesley, moving from Poona in the west towards the Nizám's frontier; the other, under General Lake, operating on the north-west against the highly trained forces, under French officers, assembled before Delhi. Both campaigns were eminently successful. Wellesley captured Ahmadnagar on August 11, encountered the combined armies of Sindhia and the Rájá of Nágpur at Assaye on September 23, and, after a desperate conflict, obtained a decisive victory. Twelve hundred of the Maráthás were left dead on the field and 102 guns were captured. He then advanced into Berár and completely defeated the army of the Nágpur Rájá at Argáum. Lake marched from Cawnpur, took Delhi and Agra, assuming custody of the Mughal emperor, and inflicted a final defeat on a powerful Maráthá army, no longer under French officers, at Laswári. Large cessions of territory followed. The treaty of Bassein was recognised by Sindhia and the Rájá of Nágpur. Gujrát, Cuttack, and the districts along the Jumna passed into British possession, and the East India Company became the visible successor, though nominally the guardian, of the Mughal emperor.
Meanwhile, Holkar remained a passive spectator of the contest. Jealous as he was of Sindhia, he was by no means prepared to acquiesce in the subjection of the great Maráthá power. Having taken up a threatening position in Rájputána, and defied Lake's summons to retire, he was treated as an enemy, and proved a very formidable enemy. Instead of relying, like Sindhia, on disciplined battalions, he fell back on the old Maráthá tactics, and swept the country with hordes of irregular cavalry who lived by pillage. In 1804 a British force of 1,200 troops under Colonel Monson was lured away from its base of supplies by a feigned retreat and incurred a very serious reverse; scarcely a tenth of them, utterly broken, "straggled, a mere rabble, into Agra". This disaster was soon afterwards retrieved by other divisions of Lake's army, but three attempts to storm the strong fortress of Bhartpur were repulsed by the rájá, Ranjít Singh, an ally of Holkar. Though Holkar's bands were at last dispersed, a new dispute arose with Sindhia about the ownership of Gwalior and Gohad, which remained unsettled when Lord Wellesley resigned early in 1805, not so much because his policy was disapproved by the court of directors, for whom he always professed a sovereign contempt, as because he was no longer cordially supported by the home government.
In his despatch to the secret committee of the East India Company after the conclusion of the war with Sindhia, Wellesley describes the consolidation of the British empire and the pacification of all India, as the supreme result of his beneficent rule.138 That rule was followed by ten years of comparative repose, if not of reaction, but two events, occurring within this period, threw a significant light on the inherent danger of relying too much on a native army under British officers. Sepoy regiments had been raised and had served loyally on both sides in the struggles between the French and English during the eighteenth century. The Bengal sepoys were mostly Rájputs and showed the highest military qualities in many a wearisome march and hard fought field, from the days of Clive to those of Lake and Arthur Wellesley. But outbreaks bordering upon mutiny had occasionally taken place in the native armies of all the presidencies, and on July 10, 1806, a most formidable mutiny, ending in a massacre at Vellore, west of Madras, produced a sense of insecurity throughout all India. It was instigated by the family of Tipú who had been quartered in that fortress, and its immediate origin was the issue of certain vexatious regulations about uniform which offended native prejudices of caste. The European force, numbering some 370, was surprised and surrounded by a much larger body of sepoys, half of them were killed or wounded, and Tipú's standard was hoisted. Within a few hours, however, cavalry and artillery arrived from Arcot, the mutineers were slaughtered by hundreds, and the disaffected regiments were broken up. Three years later, a serious mutiny broke out among the company's own officers at Madras, caused by a petty grievance affecting their profits on tent-contracts. It was appeased rather than suppressed, and, notwithstanding these discouraging symptoms of insecurity, the Company's army retained its separate organisation for half a century longer.
MINTO'S PACIFIC POLICY.
Lord Cornwallis, the successor of Lord Wellesley, was opposed by conviction to a progressive expansion of British territory, and represented not only the cautious views of the home government, but the financial anxieties of the East India Company, which always valued a steady revenue more highly than imperial supremacy. Wellesley had virtually reconstructed the map of India on lines destined to endure until a fresh period of annexation set in some forty years later. These lines were not disturbed by Cornwallis, who died on October 5, 1805, three months after his arrival, but he clearly indicated his desire to let the system of protectorates and subsidiary treaties fall gradually into abeyance. His correspondence with Lake, whose victories had won him the rank of baron, contains a somewhat peremptory warning against fresh engagements contemplated by that enterprising officer, whose vigorous remonstrance he did not live to receive.139 Sir George Barlow, who became acting governor-general for two years, adopted the same passive attitude, and forebore to carry out a projected alliance with Sindhia, though he would not allow any interference with our paramount influence at Poona and Haidarábád. Lord Minto, father of the Earl of Minto who presided at the admiralty under Melbourne, arrived as governor-general in 1807. He was imbued with similar ideas, and was fortunate in finding the Maráthás too much weakened to be dangerous neighbours. His rule was, therefore, essentially pacific, but he did good service in maintaining internal order, and especially in putting down the organised brigandage, known as "dakáiti," which had been the curse of rural districts. The distinctive feature of his career, however, was a permanent enlargement of the horizon of Indian statesmanship to a sphere beyond the confines of India and even of Asia, a change due to new movements in the vast international conflict then engrossing the energies of Europe.
However chimerical the designs of Napoleon against British India may now appear, there is no doubt that such designs were seriously entertained by him, nor is it self-evident that what Alexander the Great found possible would have proved impossible to one who combined with Alexander's superhuman audacity the command of resources beyond anything known in the ancient world. At all events, after the battle of Friedland and the peace of Tilsit, an expedition to be launched from Russian territory upon the north-west frontier of India, with the support of Persia on the flank, became a contingency which an Indian governor-general could not afford to neglect. It is, indeed, strange that a march across Europe and half of Asia should have appeared to Napoleon more practicable than a voyage across the English Channel, and it is highly improbable that he would have cherished the idea of it, if he could have foreseen the perils of the Russian expedition. But his conversations at St. Helena prove that it was not a mere vision but a half-formed design, and, even after it had been discouraged by Russia, he sent a preliminary mission to Persia. Minto lost no time in sending counter-missions, not only to Tihran, but to Lahore, Afghánistán, and Sind.